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Abstract 
In 1979 Britain committed almost 120,000 ground troops and almost the entire Royal Navy 
and Royal Air Force to NATO’s defence of Western Europe. 100,000 troops were assigned to 
Home Defence, and Britain would acts as a staging post for foreign troops on their way to 
the front. Did Britain really have the means to mobilise, transport and supply these forces, 
and defend itself, in the event of war? 
This is an analysis of the conventional defence planning of the UK, its relationship to the 
policy, and their possible and actual execution. 
Deterrent plans were aimed at the perceived threat: planning for the manifestation of that 
threat, and implementing those plans, is analysed in detail. These plans relate intimately to 
NATO's "Flexible Response" strategy and the desire to raise the nuclear threshold enabling 
NATO to stop a WTO attack by conventional means. Analysing the plans for mobilisation, 
and comparing them to the forces and facilities available, this thesis seeks to understand if 
the UK fulfilled its obligation, not only to NATO, but also to the Armed Forces and British 
public.  
Following the end of the Cold War, the idea the ‘teeth’ could be sharpened at the expense 
of the ‘tail’ persisted, and has now grown to dangerous proportions. Pursuing the 
‘efficiency’ thread the Armed Forces have been cut to the smallest level for 100 years, yet 
asked to do more. There is a large group, both military and political, who believe the policy 
worked and caused the fall of the Soviet Union. This thinking persists in policy even after the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. With the increasing tensions in Eastern Europe and the Pacific, 
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and the British Armed Forces at their smallest for over a century, this post hoc analysis is 
dangerous.   
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
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The overall defensive concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is to preserve peace 
and to provide for the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area primarily by a credible 
deterrence, effected by confronting any possible, threatened or actual aggression, ranging 
from covert operations to all-out nuclear war, with adequate NATO forces. They must be 
organised, disposed, trained and equipped so that the Warsaw Pact will conclude that if 
they launched an armed attack the chances of a favourable decision to them are too small 
to be acceptable, and that fatal risks could be involved. 
MC14/3 Enclosure I – Overall Strategic Concept For The Defense Of The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Area 
16th January 1968 
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The Research 
This thesis endeavours to answer the fundamental question: was British defence strategy 
and planning adequate in light of the role Britain had in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) between 1979 and 1985? It analyses the paradox between the public 
face of defence policy and the practice. In 1982, 3 Commando Brigade went to the Falklands 
without vitally important personnel. Because of the speed with which the Falklands crisis 
developed these personnel were unable to be mobilised in time.1 Would the same have 
occurred in a crisis which developed in Europe? The research seeks to answer this question 
by analysing the link between policy, planning and execution, the pressures on those 
elements, and presents some considerations for current policy.  
Using the contemporary operational and strategic plans, this research compares the military 
commitments of the period with the tools available for execution. It analyses the 
conventional defence and deterrence aspects of British Defence planning between 1979 and 
1985. The research also seeks to clarify the difference between policy as laid down in 
various White Papers and other documents, and its execution.  
With NATO’s adoption of a new strategy in 1967 in document MC 14/3,2  commonly known 
as Flexible Response, was Britain fully committed to the demands placed upon it? The thesis 
looks at the key areas of strategy – ends, ways, means and assumptions – and analyses 
whether the ends were achievable with the ways and means provided and available.  
The research is approached such that the ‘ends’ are described by the political objectives set 
by NATO and the British Government.3 The strategy is encapsulated in MC14/3 and the 
Government Defence White Papers. The ‘ways’ are how the ends were to be achieved. This 
                                                     
1 Colonel IJ Hellberg, ‘An Experience with the Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines’, in The Falklands Conflict 
Twenty Years on: Lessons for the Future, Sandhurst Conference Series (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005), 111. 
2 ‘A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area’, 16 January 1968, MC 14/3, NATO. 
3 The headings and interpretation of Ends, Ways, Means and Assumptions are taken from Colin S. Gray, The Future of 
Strategy (Malden, MA: Polity, 2015), 109. These heading and the definitions below were also subject to discussion 
between myself and Professor Gray. 
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is demonstrated in NATO document MC48/34 and the British Government War Book (GWB). 
It also includes the actions of the Transition to War Committee (TWC) and other planning 
documents. The ‘means’ includes the employment of military force to achieve the strategy 
objectives. This includes the MoD War Book, deployment plans, and operational and tactical 
doctrine to be employed in times of war. The use of military forces to support civilian 
organisations (for example Military Aid to the Civil Ministry (MACM)). It also involves the 
employment of civilian personnel, organisations, infrastructure and equipment to support 
military actions or to protect against attack. Finally, ‘assumptions’ are those views which are 
held to make the policy and strategy valid, such as the assumption of long warning periods 
during a crisis. These include assumptions about the intent of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation as well as its capability. 
Some academics and analysts5 suggested that the size of the NATO forces in Europe would 
be sufficient to stop an attack from the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO),6 even given the 
assumed WTO preponderance in troops, ships and aircraft. Using British Defence planning 
as its basis, and the British Armed Forces as the example, this thesis directly questions that 
conclusion. Described as the “… main ally of the Main Adversary …”7 by the Soviet Union, 
Britain’s contribution to NATO was crucial. Not only did Britain contribute more than any 
other country in terms of percentage of Gross Domestic Product other than the USA (some 
4.9% in 1979 – 1980) but the country played a role as a political and physical link between 
the USA and Canada and the continental Europeans. Britain’s strategic location was vital in 
NATO’s maritime strategy, as well as being the main reinforcement base for the permanent 
                                                     
4 ‘Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area’, 8 December 1969, MC 48/3, NATO. 
5 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe’, International Security 7, no. 1 (1982): 3–39; 
Robert W. Komer, ‘What “Decade of Neglect”?’, International Security 10, no. 2 (1985): 70–83; Malcolm Chalmers and 
Lutz Unterseher, ‘Is There a Tank Gap?: Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets’, International Security 13, no. 1 
(1988): 5–49; Hew Strachan, ‘Conventional Defence in Europe’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International 
Affairs 1944-) 61, no. 1 (1984): 27–43; Geoffrey Coyle, ‘A Model of the Dynamics of the Third World War – An Exercise in 
Technology Transfer’, The Journal of the Operational Research Society 32, no. 9 (1981): 755–65. 
6 The Warsaw Treaty Organisation of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was formed in 1955. This is also often 
referred to as The Warsaw Pact, or WP. It consisted of People’s Republic of Albania (withdrew in 1968), People’s Republic 
of Bulgaria, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, German Democratic Republic, Hungarian People’s Republic, Polish People’s 
Republic, Romanian People’s Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.  
7 Christopher M Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files from the KGB’s Foreign 
Operations, 1975-85 (Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), 118. 
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presence on mainland Europe.8 The balance of the forces in the British Armed Forces were 
formidable, and very capable, but it is impossible to say in any but the broadest terms what 
might have happened in the event of a war (a ‘counter-factual World War Three’, if you 
will).  
The ideal contribution and commitment to NATO strategy by a member state was defined 
partly through Force Proposals put forward by the NATO Military Committee, and partly by 
the national government within the overall strategy defined by NATO. (See Appendix A, 
Figure 1 - NATO Force planning cycle) In Britain, the Government set out the defence 
spending each year as part of the budget process, and within this fell the NATO 
contribution. Throughout the Cold War, the British Government had restated the 
commitment to collective defence, and always emphasised the benefits not only to the 
population of Britain, but to the population of Europe: “Our aim is to maintain deterrence … 
for our allies as well as ourselves.”9   
What does this research cover? 
This research aims to identify what Britain, through its defence policy and membership of 
NATO, committed to provide. Troops, weapons, equipment, supplies, services, transport, 
storage and infrastructure facilities were all included in the event of war in Europe. An 
important part of this research is to discover clearly what the scale of the commitment was 
and whether it was achieved, achievable or realistic.  The British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) 
and the European commitment are not the main focus of the research, but it includes 
analysis of the UK Air and Maritime roles, mobilisation and reinforcement of NATO-
committed and home defence forces, and the continuing need to supply the Armed Forces 
in times of war.  
Using Professor John Gaddis’ ‘principle of diminishing relevance’10  the outline of the period 
of research is between 1975 and 1991, but focusses on the developments between 1979 
and 1985. Analysing the 1981 Defence Review, for example, without understanding the 
                                                     
8 Appendix A, ‘Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area’, para. 19, MC 48/3, NATO. 
9 Ministry of Defence, ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1980’, Cmnd 7826 (London: HMSO, 1980), 2. 
10 John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), 96. 
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previous reviews and other actions that have consequences for defence would be 
meaningless.  
This thesis is not a history of Britain’s Cold War defence policy nor an analysis of British 
military tactics or the capabilities of particular weapons. It does not analyse nuclear strategy 
or policy nor is it a story about what would have happened if the WTO had attacked NATO. 
Although important, the nuclear weapons in the British arsenal are not a direct part of this 
study, but they do feature, of necessity, indirectly. Nor is it intended to define or debate 
who or what was being defended in the philosophical context.11 There will be, however, 
reference to all these subjects as they impinge on the core material. This research is not 
intended to state whether a particular defence policy is either ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in absolute 
terms. Specifically, the thesis does not attempt to endorse or reject the different policies 
adopted by NATO, such as MC 14/3. This thesis considers NATO’s and Britain’s assessment 
of the WTO threat and analyses its planning for the execution of NATO strategy.  
The research focusses on a limited number of aspects of the strategy, including, but not 
restricted to, planning, force levels, readiness and reserves. These core subjects were 
chosen because of the persisting deficiencies in these areas which NATO had attempted to 
address in several remedial projects, such as the Long Term Defence Programme (LTDP) 
evaluated below.12 The geographical extent of the commitment will be considered as Britain 
was the main rear-area for reinforcement and resupply to Europe in times of crisis and war. 
Britain’s ability to mobilise and supply forces for Home Defence, including United Kingdom 
Land Forces (UKLF), the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy (RN) will be studied in 
conjunction with the demands of the European commitment and Britain’s commitment to 
the United States/United Kingdom Lines of Communication agreement (USUKLOC). 
The threat, as perceived by NATO and the British Government, is analysed through NATO, 
Ministry of Defence and Government papers, as this perception is what subsequent policy 
was based upon. The research looks separately at what the NATO Alliance thought were 
                                                     
11 Dan Smith, The Defence of the Realm in the 1980s (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 21. 
12 James Wendt and Nanette Brown, ‘Improving the NATO Force Planning Process: Lessons from the Past’ (RAND, June 
1986), 2; ‘The Study of Alliance Defence Problems for the 1970s’, 1970, AD-70, NATO; ‘NATO Long Term Defence 
Planning’, 1981, FCO 46/2586, TNA; ‘NATO Short Term Initiatives’ (MOD, 1978), DEFE 11/811, TNA. 
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WTO and Soviet intentions, such as ‘blitzkrieg’ and ‘smash-and-grab’ tactics in Europe, as 
well as the assessment of WTO capabilities. This research investigates the plans for 
mobilisation, deployment and employment of troops into Europe as well as the UK in 
response to the assessed threat. This research will critically review the plans in place for 
mobilising, transporting, supplying and reinforcing units in Europe. This research focusses on 
the stages of a crisis or war defined by the United Kingdom Commanders-in-Chief 
Committee (Home) (UKCICC(H)) as the Preparatory Phase and the Pre-Strike Phase, which 
includes the Conventional Period.13 The research will cover the crisis, transition to war and 
war plans of NATO and the British Government. The plans will be compared with the 
commitment Britain made to NATO, and the real-world ability of Britain’s Government to 
fulfil those commitments.  
The Cold War was a period of relative stability: NATO knew who its main foe was; it knew 
where its foe was and had a reasonably good idea of the foe’s capabilities, both 
conventional and nuclear.14 Despite Professor Gray’s warning that one cannot predict the 
future,15 the last decades of the Cold War were probably the closest thing to stability for 
which a defence planner could hope. Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism proposed that the 
bipolarity of the Cold War was inherently stable compared to multipolar systems.16 Michael 
Quinlan wrote, “A confrontational bipolar world was, in a perverse way, distinctly 
convenient for security policy …”17 Thus, defence policy could be clearly focussed, as 
General Julian Thompson notes, on, “… the likely enemy’s potential to wage war, dealing in 
capabilities and possibilities.”18 Although Waltz considered that the bipolar world would 
continue indefinitely, by the beginning of the 1990s it was disappearing.19 This research may 
                                                     
13 DS12/54/35, Revised Glossary of terms for Military Home Defence Planning, 17th February 1975, Annex A ‘Home 
Defence and Security of UK Base: Home Defence Organisation; Command and Control of Home Defence Forces, Pre-
Strike Phase’, n.d., DEFE 11/879, TNA. 
14 Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), 14. 
15 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Phoenix, 2006), 37–38. 
16 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Stability of a Bipolar World’, Daedalus 93, no. 3 (1964): 881–909. 
17 Michael Quinlan, ‘The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Policy for Western Possessors’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-) 69, no. 3 (1993): 485. 
18 Major General Julian Thompson, Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict (London: Brassey’s, 1994), 298. 
19 Gaddis, The Landscape of History, 67. 
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have implications for current defence policy. In a time where the threat was relatively 
stable, analysing the way policy was created, met and fulfilled might provide guidance as to 
what to do in a period of greater instability, when there is no longer a clear idea of the 
identity of the foe, their location or capabilities. 
Methodology 
The methodology used in this research is based on quantitative and qualitative analysis and 
Operational Analysis, which for the purposes of this research is defined as the study of 
systems which fulfil tasks with the aim of identifying and analysing their tasks and 
structures, suitability for those tasks, their failures and successes. Systems can be viewed in 
several ways: the organisational structure of a military unit is a system intended to achieve a 
task. Weapon systems are a different type of system, but ones that can be measured in the 
same way: does it succeed in achieving its task, whatever that task is? A similar approach 
was used by the Defence Operational Analysis Establishment (DOAE),20 part of the MoD’s 
research branch.  
The planning documents in The National Archives (TNA) used in this research were never 
intended for public scrutiny, and are the plans the British Government would have used in 
the event of a crisis in Western Europe which then escalated into conventional war. A great 
deal of time was spent creating and keeping those plans up-to-date. In addition, in the event 
of a WTO invasion of Western Europe, all British Government statements and planning 
indicate it would have pursued its stated policy in keeping with Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty.21 NATO would have initially sought to stop a WTO conventional invasion 
with conventional arms in accordance with NATO strategy. Following on from Soviet 
unilateral declarations regarding no first use of nuclear weapons, the assumption is that the 
WTO would not have attacked NATO with a nuclear first-strike. The detailed reasons for 
these assumptions are explained in the relevant chapters below.  
                                                     
20 Ministry of Defence, ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1981’, Cmnd 8212-1 (London: HMSO, April 1981), 50. 
21 Article 5 states, ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against them all ...’ ‘The North Atlantic Treaty’, 4 April 1949, NATO. 
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With any research into past plans, one must take care not to exceed the knowledge of the 
time. There was little first-hand knowledge of WTO capabilities, but contemporary 
assessments have been used where available. Hindsight can give a clear view of both sides 
of an event that was not available to decision makers of the time.22 This research is 
conducted using British Government and NATO analyses and assessments of the threat 
posed by the Soviet Union to NATO generally and Britain in particular. These assessments 
were used to prepare plans for countering the threat, as well as developing strategic and 
operational doctrine.23 The fundamental comparison must be between the outcome of the 
threat assessment, and the methods identified as being required to counter it.24 
This research compares the forces provided by the UK with the NATO proposals and goals. 
These are often posed in clear, numeric terms, in the NATO Force Proposals, allowing direct 
comparison. This represents the basic level of assessment between NATO Force Proposals 
and MoD contribution. Next is the qualitative comparison; were those forces allocated of 
the correct quality? Once these analyses have been completed there will be an operational 
analysis, which looks at whether the overall force proposed by the MoD was capable of 
being employed operationally as required by NATO. This broadly looks at the speed of 
mobilisation and the sustainability of the forces. In the context of this thesis, sustainability is 
the ability to continue, for an extended period without interruption, a posture of defence or 
warfighting against an enemy. This would include the period before the outbreak of 
hostilities, whilst sustaining forces in readiness. 
This thesis is not attempting to present a new hypothesis; rather it is intended to answer the 
question set above. The philosophy advocated by Professor John Tukey has strongly 
influenced the approach taken in this thesis: “Far better an approximate answer to the right 
question, which is often vague, than an exact answer to the wrong question, which can 
always be made precise.”25 It would be possible to theorise that, ‘Britain was not capable of 
                                                     
22 See Professor Gray’s caution about predicting the future in defence analysis in Gray, Another Bloody Century, chap. 1, 
Perils of Prediction. . 
23 For example, see ‘Maritime Force Structure and the Determinant Case’, April 1975, ADM 219/704, TNA; ‘The Soviet 
Threat to the Shipment of Vital Supplies to Western Europe. MoD Chiefs of Staff Committee’, 1973, DEFE 5/195/8, TNA. 
24 A prime example would be ‘1(BR) Corps Battle Notes’ (BAOR HQ, 1981). 
25 Sharon Bertsch McGrayne, The Theory That Would Not Die (New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press, 2011), 169. 
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fulfilling its policy and obligations to NATO’ but in the researcher’s opinion this angle of 
questioning is biased. It would be possible to frame an argument thus; ‘Why was Britain 
unable to fulfil its obligation to NATO?’ but before the research was undertaken there was 
no certainty.  
The objective of this research is not only to establish if Britain could have fulfilled its 
obligations, but to examine the other ways in which different pressures shaped defence 
policy. The questions around defence policy appeared to transform from, ‘What do we 
need?’ to, ‘How little can we get away with?’26 This has direct, and possibly contentious, 
implications for current defence planning in a political, economic and military environment 
that does not have the apparent stability and predictability of the Cold War. Current 
thinking and policy echoes, even perpetuates the myth that the forces are strengthened and 
made more efficient and effective by cutting the supporting forces to provide for the 
combat troops.27  
The research is not intended to criticise, support or demonise any particular strategy, but to 
indicate where a strategy’s demands or planning was inadequate. The intention is to 
establish a framework by which, with historical understanding, the effects of alliance 
membership, budget setting and political policy can be seen to act upon Britain’s ability to 
work in alliance with other countries to achieve a goal. The approach used in this thesis can 
also be used to answer whether the same type of analysis can be found in today’s defence 
policy. If one puts aside the idea of confirming a particular theory, this work benefits from 
Professor Winton’s advice that the analysis, “… should connect the subject with other 
relevant subjects, and possibly anticipate future behaviour.”28 Even though there is no 
defined theory in this case, this thesis examines the inconsistencies between the 
presentation and planning of defence policy and preparation for war.  
                                                     
26 Colin S. Gray, ‘Strategy and Defence Planning’, in Strategy in the Contemporary World., 5th ed. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 162–63. 
27 For example, see HM Government, ‘Transforming the British Army: An Update - July 2013’ (The Army, July 2013); John 
Dowdy, ‘More Tooth, Less Tail’, RUSI, 23 June 2010, https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-defence-systems/more-tooth-less-
tail. 
28 Quoted in Gray, The Future of Strategy, 61. 
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This research is not intended to be comparative; that is it does not compare directly 
Britain’s NATO commitment with that of other NATO members. However, some comparison 
is used where it is directly relevant to illustrate a particular point. Also, the objective of the 
research is not to infer or discover an overall causality, but to identify political and military 
understanding, capability and intent. The purpose of this research is to identify and analyse 
the broad as well as detailed commitments Britain made to NATO. NATO produced Force 
Proposals on a regular basis that defined exactly what was required and by when. The NATO 
Force Proposals provide data concerning the equipment, materiel and personnel that NATO 
requested Britain to provide. These documents, and the supporting British Government 
documents, define what the commitment was, in functional as well as quantitative and 
qualitative terms. It is then possible, using Ministry of Defence documents, to compare the 
capabilities and forces available against the NATO Force Proposals.  
The research will analyse particular aspects of defence policy that can be quantified directly; 
as described above, the provision of naval vessels committed to NATO’s Eastern Atlantic 
command in the event of a war, and compare the actual available naval vessels and their 
capabilities with the NATO requirement. Such comparisons can be applied to a variety of 
circumstances from tanks to hospital beds to ammunition reserves. Where quantitative and 
qualitative overlap in these circumstances, ‘Military Judgement’ can be used from 
contemporary MoD documents.29 The armed forces provided minimum capability levels for 
units depending on their role in NATO or home defence, and the units were measured in 
terms of personnel and equipment levels, level of readiness and training. The contribution is 
often of a different type to that specified by NATO and therefore a direct numerical 
comparison is difficult. One must make a judgement as to whether the function being 
demanded by NATO was fulfilled by the alternative supplied by the MoD. It can be difficult 
to obtain qualitative comparisons between what was expected of Britain and what was 
actually delivered.  Do five Challenger tanks equate to eight Chieftain Tanks? Judgement is 
required in these circumstances to decide the qualitative value of the contribution. The 
logistical aspect must also be taken into account, and is very often forgotten.  If the logistical 
                                                     
29 ‘Military Judgement’ is used with analytical models to account for the less easily quantified elements in an analysis. 
‘Ammunition Rates and Scales: Comparison of Review of Ammunition Rates and Scales (RARS) Stage 2 and DOAE Study 
236’, 1977, 6, DEFE 48/1030, TNA. 
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support is cut, how will that affect the resupply, reinforcement and war fighting capabilities 
of the armed forces? The War Reserve of supplies would be useless to the fighting forces if 
it were not distributed, rendering them less effective.  
The debate about the meaning of ‘security’ and ‘defence’ and how these terms relate to the 
creation and implementation of government policy30 bears directly on this thesis. NATO 
objectives were defined in the series of documents on the strategic concept for the Alliance 
(MC14/3 and MC48/3), which declared that it is to, “… safeguard NATO territories and 
populations and to preserve the free use of sea and airspace … The overall military objective 
of the Alliance is to prevent war by creating an effective deterrent to all forms of aggression 
… ”31 and, “…to preserve or restore the integrity and security of the North  Atlantic Treaty 
Area …”32 Accordingly, for the purposes of this thesis ‘security’ is defined as the 
continuation of the existing political and economic regime for Western countries, or its 
restoration after external aggression; ‘defence’ is the means by which security is protected 
or reinstated, usually but not exclusively the use of military force. 
The thesis includes several subject areas. The research works from an interdisciplinary 
standpoint, integrating the military, political, economic and social characteristics of the 
time. Not only will the capability of the military forces be investigated, but also the political 
will to make unpopular and financially costly decisions, and the overall effect of policy 
within collective defence. Balance-of-power theory, or balance-of-threat, indicated that 
NATO should have varied its forces levels in line with the perceived threat from the WTO.33 
Balance-of-power theory considers the distribution of power in the international system, 
and its effects.34 There is also a case to be made for use of the economics-based Alliance 
                                                     
30 For example, John Baylis, ed., Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies (London: C. Helm, 1975); Noam Chomsky, 
How the World Works (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2012); Elinor C. Sloan, Modern Military Strategy: An Introduction 
(London ; New York: Routledge, 2012). 
31 ‘A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area’, MC 14/3, NATO. 
32 ‘Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area’, 3, MC 48/3, NATO. 
33 John S. Duffield, ‘International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels’, International 
Organization 46, no. 4 (1992): 820. 
34 Kenneth Neal Waltz, ed., Theory of International Politics, Reissued (Long Grove, Ill: Waveland Press, 2010), chap. 6. 
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Theory to explain some of the policies adopted by Britain during the period. 35 Alliance 
Theory uses a comparative analysis of two or more countries within an alliance, and the 
structure of the analysis can be used to establish levels of defence spending in the alliance 
within a standardised framework. Although this research is not directly comparative 
between states within NATO, it is useful to understand, at least in outline, the spending 
patterns of other NATO members, and the research will provide specific instances of 
comparison to establish baseline measures. Alliance Theory tells us that, in military alliances 
like NATO, larger countries will have a disproportionate share of the costs of defence to the 
smaller countries. It uses a methodology which measures such variables as GDP, defence 
spending and population size. Benefits deriving from the common defence are also analysed 
in terms of the ‘good’ provided to the populations involved. This can be employment, 
national and local income from arms sales and foreign investment, or spin-offs from military 
production that find their way into consumer products. Included in the analysis is an 
evaluation of the convergence of purpose in an alliance, which is proposed to have direct 
effect on the sharing of burdens within the alliance (the stronger the convergence, the 
greater the disproportion of burden sharing.)  
It is axiomatic that research such as this cannot be undertaken without a long view of the 
history of British defence and foreign policy, that to understand the present and prepare for 
the future the study of history is vital.36 Britain had, for the previous 200 or more years, 
concentrated much of her foreign and military policy on maintaining a balance of power in 
continental Europe. This allowed her to focus on Imperial expansion, and latterly on 
securing trade-routes and supply. Membership of NATO, and the efforts put into that 
membership must be seen in context, otherwise certain events and policies will be 
misunderstood. Professor Gray reminds us: “It is poor history that leads people to invent 
allegedly great discontinuities … A mind without stores of historical past will fail to see 
patterns …”37 Using an historically informed appreciation of the broader events of the time, 
                                                     
35 Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, ‘An Economic Theory of Alliances’, RM-4297-ISA (RAND Corporation, October 
1966). 
36 John E. Jessup and Robert W. Coakley, A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History (Centre of Military History, 1979), 
xi; Gray, Another Bloody Century, 45. 
37 Colin S. Gray and Jeannie Johnson, ‘The Practice of Strategy’, in Strategy in the Contemporary World, 5th ed. (Oxford: 
OUP, 2016), 358. 
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the qualitative and quantitative findings mentioned above can be brought together to 
comprehensively answer the questions posed by the research. 
The research will also analyse Home Defence and Civil Defence, and allow a conclusion to be 
drawn as to whether this fulfilled any NATO obligation or purpose, or contributed to the 
deterrent. To establish if Britain’s contribution was credible it is necessary to assess the 
nation’s contribution both in and around Europe and defending the Home Base. The United 
Kingdom Home Base was defined by the MoD as, “… the main-land areas of the UK, its 
offshore islands, coastal waters out to the 100 fathom line and the airspace within the UK 
Air Defence Region …”38 although the land area and coastal waters out to the territorial sea 
limit were not under a NATO Commander.39 (See Appendix I, Figure 12 - United Kingdom Air 
Defence Region (UKADR) and Air Defence Ground Environment) 
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “There are no reliable 
criteria against which to measure conventional deterrence.”40 The 1988-89 edition of its 
publication ‘The Military Balance’ contains a useful examination of the problems involved in 
measuring and resolving the uncertainties of deterrence analysis.41 Dealing with such 
evaluation tools as the Lanchester Equation42 and other scientific and quasi-scientific 
means, it concludes that such methods inevitably embody major uncertainties in their 
conclusions. Thus, quantitative analysis has been used, often poorly,43 to compare the two 
sides in the Cold War against one another, and it provides us with little information over and 
                                                     
38 ‘The Soviet Air Threat to the United Kingdom Base, 1980 - 2005’, D/DIS(CS)17/20 (Ministry of Defence, 30 July 1980), 1, 
DEFE 62/3, TNA. 
39 A/BR/214/2/MO3, Enclosure, The Incorporation of the UK into NATO as a Land Region of Allied Command Europe (ACE), 
21st February 1977, ‘NATO Allied Command Europe and Mobile Land Force’, n.d., para. 4.a, DEFE 24/1462, TNA. 
40 NATO and Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces, The Military Balance, 1988-89 (London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1988), 234–35. 
41 NATO and Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces, ibid., 233–36. 
42 The Lanchester Equations are differential equations describing the time dependence of attacker and defender strengths 
in combat. Paul K. Davis, ‘Aggregation, Disaggregation, and the 3:1 Rules in Ground Combat’, MR-638-AF/A/OSD (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 1995), 29. 
43 For example, Chalmers and Unterseher, ‘Is There a Tank Gap?: Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets’, 
International Security; Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe’, International Security. 
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above a simple equation.44 Dr Colin McInnes criticised the unreliability of bean-counting, 
and looked towards qualitative assessment.45 As Professor Gray acknowledges,   
“A problem is that military technology … [is] far easier to count and assess … than 
are such intangibles as training, morale, organization, doctrine, and quality of 
leadership … the old habit of ‘bean count’ comparisons of soldiers under arms, 
divisions, combat vehicles of several kinds, and so forth, will be of greatly reduced 
value.”46  
There are several sources available to measure and analyse quantitative data to see if 
Britain fulfilled its NATO obligation. It is possible to measure the percentage of gross 
domestic product dedicated to military spending. As part of the Long Term Defence 
Programme NATO required members to increase spending by approximately 3% of gross 
domestic product.47 There are several problems with this as a direct measure. The Defence 
Estimates and the White papers provide costs analyses of the MoD spend per year, but this 
is not broken down into ‘NATO’ and ‘Non-NATO’ costs. This would also be skewed by events 
such as the Falklands War. There was also the additional factor of increasing costs for 
research and development, as well as for technologically advanced equipment and training. 
Sir John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence, noted in 1981, “Equipment as a percentage of 
the Defence Budget had risen from 31% in 1974/75 to 44% today (1981).”48 How did this 
affect the defence budget and overall policy? Increases in the cost of technology, and 
consequently the cost of training, reduced the number and types of equipment and 
personnel the Armed Forces could have. A problem with the MoD spend was that each year 
it bought less because of inflation, but also bought fewer items because qualitative 
improvements cost more, and R&D costs increased as technology developed.49 Thus, can we 
                                                     
44 The Military Balance. 1978-1979 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978), 114. 
45 Colin McInnes, NATO’s Changing Strategic Agenda: The Conventional Defence of Central Europe (London ; Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1990), 61. 
46 Gray, Another Bloody Century, 98. 
47 1977 NATO Ministerial Guidance, quoted in DEFE 70/435, File Ref: DP 28/77(B) (Preliminary Draft), November 1977. 
48 Speech by John Nott at the IISS, 16th November 1981, ‘NATO: UK Defence Policy’, n.d., FCO 46/2585, TNA. 
49 Lawrence Freedman, ‘British Foreign Policy to 1985. II: Britain’s Contribution to NATO’, International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 54, no. 1 (1978): 32. 
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directly compare the number of older anti-tank missiles with a lower number of newer and 
more capable missiles?  
A year-on-year analysis of the troops and equipment available for deployment to NATO in 
times of crisis might be possible, and an availability analysis for the weapons (such as tanks 
and aircraft) would see if, even in peacetime, the operational numbers were up to 
expectation. This was one of the Task Forces for the Long Term Defence Programme (LTDP). 
More difficult is the analysis of the rear-area and logistical functions. Britain promised, 
through NATO commitment and several bi-lateral agreements with other NATO countries, 
to provide for supplies and reinforcement, as well as the infrastructure and personnel to 
staff and operate the necessary transport and port facilities. This study may well be 
possible, but will require qualitative analysis as well when the forces provided are different 
in number, but purportedly greater in capability. 
It would be possible to record the proposals for each year in the defence estimates, and 
compare them with the actual performance. In the defence estimates, proposals for new 
equipment and troops deployments were recorded, along with the rationale. A year-on-year 
comparison will identify areas of cost-cutting, political direction changes, and the way that 
additions to and deductions from the estimates are described. The political rhetoric that 
was used to describe alterations in the defence budget or in policy can be analysed for 
tendencies favouring expansion of the armed forces. The main drawback with this approach 
is that it does not necessarily quantify the NATO obligation clearly, which would have to be 
provided from other sources. Quantitative analysis allows a coarse comparison to be made 
between the Force Proposal details and the MoD provision. Measuring the force level by 
brigade or division is misleading as the composition of each type of structure can change, 
indeed the British Army implemented a ‘brigadeless’50 task-force organisation during the 
1970s, which renders the enumeration of brigades or divisions as an indicator of force 
deployment as useless.51 Where the Force Levels provide a concrete value that the UK must 
provide, these will be identified and the UK provision analysed. Often the Force Level is 
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accepted, but the execution delayed, altered or cancelled after the fact, and this must be 
identified by recourse to the archival material. 
A combined analysis of commitment and contribution is the most appropriate way of 
approaching the research. Britain was given certain tasks to fulfil, along with Force Levels 
and Goals to commit to, and provided forces to fulfil them. The MoD as well as NATO 
measured the ability of those forces to fulfil any particular commitment by their readiness 
and capability. This operational analysis uses both quantitative and qualitative factors 
applied to functional groupings of forces to analyse their capabilities to complete their 
particular function.52 The MoD regularly analysed and gamed particular situations, assessing 
the forces required to defend against types of possible scenarios. This then fed into the 
organisation and doctrine of the Army, Royal Air Force and Royal Navy.  
This analysis concerns Tactical, Operational as well as Strategic military thinking, and looks 
at some of the doctrinal changes. Using this analysis, it will be possible to identify if the 
ways and means were provided to the Armed Forces to achieve the ends specified by the 
Government and NATO. The impact of changing political policy upon doctrines will be 
examined to see if there was a direct connection between the policy made by the 
politicians, and the doctrines subsequently adopted by the Armed Services.53 Exercises and 
analyses were undertaken to assess the fighting capabilities of the forces available.54 The 
results of these, coupled with the NATO LTDP and Force Proposals will be used as a yardstick 
against which the measurement of credibility will be made. 
Limitations of the research 
Even now some of Britain’s Cold War contribution to NATO is kept secret. This has limited 
the areas of research available. For example, information related to the submarine force is 
                                                     
52 The Military Balance 1978-1979, 114. 
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Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2011). 
54 For example, see ‘Crusader 80, Part A’, n.d., FCO 46/2446, TNA; ‘NATO Exercise LIONHEART 84’, n.d., FCO 46/3059, TNA; 
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almost impossible to obtain, other than superficial data about the boats. Some information 
has been censored from the available records, which has limited the interpretation in areas 
such as troop readiness and weapon capability.55 
The commitment, wide as it was, would need more than a single thesis to cover it entirely. 
The researcher has selected aspects of the commitment, notably the readiness and 
sustainability of Britain’s contributed forces, to fit into the historical perspective based on 
the Long Term Defence Programme and Force Proposals. However, the researcher has, 
within the methodological framework, approached the information equally between the 
Armed Services. 
Some of the records in the archives have been difficult to date, or to find their authors. In 
the footnotes all available information has been recorded to enable the document to be 
found as speedily as possible if required. Where information is missing, there has been no 
attempt to assume authorship, origin or date. 
Parts of this thesis are very ‘quotation heavy’ so that those involved in the decision making 
process, or warning about inadequacies or concerns, can speak with their own voices, rather 
than through modern interpretation. Several attempts were made to contact and interview 
surviving politicians, Civil Servants and serving military officers who were involved in the 
development of policy during the period. However, I was only successful in obtaining 
interviews with some military personnel. Many of the politicians and Civil Servants central 
to the thesis, such as Michael Quinlan, David Gillmore, Francis Pym, Frank Cooper and Denis 
Healey had died by the time of research and writing. Consequently there is a potential risk 
of bias through only having interviews with military personnel. In an attempt to, at least 
partially, balance this biographies and autobiographies of civil servants and politicians have 
been used where appropriate and available. The intention is to avoid imposing a 21st 
Century perspective, in addition to hindsight, on the events and decisions of the time.56 
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Thus, where possible, Government documents are used to put forward a policy position and 
the reasoning behind it.  
Peter Hennessy wrote that it is difficult to, “… capture personality …”57 from Civil Service 
documents. The documents used throughout this research include follow-ups, memos and 
extensive handwritten notes from the politicians and military officers themselves, rather 
than the official Civil Service minutes of meetings. Thus the converse has been found of the 
archives used during the research for this thesis. Many of the memos and comments are 
written in the most robust terms, often by hand, and certainly evoke the emotions of the 
time. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, among many, initialled and underlined memos and 
notes, indicating directly her opinion on the matter in hand.58 
The Thesis Structure 
The thesis begins with an appraisal of the threat to Western Europe, as assessed by both 
Britain and NATO.  The next two chapters deal with an examination of the creation and 
preparation of both NATO and British defence policy, based on the assessed threat. Chapter 
Five introduces the different plans prepared by both NATO and the British Government for 
use in the event of a crisis. This chapter also investigates the scenarios used in the creation 
of the UK Government plans, and the timings necessary for the plans to function correctly. 
In Chapter Six, the actual outturn for British defence is measured, and comparisons made 
with NATO expectations. There is also an examination of the demands placed on the MoD 
by defence of the Home Base. The level of reserves is addressed in the next chapter, and a 
comparison made with the demands of mobilisation and warfighting. In Chapter Eight the 
deterrent and warfighting capabilities of the Armed Forces are addressed, and in the 
following chapter case studies are reviewed to investigate real examples of mobilisation for 
war, and planning and academic analysis of the situation. The final chapter brings together 
the main themes of the thesis, and looks at future research. 
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The Context 
Part of this work is to contextualise the research within both the current debates about 
defence policy, and those contemporary with the period of research. It will consider those 
writers dedicating works to conventional defence and deterrence, and point out that 
although they propose new strategies and tactics, or use of particular organisational 
structures, what they do not address clearly are the fundamental problems which come 
from the known deficiencies of the time identified in the LTDP. Whilst this section will 
provide a short analysis of some of these debates and how they relate to the conventional 
defence policy of Britain, others will be commented upon where relevant in the text.  
With the adoption of MC14/3 NATO’s publicly stated aim was to raise the nuclear threshold. 
This is the point at which nuclear weapons are initially used, by either side, in a conflict. The 
objective was to raise the threshold to the point where it would be possible to stop a 
conventional attack by the WTO without relying on immediate nuclear use, indeed possibly 
with conventional means only.59 The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) assessed the nuclear 
threshold to be relatively low in 1968,60 but with the more concrete adoption of Flexible 
Response, and the NATO insistence of an increase in member states’ defence budgets, the 
need to, at least publicly, be seen to be raising the threshold became of great political 
importance. Therefore, the publicly stated position of attempting to raise the threshold has 
been assumed for this thesis. 
Essential to the policy of Flexible Response and its deterrent effect was the need to portray 
the fighting capabilities of the NATO forces as credible against any type of conventional 
attack the WTO might contemplate. It might be possible that the credibility of the 
conventional defence by NATO was not seriously questioned by the WTO, although this is 
difficult to assess from a contemporary point of view. Detailed WTO plans, and their view of 
NATO, were not available to the planners of the time, at least as far as can be ascertained 
from UK archives.   
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Several political groups took an interest in the conventional defence of NATO, and of Britain. 
Professor John J Mearsheimer cautioned that, “The logic of [the defence] debate drives 
discussion to extreme positions, while the necessity of dealing with real policy dilemmas 
forces governments to balances that satisfy neither extreme. This tendency is not surprising, 
and it is not to be lamented; it is simply true.”61 The extremes of the debate in Britain were 
those of the anti-nuclear lobby,62 those dedicated to cutting the financial outlay on defence, 
and those wishing to increase defence spending. The first two groups, which will be termed 
‘alternative defence’, overlap substantially with left-wing political groups, whilst the third 
group tends to be politically from the right or centre-right. The latter group, which will be 
termed ‘strengthened defence’, rely on the increase in numbers and capabilities to deter 
any attack by the WTO. Many of the alternative defence proposals only dealt with land 
forces in Europe, and were not directly relevant to the defence of the UK, which was 
primarily air and maritime.  
The alternative defence groups argued that by removing nuclear weapons from Britain’s 
arsenal and reducing or altering conventional forces, large sums of money could be saved, 
with some being spent on improvements for the remaining conventional Armed Forces.63 
Labour left-wingers caused a rift in this group by combining unilateral nuclear disarmament 
with an absolute reduction in conventional defence spending, thereby freeing finances for 
other Government departments.64 
A series of proposals which gained widespread support from the political left was to 
configure the NATO conventional forces in such a way that the WTO would see clearly that it 
was purely defensive.65 The forces might emphasise firepower, but not mobility and range.66 
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63 Robin Cook and Dan Smith, What Future in Nato? (Glasgow: The Fabian Society, 1978); Stan Openshaw, Doomsday: 
Britain After Nuclear Attack (Oxford, Oxfordshire, England: B. Blackwell, 1983); Owen Greene et al., London After the 
Bomb: What a Nuclear Attack Really Means (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable 
Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain (London: Paladin, 1986). 
64 Dan Keohane, Labour Party Defence Policy Since 1945 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), chap. 4. 
65 Alvin M. Saperstein, ‘Primer on Non‐Provocative Defense’, Arms Control 9, no. 1 (1 May 1988): 59–75. 
66 Jonathan Dean, ‘Alternative Defence: Answer to NATO’s Central Front Problems?’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-) 64, no. 1 (1987): 64. 
Page 29 
 
The emphasis would be placed on limited tactical mobility, especially for local counter-
attacks as opposed to large, operational counter-attacks. A problem with this approach is 
that forces configured for defence and limited mobility cannot take advantage of anything 
other than local, tactical weaknesses in their opponent, which would lead to a war of 
attrition. NATO was not prepared for such an attritional war, and the memories of World 
War I and World War II precluded the idea from military thinking.67  
Another proposal was to enhance conventional defence by the application of new 
technology and improved force structures.68 One idea was for small forces to be dispersed 
throughout the FRG which proposed to deny the enemy a large concentration of forces to 
attack.69 It received considerable criticism, as the forces would be isolated, and the logistical 
resupply problems multiplied many times by the need to disperse war reserves close by.  
The objective of the NATO strategy was to provide flexibility in its response to aggression by 
the WTO. Many ‘alternative defence’ proposals would have robbed NATO of that flexibility, 
instead relying on doctrines which presupposed the tactics and operational capabilities of 
the WTO forces. The ‘alternative defence’ proposal that both NATO and WTO forces should 
be so organised as to be capable only of defence70 falls down on the verification of those 
forces. The Soviet Union was extremely reluctant to submit to detailed verification in 
negotiations over nuclear weapons, and the same would have applied to conventional 
forces and their capabilities. Only with the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev and ‘Glasnost’ did 
this option become feasible. 
For some writers in the 1970s and 1980s, conspiracy to lie to the public by the Government 
was crucial to their publications, especially about the risks and threat of nuclear war.71 This 
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played up to the more extreme figures of some political, and non-political, movements.72 
For others, the threat from the WTO seemed so glaring as to demand immediate attention 
to reinforce massively the conventional defences of NATO.73 These represented the 
‘strengthened defence’ group. In his fictional work, General Sir John Hackett proposed a 
new British Corps to strengthen the NATO defences, and common operational doctrine is 
suggested to increase the overall capability of NATO defences.74 
Britain was the key maritime contributor to the defence of the Eastern Atlantic during the 
Cold War, and undertook the great majority of sea and air defence for this region. Although 
the forces committed to BAOR were not as large as those of West Germany or the USA, they 
were substantial by any historical measure for Britain. This was necessary not only militarily, 
to enable defence of the UK as far Eastwards as possible, but also politically. Britain was 
committed, with membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), to closer ties 
with other European countries, but was also interested in maintaining the ‘special 
relationship’ with the USA. How ‘special’ it was, or how equitable, is not the subject of this 
thesis. Nevertheless, the existence of extra-Alliance agreements is discussed in this thesis, 
and shows a determination on the part of the British Government, Conservative and Labour, 
to offer the USA opportunities for basing troops, aeroplanes and naval forces in and around 
the UK. It also shows an acceptance that, to provide those facilities to the US Government, 
Britain became a clearer and more obvious target if war were to come to Europe. In the 
front-line as much as West Germany, Britain had to commit the necessary forces to fulfil its 
obligation to NATO, and to protect itself. Explicitly defining and examining the full extent of 
the plans for deployment and operation of Britain’s contribution has never been undertaken 
in relation to conventional defence and deterrence. 
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Conventional Deterrence 
Deterrence means, “… to turn aside or discourage through fear.”75 To deter, the threat must 
be credible, and to be credible there must be evidence for the other party to see. There is a 
difference between credible deterrence and credible defence. Deterrence requires the 
appearance of credibility,76 whereas defence must consist of workable strategy, doctrine 
and tactics: credible defence must be sustainable through sufficient forces, equipment and 
supplies to stop the enemy achieving its objective. Lieutenant Colonel Professor Asa Clark 
characterised this as the difference between minimum deterrence and warfighting 
deterrence.77 The assessment of the levels required for credibility are different depending 
on whether one is considering deterrence (minimum deterrence) alone or deterrence and 
defence (warfighting deterrence). Conventional defence will inevitably require larger forces 
than deterrence.  
The interpretation of UK strategy and planning in this thesis is based upon the publicly 
stated policy of conventional defence against conventional attack, the demand to raise the 
nuclear threshold, and the development of new doctrines to adapt to the changing military 
situation.78 This implied a warfighting deterrence. This also presented the Government with 
the dichotomy of raising the threshold whilst keeping control of spending. 
The Chiefs of the Defence Staff characterise British defence policy as being,  
“… based on the concept of deterrence. To be effective, this requires not only 
a nuclear capability, but also strong conventional forces for the defence of 
continental Europe, for the protection of transatlantic reinforcement routes, 
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DEFE 48/1095, TNA. 
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and not least, for the security of the UK base which forms the linking bond 
between the other elements.”79  
Deterrence includes conventional forces, and is not a purely nuclear concept or strategy. 
Since its inception, NATO has promoted the idea of improving its technology and the 
capability of the conventional weaponry and forces with the intention of reducing the 
reliance on nuclear weapons for defence and deterrence.80  The reality was different, and a 
trip-wire nuclear response had been NATO’s policy between 1957 and 1967. The last twenty 
years of the Cold War saw a change in NATO’s publicly declared policy towards deterring, 
and fighting, a war in Europe by the adoption of a more flexible strategy employing 
deterrence and deliberate escalation,81 and the minimising the reliance on all-out nuclear 
response to major conventional aggression. Explicit in the concept of Flexible Response 
adopted in 1967 was the need to increase the number and quality of conventional forces. 
NATO strategy required that,  
“Should an aggression be initiated, short of a major nuclear attack, NATO 
should respond immediately with a direct defence. The first objective would 
be to counter the aggression without escalation and preserve or restore the 
integrity or security of the North Atlantic area.”82  
This proposes a conventional response to conventional aggression, without escalating to the 
use of nuclear weapons. Britain was publicly and fully committed to this strategy. 
In the event of a Warsaw Pact conventional invasion of Western Europe, NATO’s policy 
would have led to a conventional phase of combat, preferably to a conclusion without the 
need for nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, this thesis will show that there was no time for 
actively pondering the response; in the event of an attack by the WTO there would only be 
two options available to NATO: military collapse and surrender after 48 to 72 hours, or first 
use of nuclear weapons. Without increases in the conventional military forces, first use was 
                                                     
79 VCDS(P&L) 203, 9th July 1981, ‘NATO Logistics Policy General UK Logistics Assumptions’, n.d., para. 1, DEFE 25/432, TNA. 
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81 ‘A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area’, para. 17.b, MC 14/3, NATO. 
82 Ibid., para. 22.a. 
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inherent in NATO planning, and any suggestion of NATO declaring no first use was not taken 
seriously.83 
Nevertheless, reducing the reliance on nuclear weapons would overthrow the concept 
characterised by Professor Hew Strachan as, “… preventing nuclear war by invoking nuclear 
war.”84 Many organisations, including the US Government, NATO members and many 
academics, saw the improvement of conventional defence in Europe as a necessary 
alternative to the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of war.85 Some critics of defence 
policy during the 1980s suggested that withdrawing Britain from NATO would provide a 
greater level of defence from Warsaw Pact aggression than continuing membership. Dan 
Smith wrote, “Should Britain disengage from NATO, the system of mutual threat would lose 
some of its relevance for Britain.”86 This viewpoint failed to take into account the strategic 
location of the British Isles, which, in the event of war in Europe would become a target for 
the WTO to deny to the enemy. Britain had a bilateral agreement with the USA outside 
NATO to provide transit facilities for troops and equipment, known as the US/UK Lines of 
Communications Agreement (USUKLOC) (See Appendix N, USUKLOC). The pragmatic 
approach by the WTO commanders would be unlikely to recognise the difference between 
full NATO members and neutral states when it came to the prosecution of conventional or 
nuclear war, and Britain, because of its strategic location and function in time of war, would 
remain a priority target.87  
The declared political and military commitment Britain made to NATO remained unchanged 
throughout the period, but the threat changed following the failure of détente88 in the late 
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1970s. British defence policy maintained the importance of membership of the NATO 
Alliance, but under the Labour party it had focussed very much on force reduction, and 
thereby saving money, through the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks.89  
Previous Research 
British, NATO and Superpower Nuclear policy and strategy have been studied in detail,90 but 
conventional planning, doctrine and strategy during the latter years of the Cold War have 
been largely ignored. Dr Helmut Hammerich described this in the following way: “The … 
history of the Cold War focuses first and foremost on the planning for the nuclear clash 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.”91 The available research into NATO and British 
Defence policy is overwhelmingly related to nuclear weapons and the strategy for their 
deployment and use, and shows little consideration for the conventional forces, other than 
as targets for the aforementioned nuclear weapons.  
Where research has been conducted into conventional defence planning, it has normally 
been NATO wide, in an attempt to impose some sort of common doctrine, or as part of a 
political offering based around strengthening conventional forces while removing nuclear 
weapons.92 Such research analyses the theory of Emerging Technologies, New Operational 
Concepts and other initiatives, but all avoid or omit analysing whether, in the event of a 
crisis, these forces, however they are configured, can be deployed and function as 
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expected.93 The focus of these analyses is on the ‘teeth’ elements, and the belief that they 
will function correctly, at 100% of their effectiveness from the beginning of a crisis. 
This research will aim to bridge that gap for British defence policy during the period 1979 – 
1985. Conventional policy has usually been dealt with as an adjunct to nuclear policy, 
demanding only small paragraphs in books on the nuclear subject. The transition-to-war 
planning has been referred to in only a very few publications, mostly related to civil defence 
and nuclear war in the 1980s.94 Logistics has been covered in few publications, but using 
such a broad approach as to be inadequate in relation to this period.95 As Professor Martin 
Van Creveld says, “… the relatively few authors … have usually done so on the basis of a few 
preconceived ideas rather than a careful examination of the evidence.”96 Alternatively, 
analysis of conventional capability has been a simple exercise in accounting, comparing the 
numbers of personnel, ships, aeroplanes and tanks and drawing conclusions. Usually done 
on a ‘NATO versus Warsaw Pact’ basis rather than nationally, the comparison gives no 
indication of the capabilities of the supporting infrastructure to prosecute any hypothetical 
war.97  
In a British Modern History text book specifically written for A-Level and Undergraduate 
students, one section of one chapter is dedicated to Britain and the Cold War. Of that 
section, one subsection is entitled ‘Britain and her defences’. The entire subsection is 
dedicated to a description of Britain’s nuclear forces, without a single reference to the 
conventional armed forces.98 But even in those books dedicated to conventional deterrence 
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and defence, the subject is appropriated and used as a means of promoting a particular set 
of political or military beliefs and dogmas supporting either ‘alternative’ or ‘strengthened’ 
defence.99 There appears to be little analysis, in detail, of what the conventional capabilities 
were (beyond a ‘bean-count’ of weapons and troop numbers) and whether they achieved 
the goals, in terms of capability and availability, which NATO demanded and required. In 
those works that address conventional defence, the analysis is focussed on assessments of 
alternative strategies, yet does not address the actual capabilities to implement existing 
NATO strategy.100 Vital detail is missing which renders these analyses doubtful.  
Britain’s NATO commitment was seen to be synonymous with BAOR. An article for the 
Journal of Strategic Studies published in 2008 states, “During the Cold War the UK's principal 
military role was its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) through 
the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) …”101 In fact, the commitment was much larger, as this 
study will show. Britain committed forces to the UK base, the Channel, the Eastern Atlantic 
and the mobile and specialist reservist forces. In addition, Britain was committed not only to 
providing a substantial military contingent to NATO, but also to supporting the organisation 
of the main staging point and rear area in time of war. There has been much written of 
Britain and NATO in the 1950s and 60s, of the nuclear deterrent and tripwire strategy,102 but 
little regarding Britain’s conventional defence plans and their integration into NATO in the 
late 70s and early 80s. Britain’s home defence (as opposed to civil defence) has been almost 
completely neglected, except for a recent surge in interest in Cold War architecture.103 The 
research that has been done has not been tied-in to its place in the Government plans. If 
                                                     
99 Richey, Britain’s Strategic Role in NATO; European Security Study, Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe; 
Freedman, ‘British Foreign Policy to 1985. II: Britain’s Contribution to NATO’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-); Chalmers and Unterseher, ‘Is There a Tank Gap?: Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank 
Fleets’, International Security. 
100 For example, see the omission of stockpiling and logistics in McInnes, NATO’s Changing Strategic Agenda. 
101 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Intelligence within BAOR and NATO’s Northern Army Group’, Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 1 (1 
February 2008): 89–122. 
102 Maguire, Hogg, and Laucht, ‘“Never a Credible Weapon”: Nuclear Cultures in British Government During the Era of the 
H-Bomb.’, British Journal for the History of Science; Hennessy, The Secret State. 
103 Wayne Cocroft and Roger J. C. Thomas, Cold War: Building for Nuclear Confrontation, 1946-1989, ed. P. S. Barnwell 
(Swindon: English Heritage, 2004); Mark Dalton, The Royal Observer Corps Underground Monitoring Stations (Monkton 
Farleigh: Folly Books, 2011). 
Page 37 
 
Britain had been mobilised in times of crisis or war the true implications have not been 
investigated.  
Civil and Home defence policy focusses on the defence of the home islands, facilities and 
infrastructure, and population, rather than the prosecution of an aggressive war against any 
particular enemy. The utility is in protecting as much as possible for as long as possible to 
enable the reinforcement plans to be completed. Britain was likely to be the target of attack 
in any war from the outbreak. NATO planners expected air, land and sea attack comprising 
conventional and chemical attack in the first phase.  To fulfil its obligation to NATO, and to 
its own citizens, Britain had to be able to defend the coastline and airspace of the country 
for long enough to enable reinforcement to take place, and to maintain the lines of supply 
into and out of the country. It would be in the interests of all involved if the conventional 
phase lasted as long as possible, to provide NATO with the greatest flexibility, and time for 
decision-making.104 This was later extended by the adoption of FOFA to push the nuclear 
threshold as far as possible, raising the likelihood that, given the right circumstances, NATO 
could defend against, and even stop and push back, a WTO conventional attack, without 
recourse to nuclear weapons.105  
This research has implications for current defence planning and budgeting. Despite an 
existential threat throughout the Cold War, the British Government had repeatedly cut the 
defence budget as a percentage of GDP, reduced the War Maintenance Reserve (WMR) and 
placed greater reliance on the use of reservists, all as cost saving measures. (See Appendix B, 
Figure 6 - Defence Budget as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, with trend, 1955 to 
1990) This continued after the end of the Cold War with a change in the perception of the 
greatest source of threat, and the widely publicised ‘Peace Dividend’.106 These cuts have 
been based on the assumption that the previous strategies and policies of Britain were 
successful, validated by the comment from the MoD: “The rapid deployment of some 
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46,000 personnel to the Gulf confirmed the validity of the vision set out in the Strategic 
Defence Review (SDR) …”107  This research questions these assumptions. 
Conclusion 
One cannot ascribe the fall of the Soviet Union solely to NATO policy, for to do so would be 
to assign a post-hoc analysis to events that have no agreement amongst analysts or 
academics.108 Equally, because we now know the West suffered no attack from the Warsaw 
Pact does not mean that knowledge can be passed back to the decision makers of the time. 
Policy decisions made after the fall of the Berlin Wall were predicated on the ‘success’ of the 
Cold War policies. This thesis examines the policies, and whether they can be seen as 
successful. 
The question that will inevitably be asked about this research is, ‘So what?’ Surely the 
conventional forces would have been destroyed in the inevitable nuclear conflagration that 
would have resulted from a WTO attack into West Germany. Conditions were changing 
which meant that a conventional war could be fought by both sides without immediate 
recourse to nuclear weapons. NATO had adopted a strategy which sought to raise the 
nuclear threshold, enabling a conventional defence of Western Europe. Was this feasible? 
The end of the Cold War is sometimes presented as a ‘victory’ for NATO.109  NATO’s 
defensive preparations were made because of the threat and fear that an attack by the 
WTO might take place. Was NATO’s strategy ever adopted in earnest, or simply paid lip 
service? Did Britain live up to the commitment made to NATO?  
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Chapter 2 - Threat Assessment 
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Introduction 
Following the end of the Second World War, a series of political crises in and around Europe 
culminated in the blockade of Berlin between 1948 and 1949. Ernest Bevin, British Foreign 
Secretary after the Labour election victory in 1945, became increasingly aware of Soviet 
hostility to the West, and aimed to bring the US politically closer to Europe.1 The explosion 
of the first Soviet atomic device in 1949 and increasingly difficult relationships between the 
Soviet Union and Western Europe prompted the establishment of a collective defence 
region by the USA and some Western European allies. They feared aggression by the Soviet 
Union, exploiting its superiority in conventional forces2 to attempt to spread Communism 
into the capitalist West, by force if necessary.3 This fear was to persist for the next four-and-
a-half decades. 
MC14, the first of the NATO Strategic Guidance documents,4 presents the Soviet threat as 
full-scale offensive operations being launched pre-emptively, and the conflict being world-
wide, rather than confined to the European and North Atlantic areas. According to NATO, 
the scale of the threat posed by the Soviet Union was evident:  
“At the close of World War II Soviet forces were not demobilized to the same 
extent as were those of the Western Powers. Instead, a considerable 
programme of reorganization and training was initiated. As a result, the Soviet 
Union now has in being a powerful military machine. These forces, in contrast 
to the combined forces of the Western Powers, are controlled by a unified 
command and a single staff system.”5  
The Soviet Union was expected to wage a blitzkrieg style attack against Western Europe,6 
accompanied by, “… a heavy aerial bombardment, including atomic attack, minelaying and 
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submarine operations against the British Isles with their drive in Western Europe.”7 David 
French comments that, “… [in 1948] the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) suggested that in the 
opening stages of a campaign the Soviets could commit up to 45 divisions on a 150-mile 
front running from the Ruhr to the North Sea …”8 Initially, NATO strategy spoke of holding a 
Soviet attack, “… as far to the east in Germany as possible …”9  and that, “… All types of 
weapons, without exception, might be used by either side.”10  
Very quickly, NATO policy established a central principle of Western European defence that 
remained part of the threat assessment throughout the Cold War: the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation (WTO) would have numerical superiority in conventional forces.11 The solution 
was explained in the NATO Medium Term Plan; 
“To compensate for the numerical inferiority of the armed forces of the North 
Atlantic Treaty nations by establishing and maintaining technical superiority, 
by developing and using modern combat methods, by providing training 
facilities capable of expansion, and by achieving close coordination of 
effort.”12  
Anti-armour missile development was an example of the technical superiority which would 
be relied upon. This would be given high priority, “… as the availability of such equipment is 
likely to change materially the nature of the defensive battle.”13 The Medium Term Plan 
explained the reason behind the need for a strong conventional defence:  
“For the defense [sic] of Western Europe, and particularly Continental 
Europe, it will be necessary to make a maximum initial effort with all available 
resources even though it may not be possible to sustain this effort, provided, 
by so doing, sufficient delay may be achieved to allow for reinforcement, and 
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for the strategic air offensive to take effect.”14  
The reinforcement of Europe relied on firm control of the sea-lanes of the Atlantic and 
English Channel. Although the WTO did not initially possess a strong surface fleet to 
threaten the reinforcement by sea, it developed a powerful submarine force which NATO 
believed would threatened their maritime freedom.15 This idea of sustaining the initial 
defence to allow the military build-up remained at the heart of NATO strategy during the 
Cold War. At sea, the North Atlantic Ocean Group16 was identified as possessing, “…the 
principal means of controlling and securing the ocean lines of communication”17 and the 
great naval strength of the Western powers was important because of the reliance on 
maritime communications and trade.  Thus, the concepts of sea control and sea denial were 
vital for NATO. These eventually replaced command of the sea as the objective of the NATO 
navies.18 Much of the output of the Royal Navy was aimed at countering the threat from 
WTO interference with specialist Anti-Submarine Warfare ships and technology.19  
Under NATO’s Medium Term Plan of 1950, the timescale for the achievement of the 
required levels of military forces was set at 1st July 1954.20 These timescales were reviewed 
following the outbreak of war in Korea, and new Force Goals were set at the Lisbon 
Conference in 1952.21 The Korean War raised fears that Western Europe, divided like Korea, 
would be the next target of Communist aggression,22 and so NATO began to re-assess its 
strategy. In 1952, NATO document MC14/1 sought to expand on MC14, taking into account 
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the strategic and political changes since 1949.23 The threat was considered to be a strike by 
the USSR and its allies using its preponderance in land forces, and it was considered not to 
be vulnerable to sea action.24 Because of this re-evaluation, the timescales for readiness of 
increased and improved NATO conventional forces were moved to 1956.25  
Although the early NATO documents mentioned the use of atomic weapons, their relative 
scarcity as well as their effectiveness limited what the planners expected of them.26 In the 
early 1950s the US developed low-yield warheads which promised weapons that could be 
used tactically.27 Additionally, the operational availability of thermo-nuclear weapons to 
both the USA and Soviet Union,28 with what Professor Peter Hennessy called their, “… huge 
step change in destructive power …”29 meant that the defence of Western Europe became a 
different exercise, and brought about the policy of massive nuclear response, sometimes 
referred to as the ‘Trip-Wire’.30  
In 1954, NATO document MC 48 identified the threat as being one of, “… Communist 
aggression either intentional or as a result of miscalculation.”31 MC 48 was interim guidance 
pending a review of MC 14/1.32 The solution proposed to convince the Soviet Union that 
they could not win a war, and would be subject to a, “… devastating counter-attack 
employing atomic weapons.”33 Events were to quicken in the latter half of the 1950s which 
prompted the North Atlantic Council to prioritise a reassessment of the Soviet threat.34 The 
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suppression of the Hungarian Uprising in 1956 did little to quell Western fears about the 
readiness of the Soviet Union to use force.35 The Suez crisis of 1956 had also prompted a 
direct threat from the Soviet Union against Britain and France, encouraging the need to 
maintain the collective defence arrangements.36 In the following year the launch of the first 
artificial satellite, Sputnik, raised fears that the Soviet Union was now capable of launching 
thermonuclear warheads at both Europe and the USA with little or no warning.37 
1957 to 1967 
While the numerical superiority that the WTO enjoyed in conventional forces was, for a 
while, countered by the threat of nuclear retaliation from NATO, the lead was reduced as 
the WTO developed its own nuclear strike capability.38 WTO troops were trained extensively 
to fight in a nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) contaminated environment,39 and NATO 
commanders feared that the WTO would attack using a first strike of chemical and nuclear 
weapons, neutralising the NATO conventional forces before reinforcements could arrive. To 
address this concern, MC14/2, or what has been termed ‘massive retaliation’ or ‘Trip-Wire’ 
was adopted in 1957.40  
Nonetheless, with rising tension in Europe, especially over Berlin, in the late 50s and early 
60s, there was disillusionment with the ‘Trip-Wire’ strategy for dealing with low-level, non-
nuclear, or intensifying, crises.41 The 1961 Vienna Summit caused consternation in the West 
because of the threats to Berlin by the Soviet Union:42 in October 1961, US and Soviet tanks 
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confronted one another at Checkpoint Charlie:43 three days later, the Soviet Union exploded 
a 58 megaton thermonuclear weapon, the largest ever detonated.44  
The building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the Cuban Missile crisis of 196245 demonstrated 
the additional concern that a crisis could move to war rapidly.46 The threat of air delivered 
thermonuclear weapons, and their attendant devastating power, meant countries like the 
UK could be devastated by a small number of successfully delivered weapons in days, 
possibly even hours by the new range of WTO bombers with sufficient range to attack the 
UK mainland directly.47  
The fears of starting a war through miscalculation, as the Cuban Missile Crisis so nearly 
demonstrated, forced the problem of nuclear reliance into the forefront of strategic, policy 
and planning thought. If the WTO countries were forcibly to deny Western access to Berlin 
again, what strategy was available to NATO with which to respond? 48 An all-out nuclear 
attack could not be countenanced for something low-level, so corresponding strategies 
needed to be developed. Soviet ‘salami-slicing’ techniques – small incursions or actions that 
could not be answered with nuclear weapons49 – meant the likelihood of smaller, quicker 
attempts to gain an advantage might increase.50 This aspect of the threat from the WTO was 
mentioned in the 1966 UK Defence Review, but given little space and consideration.51 The 
UK was left vulnerable to conventional attack because of the expectation of nuclear war. In 
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a memorandum written in 1978, Sir John Hunt, Cabinet Secretary, wrote to the Prime 
Minister to say,  
“Until the late 1960s NATO’s strategy was based on the ‘trip-wire’ concept 
and we did not cater for any substantial conventional defence of the United 
Kingdom …”52 
1967 to 1978 
To counter the critics, and to develop a more adaptable strategy, in 1967 NATO adopted the 
strategy popularly termed ‘Flexible Response’ laid out in document MC14/3: 53  
“NATO Strategy … rests on the concept of flexible response. The intention is 
to deter the enemy from aggression through military preparedness and 
political solidarity and, if that deterrence fails, to allow the appropriate 
degree of effective military action to be taken to end the conflict at the lowest 
level possible.”54 
This placed much greater emphasis on the provision of conventional forces, their combat 
endurance, their capabilities and the deterrent effect they might have.  
At approximately the same time, the US Government withdrew several divisions of troops 
from the Central Front in West Germany, and subsequently Britain moved some regular 
forces back to the UK. NATO strategy and associated plans assumed that before any war 
there would be a progressive deterioration of international relations.55 Although there were 
plans to reinforce the Central Front from the US, known as REFORGER56, and from the UK, 
the delay inherent in the mobilisation and transport of these troops increased the time 
needed to attain full conventional readiness.  
                                                     
52 Ref. A07783, Defence of the United Kingdom, DOP(78)12, Memorandum from John Hunt to the Prime Minister, 1st 
August 1978, ‘Defence against the Soviet Threat to the United Kingdom’, n.d., 2, PREM 16/1563, TNA. 
53 ‘A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area’, MC 14/3, NATO; ‘Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the 
Defence of the NATO Area’, MC 48/3, NATO. 
54 ‘WINTEX-CIMEX 83 Committees’, CAB 130/1249, TNA. 
55 ‘A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area’, para. 15, MC 14/3, NATO. 
56 This is variously interpreted as Reinforcement or Return of Forces in (or to) Germany. Faringdon, Confrontation, 133–34. 
Page 47 
 
Between 1968 and 1977, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)57 assessed the threat from 
the WTO to include an additional 100 nuclear powered submarines, 260 new major 
warships, the equivalent of a further six infantry divisions and 2,000 tanks, and some 250 
new aircraft. Despite the alarm caused by reports such as this in NATO, little determined 
action had been taken to correct the developing imbalance.58 
The threat assessment in the 1970s became confused over intention and capability, 
particularly regarding warning time. A UKCICC report reassuringly concluded that NATO 
would receive 20 days’ firm warning of WTO conventional forces being made ready.59 Other 
sources expressed an increasing concern that a limited attack could be launched with no 
more than 48 hours’ warning.60 The US Government concluded that the WTO force 
structure was designed for an intensive war in Europe,61 and the UK MoD agreed with this 
assessment.62 Nevertheless, the assumption used by the UK Government in official plans 
reflected the official NATO line that there would be a steady deterioration of international 
relations over a period of several weeks before the outbreak of any hostilities.63 This 
appeared to be the politicians’ ‘fall-back’ position when discussing the Defence Estimates. 
The intelligence analysis was not so comforting, however. The JIC produced an assessment 
that stated only two weeks would be necessary for the WTO to prepare for war, or only two 
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days in some cases.64 Given the probable caution on the part of NATO countries to mobilise 
fully, the very real fear was the WTO could achieve full mobilisation before the NATO forces 
were even partially prepared. The Soviet military preparations for the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 brought this into sharp focus, with an apparent disconnection in 
Western Government circles between the developing political situation and the ultimate 
Soviet military objective.65 It highlighted the problem of identifying WTO intentions, and 
activating political will in sufficient time to act. Even with two weeks’ warning, it was 
unlikely that all of the United Kingdom Armed Forces could be brought to full readiness in 
their correct locations.66 NATO put in place projects, such as the Long Term Defence 
Programme, to address such deficiencies.67  
In parallel with the urgings to improve defence, much Labour Government time was spent 
during the years of détente pressing for multilateral force reductions, and negotiating the 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). The Soviet Government had declared a 
readiness to talk about force reductions in 1972, but despite continuing negotiations, little 
progress was made.68 In 1973 the MoD viewpoint of these talks was largely pessimistic: 
“In general terms, even if land force reductions in the Central Region were 
negotiated on a mutual basis as favourable to NATO as could reasonably be 
envisaged, our studies indicate that there would still be a grave risk that a 
major conventional WP aggression could result in defeat for the Alliance 
before the enemy’s reserve divisions had been committed. In these 
circumstances the possibility of a quick win might induce the Soviet Union to 
take risks which the possibility of more protracted operations will probably 
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always deter them from taking.”69 
A cooling of relations began towards the end of the 1970s, and the increasing conventional 
military build-up by the WTO gave momentum to NATO to reassess the threat posed by the 
WTO.70 Dr Joseph Luns, Secretary General of NATO, in his Ministerial Guidance for 1977, 
wrote; 
“It is in the conventional field … where the growth of the Warsaw Pact 
capability has been most pronounced. In particular, the Warsaw Pact ground 
forces have the capabilities to stage a major offensive in Europe without 
reinforcement. The improved offensive and deep penetration capabilities of 
the Warsaw Pact tactical air forces now permit the Warsaw Pact to conduct 
the initial stages of an air attack to a greater extent than hitherto, with in-
place forces. The capabilities of the Soviet Union to exercise sea power all 
around the world have been enhanced by the introduction of new and 
improved ships, submarines and aircraft.”71 
Détente came to an abrupt end in December 1979 following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.  
1979 and beyond 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reinforced the Western concern regarding Soviet 
expansionism and its continuing military dominance in Europe,72 emphasised later in a JIC 
report which commented, “The Marxist-Leninist philosophy of the Soviet leadership 
assumes that some form of conflict between communism and capitalism is inevitable.”73  
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Although both WTO ‘Opportunism’74 such as Afghanistan, or ‘salami-slicing’, featured in 
NATO planning,75 the broad threat, as assessed by NATO and the British Government, was of 
an attack by the WTO on NATO with not less than 48 hours’ warning: directly across the 
Inner German Border by large armoured conventional thrusts, including at least two tank 
armies in the 1(BR) Corps sector:76 air attacks on all NATO members; and denial by the 
Soviet Navy of NATO maritime freedoms.77 The Chiefs of Staff Committee acknowledged in 
1980 that the improving WTO navy and air forces particularly were, “… better equipped and 
more adventurous now than they have ever been; their capability representing a formidable 
instrument for the exploitation of air power.”78 The scale of the changes in equipment levels 
was illustrated by the intelligence evaluation of WTO aircraft production, which every six 
months was supposed to exceed the entire front line strength of the RAF.79 Improvements 
in tank development - for example the deployment of the T64 and T8080 – and anti-aircraft 
defence – the new range of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) – 
meant that the forces deployed in Eastern Europe were not only quantitatively superior to 
NATO, but approaching qualitative parity as well.81 The defence spending of the Soviet 
Union continued to take up an estimated 12-13% of GDP,82 with their technological 
capability demonstrably narrowing the gap with the West. The Soviet Union had extended 
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its reach into space, threatening communication and intelligence gathering satellites when 
they conducted a successful orbital interception of a satellite in March 1981.83 
Because of the delay from mobilisation to full war-posture, early warning in a crisis allowing 
reinforcement of the Central Front would be decisive. From a previously firm warning period 
of two weeks, the possibility was now down to one week’s warning of the WTO achieving 
full war posture. The Secretary of State for Defence was concerned that,  
“Short-warning aggression … is far more attractive to the Soviet Union and 
more dangerous to NATO … and in such circumstances seaborne Transatlantic 
reinforcement might simply become irrelevant.”84 
A 1981 JIC assessment could be no more precise than saying that, “… Warning times are … 
assessed as remaining at ‘not less than 48 hours’.”85 The Government War Book indicated 
that the most likely period of warning would be one to two weeks,86 but contemporary and 
subsequent exercises used three weeks’ or more warning time.87  
A variety of reports and assessments were prepared covering not only the direct threat in 
West Germany and Scandinavia, but also the maritime and air threat in Europe and against 
the Home Islands.88 These highlighted changes in the WTO’s dispositions and capabilities. As 
the WTO forces expanded and the range and capabilities of their aircraft and weapons 
improved, the air threat to the UK would increase. In the conventional phase of war, attacks 
on vital infrastructure and installations could be expected. In the latter half of the 1970s, the 
direct threat to the UK was assessed in detail as being from sea and air launched 
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conventional weapons. The threat of chemical attacks was also considered very real.89 
Invasion from the sea or air was considered extremely unlikely.90 During the conventional 
phase of war,  
“… a considerable Soviet air effort will be allocated to attacking targets in the 
United Kingdom with conventional weapons. The targets selected could 
include our nuclear installations, air bases, air defence facilities, fuel and 
ammunition dumps, dockyards and transportation facilities associated with 
the movement of Allied reinforcements to Europe.”91  
The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) recognised that conventional attack would cause 
problems: “Neutralisation of ports and airfields which were to receive reinforcements could 
be more effective militarily in the early stages of a conflict – and perhaps less escalatory – 
than attempts to neutralise theatre nuclear assets.”92 This struck directly at the choke points 
for defence of the Home islands, British reinforcements to Europe, and for US and Canadian 
reinforcements transiting through the UK. It also raised the question of Britain’s capability 
to resist such attacks, and to maintain its mobilisation and reinforcement plans. 
The United Kingdom Commanders In Chief Committee considered the air threat to be 
primarily against the conventional and nuclear war fighting capabilities of the UK, followed 
by air defence and transportation facilities.93 In part of the study on the maritime force 
structure for 1987, the air threat is identified as being against the UK Air Defence System, 
notably an attack on the shore-based early warning installations, with follow up attacks on 
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the fighter, Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and tanker bases.94 This was considered to have a 
potentially dramatic effect on the UK’s ability to defend the airspace and waters adjacent to 
the islands, particularly the Channel and North Sea. An attack such as this would make 
further penetration raids less costly for the WTO, allowing them to attack transport facilities 
and infrastructure, headquarters and other installations. Another assessment identifies the 
nuclear strike forces as being the highest priority.95 This assessment considers that the 
operational level of defence in Europe had a direct effect on the weight of attack that the 
UK could expect to receive. “Should the battle in the Central Region go badly for NATO … 
assuming the nuclear threshold had not been passed … more of [the WTO] aircraft would be 
able to reach the UK …”96 The implication is that even with the expected attrition of the 
long-range WTO bombers, the UK would be subject to increasing aerial attack as the war 
progressed. If airfields nearer to the UK were captured, the WTO Tactical Air Force had 
several ground attack aircraft available in large numbers which would be able to reach the 
UK islands.  
The WTO’s air forces had changed in character from short-range, low-payload aircraft 
intended for close air support and interception to longer range, heavier payload capable 
aircraft designed to penetrate NATO airspace.97 Analyses carried out by the UK Government 
were focussed on the developing air threat to the UK.98 The secret 1979 report entitled ‘The 
effect on maritime operations of Warsaw Pact air attacks on NATO land bases and 
installations’ provides a good example. 99 This report analyses the first 15 days of 
conventional hostilities, from D-Day (the start of hostilities) to D+14. It looked towards a 
future when the air defence of the UK will be undertaken by Tornado F2, Tornado GR1 and 
Nimrod Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft, supported by air-to-air refuelling tankers. It 
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recorded that the WTO objectives will be to degrade the UK Air Defence, attack 
reinforcement bases and airfields.100 
The threat to the UK would be mainly from the Soviet Long Range Air Force (LRAF) and the 
Naval Air Force (NAF) and that approximately one third of the available force in the West 
would be used against the UK. In 1979, the Soviet LRAF comprised 756 aircraft, most of 
which were capable of carrying stand-off air-to-surface missiles (ASM). Approximately 75% 
were based in Europe and the Western USSR.101 The NAF comprised 770 aircraft,102 whilst 
the Air Force comprised approximately 4,650 combat aircraft. Most of the aircraft of latter 
two would not be available, or indeed able, to reach the UK, except for the medium and 
long-range bombers of the Naval Air Force.  
The threat was evaluated as being equivalent to 229 sorties on the first day of hostilities 
attacking 12 targets.103 In another report from around the same time the capability analysis 
was slightly different. This report read, “It is estimated that the threat to UK will consist of 
about 120 sorties per day by the Long Range Air Force, mostly Backfire, and 120 Fencer 
sorties per day by the tactical force. In addition a number of reconnaissance sorties by 
Foxbat should be expected.”104 In yet another assessment of the same time, the threat was 
expected to be, “… one-third of the [Long Range Air] force [of approximately 550]… available 
for operations against the UK base.”105 This meant estimates ranged between approximately 
180 and 240 sorties against the UK base at the beginning of hostilities. Identified within 
these reports were key targets which were airfields, Early Warning radar systems, naval 
bases and operational HQs.  
The main air threat was identified as four key aircraft. The Sukhoi Su-24 (NATO codename 
FENCER) was an interdiction/strike aircraft capable of reaching the UK from airbases in 
Eastern Europe. This aircraft did not have the weapon carrying capability of those noted 
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below, but was available in large numbers. The Tupolev Tu-16 (BADGER) was a medium 
bomber:  The Tupolev Tu-22 (BLINDER) was a high altitude, fast bomber; The Tupolev Tu-26 
(BACKFIRE) was a long-range bomber capable of reaching the whole of the UK from East 
Germany. This aircraft also posed a threat to NATO and allied shipping in the North Eastern 
Atlantic. In 1978 the Secretary of State for Defence had told the Prime Minister, 
“The new Soviet ‘Backfire’ bomber was the main problem … The 
Backfire bombers … would probably fly very low en route to the UK, 
thereby beating our radar warning system. Against this, we were 
improving our radar coverage through the Nimrod flying radar system; 
and we were also developing the capacity to refuel fighter aircraft in 
the air. The Nimrods would be operational in 1982.”106  
Older aircraft, such as the Tupolev Tu-20 (BEAR) and Myasishchev M-4 (BISON) were still 
available, but were expected to be phased out of the WTO arsenal by the early-to-mid 
1980s.107 The MiG-23 (FLOGGER) is not mentioned in the main assessments as it is not a 
strategic bomber, but it would be a threat in substantial numbers from East German 
airfields.108 Low-flying penetrating aircraft such as the MiG-23 were a clearly identified 
threat that resulted in the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) development,109 
aimed at preventing mass attacks which could overwhelm the anti-aircraft defence.110 As 
most MoD plans indicate that things would definitely ‘go badly’ in the Central Region, air 
defence of the UK would become more difficult over time, especially as the forces and 
supplies available for defence were limited both in number and sustainability. Attacks by 
large numbers of aircraft were also a serious threat to the naval forces in Allied Command 
Channel (ACCHAN) and the Eastern Atlantic Area (EASTLANT). 
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In addition to the air threat, the maritime threat was closely analysed with reports about 
Soviet merchant fleet operations,111 amphibious capabilities112 and anti-ship missiles113 
amongst others. The WTO navies, primarily of the Soviet Union, showed an increase in 
numbers of various types of significant vessel, such as submarines, cruisers and aircraft 
carriers, as well as improvements in technology, turning it from a coastal force to a true 
blue-water navy.114 The UK served as a base for NATO maritime reconnaissance and attack 
covering the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK)115 gap against Soviet naval forces trying to break 
out into the Atlantic.116  Because of this, maritime operations against the UK coastal facilities 
increasingly offered the WTO an attractive option especially mining ports and anchorages, 
direct missile attack on shore based or near-inland facilities, and interference with shipping 
and access routes to and around the islands.117 Britain relied heavily on imports of food and 
fuel for everyday life, and the threat was outlined in a report from the Defence Operational 
Planning Staff (DOP) thus: 
“The maintenance of food and other supplies to the United Kingdom in the 
face of this maritime threat will be vital should the period of conventional 
hostilities be prolonged. Surface launched conventional missiles, primarily 
intended for use against surface shipping, could be used against prominent 
coastal targets.”118  
This posed a threat to the reinforcement and resupply by sea, especially if mining of ports 
was effected clandestinely before the outbreak of hostilities. A crisis would require large 
numbers of ships to be docked and unloaded as military personnel and supplies are received 
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from Canada and the USA. These would need clear, quick access to major ports and 
anchorages along the South and West coasts of Britain. The Royal Navy considered that 
protection against the mining of ports and harbours would be difficult to achieve. A Royal 
Navy Captain commented in a letter to his Member of Parliament (MP), “… when all the 
‘Ton’ class have gone in the near future, we may have enough of the costly ‘Brecons’ to 
keep one port clear at any one time …”119 
A direct invasion of the UK by air or sea during a general war in Europe was discounted by 
the MoD, with the main land-based threat considered to be subversion, industrial action, 
sabotage, and terrorist activity.120 The MoD anticipated the WTO would introduce Special 
Forces into the UK for these purposes. Naval forces would be used to land Special Forces 
units on the British coast for sabotage attack, but were not expected to make serious 
attempts to attack or land large numbers of troops. Britain’s Army was very experienced in 
counter-insurgency tasks, with their expertise honed in Northern Ireland and other low-level 
conflicts. Many of the troops with this experience had rotated from BAOR, and in the event 
of war would have been deployed in West Germany.121 This left the Territorial Army (TA) 
and reservists, who constituted the bulk of United Kingdom Land Forces (UKLF). The 
reservists would be inexperienced handling sabotage and subversion. 
The Government expected the WTO to provide support for dissident and terrorist groups, as 
well as political organisations that were deemed a threat. Military Aid to the Civil Authority 
was supposed to be available to counter any danger from sabotage, but the number of 
potential targets for sabotage was large. The defence of installations on land relied on 
sufficient time to mobilise in the event of war, otherwise those installations would be 
vulnerable. The establishment of Key Point (see Key Point definition, United Kingdom 
Categorisation of NATO Alert Measures 
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Glossary of Terms, page 377) defence and Ground Defence Areas would necessarily have to 
happen very early in any crisis. This was problematic as the Army, “… would, until 
mobilisation is complete, have insufficient forces to meet its commitments.”122  
The defensive strategy of NATO did not exclude, once a war had begun, strikes at the enemy 
forces in their rear areas or homelands, or counterattacks against enemy penetrations. 
Indeed, part of the doctrine for the air force was to attack enemy forces deep within Eastern 
countries with the intention of stopping their progress into the West. This was known as 
‘Follow On Forces Attack’ (FOFA) was adopted and incorporated as part of NATO’s overall 
strategic doctrine. In the event of war, FOFA sought to attack the Warsaw Pact second-
echelon units relying on the technological advantage of NATO targetting and delivery of 
munitions.123  FOFA was not new. Large scale attacks on lines-of-communication from the 
air has been exploited in almost all conventional conflicts from the beginning of the Second 
World War onwards. FOFA was meant to exploit the accuracy of new, guided munitions to 
make the impact of interdiction much more effective. A controversial area of policy, even 
today, it requires an aggressive use of military force aimed at reducing the war-fighting 
capability of the enemy, and accepting that collateral damage in terms of civilian deaths and 
destruction of property will occur.124  NATO, being a democratically based organisation of 
freely joined members, has always been careful to phrase such thinking in terms considered 
the least alarming for the civilian populations of countries where fighting might take place.  
The WTO looked to new operational and tactical developments, the threat assessment by 
NATO altered to one of purely conventional operations without reliance on the initial use of 
nuclear weapons.125  Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had looked for agreement with the USA in the 1970s 
regarding ‘strategic sufficiency’ of nuclear weapons.126 This position was reinforced by 
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Brezhnev’s announcement in 1982 that the Soviet Union unilaterally, “… assumes an 
obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.”127 Utilising doctrinal, positional and 
political differences within the NATO Alliance, it was feared the WTO planners would seek to 
exploit speed and numbers to achieve victory.128 A NATO report from 1984 states that the 
WTO forces are, “… organised and equipped to take the offensive right from the beginning 
of a conflict.”129 Soviet doctrine had always espoused speed and mass, and the latest 
iteration of this was the Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG).130 Intended to break into 
the rear areas of NATOs defences, this was of deep concern to NATO commanders. The 
direct threat to the forces in Europe is summed up in the Battle Notes for 1(BR) Corps: 
“Soviet military doctrine requires that offensive operations are mounted by a superiority of 
tanks, infantry and artillery … The primary aim of such operations will be the destruction of 
NATO’s defensive capability …”131 The doctrine relied on an attack making a quick 
breakthrough of the ‘crust’ of NATO’s ‘Forward Defence’. General Bagnall experienced the 
effects during a wargame with a Soviet trained Afghan officer, Colonel Wardak, in 1983. 
Colonel Wardak had escaped from Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion. General Bagnall 
invited him to a wargame at 1(BR) corps HQ where Wardak employed the training he had 
received at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy.132  By using an attack on the British 
sector, he fixed the British forces with frontal attacks and forced them to commit their 
reserves. On doing so, his WTO forces broke through the Dutch and Belgian Corps on the 
flanks and surrounded 1(BR) and 1(GE) Corps. 133 Victory was total. 
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Conclusion 
Between 1945 and 1991 NATO assessed the threat from the Soviet Union, and later the 
WTO, in three broad categories. Immediately post-war, the threat was based on 
conventional numerical superiority. Following the Soviet detonation of its atomic, and then 
thermonuclear devices, the threat became parity or superiority in nuclear weapons. Once 
near-parity became a reality, the threat moved to a progressive qualitative improvement in 
conventional arms, with updated tactics, to complement the continued numerical 
superiority. 
The strategy, doctrine and policy for conventional deterrence had developed throughout 
the life of NATO, along with the nuclear deterrent. NATO strategy had to find a balance that 
did not destabilise deterrence, whilst also managing potential crises.134 The conventional 
aspect of collective European defence was central from the very first days of the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC). 
The initial post-war demand for large conventional forces was reduced by the change to 
massive retaliation, but renewed with the adoption of flexible response. The response from 
the UK Government was, outwardly, unstinting support of NATO and its strategy. Internally, 
however, the policy of the UK Government wavered as successive Governments applied 
different national policies, reduced the overall defence budget, and disputed the focus of 
the policy. The evaluation of the threat to the UK Home Base, for example, did not provide a 
consistent theme for air defence. The result was that policy looked to defend the nuclear 
deterrent first, with all conventional facilities in second place.135 
Between 1967 and 1991 the official NATO strategy remained Flexible Response, with minor 
operational adjustments to NATO and National doctrine. The policy making in NATO was 
based on the assessment of the threat made by the Military Committee in NATO and the 
Defence Ministries of the member nations. An estimate of the forces required to counter it 
was made from these assessments. What NATO defined as ‘adequate’ forces was the 
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subject of the Force Proposals and Force Goals, presented by the Military Committee of 
NATO to the member nations for their consideration. 
With the collapse of Détente in the late 1970s, the build-up of WTO conventional forces, 
and the apparent disparity between East and West in military terms, the complacency 
brought about by the earlier thaw in international relations was replaced by urgent 
demands to strengthen the Western European defences. There was an increasing belief in 
the WTO’s capability to prosecute a non-nuclear, short offensive against NATO. The Long 
Term Defence Plan was amongst NATO’s response to these demands.  
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Background 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was formed in 1949 to provide collective 
defence for its members.1 Its strategy was to be founded upon, “… a balanced military force, 
bearing in mind the economic situation of each nation.”2 After the Berlin Crisis and the 
North Korean invasion of South Korea, the need for mutual defence and stronger 
deterrence obtained a greater emphasis. Western politicians realised that Europe could not 
defend itself against the Soviet Union without the assistance of the USA in both nuclear and 
conventional forces, and these crises gave additional drive to that thinking. The original 
members were joined by Greece and Turkey in 1952, and the Federal Republic of Germany 
in 1955. In parallel was the development of the Western European Union, which was 
confined to European nations. The WEU Treaty of Brussels was originally signed by five 
Western European nations.3 The WEU contained a clause covering mutual defence, but as 
this threatened to duplicate the function of NATO, it was absorbed by NATO in 1954.4  
Dr Gregory Pedlow explains the original NATO strategy, “… was contained in three basic 
documents: DC 6/1, which set forth the overall strategic concept; MC 14, which provided 
more specific strategic guidance for use in defence planning; and DC 13, which included 
both of these aspects as well as considerable detailed regional planning.”5 MC14 sought to 
add detail to the outline proposed in DC6/1, “The Strategic Concept for Defense [sic] of the 
North Atlantic Area” published in 1949. It laid out the policy that would continue until 
1991,6 to, “…insure a successful defense [sic] of the North Atlantic area. This policy requires 
the development of an adequate military strength and a close coordination of the political, 
economic and psychological efforts of member nations.”7 Although DC6/1 did not mention 
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the Soviet Union specifically, DC13 and MC14 referred to it as the ‘enemy’. MC14/1 
superseded MC14 in 1952. It established in greater detail the defensive actions to be carried 
out, including the use of weapons of mass destruction.8 
In 1957, a new strategy was adopted in MC 14/2.9 This was the policy document that 
relegated the conventional forces of NATO to a ‘trip-wire’ and relied on massive nuclear 
retaliation in response to any attack. The tone of the MC14/2 document is very different 
from its predecessors, talking clearly about the phases of war, and the, “…drastically 
reduced mobilization base on both sides following an all-out nuclear exchange, which in 
itself would preclude large-scale sustained combat operations.”10  
Conventional forces were mentioned as a response to,  
“… infiltrations, incursions or hostile local actions in the NATO area, covertly 
or overtly supported by [The Soviet Union] …”11  
Although this has been termed ‘Flexible Response 1’ or ‘Differentiated Response’ the intent 
was to limit the need for conventional forces, and rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence.12 
Because of the increased availability of nuclear weapons to both sides, the strategy saw an 
escalation to nuclear exchange as inevitable:  
“Since NATO would be unable to prevent the rapid overrunning of Europe 
unless NATO immediately employed nuclear weapons both strategically and 
tactically, we must be prepared to take the initiative in their use.  
14. In case of general war, therefore, NATO defense [sic] depends upon an 
immediate exploitation of our nuclear capability, whether or not the Soviets 
employ nuclear weapons.”13 
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NATO’s strategy, therefore, was one of threatening massive retaliation, relying on the swift 
use of nuclear weapons to counter any aggression by the WTO. Conventional forces were to 
act as a tripwire, but,  
“ … priority must be given to the provision of forces-in-being capable of 
effectively contributing to success in the initial [nuclear] phase.”14  
In 1967, the strategy termed ‘Flexible Response’ was adopted by NATO in MC14/3.15 Flexible 
Response originated with the US idea of graduated deterrence, relying ultimately on a US 
nuclear guarantee to the European states.16 MC 14/3 was seen as an attempt to counteract 
the dangers of the low nuclear threshold of the ‘Trip-Wire’.17 This strategy promoted 
greater freedom of action in response to any level of aggression by the WTO.  A period of 
warning of attack was postulated, with a conventional response to conventional attack, and 
a war whose duration could not be predicted.18  
The conventional contribution to deterrence was fundamental to this new NATO policy, and 
by extension, to Britain. The Chiefs of Staff wrote, “If we wish to play the part of a major 
military power among Western European nations a strong conventional contribution is 
essential … it is in conventional forces that the Alliance is weak, and deterrence therefore is 
at comparative risk.”19 
This strategy would carry NATO through to the end of the Cold War, but was subject to 
review and reassessment throughout the period. However, improved conventional forces 
were not collectively established. Several programmes and initiatives, such as the Long Term 
Defence Programme, were adopted through the lifetime of ‘Flexible Response’ which 
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demonstrated that there were continued deficiencies in the conventional forces, most 
notably in reserves and logistics, which member countries either could not, or would not, 
rectify.20 
NATO’s Politico-Military Structure 
NATO’s top-level governance was the North Atlantic Council (NAC) which was comprised of 
political representatives from all the member countries. (See Appendix A, Figure 2 - NATO's 
Politico-Military Structure) Subordinate to the NAC was the Defence Planning Committee 
(DPC) which handled military affairs. Under the DPC was the Military Committee, made up 
of the Chiefs-of-Staff of the member countries’ defence forces. Regular meetings were held 
between representatives on the NAC and DPC. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) met twice 
yearly at Ministerial level. The three Major NATO Commands (MNC) – Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and 
Commander-in-Chief Allied Command Channel (CINCHAN) - were directly responsible to the 
Military Committee. Geographically, NATO was divided into several command areas: 
SACEUR commanded Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), Allied Forces Central 
Europe (AFCENT), Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH): SACLANT commanded the 
Eastern Atlantic Area (EASTLANT), Allied Command Western Atlantic (WESTLANT) and 
Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT): CINCHAN commanded Allied Command Channel 
(ACCHAN) (English Channel and North Sea)21 (For full details see Appendix A) 
The internal workings of NATO were not smooth, with national considerations sometimes 
interfering with or delaying internal projects.22 Even with the increased possibility of conflict 
in Europe after the outbreak of the Korean War, NATO could not agree on a conventional 
force level which the member nations could afford to provide.23 France left the military 
structure of NATO in 1966 following disagreements between the French and US 
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21 Britain and NATO. Over Thirty Years of Collective Defence (London: HMSO, 1980), 11–12. 
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Governments about NATO policy.24 The NATO bureaucracy also slowed or stifled some new 
ideas which could not be integrated into the procedures of the Alliance.25 
The Eurogroup was established in 1968 following a British initiative to provide closer co-
operation between the European members of NATO.26 Additionally, the Independent 
European Programme Group initiative, which was not part of NATO, first met in 1976 to 
promote the European defence industry.27 Political and military differences, however, 
meant that there was no clear unified policy from the European countries. Each nation 
within NATO had its own defence ministry, along with its own doctrine of military 
operations. In addition, the system of alerts and warnings which NATO used was not 
universally adopted by the member states, causing some confusion over alert level 
equivalence, and also political disagreements about NATO’s attempts to automate 
mobilisation and transfer of command authority. Politically, there was no method for any of 
the agreements within NATO to be forced on to the member states.28 General Julian 
Thompson said the command structure employed by NATO was an example of ‘cognitive 
dissonance’ for anyone to believe it could be a realistic operational structure during 
wartime.29 
Difference between members arose regarding the commitment of forces: it was of great 
concern to NATO Commanders, especially the, “… assurance from nations that forces will be 
committed when requested.”30 This required the correction of deficiencies in the NATO 
Alert System, allowing Automatic Transfer of Authority in times of crisis.31 A great deal of 
time was spent aligning the alert system of NATO with that of the member countries,32 so 
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that during a crisis the operational command of the forces was given to NATO, or already 
held by NATO, removing the problem of some countries’ political leadership denying NATO 
the use of forces until it was too late. Despite this, Britain rejected the automatic call-up of 
troops and programmed switching of command authority to NATO. The British 
Government’s response to the request by the SACEUR was that, regardless of how it might 
improve matters for NATO military commanders, “The decision … is a political one …”33  
NATO Strategy and the Force Planning 
The force level requirement for NATO were established by Force Planning. (see Appendix A, 
Figure 1 - NATO Force planning cycle) Following on from the ‘Annual Review’ system 
implemented after the Lisbon Conference in 1952, the practice was introduced of reviewing 
force plans each year and projecting them for five years.34 Every two years, as part of the 
Force Planning Process, assessments of the economic and military situation were prepared 
by NATO Ministers and Major NATO Commanders and their staffs, and agreed with the 
individual nations. Ministers from those nations then agreed the framework within which 
they will plan the next round of Force Proposals. These were, “… specific objects in each 
area of national military activity.”35 NATO then issued the Force Proposals to the respective 
countries’ Defence Ministries. Each year, the nations were to draw up detailed plans based 
on the Force Proposals, co-ordinating the five-year Proposals with annual national 
commitments.36 They were, therefore, a compromise between what NATO saw as its 
strategic, operational, and sometimes even tactical requirement, and the ability of the 
nations to make resources available. Force Proposals were intended to seek a balanced 
distribution of effort among NATO members, given the financial and political realities 
obtaining at the time.37 The Force Planning cycle could be bypassed for specific or urgent 
initiatives, such as the Long Term Defence Programme. 
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For the period of research, the NATO documents MC 48/3 and MC 14/3 explained the 
overall strategic view of NATO, but did not define in any concrete terms the force levels 
required in any area of NATO responsibility.38 MC 14/3 defined the overall posture for the 
defence of the NATO area under a variety of conditions ranging from covert operations to 
nuclear attack. The objective of the strategy was to, “… preserve or restore the integrity and 
security of the North Atlantic Treaty Area …”39 The report identified the capabilities and 
probable forms of action which the WTO might take against NATO. The strategy was broken 
down into elements that covered the concepts and decision-making required. The forces 
were described in general terms as needing to be sufficient, “… to present a credible 
deterrent to any level of aggression …”40 The British view of this was presented in the 1977 
Defence Estimate which declared,  
“Adequate conventional forces are required to repel limited conventional 
attacks and to impose delay and inflict serious losses on large-scale 
conventional attacks, thereby demonstrating to the aggressor the 
determination of the Alliance to defend itself, making credible to him the risks 
of escalation that he is running, and providing time for diplomatic efforts to 
resolve the conflict. They serve to keep the nuclear threshold high.”41 
MC48/3 identified the military implications of the strategy laid out in MC 14/3, and 
recorded the measures required to achieve the strategic objective.  MC 48/3 described the, 
“Roles and Tasks for NATO Forces by Commands and Geographical Region” and identified 
the capabilities required by the forces in those regions. The Atlantic approaches, English 
Channel and North Sea were identified as strategically important,42 as well as the defence of 
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the British Isles for reinforcement.43  Despite this, the UK home islands were never included 
within the area of a Major NATO Commander for land defence.44 
Force Proposals and Force Goals 
At the Lisbon conference in February 1952, NATO proposed to its member states what their 
military contribution to the collective defence should be.45 The British share of the force 
level for NATO was set, but was subsequently revised downwards.46 Despite Britain’s 
aspiration to remain a world power, it was financially impossible to provide the numbers of 
regular troops, equipment and supplies NATO required. The North Atlantic Council reported, 
“The United Kingdom authorities state that since the earlier force goals were formulated it 
has become evident that their financial and economic capabilities will not permit the 
numerical expansion …”47 of the Armed Forces. The force planning prior to 1961 were 
carried out by SACEUR with little consideration given to economic pressures, and hence the 
plans tended to be ignored.48 A review of the planning process was initiated under NATO 
Secretary General Dirk Stikker in 1962,49 and reviewed again in 1971.50 The new process 
developed from this review is described below.  
The Force Proposals were presented by the Major NATO Commanders, based on their 
individual assessments, and examined by the Military Committee and the Defence Review 
Committee. A procedure, adopted in 1977 meant that the International Military Staffs, 
along with national staff officers and MNC representatives carried out a review of the 
Proposals. Further reviews by the Military Committee and Risk Assessments followed. The 
Proposals then returned to the Defence Planning Committee for further consideration. The 
Military Committee, along with the Major NATO Commanders, then decided which of the 
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Proposals were amended, deleted or deferred, based on the constraints identified by the 
Defence Review Committee. Nations could seek to change the Proposals or oppose them in 
both the Defence Planning Committee and Military Committee. Evidence of these 
alterations and oppositions presented by the UK Government can be seen in the report 
produced by the Chiefs of Staff Committee in response to the 1979 – 1984 NATO Force 
Proposals.51 Following this process, the Proposals were adopted as NATO Force Goals by the 
Defence Planning Committee.52 
The Force Goals laid out each category that was to be implemented and the NATO 
requirement in terms of numbers and capability. They were intended to, “… establish an 
element of reasonable challenge to each country in the interests of collective defence …”53 
These Force Goals were then turned in to Force Plans. These plans were an attempt to 
reconcile national Force Plans with the NATO Goals.54 The nations identified the best match 
between their own plans and the Goals in the Defence Planning Questionnaire. This then 
developed into the Five Year Force Plan where forces were formally committed to NATO.55  
It was crucial for the strategy of NATO that the conventional forces and facilities under 
Flexible Response should be able to provide a defence against the WTO, giving time for 
reinforcements and resupply to arrive. If it was impossible to maintain these conventional 
forces in action, then the nuclear threshold would have been reached very much 
sooner. Because of the change in strategic outlook within NATO, greater emphasis was to be 
placed on providing fully capable conventional forces, ready to move into their warfighting 
positions. In the early 1980s the proposed increase in conventional forces, in response to 
the expansion of WTO forces, and the invasion of Afghanistan, had been accepted by NATO 
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members, “… by national commitments to the biennially agreed NATO Force Goals.”56 
However, Professor Strachan writes; 
“'NATO force planning', Anthony King-Harman has recently written, 
'especially for conventional forces and the economic reserves to support 
them, are only related to NATO's strategic concept in very general terms'. 
Instead, NATO plans rest on little more than 'a largely numerical assessment 
of the threat, and secondly, resource guidance ... based on the 3 per cent real 
increase per year formula.”57 
The limitations of the Force Planning cycle were clear: no nation was duty bound to 
implement the plans. Each nation could, and did, plan for their own national security, 
sometimes to the exclusion of NATO requirements.58 In the UK, no cost/low cost aspects of 
the Plans were prioritised.59 In 1981, only 57% of the UK Force Goals were to be fully 
implemented.60  
Infrastructure and Facilities 
Outside of the direct military contribution, each member of NATO provided funds for 
infrastructure projects such as anti-aircraft missile batteries, fuel lines, port and airport 
facilities and transport depots. The UK Government wrote, “The NATO infrastructure 
programme has been in existence for almost as long as the Alliance itself and has proved 
one of the most effective co-operative defence efforts.”61 However, this area of NATO 
contributions is rarely referred to. Britain’s contribution to the NATO Infrastructure budget 
was 12% of the total (total approximately £1,750 Million for the period 1980 - 1984,62 rising 
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to £2,100 Million in 1989.63) Whilst Britain was content with the system, some countries – 
notably Germany in the early 1980s – sought to reduce their contribution to the 
Infrastructure fund.64 All the European countries were suffering economic problems, and 
many sought to save money by cutting funding for non-combat forces. 
Corrective Initiatives 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970 NATO members sought to make budget cuts in defence, 
some by moving troops to their home country to improve balance-of-payments deficits, 
others by simply reducing the force numbers and materiel stocks.65 To try to reverse the 
deficiencies these cuts left, several corrective initiative were instituted within NATO 
between 1969 and 1985. The initiatives focussed on readiness, planning, reserves and 
sustainability and the improvement in the use of technology over different areas of the 
force structure.66 These initiatives were meant to be outside of the normal planning process, 
but were eventually subsumed into it.  
AD-70 
Improvements in NATO’s conventional forces were required following the adoption of 
MC14/3. Alliance Defence in the Seventies (AD-70) was a detailed analysis of the expected 
problems to be faced in the 1970s by NATO.67 The proposals addressed specific areas of 
improvement to NATO’s conventional defence forces.68 Little has been written about this 
initiative. 
There were eight areas which required attention: armour and anti-armour; air defence 
(hardened aircraft shelters); ASW and maritime surveillance; maldeployment of forces in the 
Central Region; the flanks; mobilisation; communications; and war reserves. However, in a 
1988 IISS review of the schemes for improving NATO’s conventional defence, AD 70 was a 
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likened to a political ‘lucky dip’.69 As the areas of defence requiring attention re-emerged in 
the Long Term Defence Programme, one can assume that AD-70 was not wholly successful. 
Long Term Defence Programme 
As NATO became increasingly uneasy about the military build-up of the WTO, concern was 
voiced at several NATO meetings that, “ … the sustained growth in the Warsaw Pact 
countries' military power, on land, at sea and in the air [is] beyond levels apparently justified 
for defensive purposes.”70  The US put forward a series of initiatives to strengthen NATO 
defences.71 These initiatives were aimed at improving the military capability of NATO 
member countries from the low point of the mid/late 1960s, and to solve particular 
problems still associated with moving away from the trip-wire to the flexible response 
strategy.  At the 1977 NATO London Summit meeting the decision was taken to adopt the 
initiatives:  
“In response to recommendations and decisions made at the London meeting 
for improving Alliance defences, Ministers agreed that the Alliance should, as 
a means of strengthening ongoing NATO force planning and national 
programmes, undertake … to prepare a time-phased defence action 
programme concentrating on a limited number of areas where collective 
action is urgently required and to review means for strengthening NATO …”72 
This became the Long Term Defence Programme (LTDP).73 The LTDP was to strengthen 
NATO forces to, “… meet the changing defence needs of the 1980s.”74 General Rodgers, 
NATO SACEUR, noted that, “The intention to provide a stronger conventional deterrent has 
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been reaffirmed by NATO’s Long Term Defense [sic] Programme, adopted in 1978 …”75 The 
priorities in the LTDP for Britain, across the Task Forces, were sustainability, improving 
readiness and communications, and enhancements to the speed of mobilisation and 
deployment.76 Plans were also proposed to increase defence spending by 3% in real terms 
between 1979 and 1984.77 The LTDP was meant to maintain the members’ armed forces at 
a level already declared to NATO, whilst improving the overall effectiveness of the 
conventional forces with emphasis on readiness, mobilisation and sustainability.78  
The Task Forces 
The LTDP was broken down into Task Forces each looking at a separate subject. They were: 
"Task Force 
1 - Readiness 
2 - Reinforcement 
3 - Reserve Mobilisation 
4 - Maritime Posture 
5 - Air Defence 
6 - Communications, Command and Control 
7 - Electronic Warfare 
8 - Rationalisation 
9 - Consumer Logistics 
10 - Theatre Nuclear Modernisation”79 
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Initially the ten task forces were to consider 123 measures, but these had increased to more 
than 150 by 1981.80 As an example of the classification of responsibilities within the task 
forces, ‘Task Force 1 – Readiness’ dealt with measures related to speed of response to a 
crisis, and the cost associated with improvements.  The, “… Main Action Areas addressed 
were: 
Armour and Anti-armour weapons 
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (protection and weaponry) 
Ammunition Uploading 
Air-to-surface munitions 
Operational Readiness Test Programme [ORTP] 
Malstationing and malpositioning 
Commitment of force to NATO 
The Alert System”81 
Task Force 2 looked at the reinforcement of Europe, and required the earmarking of civilian 
transportation facilities for use in a crisis. The findings of this Task Force were almost 
universally adopted.  
Reserve Mobilisation, addressed by Task Force 3, was more problematic. Although the UK 
felt that its reserves met NATO standards for mobilisation, the level of training was 
questioned. The MoD was not able to meet the 48-hour period for deployment of reserves 
stipulated by Task Force 3. The UK was also not prepared to accept the need to increase 
training, and certainly did not accept the automatic triggering of mobilisation. 
Maritime commitments were hit hardest from the list of Task Force 4 goals, especially after 
the 1981 SDE. In most cases, the goals were to be subject to ‘study’. A shortage of ships and 
maritime reconnaissance aircraft was the most pressing concern from NATO, and the UK 
responded by suggesting that qualitative improvements and survivability would offset the 
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reduction in numbers.82  Likewise, Task Force 5, Air Defence, would be subject to, “… studies 
in greater depth …” because of the cost.83 Task Forces 6, 7 and 8 looked at Communications, 
Electronic Warfare and Rationalisation, and were all generally welcomed, although subject 
to further study by the MoD.  
At the beginning of the research period, LTDP Task Force 9, “… concluded that NATO has not 
the logistic support required for the strategy of flexible response …”84 and thus would rely 
on early use of nuclear weapons, or the hope of a short war. The situation had not improved 
by 1989, with the British Government still unable, or unwilling, to invest in a War 
Maintenance Reserve that would last more than a few days. By the end of the 1980s the 
logistical disparity between NATO and the WTO was, according to Western sources, more 
marked than ever. The WTO had ammunition and fuel stocks to fight a high intensity war for 
about two months, with, “… forward based war stocks …” providing two week’s offensive 
support.85  
In the view of the MoD, the LTDP was intended “… to arrest and if possible reverse the drop 
[in comparison to the WTO] …”86 The UK Government, “ … intend to give our full support to 
NATO’s Long Term Defence Programme which will bring significant improvement to NATO’s 
conventional capabilities in the 1980s and beyond.”87 Despite the urgent need identified by 
the LTDP to improve readiness, Britain was reluctant to adopt some of the proposals. An 
example was proposal 1E/WHR2, that, “Nations should conduct weekend no-notice recalls 
to ensure adequacy of personnel availability and recall systems…” which was only accepted 
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in principle by the UK Government. Its hesitancy was explained because, “… this proposal 
imposes an unnecessary further restriction on the quality of life …” of forces personnel.88 
There was a distinct divide between the US and the UK regarding the commitment to the 
LTDP. In many cases Britain was prepared to endorse the overall programme rather than 
endorse the objectives themselves.89 For their part, and consistently throughout the 
development of the LTDP, the US Government said it, “…would like to see the language 
strengthened.”90 Nevertheless, Britain’s Government continued to dismiss those parts of the 
LTDP with which it disagreed and to focus most of its efforts on the low- or no-cost 
options.91 Items already in the National plans, or those with low or no cost were quickly 
adopted. Those with a high associated cost could be, “… accepted for further study without 
commitment ….”92   
A telling comment in a memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence regarding the 
NATO report says, “I believe … we can circumvent the difficulties over the cost of the LTDP, 
at any rate for the purposed of the Summit, without undertakings about the future level of 
the Defence Budget.”93 This position was reinforced in a memorandum to the Secretary of 
State for Defence from Michael Quinlan which categorised the proposals in the LTDP: 
Category 1 which could be accepted, were, “… covered by existing plans or will cost little …”; 
Category 2 which required further work; Category 3, “… where there has not been enough 
time for proper formulation of the nations’ views.”94 
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Short Term Initiatives 
The increase in WTO numbers and capabilities worried the NATO ministers sufficiently to 
prompt the development of measures to correct quickly some obvious problems with 
conventional defence in Europe, rather than wait for the LTDP to take effect. The NATO 
Defence Planning Committee reported; 
“Ministers also endorsed the prompt and positive outcome of the 
accompanying programme of short-term force improvements in the selected 
areas of anti-armour, war reserve stocks, and readiness and reinforcement. 
They noted that, for example, the Alliance will increase by end-1978 holdings 
of anti-armour missiles by about one-third and plan similar improvements in 
stocks of other critical war reserve munitions. The response to the short-term 
initiatives has enhanced NATO's defence capabilities and provided an 
example of the Alliance's ability to act expeditiously and effectively.”95  
The apparent capability of the WTO to attack at short notice was a direct threat to the 
mobilisation plans of the NATO members. In the past, NATO expected a warning period of 
several weeks, but now reports suggested that any warning would be very limited.96   To 
counter this, and to provide more combat ready troops, some of the proposed short term 
measures included stationing a US Marines Amphibious Force of 7,500 troops and 70 
combat aircraft in England, allowing rapid deployment to the NATO Northern Region; and 
the forward stationing of a second Dutch Brigade in the Federal Republic of Germany. There 
were political difficulties with some of the proposals, and a note to the Secretary of State for 
Defence found that, “Despite many fine words the Dutch authorities are very unenthusiastic 
about forward deployment.”97  
Of vital interest for all NATO deployed troops was the improved forward storage of 
ammunition and equipment. This had been identified as a serious limitation to the 
effectiveness of NATO defence, due to the lack of ammunition-handling equipment and 
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secure storage areas within easy reach of the troops’ deployment locations. Eight storage 
sites were to be built, with at least two completed by the end of 1979.98   
Small modifications to the provision of guided weapons and readiness of troops for 
deployment were also identified. A third troop of Striker vehicles was to be provided for 
reinforcement to BAOR, and alterations to the deployment of troops to Northern Ireland 
meant that fewer troops would be withdrawn from BAOR.99 An increase in Harrier 
availability, the purchase of 10,000 additional ‘Jezebel’ sonobuoys and additional at-sea 
refuelling capability were included in the short-term measures. Field exercises were 
undertaken to ascertain and, if necessary, redefine the turn-around times for aircraft 
operations.100 As part of the improvement measures, two River Class BP tankers were to be 
fitted out to refuel combatant ships at sea.101  
The LTDP died away in the early 1980s. The programme had been resisted by the NATO 
bureaucracy, as it attempted to work outside of the force planning cycle. Emphasis on the 
LTDP as a separate set of goals was terminated in 1982, and the final LTDP report was issued 
in 1983.102 
Conventional Defence Improvement Initiative (CDI(I)) 
This is a little known, and little studied, initiative begun in 1985 by NATO with the intention 
of, “…achieving our objective of improving our conventional defences.”103 It sought to deal 
with the deficiencies still present in NATO’s conventional defence posture following the 
LTDP.104 The (CDI)I was introduced by General Bernard Rogers, SACEUR from 1979 to 1987, 
and became part of NATO’s defence framework.105 Rogers expressed his opinion that NATO 
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conventional defences were inadequate when compared to the conceptual requirements. 
Although the CDI(I) was a US initiative, the US Government attempted to avoid appearing to 
impose its own agenda. The West German Government sponsored the initiative, which was 
adopted by the NATO defence ministers in December 1984.106  
The CDI(I) identified military deficiencies, such as improving munitions supplies and 
planning. The initiative sought to modernise equipment in the Armed Forces, increase 
convergence of national and Alliance planning, exploit emerging technologies, as well as to,  
“…acquire more ammunition stocks for selected battle decisive systems. The 
results are promising particularly in the Central Region. Most nations plan 
more rapid progress towards achieving the 30-day objective in the selected 
high priority items and there have also been improvements in plans for other 
ammunition items …”107 
It was telling that, after fifteen years of Flexible Response, and six years of the Long Term 
Defence Programme, ammunition supply, readiness and planning were still problematic for 
all the NATO members. In his work on the evolution of NATO’s conventional force posture, 
Professor John Duffield commented that, “… The shortcomings of the CDI were strikingly 
similar to those that hobbled the LTDP.”108  
Balance in NATO 
Robert Keohane and Jospeh Nye refined the concept of post-war Realist thinking by 
postulating the idea of Complex Interdependence, which helps explain aspects of the 
relationships between Alliance members affected NATO development – economic, political, 
and social as well as military. Increasing complexity in the relationships between states 
means that military force was not the main measure of strength, and that power was 
aggregated across several areas of influence.109  This reflected quite accurately the situation 
both within NATO, between the Alliance members, and outside NATO, balancing the 
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Superpower blocs. As Complex Interdependence suggested, not all countries within NATO 
exerted the same amount of influence on policy and strategy.110 In addition, influence in 
one area, such as economic power, was used to create influence in others. Keohane and Nye 
used the example of US troops levels influencing trade and monetary negotiations.111 With 
the greatest single contribution to NATO, both in financial terms and in numbers of troops 
and equipment, the USA had a dominant influence on the Alliance.112 The Continental 
members of the Alliance sought to balance the dominance of the USA, and Britain acted as 
something of an arbitrator.113 
The US had long felt that the European NATO allies were not carrying enough of the burden 
for protecting Europe.114 In 1966 RAND published An Economic Theory of Alliance by Mancur 
Olson and Richard Zeckhauser which stated that, “… the most notable complaint is about 
the American share of the burden of common defense [sic] under the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation.”115 NATO relied for its long term survival in the event of a war on the US 
REFORGER programme.116 In 1981 President Jimmy Carter reported, “We must insist that 
our European Allies undertake programs and make available the resources needed …”117 In 
contrast, the Eurogroup declared that the European contribution to the Alliance was 
substantial and in keeping with the vital interests of Europe.118 President Ronald Reagan’s 
military build-up in the early 1980s shifted some of the financial burden back to the USA, 
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with US defence spending rising between 1980 and 1984.119 Britain’s position as a transit 
point in the REFORGER programme made its defence crucial to any hopes of the successful 
reinforcement of Europe by US and Canadian troops. 
Olson and Zeckhauser suggested that, not only were the smaller nations not sharing the 
burden equally, but that there was a direct relationship between the gross national product 
of a country and the percentage of their resources which were committed to collective 
defence in NATO.120 Subsequent analyses have queried the findings121 and questioned the 
original hypothesis from RAND.122 Flexible Response required a greater degree of 
conventional commitment from NATO countries than before, and the smaller countries had 
been seen by the USA as riding on the ‘coat-tails’ of the US (and to some extent the British 
and French) nuclear deterrent and conventional forces, without contributing sufficient funds 
and personnel to the Alliance.123 It was not only the USA which considered ‘free-riding’ a 
problem. Chancellor Schmidt commented in 1980 that Britain was not carrying out its 
proper share in European defence, and received a strong correction from the UK 
Government.124 The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) again questioned Britain’s 
commitment to NATO in 1981, and in response Michael Quinlan tried to reaffirm the 
positive actions taken despite a serious economic squeeze.125 
The Federal Republic of Germany, as the potential main battle ground in any conventional 
war between NATO and the WTO, carried a corresponding influence within NATO. ‘Forward 
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Defence’126 – a determination to defend against a WTO invasion as far forward as possible 
without ceding territory – was naturally popular in the FRG.127 This was characterised by a 
desire to deter and if necessary defend, rather than liberate following an invasion.128 
Flexible response caused some European countries to fear that the US was attempting to 
reduce its commitment to the use of nuclear weapons in NATO’s defence.129 The Europeans 
feared a US withdrawal of forces from Europe would mean a weakening of the deterrent 
value of the nuclear ‘umbrella’ which the US offered to Europe. The increase in conventional 
forces demanded by Flexible Response concerned some that the Europeans would be left to 
fight a conventional war almost alone, with its attendant destruction. Continental European 
countries such as FRG saw the threat of strategic nuclear retaliation on the Soviet Union and 
its allies as preferable to the devastation a conventional war, or short-range nuclear 
exchange on its own soil, would cause.130 The fear was that the Superpowers would fight a 
war in Europe, whilst remaining untouched themselves.131 Keeping the US strategically close 
to Europe meant that the threat of destruction could be spread between the member 
states.132 This difference in approach caused bitter disagreements within NATO about the 
implementation of ‘Flexible Response’.133 
An important effect of the adoption of Flexible Response was the broadening debate of the 
nuclear threshold. The nuclear threshold, for the purposes of this research, is defined as the 
point at which nuclear weapons are used, in whatever quantity and size-range, by either 
side in a conflict between NATO and the WTO.134 The NATO strategy of Flexible Response 
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was, according to one MoD representative, “… a matter of degree: there is a spectrum 
ranging from a near-trip-wire posture to a capability to hold on and win without escalation 
in almost any mode of conflict …”135 The strategy compromised between the US desire for a 
conventional defence of Europe, and the European preparation for a brief conventional war 
before the use of nuclear weapons.136 
There was a heavily publicised effort to raise the nuclear threshold.137 Professor Hew 
Strachan wrote, “In raising the nuclear threshold, conventional defence aims to reassert the 
principles of graduated deterrence.”138 As part of a publication on the use of emerging 
technology to raise the nuclear threshold, Dr Phil Williams139 wrote, “The argument that this 
threshold needs to be raised has won widespread approval.”140 The fear about the threshold 
was that once it was crossed, and nuclear weapons had been used regardless of their 
designation as tactical or otherwise, there would be a rapid escalation to strategic 
exchange.141 Raising the threshold required greater conventional resources for the forces to 
hold, or defeat, any non-nuclear attack by the WTO into Europe, and to keep holding 
without allowing the WTO a break-in or breakthrough. There was a need to, “… improve 
conventional stopping and staying power in order to maintain the nuclear threshold as high 
as possible.”142 Britain committed itself publicly to improving defences, both nationally and 
for NATO, to raise the nuclear threshold and retain the cohesion of the Alliance. 
Defining Britain’s Commitment to NATO 
Britain’s commitment to NATO was and is both dependent upon, and influences, British 
policy. In 1943 Sir Halford Mackinder, one of the originators of geopolitics, regarded 
                                                     
135 MO9, Annex ‘NATO Strategy’, Memorandum from B Norbury (MoD) to G Walden (FCO), 10th March 1980, ‘UK Future 
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139 Dr Phil Williams was a lecturer in International Relations at the University of Southampton 
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Britain’s position in Europe as decisive, noting that the geographical area of the North 
Atlantic was made up of, “… three elements -- a bridgehead in France, a moated aerodrome 
in Britain, and a reserve of trained manpower, agriculture and industries in the eastern 
United States and Canada.”143  Following the end of the Second World War, the overall view 
of the balance in Europe shifted. The friendly forces of the two great power blocks became 
less than friendly, and the front line between them solidified at the Inner German Border. 
The Western democratic countries felt compelled to keep garrisons in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, not because of the military threat from Germany, but because of the threat 
from the Soviet Union.144 France left the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966 and, 
politically, the bridgehead onto the European mainland for Britain became the Low 
Countries, Denmark and the North West coast of West Germany.  
The Original Commitment 
Britain committed to provide forces to NATO which would be available to the Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe. At the Lisbon Conference in 1952 Britain committed to providing 
4⅔ Divisions at mobilisation (M-Day), increasing to 6⅔ by M+90.145 Naval forces were to 
include 92 maritime aircraft, 2 Fleet Carriers, 20 Destroyers and 29 Ocean Escorts, among 
other vessels. 1,516 front line aircraft were also to be committed.146  
The British share of the contribution to NATO was revised downwards in 1953.147 It was 
financially difficult to provide the numbers of regular troops, equipment and supplies NATO 
required.148  The structure of the commitment was modified in 1954 at a meeting of the 
Western European Union. Called ‘Protocol No. II’, the actual wording is worth consideration: 
                                                     
143 Mackinder was significant in developing the ‘Heartland Theory’, which provided the foundation for geopolitics. H. J. 
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148 Defence Problems, ibid., sec. II. 
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“… for the United Kingdom, four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force [2ATAF] 
…”149 
“…As regards naval forces, the contribution to NATO Commands of each of the High 
Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall be determined each year in the 
course of the Annual Review …”150 
This commitment was the ceiling, rather than the minimum, to be provided. But the Lisbon 
Force Goals of 1952 had filtered down into political and military lore by the 1970s, surfacing 
in policy documents and speeches, but not actually reflecting the facts. Authors and 
politicians have noted a 55,000 man requirement for BAOR from NATO that derived from 
the Brussels and Paris treaties.151 British Forces in Germany, with the agreement of the 
North Atlantic Council and Council of the Western European Union, declined from 105,000 
in 1955 to 77,000 in 1956, 63,500 in 1957 and 55,000 in 1958,152 with 2ATAF being halved in 
1957-1958.153 There was a planned reduction of forces in Germany to 44,000 by 1963 but 
this was never achieved, partly because of an increase in East-West tension, but also 
because NATO was concerned about the reduced capabilities of so small a force, and also 
the possibility of other countries reducing their contribution.154 It is possible that this is the 
source of the misunderstanding of the force size of BAOR. 
The units of BAOR in the 1950s and 1960s were configured in several brigade groups which 
could loosely be described as four divisions, but lacked important headquarters and support 
troops.155 Reorganisation and restructuring continued through the 1970s and 1980s in an 
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attempt to reduce costs, including the removal of several brigade HQs and the formation of 
‘field forces’ which were stationed in the UK.156 BAOR was again restructured in 1983 to 
provide three divisions in the Federal Republic of Germany, with one division in the UK for 
reinforcement of BAOR in time of war.157 
After the adoption of MC14/3, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) reported,  
“There are no criteria which could ever be taken as precise determinants of 
the total size of the United Kingdom armed forces and therefore our 
contribution to NATO; nor are there any NATO criteria from which can be 
deduced in exact and irrefutable terms the correct size of each of the United 
Kingdom Services, and hence the correct balance between them.”158  
In short, the COS wrote,  
“Clearly our contribution should be consistent with NATO strategy and NATO 
force requirements as we interpret them … This is not in itself, however, a 
sufficient guide to the lines along which our contribution should evolve … The 
forces contributed by any particular nation … must depend very much upon 
subjective judgement and national factors.”159  
Britain committed forces to the North, Central and South commands (AFNORTH, AFCENT, 
AFSOUTH, with AFSOUTH commitment being on-call, rather than standing forces160) Eastern 
Atlantic and Channel commands (ACCHAN and EASTLANT) as well as to defence of the Home 
Base. The force levels were defined by NATO for each region and their subordinate 
commands.161 
The detail of the geographical extent of Britain’s standing commitment to NATO was: 
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AFNORTH - Northern West Germany; Denmark; Norway; 
ACCHAN - English Channel; North Sea 
EASTLANT - Eastern Atlantic; Norwegian Sea 
UKADR – United Kingdom Air Defence Region which contained UKADGE – United 
Kingdom Air Defence Ground Environment. 
Through bilateral agreements as well as its NATO commitment Britain was to provide 
support to Norway and, after 1982, Denmark.162 The UK Government became increasingly 
concerned with the limited forces provided by Norway, the Netherlands163 and Denmark164 
in Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), and the threat to Norway. The UK Mobile Force and 
UK/Netherlands amphibious force were expected to cover any shortfalls in the defence of 
NORTHAG areas,165 and to reinforce the Baltic Approaches (BALTAP). There was 
considerable wrangling, particularly in Denmark, about the need for British reinforcement, 
and possibly US troops as well. Concern was raised about the political impact of weapons 
and equipment stocks being pre-positioned in Denmark, though, “There is no evidence here 
[UK] that Denmark … will fail to meet its Host Nation Commitment in full.”166 Nonetheless, 
later cuts made by the Danish Defence Ministry caused turmoil in the MoD. This reduction 
included fewer regular Danish troops and cancellation of some modernisation plans. The UK 
Mobile Force (UKMF) was by now overcommitted and had several different reinforcement 
plans, including the defence of Zealand and Jutland. The Danish Government dedicated only 
two mechanised brigades, made up of 80% reservists, for this purpose. The MoD suggested 
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that the Danish Government was using the NATO reinforcement plans as an excuse to 
reduce their national defences.167  
In addition to holding a portion of the Central Front, and supporting the Northern Front, 
against a potential WTO attack, Britain also needed considerable maritime forces to keep 
the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap open for shipping, and more importantly close it to 
exploitation by WTO ships trying to enter the Atlantic.168 The UK required as much control 
over the North Sea as possible, both to protect the oil- and gas-rigs there, and to protect the 
North-Eastern entrance to the English Channel. Channel Command covered the main choke-
point for ship-borne reinforcements to the Continent.  
Conclusion 
NATO had, to varying degrees, looked to the deterrent effects of conventional forces in its 
strategic evolution. The US (followed by the UK and France) provided the means to 
implement the fall-back position of nuclear retaliation.  MC14/2 removed the need for large 
conventional forces, and replaced the conventional deterrence with the threat of massive 
retaliation.  
Following the adoption of MC 14/3, some Alliance members were unhappy about increasing 
their defence spending to incorporate the additional conventional demands of the strategy. 
Corrective initiatives sought to promote increased spending, such as the 3% requirement of 
the LTDP. Some countries, like Britain, who tried to keep to the 3%, had difficulties. 
Economic problems, Alliance and internal disagreements, inter-departmental and inter-
service rivalries all contrived against a consistent, positive implementation of the Flexible 
Response strategy generally across NATO. Despite the problems, the force levels of NATO 
varied little during the last three decades of the Cold War.169 (For Britain’s force levels, See 
Appendix C, Comparison of regular and reservist forces 1975 – 1991) 
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The NATO Force Plans were not obligatory. They relied upon the member nations adopting 
the proposals and implementing them. Fundamental differences in the interpretation of 
NATO strategy, and the analysis of the actions of other NATO members, meant that some 
nations kept their conventional forces at low levels, whilst others invested in front-line 
forces but not sufficient war materiel. 
Attempts to improve the Alliance members’ response to NATO strategic demands invariably 
fell short of the goals. AD-70, the LTDP and CDI(I) all failed to achieve their objectives. 
Whether within the force planning cycle, as with the CDI(I), or outside it, as with the LTDP, 
the UK Government consistently adopted only those goals which were already part of its 
national plans, or could be adopted without significant cost. Whether through doctrinal 
disagreements or financial limitations, no member of NATO implemented the initiatives 
fully. 
Keohane and Nye’s concept of Complex Interdependence suggested not all countries within 
NATO exerted the same amount of influence. The US dominated the Alliance with the 
greatest financial contribution and levels of troop numbers and equipment. A more 
equitable power balance was sought by the continental European members of the Alliance, 
despite criticism by the US Government of lack of commitment by the Europeans for their 
own defence, a circumstance proposed by Alliance Theory as ‘free riding’. The British 
Government positioned itself to work between these two blocs to maintain friendly contacts 
between them, and to uphold the Alliance’s aims for collective security. British defence 
policy recognised the delicacy of relationships within NATO. 
Britain’s commitment to NATO was laid out in the 1954 protocol and remained the same 
until the end of the Cold War, but as the Chiefs of Staff Committee noted, it was impossible 
to say categorically how many troops constituted the correct number. In addition to the 
personnel committed to NATO, contributions such as the Infrastructure Fund have been 
effectively absent from histories of the period. Perhaps the largest absence was and is, 
however, the contribution made as an island nation within the Alliance.  
The defence of the British Isles was an important part of NATO’s strategy. The strategic role 
that Britain would perform in NATO had been clearly identified by Sir Halford Mackinder’s 
earlier description. But the public, and to some extent politicians, were not made aware of 
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the full extent of the demands that would be placed on Britain in the event of war. The 
British Government understood that a conventional war would probably include heavy air 
attacks with conventional weapons against the United Kingdom, with the aim of preventing 
NATO bringing forward vital reserves and reinforcements from both the UK and USA.170 As 
such, the inclusion of the defence of the UK to Britain’s NATO contribution is vital.  
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Chapter 4 - British Defence Policy 
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Background 
The British Government, between 1946 and 1996, published a statement on defence each 
year. Referred to as the Statement on the Defence Estimates (SDE) since the mid-1960s,1 
these were largely statements of overall policy and a guide to the Armed Forces’ activities 
for the year. Some of these statements became reviews of defence policy, looking at 
national strategic interests, collective defence and the military forces necessary to 
implement the policy. There were also four independent reviews into the Central 
Organisation for Defence, which resulted in the progressive unification and centralisation of 
the structure and management of the Armed Forces.2 
Defence policy, closely linked to Foreign policy, is the political description of what the duly 
appointed military forces should be capable of doing.3 It concerns the military response to 
current and future threats, actual or otherwise.4  It describes the way the population and 
the homeland will be protected, as well as the commitment to any alliances or collective 
agreements. The policy defines the scope of activity, set by the Government, which the 
armed forces are required to prepare for in order to provide a required level of defence. It 
also defines the budget and resources available to meet those obligations. Advice offered by 
Lord Ismay and Sir Ian Jacob, both professional soldiers who served in World War Two, 
outlined the scope of defence policy for those politicians who made it. It was;  
“… to govern the size, character, equipment and dispositions of our armed 
forces. Having made this decision they must keep their policy under constant 
review and make such adjustments as changes in the situation may render 
necessary. And all the time they must ensure that, at every stage, policy and 
action are kept in step with one another. In addition … the Cabinet had to be 
prepared to deal at a moment’s notice with unexpected problems that 
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suddenly flare up in remote parts of the world…”5 
Historically, British defence policy has looked to a strong Navy to defend its shores and its 
international trade.6 It provided a small army for Imperial excursions, bushfire wars and the 
like, and had an occasional involvement in Europe.7 Britain has long sought to maintain a 
balance of power in Europe, and to intervene when it considered it necessary.8 The 
objective has been to stop any one power gaining dominance in Continental Europe, and 
this has made for changes in alliances over short periods of time, but usually without a 
standing force in place in Europe. Although British troops had been stationed in Europe 
following the Napoleonic Wars and World War I, they were withdrawn within a few years.9 
Only after the Second World War did Britain have a permanent garrison of troops on the 
European continent, and even then, the cost, legitimacy and practicality were questioned.10 
British defence policy increasingly emphasised Europe as the priority, becoming 
progressively dedicated to NATO,11 and with Britain’s continuing economic problems, there 
was a sustained reduction in the share of gross domestic product for defence. (See Appendix 
B, Defence Budget Spending) 
A Joint Intelligence Sub-committee report prepared in November 1944 said that after the 
war, Britain would require defence in depth, and powerful allies on the Continent in order 
to balance the land forces of the Soviet Union.12 In 1947 the Chiefs of Staff cautioned, 
                                                     
5 Higher Direction of Defence, February 1963, Lord Ismay and Ian Jacob, ‘Organisation for Defence’, 25 February 1963, 
para. 1, CAB 129/112/27, TNA, also quoted in French, ‘Army, Empire and Cold War’, p12. 
6 Britain has relied on food imports since the 18th Century, and much of its wealth was generated by the import of raw 
materials and the export of finished goods, especially to the Empire. Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707 - 
1837 (London: Pimlico Ed, 1994). 
7 G. C. Peden, ‘The Burden of Imperial Defence and the Continental Commitment Reconsidered’, The Historical Journal 27, 
no. 2 (1984): 405–23. 
8 Rees, ‘Preserving the Security of Europe’, 49, in Britain and Defence, 1945 - 2000. A Policy Re-Evaluation. 
9 Two brigades were kept in the Rhineland until 1929. G.M. Bayliss, J.E. Edmonds, and Imperial War Museum (Great 
Britain), The Occupation of the Rhineland, 1918-1929, History of the Great War Series (H.M.S.O., 1987). 
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“… in a future war, time will be an all-important factor. The days when we 
could afford to remain on the defensive while gathering our great strength … 
ended with the advent of the cross channel pilotless missile and with the 
dropping of the first atom bomb. A far higher degree of preparedness in peace 
is now imperative if we are to survive the opening phase of another war – a 
preparedness which must enable us to hit back hard at the outset to defend 
our very existence. Moreover, in view of the speed with which we could be 
knocked out, it is vital that we possess the ability by ourselves to withstand 
and counter the initial onslaught. This entails the stockpiling of reserves in 
peace-time.”13 
The Chiefs of Staff warned about the reliance on the use of atomic weapons, suggesting that 
plans, “… for the use of normal weapons …”14 should be prepared. The Defence Committee 
produced another memorandum in 1947 which recommended that, “Priority must be given 
to forces which in peace give the best visible show of strength and therefore have the 
greatest deterrent value.”15 Visible deterrence and stockpiling were not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, but a worsening economic situation meant that a choice would need to be made 
between the two. With the advent of long-range missiles, the further East the front line of 
any war could be pushed, the better for Britain.16 As a result Britain was instrumental in 
setting up both the Western European Union and NATO to provide collective defence and 
deterrence in Europe. This demanded a continental European presence, and also provided 
support for other, less military capable allies, as well as keeping the major enemy, the WTO, 
at arm’s length. However, memories of 1940 kept caution and distrust between some 
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continental European, most notably the Dutch and Belgians of the Germans, allies close to 
the surface.17 
Whilst defence of the home islands had always been the priority of defence policy, there 
were other demands placed on it. Britain retained an Empire, later Commonwealth, after 
World War Two, as well as several protectorates and involvement in defence arrangements 
and alliances.18 Britain attempted to maintain several overseas garrisons and facilities, with 
an associated heavy drain on military resources and finances. To counter this, through 
numerous defence reviews, conscription was ended in 1960, and British forces were 
demobilised and contracted.19 The defence functions of the British Government were 
steadily centralised, resulting in the formation of the Ministry of Defence in 1964. Changes 
in the ministerial and bureaucratic structure of the MoD followed during the 1970s and 
1980s. The Chief of the Defence Staff, with the Chiefs of Staff committee, advised the 
Ministers (Armed Forces and Procurement) and Secretary of State for Defence. Further 
centralisation continued under the Conservative Government.20   
Several Defence Reviews have taken place since the Second World War, most notably the 
Sandys,21 Healey,22 Mason23 and Nott24 reviews of 1957, 1965-68, 1974-75 and 1981 
respectively.25 Following the withdrawal of most British forces from ‘East of Suez’ 
announced in the 1968 SDE, the focus of policy shifted to become collective defence in the 
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shape of NATO26 with minimal Out-Of-Area commitments. The 1981 Statement on the 
Defence Estimates therefore was one in a series which attempted to match the demands of 
defence with the resources available, and the political direction necessary at the time.27 
Policy focus during the late 1970s and 1980s was defined in the following terms: 
“NATO should remain the first and overriding charge on the resources 
available for defence (Priority One). Commitments outside the Alliance should 
be reduced as far as possible and that general purpose forces should be 
maintained as an insurance against the unforeseen (Priority Two).”28 
In providing for ‘Priority One’ defence, Britain furnished,  
“… the great bulk of its forces to the [NATO] Alliance. It is the only European 
country to commit forces to NATO in each of the three elements of the triad 
on which the Alliance’s strategy of deterrence depends. At the same time the 
United Kingdom is one of the two European countries which provide forces 
for all three major NATO commands, and one of the few countries that 
commits forces to more than one region of Allied Command Europe (ACE).”29  
The policy for Britain was one of deterrence, within the framework of general NATO 
Strategy of deterrence and defence. Politically, Britain wanted to improve co-operation with 
the Central European countries, and draw in those on the periphery, notably the 
Scandinavian and Mediterranean countries.30  
E. H. Carr, classical realist, diplomat and historian,31 proposed the idea that one’s own views 
are promoted by being veiled as in the interests of all,32 and there may be truth in this 
                                                     
26 Ministry of Defence, ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975’, Cmnd 5976. 
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28 E63/2, Army Logistics Planning Guide, 26th November 1981, ‘NATO Logistics Policy General UK Logistics Assumptions’, 1, 
DEFE 25/432, TNA. 
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statement with relation to British defence policy within NATO, stated thus: “Our aim is to 
maintain deterrence … for our allies as well as ourselves.”33 It was in Britain’s interests to be 
part of an alliance that provided friendly space immediately adjacent to the British Isles. In 
pursuit of that policy, Britain committed nuclear and conventional forces to NATO in and 
around continental Europe. According to MC 48/3, the British Isles had a role in NATO to 
provide a base for, “…strategic counter-offensive forces and support of NATO forces in 
Europe.”34 This meant that Britain’s contribution was not only military personnel and 
weaponry, but locations, routes, ports, airports and other facilities which would be made 
available in times of crisis. Dr David Owen,35 then Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, observed that, 
“The defence of the United Kingdom itself is the most fundamental 
responsibility of a British Government … and it is a task which we have to 
undertake on our own without any support from our other allies. None of the 
American forces which are stationed here … are of any direct help in 
protecting the United Kingdom: rather, it is we who have the added 
responsibility of protecting them.”36  
This placed a greater burden on the British economy than can be simply gauged from the 
Defence Estimates. At times, cutting or radically altering the contribution to NATO, once 
seen as sacrosanct, seemed to be the only way to provide resources for home defence, 
regardless of the problems it may cause in NATO. Two Foreign Office junior ministers Sir 
Julian Bullard37 and Sir Patrick Moberley38 discussed the problem, concluding that, “… the 
                                                     
33 Ministry of Defence, ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1980’, 2, Cmnd 7826. 
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hour may be approaching when the British commitment of 1954 to maintain a certain level 
of forces on the continent of Europe may have to be put under the microscope ...”39  
The Politics of British Defence  
Britain’s Cold War defence policy sought to answer some difficult questions, especially 
relative to the Alliance. Where and what should the priority be? Should it be Eurocentric, or 
global? If Eurocentric, should it be Maritime or Continental? If Eurocentric, does Britain 
need the capability to operate out-of-area at all? How does defence of the home islands fit 
into NATO policy, however it is prioritised? Throughout the Cold War, all British Government 
had restated the commitment to collective defence, and always emphasised the benefits 
not only to the population of Britain, but also to the wider population of Europe.40 
Regardless of how those questions were answered, the means to provide defence were, and 
are, always limited. During the build up to the 1981 Statement for the Defence Estimates 
(SDE) there was an acknowledgement between senior staff at the Foreign Office that, 
“There is a significant and growing gap between the UK’s defence programme on the one 
hand and our likely defence resources on the other.”41  
The 1979 Statement on the Defence Estimates speaks in broad terms of Alliance policy, and 
how Britain is fully committed to collective defence within NATO. Fred Mulley, Labour 
Secretary of State for Defence between 1976 and 1979, presented the SDE to Parliament in 
February 1979, the last Labour Secretary to do so until George Robertson in 1997. The 
general essence of the paper was that NATO had been successful in protecting Western 
Europe through shared defence. It also noted a military build-up by the WTO forces, but 
placed great emphasis on creating and maintaining stable international relations with the 
Soviet Union, WTO countries and China. Mention was also made of the commitment to 
arms control and disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, through Strategic Arms 
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Limitation Talks (SALT II), Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)42  talks, 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Comprehensive Test 
Ban.43 These talks were seen as a potential way to reduce the cost of the Armed Services 
whilst remaining in NATO. According to the MoD, the MBFR as it stood in 1978 would be 
anything but ‘balanced’, “… it seems to be the present Soviet intention that Soviet MBFR 
withdrawals would all be made from Czechoslovakia. An MBFR agreement would therefore 
leave the threat to 1 BR Corps much as it is.”44 
The ultimate goal of the Government, according to the 1979 Statement, was, “… general 
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control …”45 In the 
meantime, NATO was central to the security of the UK, and whatever policy the UK decided 
upon must integrate closely with those of its allies. Resources committed to this depended 
heavily on the economic situation obtaining at the time.46 The 1979 SDE caused problems 
for an already weakened Labour Party. In response to Fred Mulley’s Estimate during the 
debate in Parliament, the left-wing Labour MP Frank Allaun proposed the following 
amendment, that the House,  
“…declines to take note of the White Paper because it provides for a massive 
increase in military expenditure to £8,588 million in the year 1979–80, which 
will add to world tension, divert resources from urgent social needs and 
contravenes Her Majesty's Government's election pledge to give active 
support to policies designed to redeploy armaments industries to the 
manufacture of alternative socially useful products … and reaffirms Labour's 
commitment not to proceed to a new generation of nuclear weapons.”47 
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In the period leading up to the 1979 general election defence became a more prominent 
political campaign issue.48 Labour looked to force reductions to enable a running down of 
defence expenditure, whilst the Conservatives saw a strong defence and increased 
expenditure as the way forward. There was a large anti-nuclear lobby in the UK that put 
pressure on the Government not only to remove nuclear weapons from Britain, but to 
remove US bases and loosen the ties with NATO,49 allowing a reduction in defence spending 
and a reallocation of resources. In its manifesto for the 1979 general election, the 
Conservative party stated that,  
“During the past five years the military threat to the West has grown steadily 
as the Communist bloc has established virtual parity in strategic nuclear 
weapons and a substantial superiority in conventional weapons. Yet Labour 
have cut down our forces, weakened our defences and reduced our 
contribution to NATO. And the Left are pressing for still more reductions.”50  
In contrast, the Labour manifesto declared,  
“While actively pursuing a policy of détente, the Labour Government will 
continue to press for the implementation of the human rights provisions of 
the Helsinki Final Act. The Labour Government will continue to work for the 
success of the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna, and will give 
full support to the work of the United Nations Committee on Disarmament. 
The Labour Government will work for the speedy conclusion of a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We shall also give every encouragement to 
our American allies to achieve a successful conclusion to the vital Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks. The Labour Government will maintain its support for 
NATO as an instrument of détente no less than of defence. The ultimate 
objective of a satisfactory relationship in Europe is the mutual and concurrent 
phasing-out of both Nato and the Warsaw Pact.”51 
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Labour was seen as divided over the issue of nuclear disarmament and weak on defence.52 
Publicly, UK membership of NATO under a Labour Government was thrown into doubt; 
secretly the Chevaline upgrade for Polaris had proceeded.53 Following the election of 
Michael Foot as Labour leader in 1980, and the Labour Conference’s increased support for 
withdrawal from NATO, Labour lost more support in the country.54   
Since World War Two, defence spending and defence matters in general had been politically 
significant in Britain.55 Moreover, it was becoming much more important to the public 
during the late 1970s. The rise in East/West tension following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 had sharpened the debate that was reflected in the way the political 
parties began to use it in their publicity material, and the way the Government of the time 
spoke about its importance.56   
There is a substantial difference in tone between the 1979 Statement on the Defence 
Estimates and the 1980 Statement. Despite the support for the NATO strategy of Flexible 
Response, the 1979 Statement talks about modernisation and improvements in the 
‘Alliance’ rather than UK defence; it makes arms reduction a priority; Home Defence is 
mentioned in passing as part of the role for UKLF; the emphasis is on détente and 
disarmament, especially the MBFR talks.  
British Defence Policy was more clearly stated in national terms in 1980, the first full year 
after the return to Government of the Conservative party. Still fully committed to NATO, 
“The objective must be to deter aggression, if possible, without any recourse to use of 
nuclear weapons. This means that NATO must be able to resist the formidable conventional 
forces of the Warsaw Pact at their own level.”57 The thrust of the 1980 SDE was that 
modernisation and strengthening of the UK’s conventional forces would be a priority. The 
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Private Secretary wrote to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about, “… the 
excessive concentration on détente and arms control in the Labour Government’s last White 
Paper …”58 and was concerned that the Conservative Government might be moving too far 
the other way. Despite a moratorium on defence contracts, additional cuts to the budget 
were necessary to keep within the Conservative financial limitations.59 1980 saw increasing 
tension between Defence and the Treasury, and in early 1981 Secretary of State for Defence 
Sir Francis Pym60 was replaced by Sir John Nott. 
Between the election victory of 1979 and the defence review of 1981, the Conservative 
party struggled with the disparity of Government income against spending.61 The 
Conservatives, while in opposition, had criticised the spending levels of the Labour 
Government.62 Now the new Government wrestled with the commitment to NATO, the Out 
Of Area (OOA) demands, and the increasing cost of technology.63  The Conservatives, having 
been elected in 1979 with the manifesto promise of strengthening the Armed Forces but 
cutting public expenditure,64 found some very difficult decisions needed to be made. The 
simple act of increasing VAT from 12½% to 15% and petrol duty by 7p (raising the price of a 
gallon of petrol to around one pound) caused enormous problems with the defence budget, 
increasing costs by £180 million by these two measures alone. Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher penned on a memorandum concerning cash limits that, “We are not going to 
demoralise the whole of our Armed Forces by taking out more in V.A.T. than we added in 
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cash limits.”65 Following a flurry of memos soon after the election regarding the cash limits 
on Defence, Secretary of State for Defence Francis Pym wrote: 
“I do not see how we, as a Government, can defend a position in which we 
have made much play in public of our decision to increase the defence budget 
by £100M and at the same time take an action which effectively cuts the 
defence programme by nearly £200M … There will be no way of concealing 
that we are in fact proposing a net reduction of nearly £100M.”66 
Equipment, training and personnel cuts were necessary if the defence budget was not to be 
dramatically expanded, so in 1980 spending was kept down with redundancies and limits 
placed on orders to major firms.67 Of the twenty-two identified cost-cutting measures 
already agreed before the 1981 Defence Review was published (i.e. after negotiations 
between the MoD and Treasury), six directly affected Britain’s NATO commitments, two 
negatively affected the logistical capability of the services, one reduced the maritime/strike 
capability of the RAF by 30%, and three had civilian/industrial implications.68 Fuel supplies 
and training were also to be cut, which directly affected readiness of NATO committed 
forces.69 Additional measures on top of those already agreed meant cancelling six Mine 
Counter Measure Vessel orders and disbanding the Nimrod force. This still left a gap of 
£40m to close, and to do that it was suggested a supplementary reduction of eight 
Destroyers/Frigates, one Fleet Tanker and one Stores Support Ship, as well as deferring 
more MCMVs and reducing the Vulcan and VC10 force would do it.70 This process of finding 
small amounts by cutting and deferring was commonly called ‘cheese-paring’.71 
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John Nott presented ‘The Way Forward’ in 1981 which was not in itself an ‘official’ Defence 
Review, but was an attempt a refocussing the priorities of British defence. The SDE caused 
problems, with Nott concerned about the prospect of a back-bench revolt because, “…at a 
time of 2½M unemployed we should be creating further unemployment … Many 
constituencies will be affected … The situation in the House will be very finely balanced.”72 
The proposed policy of the Conservative Government in 1981 was that, 
 “… the structure we set must be one which we can afford to sustain with 
modern weapons and equipment, and with proper war stocks. This is less 
glamorous than maximising the number of large and costly platforms in our 
armoury, but it is far the better way of spending money for real security value. 
Moving in this direction will mean substantial and uncomfortable change in 
some fields. But the alternative, of keeping rigidly to past patterns, would be 
a recipe for overstretch, inadequacy and waste …”73  
The RAF proved to be the main beneficiary of the review, with substantial cuts to the Royal 
Navy,74 and the Army secured an increase in the Territorial force from 70,000 to 86,000. But 
this review returned Britain’s policy to one similar to that of 1952: the focus of defence was 
to be on an intensive war in Europe of short duration.75  The use of nuclear weapons was 
explicit in the planning that clashed directly with the very public pronouncements of 
increasing the nuclear threshold.76  
Less than a year after ‘The Way Forward’ was presented, and just before the cuts took 
effect, Britain was dependent on the efforts of the Royal Navy in retaking the Falklands. The 
campaign was reported by Lawrence Freedman, “… as an indictment of established defence 
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policy.”77 However, given that the Navy was intended to fight a WTO threat, its actions in 
the Falklands cannot be used directly as a guide for its overall performance in a potential 
war in the Northern Atlantic. The MoD commented on the lessons drawn from the Falklands 
War thus: 
“The Falklands Campaign was in many respects unique. We must be cautious, 
therefore, in deciding which lessons of the Campaign are relevant to the 
United Kingdom’s main defence priority – our role within NATO against the 
threat from the Soviet Union and her allies.”78  
The Falklands War provided critics of the defence policy with a great deal of advantage. In 
response, the Government maintained that the NATO-centric policy was correct, but 
allowed that improvements could be made:  
“Following the Falklands campaign, we shall now be devoting substantially 
more resources to defence than had been previously planned. In allocating 
these, we shall be taking measures which will strengthen our general defence 
capability by increasing the flexibility, mobility and readiness of all three 
Services for operations in support of NATO and elsewhere.”79  
At no point did this report establish what ‘substantially’ meant. A draft of the 1983 SDE 
gives a response to the changes necessary to the policy put forward in 1981;  
“ … the lessons learnt from the Falklands Campaign in no way invalidates the 
policy set out for our conventional forces in the 1981 defence programme 
review. The additions to the programme following the Falklands operation 
will be used, as far as possible, to enhance our capabilities both within and 
beyond the NATO area.”80  
The Falklands war affected defence policy only marginally with respect to NATO, with the 
1983 SDE draft stating, “The Falklands campaign underlined the importance of the flexibility, 
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mobility and readiness of our forces …”81 A small amount of the defence budget which 
would have been cut was restored, and some ships and equipment were retained, at least 
for a short time.  
Nationally, the Falklands War brought the defence debate into sharp focus, and was 
exploited to a great extent in the 1983 general election.82 This election saw opinion sharply 
divided on the subject of defence, and brought a landslide victory for the Conservatives.83 
This came at the same time as a heightened awareness of the effects of nuclear war that 
surrounded the Trident debate and the deployment of Cruise missiles into the UK.84 At the 
same time a report by the British Medical Association85 was criticised by the Government as 
it might be used as an argument to pull out of NATO. It included ‘non-medical’ discussions 
on the deployment of cruise missiles and the credibility of the concept of ‘limited’ nuclear 
war.86 Defence continued to be subject to wide ranging public debate.87 Although CND 
gained support, the majority of voters supported a strong defence policy, both nuclear and 
conventional. Part of that debate included the assertion that the defence policies were 
working, and did not need changing.88 At the 1987 general election, continued Labour 
support for unilateral disarmament and the removal of US bases from Britain helped the 
Conservatives to another victory.89  
The British public were certainly concerned by the nuclear threat. Views became polarised 
through the early 1980s, and the public expression of that concern was manifested in the 
media and entertainment. Several books were published about both conventional and 
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nuclear war,90 TV films and documentaries were made,91 and the music industry even 
contributed.92 ‘Yes, Prime Minister’, a popular comedy programme of the time about the 
British Government, included a sketch regarding the nuclear deterrent, with Prime Minister 
Jim Hacker being convinced that cancelling Trident and spending the money on Emergent 
Technologies and Conscription would answer all the political and military ills of the time.93 
Emergent Technology was a key aspect of the technological lead NATO countries were 
relying on to give them an advantage in any conflict, and its inclusion in a comedy 
programme, complete with descriptions for and against, demonstrated the interest being 
shown among the public, as well as an understanding of the financial limitations of defence 
spending.  
The Financial Constraints 
Defence Secretaries have had to restrain the overall spending on the Armed Services, whilst 
keeping the best public face on their actions.94  (See Appendix B, Defence Budget Spending) 
The Sandys reforms in 1957 maintained, “… the Government are satisfied that Britain could 
… make an effective contribution to the defence of the free world with armed forces much 
smaller than at present.”95 A move to all-regular armed forces was emphasised:96 “The 
Government are confident that this defence plan … will produce compact all-regular forces 
of the highest quality, armed and organised on the most up-to-date lines.”97  
Harold Wilson’s Government looked to a revision of NATO strategy as a means of reducing 
the defence budget.98 Denis Healey’s Defence Review of 1966 sought to achieve “… a major 
cut in expenditure without any loss in military efficiency …”99 Denis Healey made it clear in 
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1966 that “… Britain will not undertake major operations of war except in co-operation with 
allies.”100 There were some dissenting voices to the manner of cuts being undertaken. Fred 
Mulley referred to the Healey cuts as ‘crazy’101, which he said left the home islands almost 
undefended. John Nott later said that, “… it could be argued … that the reviews of the ‘60s 
and ‘70s went too far …”102 
Roy Mason conducted a review in 1975 which announced it would ‘… safeguard the 
essential security interests of Britain and her Allies …’103 whilst reducing specialist forces 
(logistics, engineers and medical) and transport. The invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 gave 
pause, and was for some politicians and analysts confirmation of Soviet aggressive 
intentions.104 It also called into question the past decades of falling defence spending, and 
moved conventional defence back into the political spotlight. This came at about the same 
time as the broadening debate around the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. In 
Britain it provided a focus on the defence of the UK, as well as membership of NATO. CND 
membership rose, with the debate about nuclear disarmament extending to conventional 
forces, with a large minority urging the disengagement of Britain from NATO.105 
Economically Britain was no longer strong; its aims must be planned in accordance with the 
available resources. The Chiefs of the Defence Staff expressed their concern in a meeting 
with the Prime Minister: “The Soviet threat had increased. NATO had not succeeded in 
improving its position. The resolve of its members seemed, if anything, to have weakened ... 
This was no time for Britain to be planning reductions.”106 The Secretary of State for 
Defence responded to a question in Parliament regarding this matter: “Some reductions in 
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planned expenditure have been made in order to contain the overspend … to protect 
current operational capability.”107  
In the 1981 Defence Review, “…hard decisions … reflect our resolve to give defence the 
resources Britain’s security demands … in accordance with realistic, unsentimental and up-
to-date judgement of what will be most relevant and effective in future years.”108 Concerns 
were raised about maintaining an effective force in Germany because of the cuts and 
relocation of some units and headquarters back to the UK. The House of Commons Defence 
Committee (HCDC) reported in 1982 that, “It is accepted in BAOR that some of the 
economies must affect efficiency, although in general it is claimed that operational 
effectiveness should be maintained if not enhanced.”109 The cuts were announced as 
efficiency drives, but were financially driven. As Sir John Nott later noted, “… that was at the 
heart of the defence review: money, money.”110 
Cutting Costs 
The Defence Budget estimate for 1979/80 was £8,558 million, equivalent to 4.75% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), second only to the USA in terms of GDP, and a 3% increase in real 
terms over the previous year. (See Appendix B, Defence Budget Spending) Spending 
increased in real terms from an outturn of £9,200 million in 1979 to £17,900 million in 1985, 
to over £20,000 million in 1989. This represented an increase from 4.4% of GDP to 5.1% at 
the peak, down to 3.9% in 1989.111 As relations between the Western nations and the Soviet 
Union warmed after Gorbachev assumed power, defence spending began a steady decline. 
Aside from a small peak in 1991 for the costs of the First Gulf War, UK defence spending 
declined to approximately 2.4% of GDP by 1997/98.112 But ‘modernisation inflation’, the 
increase in the cost of technology, meant the budget was effectively moribund in its 
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purchasing-power. According to Lawrence Freedman ‘modernisation inflation’ means; “… 
the same expenditure of defence pounds buys far less quantitatively than it would have 
done a decade ago because it must buy far more qualitatively …”113  
Dr David Owen had foreseen the problem in 1978 and warned:  
“Our past emphasis on maintaining, at all costs, the ‘teeth’ element of our 
forces and cutting where necessary the ‘tail’ seems to have impaired our 
actual war fighting capability to a very dangerous extent. In the future, as the 
real costs of defence equipment rise, this problem is likely to get worse.”114  
Rising equipment costs and exchange rate penalties115 for stationing troops abroad were 
draining the defence budget. Little could be done about equipment unit costs, but different 
ways were tried to save money on foreign postings. A 1981 Parliamentary Question from Mr 
Hal Miller MP116 asked about whether there were any plans to change the emphasis of 
Britain’s defence commitments in light of the resources available. The Secretary of State for 
Defence answered:  
“Because of the high cost of maintaining troops on the Continent we continue 
to study ways in which we can streamline the structure of 1 BR Corps while 
maintaining or even improving its effectiveness. Our aim is to concentrate as 
much of our available resources as possible on the teeth arms, whilst cutting 
back the ‘tail’.”117  
Some savings were made by removing forces from Germany and stationing them in the UK, 
but this brought with it new problems, and accusations from the FRG of failure to meet 
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NATO force levels.118 Some of the troops who were meant to be on the front line in 
Germany were actually based in the UK, and this had a damaging effect on their readiness. 
The HCDC observed in 1982, “It is accepted in BAOR that some of the economies must affect 
efficiency, although in general it is claimed that operational effectiveness should be 
maintained if not enhanced.”119 But moving troops back to the UK did not necessarily 
provide much financial economy, as new barracks needed to be built and other services 
provided for the personnel and equipment.120 Stationing troops in the UK for the 
reinforcement of Europe brought a particular problem. The WTO had internal lines of 
communication, and land-based reinforcement routes. This enabled faster movement of 
units from Military Districts within the Soviet Union to Central Europe than the shipment of 
troops to Europe from the UK and America.121 As Dr David Gates commented, “… 75 per 
cent of all Russian reinforcements and war stocks could be moved by railways, with much of 
the balance going by road. NATO would have to transport 90 per cent of its reinforcements 
and materiel by sea.”122 Superiority at the point of attack, something generals have always 
sought to achieve, would be achieved by moving the greatest numbers in the shortest time. 
US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown pointedly asked his NATO colleagues at the NATO 
Defence Planning Committee meeting in December 1979, 
“How can we maintain deterrence with national corps areas that have 
inadequate covering forces, that cannot move their divisions to their defense 
[sic] positions in the required time, that are short of tanks … to say nothing of 
munitions for those systems.”123  
Could the British Government declare that they were as committed to NATO as they said 
whilst withdrawing troops to the UK? Would this encourage other countries, especially the 
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USA, to do the same, leaving Europe denuded of regular forces and particularly vulnerable 
to a sudden WTO attack? The relocation of units from Germany to Britain would raise 
problems during any mobilisation. In time of crisis, or war, they would need to be returned 
to the continent in time to influence the battle. Serious doubts arose about Britain’s ability 
to mobilise and reinforce NATO in a timely manner.  
Budget Control 
Attempts to reduce costs and control the defence budget, such as bringing troops back to 
the UK did not stop criticism being levelled at the MoD for poor financial control and budget 
management.124 Millions of pounds had been spent on delayed, failed and cancelled 
projects such as Nimrod and Stingray.125 The Conservative Government imposed a 
moratorium on some new defence spending in 1980126 and in 1981, with new, “… stringent 
discipline in the placing of new contracts …”127 to be introduced. The Management 
Information System for Ministers (MINIS), a management reporting and budgeting tool, was 
introduced by the Conservative Government in an attempt to impose a standardised 
financial management process onto not just the Armed Forces, but all Government 
departments.128 This level of financial and project control was thought to have been lacking. 
In 1984 Secretary of State for Defence Michael Heseltine told the House of Commons, 
“… MINIS—is now firmly established in the Ministry for Defence and is the 
focus for work aimed at improving the management of resources and 
increasing efficiency … MINIS has already led to management improvements, 
particularly through clarification of responsibilities, and has identified a range 
of areas for work directed towards improving efficiency and reducing the 
costs of defence overheads. This will be a continuing process.”129 
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Not everyone was impressed: Sir Edwin Bramall, Chief of the Defence Staff, observed that 
the amount of effort MINIS required was disproportionate to the result.130 Computer 
systems were seen by the Government as the solution not just for financial management 
but, “… to enhance the speed and efficiency of mobilisation, of both regular and volunteer 
reserves …”131  
The Conservative Government, in its wholehearted adoption of business practices, saw no 
distinction between the MoD and any other Government department. The process, which 
began in the late 1970s, replaced military thinking with more transient demands. These 
demands were politically driven, shaped by the rapidly changing situation both at home and 
abroad. Because of the Conservative’s desire for rapid economic growth, privatisation and 
free enterprise, management reforms were demanded within Government departments 
and the civil service. In his introductory paper to Institute of Contemporary British History’s 
seminar on the 1981 Defence Review, Professor Andrew Dorman commented that, “Since 
the MoD was the biggest department in central government and the largest employer of 
Civil Service manpower it was inevitably at the forefront of these changes.”132 Business 
terms were introduced into the military lexicon. It also brought with it an expectation that 
rules that could be applied in business could be applied to the Armed Forces. In business, 
work could be contracted out to reduce costs: the military equivalent was reserves and 
civilian consultants and contractors.133  
Defence policy was, and is, heavily influenced by economic performance, and this has led to 
unpopular decisions having to be made, not only for defence, but also for other parts of the 
Government. The cuts in defence procurement, closing dockyards and cutting force levels all 
meant unemployment, not just for the Armed Forces, but for the civilian employees. 
Despite attempts in the past to, “… suggest that strategic priorities rather than the 
allocation of resources should determine defence policies …”134 budgets and the Treasury 
were, and still are, the final arbiters. The trend for the defence budget has varied depending 
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on the political and economic situation, but as weapons become more sophisticated they 
also become more expensive per unit. It also requires a higher level of training to operate 
them, which is also more expensive. ‘Modernisation inflation’ meant, over time, the budget 
allocated for defence may stay the same, or even rise, but the buying power for weapons 
systems and troops will diminish. However, the comparison of quantity and quality is 
extremely difficult, as according to David Greenwood135 there are no, “…inter-temporal 
‘exchange rates’ between successive generations of [weapons].”136 Indeed, it is difficult to 
compare similar weapons of contemporary generations, such as anti-tank guided weapons, 
as they each have capabilities unique to the individual weapon.  
Cuts were made to the ammunition stocks, fuel and even food reserves of the Armed Forces 
whilst publicly maintaining the façade of a full and functional defence. The MoD explained, 
“Under-provisioning has been caused in part by [the readiness with which] cuts have been 
made in [stocks] to preserve the main equipment programmes.”137 The deficiencies that this 
caused were extremely serious, affecting vital weapon systems, reinforcement plans and 
staffing levels. Remedying them, at least in the short or medium term, was impossible. The 
MoD reported in 1977; “We do not have the financial resources or, more importantly, the 
manufacturing capacity.”138 
The 3% Promise 
To address the problem of reduced defence budgets and ‘modernisation inflation’, in 1977, 
NATO requested an increase in real terms of approximately 3% per annum in the defence 
budget of member countries, to which Britain and the other NATO members agreed: 
“Against the background of adverse trends in the NATO-Warsaw Pact military 
balance and in order to avoid a continued deterioration in the relative force 
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capabilities, an annual increase in real terms in defence budgets should be 
aimed at by all member countries. This annual increase should be in the 
region of 3%, recognising that for some individual countries: - economic 
circumstances will affect what can be achieved; - present force contributions 
may justify a higher level of increase.”139 
A 3% increase in real-terms at a time of increasing inflation would intensify the pressure on 
the overall budget. In 1979 the Conservative Government had pledged to fulfil this increase, 
agreed by the previous Labour Government. Inflation was running at more than 13% in 
1979, increasing to 18% in 1980, putting further pressure on the Government’s ability to 
achieve the 3% figure in ‘real’ terms.140 It was later noted by Field Marshall the Lord Bramall 
that, “The Treasury, as they always do … were doing all sorts of things to see that [the MoD] 
were not going to get a 3 per cent increase at all.”141 
But 3% of what, and how would it be gauged? There were differences of opinion between 
the Treasury and MoD about how this was to be measured against the NATO 3% target.142 
The Prime Minister noted to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, “There is a dispute between 
the Treasury and MOD about the interpretation of the 3% NATO commitment.”143 Francis 
Pym, then John Nott (Secretaries of State for Defence), John Biffen (Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury) and Geoffrey Howe (Secretary of State for the Treasury) engaged early on in the 
Government’s term in disputing just how to measure 3% of the defence budget, whilst still 
presenting it positively to their NATO allies.144 The Treasury questioned the MoD’s 
measurement of the 3%, (i.e. a simple 3% increase over the previous year’s costs) with the 
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Treasury measuring it in terms of budget which did not take inflation into account.145 
Interestingly, the majority of these documents are marked SECRET, or TOP SECRET, and one 
can safely assume that their authors did not expect their words to become public 
knowledge, at least not in their lifetime. These were not petty wrangles over minor policy 
details, this was central to the Conservative’s political credibility. All this was being 
discussed at a time of pay increases measuring 30% for some, and severe cuts in other 
Government public spending.146  But there was an air of concern in the Government about 
how these ‘facts’ appear, both to military and economic allies. Francis Pym cautioned; 
 “The Germans and Americans can do the calculations as well as we can.”147 
And regarding Geoffrey Howe’s Treasury proposal for the measurement of the 3%; 
 “… his proposal … will not deceive our Allies, who are inevitably looking very 
closely at what we are doing and proposing to do on the 3% …”148  
Sir John Nott felt the same as his predecessor, and was concerned how it would look to ‘the 
Country’; 
“Having studied these my Secretary of State has asked me to write and say 
that he does not accept … what seems to be a unilateral Treasury move to 
change the definition of real spending. This is an important matter in terms 
of the UK’s commitment to the NATO 3% aim and of presenting to the country 
the Government’s achievements in increasing spending on defence.”149 
A letter from the Assistant Under Secretary for the Defence Staff concerning the 
announcement of defence spending cuts advises, “… the manner and timing of their 
announcement … raises extremely difficult problems.”150 These problems were explicitly 
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stated in a letter from the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary, which said, “… She was 
particularly concerned about the political implications of closing Deal and cancelling the Sea 
Eagle project both of which were in marginal constituencies.”151 This was complicated by 
the reaction in NATO to a reduction of UK spending. A report from the Directors of Defence 
Policy following the 1981 Defence Review suggested that Alliance cohesion depended to 
some extent on British defence expenditure being maintained.152  
The financial information presented to the main Ally, America, reassured them sufficiently. 
Sir John Nott reported to the Prime Minister, “Mr Weinberger [US Secretary of State for 
Defense] was clearly relieved … that we are responding in so positive a way to the NATO 3% 
aim …”153 In this respect, the Conservative Government had left itself with little room for 
manoeuvre. Elected as the party to control spending and improve defence, both policies 
were under serious threat of, if not failure, then serious compromise. Nevertheless, it would 
have been politically difficult to present that in plain terms to the electorate or Allied 
countries.  Having created a ‘truth’, or at least attached themselves to an economic and 
military ‘belief’, they now had to adjust the promises to fit the new circumstances.  
Those circumstances included difficulties in securing arms sales abroad. Manufacturing of 
weapon systems and ammunition is an area of foreign sales which was and is extremely 
valuable to the British economy. A balance must be struck between providing for the Armed 
Forces and foreign sales, such that both are satisfied, but which tends to work for the 
dissatisfaction of both. The MoD cautioned, for example, “The balance between output [of 
Skyflash missiles], RAF requirements and any export orders will have need careful review 
before any sales commitments are undertaken.”154 Even major weapon systems earmarked 
for the Services were not immune. RAF Tornados were sold to Saudi Arabia in 1985 as part 
of an arms deal with British Aerospace, their Director of Sales commenting,155 “The Chief of 
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the Air Staff learnt that we had nicked ten of his aircraft. No one told him.”156 Once approval 
for the purchase of new or updated systems for the Armed Forces had been received, there 
was a necessary compromise between purchasing weapons and ammunition, making it, 
according to the MoD, “… necessary to review outfits and reserves in this context to ensure 
the correct balance between expenditure on … their weapon systems and on the weapons 
themselves.”157 Each Service urged more spending on its own needs, even if that was at the 
expense of the others.158 
Influences on Policy 
Inter Service Rivalry 
Rivalry between the three services for funding and support had existed since the creation of 
an independent air force in 1918.159 Prior to that the Navy had received the larger part of 
the defence budget. After World War Two, the three services received a generally equitable 
share of the shrinking defence budget, known as ‘equal misery’.160 With the withdrawal 
from Imperial commitments and attempts to centralise the functions of defence, that 
equilibrium became disturbed by increased competition between the Services for 
diminishing resources.161 Part of the folklore of competition for funding was demonstrated 
by the story of the RAF surreptitiously moving Australia some 500 miles on a map to 
demonstrate their ability to provide air-cover for the Royal Navy,162 which encouraged the 
Government to cut the CVA-01 carrier.163 The RAF lost its all-important nuclear deterrent 
role once this task was transferred to submarines,164 and after the 1981 review the Royal 
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Navy felt it had lost its natural position as the ultimate defender of the Home Islands.165 In 
the 1980s the Army was in a better position than it had been before,166 with a period of 
modernisation to replace much of its equipment, some of it dating back to the 1960s.167 
Defence policymaking in Britain had contributions not only from the MoD, but from several 
other Government departments. The relationships between departments, particularly The 
Treasury, The Foreign Office, and the Ministry of Defence were at times tense, and 
sometimes openly belligerent. When purchasing Type 42-10 in 1977, the Director of 
Resources and Programmes (Ships), H Chambers, was directly criticised by the Treasury for 
his dealings with Cammell Laird Shipbuilders, after he failed to involve the Treasury in some 
of the negotiations.168 In a 1980 memorandum to Sir Antony Acland,169 David Gillmore, then 
Head of the Defence Department at the Foreign Office, complained that the, “… tug of war 
between Departments not only absorbs time and energy, but blunts the effectiveness of 
overall policy.”170 Making policy was made more difficult, or even impossible, by an 
apparent lack of communication between departments within the Government. The Foreign 
Office expressed concern that decisions taken in the MoD had direct repercussions on 
foreign policy. Ministers at the Foreign Office maintained, “ … that decisions on UK defence 
policy cannot fail to have foreign policy implications …”171 In a backhanded manner, John 
Nott was described in the following way; “There is certainly a limit to what all of us can do 
to control Mr Nott in public. He can in any case often be quite effective, and cultivates a 
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brand of disarming candour which is consistent with his view of opening up the defence 
debate to intelligent discussion.”172 
Denis Healey said of his time as Secretary of State for Defence: “I sometimes felt that I had 
learned nothing about politics until I met the Chiefs of Staff. Each felt his prime duty was to 
protect the interests and traditions of his own service.”173 John Nott’s view of inter-service 
rivalry was almost the same.174 Gordon Corrigan wrote, “… it is easy to forget that it is only a 
few years ago that the [Services] stopped regarding each other as a far greater threat … 
than the Russian hordes across the inner German border.”175 
Modernisation 
As the NATO assessment indicated that the conventional forces were inadequate for the 
defence of Western Europe against an increasingly numerous, and capable, WTO threat, the 
Alliance members now had to wrestle with the balance between numbers and new, up-to-
date, equipment.176 Modernisation became a thread that passed through the policy 
documents of the MOD during the 1970s and into the 1980s. Outdated systems needed to 
be replaced, and run-down defences strengthened.177 Despite the background of economic 
stagnation and political upheaval, as well as increasing unit costs, the required 
modernisation was essential, but introduced the problem of ‘modernisation inflation’.178 
This suggested that improvements in technology increase the weapon cost per unit, and 
required increased levels of education and training amongst the operators, increasing costs 
further. 
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NATO placed great reliance on modernised guided weapons for anti-tank, anti-aircraft and 
anti-ship tasks. Ships, aircraft and armoured vehicles were becoming more complex in their 
defensive and offensive capability to be able to survive and operate in the expected war-
fighting environment. New tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) were being developed 
(Challenger and Warrior) as well as new ships and aircraft (Tornado) and weapons (JP233, 
LAW).179 The so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’,180 branded from this development of 
highly accurate guided weaponry, better survivability and improved communications, 
should be regarded less as a revolution and more as an evolution. The developments were 
the outcome of decades of military demands and technological inventions that enabled 
those demands to be met. When nuclear weapons were unusable – politically or 
strategically - extremely accurate weapons were required which could destroy pin-point 
targets with a high probability.181 However, those improvements in technology were not 
universally applied. Communication system had not been improved in line with weaponry, 
which caused the Deputy Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe to write: “Our 
communications are still abysmal and are still geared to the [MC]14/2 strategy of immediate 
nuclear response.”182 The development of new technology was a continuous process as 
were the development of doctrines and plans to exploit it. 
How should an improvement in qualitative terms, such as the NATO modernisation 
programme, be measured against a qualitative AND quantitative improvement in the 
expected enemy’s capabilities? ‘Greenwoodery’, proposed by Professor David Greenwood, 
sought to measure the capability of forces in relation to those of the probable adversary.183  
Against such an improvement by the enemy, a qualitative improvement in one’s own forces 
(in addition to a quantitative reduction such as the British Armed Forces faced), unless it is 
significant, will not sufficiently level the advantage that the enemy has gained. NATO had, 
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from its inception, relied on improving technology to redress the numerical imbalance 
between NATO and the WTO.184 NATO relied on, “… establishing and maintaining technical 
superiority ...”185 to make up for the numerical shortfall of its forces. 
To reduce some of the costs of modernisation there was an effort to replace expensive and 
sophisticated equipment with simpler, and therefore cheaper, alternatives. The 
replacement of the Leander and Type 21 Frigates with Type 23 was intended to save money, 
although with changes following the Falklands War, and other modifications, the Type 23 
proved not to be any cheaper than the ship it was replacing.186   
“The Type 23 was designed to be a cheap ASW escort for the Cold War – to 
provide a helicopter with [nuclear depth bombs] and torpedoes to kill 
submarines.  Cheapness was to be achieved through automation, reducing 
the crew size, relying on a 30 day patrol cycle (i.e. only staying away from port 
for 30 days) and presuming that the ships themselves would be provided with 
protection by other ships.”187  
This design proved unsatisfactory, and investment in a significant improvement programme 
was needed to improve the ship’s capabilities.188  
Improvements in some areas were complicated by a policy which was known to the Royal 
Navy as ‘short-lifing’, in which vessels would be disposed of before their scheduled life-time 
ended.189 This policy was implemented in all of the services as a means of saving money in 
preparation for the introduction of a replacement system. It happened with the NIMROD, 
and has continued to happen to the present day, one recent example being the scrapping of 
Harriers in 2010 with its replacement, the F35B, coming into service in 2016. 
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In the NATO Central Region, most, if not all the NATO allies were relying on quality to 
succeed over quantity in a war, but the disparity in the quality of the tanks of each side was 
not as significant as previously. Indeed, some analysts believed the Soviet T80was almost on 
a par with the NATO Main Battle Tanks (MBT).190  The Defence Committee noted in 1980 
that, “Intelligence assessments since 1977, accepted in NATO, indicate a much greater 
advance in the quality of Soviet Tanks … than had previously been thought possible.”191 
Therefore NATO believed it would have been at a quantitative disadvantage which was not 
levelled by a sufficiently large qualitative superiority. The number of anti-tank weapons had 
increased significantly, and so had their effectiveness, but this applied to both sides. NATO 
could not rely on air superiority, qualitatively superior equipment or superior tactics and 
operational mobility to counter the numerical difference. NATO forces would be entering a 
battle knowing they had a quantitative disadvantage, relying on the slim qualitative 
advantage. NATO defence rested on a slimmer and slimmer technological advantage to 
offset the increasing numerical superiority of the WTO in almost every aspect of land, air 
and maritime forces.192 Quantity does, indeed, have a quality all of its own. 
Allied Influence 
Part of Britain’s policy was to try to maintain the cohesion of the Alliance in Europe, whilst 
also keeping the USA committed to Europe’s defence.193 The key focus to British defence 
policy was that the prime threat would be from the Soviet Union, and this was not likely to 
change in the near future. The Government characterised the threat as being from, “… 
Soviet forces … in size and quality on a scale which goes well beyond the need of any purely 
defensive posture.”194 
In addition to the changing priorities and economic factors during the 1960s and 1970s, 
NATO was under pressure from internal stresses: The US Government had long felt the 
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European countries were not taking enough of the burden of European defence;195 the 
Scandinavian countries that had political parties which continued to demand a defence 
alliance outside NATO;196 and from various political parties in the Central Region countries 
which, for domestic reasons, kept their defence budgets at dangerously low levels.197 
Successive British Governments saw the maintenance of the integrity of NATO as 
paramount, with the Chiefs of Staff Committee reporting in 1968, “The strains in NATO … 
could lead to a dangerous weakening of Western cohesion and eventually to the unravelling 
of the Alliance. It is a vital British interest that this should not happen.”198 
The influence of certain other NATO members on the making and implementation of policy 
was evident. Deterrence, the main leg of NATO policy, was a case in point. The Vice-Chief of 
the Defence Staff wrote in 1977,  
“The FRG tend to believe that deterrence is best achieved by maximising the 
outward and visible signs of military strength, weapons systems, if necessary 
at the expense of stocks, by contrast with the US Corps and to a lesser extent 
1 (BR) Corps, who have the stocks to sustain conventional operations over a 
more protracted period.”199  
Within NATO, there was pressure to be seen to accommodate the policies and plans 
developed therein. For example, the UK Government’s approach to the LTDP was to, “… find 
as many things as possible to say a definite ‘Yes’ to in the Task Force reports. (It is accepted 
that this must generally mean confirming elements already in national plans, or costing very 
relatively little.)”200  
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Britain’s politicians spoke of a ‘special relationship’ between the US and Britain, though this 
view was heard less often from the Americans.201 The US view of a threat from the WTO, 
and especially the Soviet Union, was deeply ingrained in American politics, security and the 
armed services. Although there was some controversy about the numbers, the CIA 
assessment of Soviet spending on defence was that it had increased significantly from 1975 
to 1982; from then on CIA assessed it as levelling off.202 The view of what might happen in a 
European war was different too: the Americans expected a longer period of tension before a 
war broke out than their European allies.203 Henry Kissinger had written in 1962 about the 
differences in approach to timescales expected in a European war,204 and these differences 
of expectation continued throughout the period. The difference was emphasised after 
several Divisions of US troops were withdrawn from Germany in 1968, but promised as 
reinforcements to Europe in the event of a crisis under REFORGER.205 REFORGER was based 
upon the premise that a crisis which developed slowly enough, up to 90 days, would allow 
reinforcements to be sent back to Europe.206 The European allies saw a much shorter build 
up to war than the US.207 Both parties agreed that initially at least, it would be West 
Germany that was the battleground.  
There had been complaints from the US Government that the European members of NATO 
did not contribute enough to the common defence of Europe, and this was confirmed in 
Presidential Directive PD/NSC62, issued by President Carter in 1981, which stated that in 
addition to a need for greater readiness, “… we must make more effort and devise better 
                                                     
201 Churchill famously used it in his speech at Fulton, Missouri in 1946. The phrase has been used by both Presidents and 
Prime Ministers from before World War Two to the present. See Introduction, David Stafford, Roosevelt and Churchill: 
Men of Secrets (London: Abacus, 2000); See also George Pratt Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of 
State (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1993). 
202 Mikhail A Alexseev, Without Warning: Threat Assessment, Intelligence, and Global Struggle (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Macmillan, 1997), 213. 
203 D/MIN/JG/16/3, Note for the Record, C T Sanders, Private Secretary to the Minister of State for Defence, 28th 
November 1978, Ministry of Defence, ‘War Reserve Stocks’, para. 3, DEFE 13/1059, TNA. 
204 Henry Kissinger, ‘The Unsolved Problems of European Defence’, Foreign Affairs, July 1962. 
205 Reinforcement or Return of Forces in (or to) Germany 
206 Andrew Hamilton, ‘Redressing the Conventional Balance: NATO’s Reserve Military Manpower’, International Security, 
10, no. 1 (Summer 1985). 
207 Facer, ‘Conventional Forces and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response’, 5, R-3209-FF. 
Page 128 
 
ways to share the economic and military burden with our Allies.”208 The feeling in America 
was that the US should reduce its contribution and let the Europeans take up the slack. A 
reduction in the number of US troops in Europe was a concern for the European 
members,209 and Britain made substantial political efforts to stop this from happening. 
Successive British Governments had felt that NATO required the US, in strength, to act as a 
counterweight to the WTO. This was something it felt that European nations could not do 
alone. The US was also viewed as a moderator between the European nations, attenuating 
the historical differences and antagonisms between the countries of Europe, and providing 
an extra-European perspective.210 
Some writers, analysts and politicians saw a clear strategic divide which they felt the 
Defence policy must address; should Britain have its focus on a ’continental’ or ‘maritime’ 
strategy.211 This should not be confused with the ‘Atlanticist v European’ debate. It was not 
about links to the US, but whether the policy focussed on Land (i.e. the Army and Air Force) 
or Maritime (i.e. Navy and Air).212 Britain’s strategy was seen as being ‘maritime’ until the 
commitment to NATO and shedding of Imperial pretensions: from then on it appeared that 
there was a creeping continental strategy, with the focus moving more towards the land 
defence of Europe.213 A reversion to the maritime strategy was attractive for many, with a 
reduction of forces committed to the continent.214 Admiral Woodward commented that, “… 
the last [1981] review of Defence decided in favour of the short-term, politically expedient, 
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continental European commitment to the detriment of the long-term, long established 
maritime worldwide, national interest.”215 The FCO had a view on what constituted the 
correct approach to the formation of defence policy, observing that Britain was stretched in 
her roles covering land, sea and air from the Eastern Atlantic to the Inner German Border.  
“It is worth bearing in mind that certain roles can only be fulfilled by the UK. 
Defence of the UK base is the most obvious. There are, on the other hand, 
roles which other Allies could take over from us provided they were prepared 
to make the effort. The most obvious examples here arise in the land/air 
defence of central Europe.”216  
The suggestion made by the Foreign Office was that Britain’s contribution to BAOR and 
2ATAF could be retained but their budget reduced, with increased financial support from 
West Germany and possibly the USA to fund the shortfall.  
The British Government’s publicly stated position was that, “Talk of choosing in some simple 
or exclusive way between, say, a ‘maritime’ and a ‘Continental’ effort is misconceived.”217 
Politically, and less publicly, the decision making was clearer; “All our significant European 
allies, especially the FRG, would dislike cuts in Europe [BAOR and RAF(G)] far more than 
maritime cuts.”218 This is made explicit in a memo from the Defence Secretariat on defence 
policy in October 1981 which noted a clear, “… shift in emphasis from maritime to land/air 
…”219 
In addition to the debate over a ‘continental’ versus a ‘maritime’ policy, there was 
discussion over gradual change in defence policy as opposed to a radical shift, usually 
described as ‘incrementalism’ versus ‘revolutionary’.220 Incrementalism sought to maintain a 
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balance in the forces available, rather than the revolutionary policy which put its weight 
behind one particular arm of the services, or one particular configuration of the Armed 
Forces. Britain had a generally incrementalist policy since the Second World War, up until 
the 1981 SDE.221 Funding, and cuts in funding, had usually been spread across the services 
roughly equally. In the 1981 Defence Review the Navy suffered proportionately more severe 
cuts as the contribution to the defence of the Eastern Atlantic was ‘reshaped’ and 
reduced.222 The ‘reshaping’ of the Navy was expected to leave the forces completely 
inadequate for their assigned NATO tasks. It would be expected that the Navy would fight 
such severe cuts in its forces, and indeed they tried. In a letter to the Queen, Admiral Leach 
said that the effect of the cuts,  
“… will be profound … our capability to conduct the full range of anti-
submarine warfare will be degraded … as the number of frigates reduce … 
Many of our operational concepts and the whole pattern of our future 
operating and training will have to be radically revised.”223  
Greenwood’s viewpoint that the ‘reshaping’ was a rational response to strategic necessity is 
inconsistent with the evidence presented in this thesis.  The idea that, “… the state of the 
economy does not force governments to make cuts …”224 is erroneous when compared to 
the evidence of the Government’s own papers. Time and again it is possible to see the 
reason explicitly stated as insufficient funding caused by the state of the economy, and 
political demands to spend more on other Government departments.  
Suggestions for economic savings came from politicians, journalists, think-tanks or other 
‘experts’. Subjects that repeatedly arise in the ‘alternative defence’ literature as cost saving 
measures are unilateral nuclear disarmament and disengagement from NATO.225 Many 
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writers of the period put their thoughts into books suggesting ways in which Britain could 
either improve its defences or save money.226  These also suggested ways to improve the 
efficiency of the Armed Forces, by reducing the budget for Research and Development as 
well as ‘quality’ weapon systems, and purchasing more basic equipment. Writing in 1980, 
Dan Smith227 criticised the cost of the Sea Harrier. He said it had “… limited capabilities …” 
on which, “… a lot of money is being spent with little purpose. It is, in any case, not clear 
that the ASW task forces will need their own carrier-borne air cover …”228 This view ignored 
the possibility of the land based aircraft either being unable to reach the naval forces, or 
simply being too few to cover the number of tasks assigned to them, which meant having an 
integrated air unit enabled greater flexibility on the part of the Royal Navy. It ignored the 
benefit organic air support could provide for naval forces. As part of the ‘alternative 
defence’ lobby, Dan Smith argued for a change in policy, allowing a disengagement from 
NATO. He reviewed the policies for defence of Britain and concluded that, “Should Britain 
disengage from NATO, the system of mutual threat would lose some of its relevance for 
Britain.”229 He supported the concept of,  
“Concentrating on territorial defence [which] would reduce the scope of 
British defence policy and a strategy of defensive deterrence would eliminate 
certain types of forces – long-range strike aircraft, nuclear weapons, ocean-
going naval forces – with, one expects, consequent budgetary savings.”230  
At the other extreme are the ‘Strengthened Defence’ proponents who support the re-
introduction of National Service which would allow the Armed Forces to fulfil both NATO 
and OOA commitments simultaneously.231 The arguments in favour of bolstering defence 
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against large scale, WTO-style, armoured attack were buttressed in the wake of the Yom 
Kippur War. 
The Yom Kippur War 
The 1974-5 defence review occurred in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, and lessons 
were drawn from that conflict that were directly relevant to NATO and Britain.232 The 
outcome of the War of Attrition and Yom Kippur War gave the British policy makers pause 
for thought.  The lessons available brought contradictions from the MoD, with some 
suggesting that the conflict pointed at particular, specific lessons that could be learned, such 
as a need to increase ammunition and supply stocks.233 Others indicated, “… the difficulties 
of acquiring the necessary data and the problem of interpretation in terms of the European 
theatre …”234  
The Yom Kippur War offered a variety of scenarios applicable to the situation in Europe, 
with some others less so. The use of Soviet made, anti-armour and anti-aircraft missiles in 
high density combinations as a protective ‘envelope’ for the armoured advance, using WTO 
doctrine, was significant for the NATO observers.235 The use of fixed defensive positions in 
Sinai by the Israelis, the so-called Bar-Lev Line, was seen to have been a failure. It provided 
little resistance to the Egyptian attacks in 1973, and only served to fix small units of Israeli 
Defence Force troops which could be dealt with piecemeal by the Egyptians.236 There had 
been a suggestion previously that NATO defence costs could be reduced by employing a 
strong line of fixed defences in West Germany, similar to Bar-Lev and close to the IGB, as a 
first line of defence against a WTO attack.237 The potential for developing a Maginot 
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mentality, along with the ease with which the WTO forces could identify and destroy such 
fixed defences, meant that the idea was never adopted.238  
Parallels could be drawn from the wars in the Middle-East, not just about ammunition 
expenditure and capabilities, but the political build-up and manoeuvring before combat was 
joined. The continued strain on the Israeli economy of partial and full mobilisations during 
times of tension was seen as a harbinger of possible WTO policy if war were to come to 
Europe. Like Britain, Israel had a small army, but unlike Britain, all adults served in the 
military. This gave a large reservoir of well-trained and highly motivated reservists. But 
these reservists could only be mobilised with the greatest care.239 The Israeli economy 
suffered dreadfully from the effective freezing of normal life during these periods of 
mobilisation, and they were kept to a minimum to reduce these damaging economic 
effects.240 The Egyptians and other Arab states understood this, and used it as an indirect 
weapon.241 In a similar way, British military commentators noted that the WTO was likely to 
use propaganda, stop-go crisis creation, aggressive political and military moves and 
continuing tension as a means to confuse and paralyse the response of NATO members.242 
These stop-go scenarios were recognised by the British Government, and indeed were part 
of their command post exercises.243 This was recognised by NATO in MC14/3; “The more 
probable actions appear to be those at the lower end of the spectrum, such as creating 
tension by harassment or blockading Berlin or other political military pressures …”244 There 
were also examples of the difficulty of timely mobilisation and the need for positive and 
strong decision making. (The resurgence recently of Russian power and also of Chinese 
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expansion seems to be making use of similar strategies. NATO seems to have forgotten the 
lessons.) 
The policies and strategies employed before the Yom Kippur war also reflected the same 
approaches as NATO and the WTO. It was apparent why some of the lessons of Yom Kippur 
were so vital for NATO. Israel’s defence was based on, “ … sufficient warning to mobilize 
reserves; a standing army, which would fight the holding phase of an enemy attack; and an 
air force, which had a large regular component. These … were designed to win time and 
hold the line until the reserves moved in…”245 This approach is almost indistinguishable from 
the British defence policy of a small standing force capable of holding an enemy until the 
balance of forces could be delivered.246  The greatest difference in Europe was the 
possession of nuclear weapons by both sides. 
The Nuclear Threshold 
The nuclear threshold, for the purposes of this research, is defined as the point at which 
nuclear weapons are authorised and used, in whatever quantity and size-range, by either 
side, in a conflict.247 The nuclear threshold in any war between NATO and the WTO was a 
direct function of the relative capability of the conventional forces, and not a function of the 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons.248 It was not fixed, but varied over time based on the relative 
capabilities of the potential combatants, as viewed by each side. There was a publicised 
effort to raise the nuclear threshold249 and the desire to move away from a speedy use of 
nuclear weapons demanded that NATO provide, “… conventional forces of considerable 
size. Unless these were capable, and seen to be capable, of giving battle on a major scale, 
the enemy could gamble on a swift success, and deterrence would be weakened 
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thereby.”250 The threshold depended on the readiness of either side to use nuclear 
weapons.251 Michael Quinlan wrote, “… cold war planners in Western countries customarily 
assumed that it would be NATO, not the Warsaw Pact, that found itself in this situation.”252 
In the move to flexible response, conventional defence was seen as giving NATO Military 
Commanders and the member Governments time to consult on nuclear release, and 
perhaps eventually raising the nuclear threshold permanently. Writing about the 
replacement of nuclear weapons by new technology, Dr Phil Williams, then Lecturer in 
International Relations at the University of Southampton concluded, “The argument that 
this threshold needs to be raised has won widespread approval.”253 The declared intention 
was to allow a more flexible method of responding to potential aggression, thereby delaying 
or removing the need for nuclear use. In support of improving the conventional deterrence 
posture, Hew Strachan wrote, “In raising the nuclear threshold, conventional defence aims 
to reassert the principles of graduated deterrence.”254 The fear concerning the threshold 
was that once nuclear weapons had been used, regardless of their designation as tactical or 
otherwise, there would start an escalation to a strategic exchange.255 If a WTO conventional 
invasion was succeeding, NATO would be faced with the need to use tactical nuclear 
weapons to try to stabilise the situation, or surrender.256 In 1981, the Assistant Chief of the 
Defence Staff commented that, “… if stockpiles are inadequate to sustain conventional 
operations, the inevitable options are defeat or a lowering of the nuclear threshold.”257 The 
UK and France, with their own nuclear weapons, might consider their use necessary. The US 
would then be faced with a dilemma: use nuclear weapons in Europe and accept that there 
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was a good chance that retaliation would include direct strikes against US targets; or allow 
Europe to be over-run.  
Regardless of the nature of the political party in Number 10, Britain’s support of NATO was, 
publicly, unequivocal. But to raise the threshold significantly would require for Britain 
conventional forces in numbers not seen since National Service. It is perhaps worth noting a 
report from the Chiefs of Staff Committee from 1973 regarding the conventional situation:  
“… there is an important relationship between the size of conventional forces 
and the time available for consultation, but there has been no attempt within 
NATO to specify how long this time should be. Nevertheless, with present 
force levels it is almost certain that, in the event of a major WP conventional 
aggression, a decision on the initial tactical use of nuclear weapons would 
have to be taken in a matter of days …”258 
Equally, avoiding lowering the nuclear threshold was an important aspect of defence policy. 
A 1980 Government booklet celebrating the 30th anniversary of NATO’s formation contained 
the statement, “The danger in allowing the conventional imbalance to grow unchecked is 
that it would lower the nuclear threshold and therefore make the deterrent strategy less 
credible.”259 The Government did not wish to be seen to be involved in structuring a policy 
which would make nuclear war more, not less, likely.  
A study by the Directors of Defence Policy on the defence review of 1981 found that,  
“… there will be a significant number of qualitative reductions in the capability 
of the UK’s conventional contribution to the Alliance. This will cause its war 
fighting capability to be progressively degraded in relation to that of the WP, 
and consequently reduce deterrence and lower the nuclear threshold.”260  
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Critical to the sustainability of the defence of NATO were levels of war reserves, and their 
maintenance and availability. The Chiefs of Staff advised the Government“… that BAOR did 
not have the capability to sustain conventional warfare in the Central Region for more than 
four days (at UK perceptions of intensity) without resort to nuclear weapons: and I am sure 
that the situation is no better today.”261  
Out Of Area Commitments 
Despite the contraction of British defence commitments and the policy statement that 
NATO was the focus, Britain still maintained out-of-area military responsibilities.262 Although 
the Out of Area defence commitment is not part of this research, it had a direct effect on 
defence policy. Northern Ireland was a continual drain on troops from BAOR, as was Cyprus, 
and to a much lesser extent Belize and the Falkland Islands. Northern Ireland constituted a 
severe burden on BAOR, not only in terms of the number of troops deployed, but in 
interruptions to training for their NATO role. In reply to concern expressed by the Secretary 
of State for Defence, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) wrote, “… about 25% of [BAOR] 
units are either in Northern Ireland or training to go there at any one time. In any twelve 
month period 50% of BAOR units will have been engaged for some part of the time in 
training for, or a tour in, Northern Ireland, or both.”263 Between 1979 and 1989, the average 
number of service personnel in Northern Ireland was approximately 10,000. This would 
have had a telling effect on the capabilities of BAOR in the event of a war. 
Conclusion 
The pressures on defence policy come from different places at different times, and there are 
various schools of thought as to why some reforms were more radical in their approach 
than others were. One suggests that economic decline along with a desire to remain a 
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‘Power’ meant some realities were not faced up to until too late.264 Alternatively, a 
preoccupation with the threat from the East meant that Britain continued to, “… issue a 
series of promissory notes which could not be cashed.”265 The ‘orthodox’ view considers the 
economic factor to be the main driving force behind the formulation of defence policy,266 
and the ‘unorthodox’ which says that economics can only explain part of the ‘reshaping’ 
undertaken since World War Two.267 There appears to be a large amount of common 
ground between these two schools of thought, and that the economic factor is strong within 
each. However, the suggestion by Daniel Gibran that, “… economic factors only came into 
play when the strategic environment was conducive and benign …”268 can be shown to be 
incorrect. Political pressures to reduce defence spending came from within the UK 
Government, most notably the Treasury, at times when the situation was far from benign.  
Britain’s defence policy had to accommodate the narrowing focus to Europe, and within 
that the move towards a more continental structure. Policy also had to try to accommodate 
the reduction in Britain’s economic power. Britain remained vital to NATO’s interests, but 
there seemed to be a willing suspension of disbelief by politicians in Britain after the 
adoption of MC 14/3 regarding the need for correspondingly larger conventional forces. The 
simple expedient of building forces to face threats came second in the political world. In the 
military view, “One of the most efficient ways to develop a coherent and rational military 
force structure is to construct it by reference to the likely threat it may have to face.”269 In 
the political world economics, popularity and a combative Treasury Department loomed 
larger than threat analysis. As Lawrence Freedman wrote in 1982, “The history of British 
defence policy is of an attempt to reconcile the mismatch between resources and 
commitments.”270 Throughout the twenty years following the adoption of MC14/3, 
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Governments have repeated the refrain of more efficient defence, reduced cost and 
improved capability. They also repeated the assurance that NATO was the focus of defence 
policy now that the Empire had been successfully dismantled.  
Whilst it is understood that there was and is a need for secrecy, the Statements on the 
Defence Estimates issued by the Government each year provided almost no indication of 
what was happening with the provision of equipment, personnel or supplies to the armed 
forces. Written in equivocatory phrases, the promise of one year’s Statement could be easily 
cancelled and then lost in the subsequent years’. Tactical and Operational doctrine 
developed by the military depended on maintaining continuous research and development, 
which depended on consistent funding from the Government. Training suffered further 
because of equipment orders being cut or postponed. Failure to persist with the 
development of weapons, communication and transport systems meant long term military 
planning had gaps in the forces and systems available, limiting capabilities further. However 
well the Generals, Air Marshals and Admirals planned, they could not make up for cuts to 
essential personnel, services and supplies.  
The defence of the British Isles are clearly identified by NATO as an important part of its 
strategy, as a rear area for the supply of war materiel to Europe, and adding depth to the 
battlefield. A clear picture isn’t drawn of the full extent of the demands which would be 
placed on Britain in the event of war, although Government documents contain the warning 
that, “Any Warsaw Pact conventional attack on Western Europe would probably include 
heavy air attacks with conventional weapons against the United Kingdom, with one of the 
aims being to prevent NATO bringing forward vital reserves and reinforcements.”271 The 
inclusion of the defence of the UK to Britain’s NATO contribution was therefore vital.  
Britain had been the only NATO ally to allow US aircraft to fly from their bases during the 
attack on Libya in 1986 and several NATO allies denied overflight to the US aircraft. Regular 
cooperation and ‘interoperability’ between US and British Armed forces meant that when 
the allies did finally go to war together in the Gulf in 1991, they worked extremely well 
together. Britain and the US co-operated on several military projects, as Britain did with 
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other NATO members. In many ways this was an attempt to bind the Alliance members 
closer together, as well as to produce weapon systems collectively. Some of the projects 
failed miserably, ending with disagreements between the members, whilst others – notably 
Tornado – produced an effective weapon system. 
Political ideology played its part in the formation of policy, and the dichotomies therein. The 
Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher wished to control the economic situation, and 
improve Britain’s position economically and politically. At the same time, the Conservative 
Government wanted to implement the promises made in the run up to the 1979 election to 
improve Britain’s defences. There was a direct conflict between financial control of the 
economy and defence spending. 
The Conservatives came into power in 1979 decrying the state of defence, and promising 
increases in defence spending. Once elected, they were faced with the economic realities of 
the time and were forced to make cuts or adjustments in the focus of defence. Indeed the 
1981 Statement was roundly criticised by all colours of the political spectrum, those from 
the left criticising the Tories for false promises, and those from the right complaining that 
more money needed to be spent on defence, over and above any existing increases. The 
decision to buy Trident and the installation of additional and new American nuclear 
weapons caused the Conservatives political difficulty, as well as problems funding the 
improvements to the conventional armed forces that had been promised to NATO as part of 
the LTDP.  
Throughout the 1980s the Labour Party’s defence policy was seen as being the worst of all 
worlds: a unilateral abandonment of nuclear weapons and cuts in defence spending.272 
Some senior members in the party, such as Robin Cook and Tony Benn, suggested that 
Britain loosen, or even cut completely, its ties with NATO.273 The party had split in the early 
1980s, partly over the question of defence, with several prominent members going to make 
up the Social Democratic Party.274 It was the uncertainty over defence, especially nuclear 
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weapons, which contributed to keeping the Labour Party on the Opposition benches for 
nearly twenty years. 
Raising the nuclear threshold required greater conventional resources for the forces to hold, 
or defeat, any non-nuclear attack by the WTO into Europe, and to keep holding without 
allowing the WTO a break-in or breakthrough. Approximately 55,000 troops were 
permanently stationed in West Germany from an overall Army total of 158,100 in 1979 and 
156,000 in 1989.( See Figure 9 - Army comparison of regular, reservist and auxiliary forces, 
including BAOR, 1975 - 1991, on page 347) The Royal Navy, almost completely committed to 
NATO, numbered 73,500 and 64,700 respectively (See Figure 11 - Royal Navy comparison of 
regular, reservist and auxiliary forces 1975 - 1991, on page 349) the RAF 85,400 and 93,100.( 
See Figure 10 - RAF comparison of regular, reservist and auxiliary forces 1975 - 1991, on 
page 348.) In addition to the personnel committed to NATO, contributions such as the 
Infrastructure Fund have been effectively absent from histories of the period. Perhaps the 
largest absence was and is, however, the contribution made as an island nation within the 
Alliance. Vital to the defence of Western Europe, but not part of a NATO Region, the UK 
Home Base was critical to NATO. Britain’s contribution was much broader than is has been 
considered, and may have been broader than had been anticipated in the plans for war. 
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Chapter 5 - Planning 
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Introduction 
Having established what NATO and Britain considered the threat to be from the WTO, the 
military and non-military contributions to NATO, overall British Defence policy, and the 
wider collective defence of Europe, this chapter addresses the plans and crisis scenarios 
which the planners used to assess various responses. Were the plans and allocated 
resources adequate? Were the plans sufficiently robust to be a realistic view of any 
anticipated war? This description of the plans and analysis of the timescales is crucial in 
assessing the practicability of executing defence policy. Some of the examples below may 
read like a shopping list. That is because that is exactly what they were: a shopping list of 
plans, measures and procedures intended to move Britain and her Armed Forces from peace 
to war as smoothly and quickly as possible. 
Given the level of the UK contribution to NATO, and the policy undertaken by the UK 
Government that the UK would only fight a war under the auspices of NATO,1 could the UK 
have fulfilled its obligations as set out in its own plans? Those plans provided responses to 
different postulated attack scenarios, and examined the WTO’s doctrine and tactics. The 
transition to war depended on how soon NATO could identify an impending assault, how 
long it would then take to mobilise the forces, and how long it would need to position those 
forces where they were needed.2 The timeline for transition to war can be compiled from 
the exercises undertaken during the late 70s and early 80s,3 combined with the actions 
defined in the Government War Book (GWB).4 Along with these are the detailed plans 
available showing the structure of forces involved, their locations and the movement 
schedules to get them to their correct war locations. For the purposes of comparing the 
readiness and flexibility of the UK’s transition to war plans, the timescales and the British 
Government responses are taken primarily from the WINTEX 83 documents. 
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The War Book 
The Government War Book catalogues and describes the actions necessary in a crisis to 
prepare the civil authorities and mobilise the Armed Forces. It outlined the measures, plans, 
and groups of plans, to be implemented with the intention of ensuring a smooth transition 
from peace to war. Each measure was broken down into three steps, or paragraphs. The 
first paragraph of each measure contains preparatory actions. The second paragraph 
contains additional preparatory actions, or in some cases partial implementation. The third 
paragraph fully implements the measure.5 Each measure could be implemented paragraph 
by paragraph, or all together, depending on the situation at the time.  The Government War 
Book measures are categorised A, B, or C. ‘A’ means a measure that could not be 
implemented within five days. ‘B’ is a measure that could be implemented in five days 
without materially affecting day-to-day life, or being provocative. ‘C’ is a measure that could 
be implemented within five days, which would materially affect the population and was 
potentially provocative.6 In any crisis, the measures in the GWB would be reviewed to 
ensure they were relevant and up-to-date.  
The Government War Book measures were collected together into ‘Group Decisions’ (GD).7 
These were collections of measures required to permit the mobilisation of the Armed 
Forces, the call-up of reservists, the protection of Key Points within the UK and the 
mobilisation of civilian transport, for example.  Several of the GDs dealt with gaining control 
of transportation, implementing preparations for Energy, Health Services and the 
Emergency Services, as well as arranging for the administration of justice to be moved to 
Regional Government.8 Group Decision 8 was the most important for the purposes of this 
research, as it corresponded with the mobilisation and movement of regular and reserve 
forces, and their deployment both in Germany and the UK. GD10 ends with the declaration 
of war, or the assumption that a state of war exists. 
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The GWBs were seen as being, “…unwieldy and complex … from a user viewpoint.”9 The 
system was complicated, as demonstrated by a table which cross-references the NATO 
State/Stage with the GWB measure. It is a five page long table which breaks down the NATO 
alert by the three letter NATO measure, defines the category against which the three NATO 
commands are to react, and finally shows which GWB measure, and the relevant section, it 
related to.10 (See Appendix O, United Kingdom Categorisation of NATO Alert Measures) 
Despite attempts to align the NATO and UK alert system, the MoD Transition to War Team 
cautioned that, “There are a number of national Measures that have no NATO counterpart 
and a number of NATO Measures that have no national counterpart.”11  
NATO Alert System 
The NATO Alert System aims were:12 to provide for readiness in time of tension; to provide 
for the survival of NATO forces and their readiness to react in case of attack with little or no 
warning; to ensure an orderly transition from peace to war.13 
NATO had three States to the overall alert system; Military Vigilance; Counter Surprise 
Military System; and Formal Alert. The Formal Alert System measures have a two-stage 
process for their implementation. Firstly, the request by an MNC must be approved 
unanimously by the member states. Secondly, the measure is declared, and the separate 
nations must implement it as soon as possible. This process could be bypassed in an 
emergency by the MNC making the declaration of Simple or Reinforced alert themselves. 
The alerts are further broken down by classification into one of four categories; Category I – 
all National Authorities agree to implement this measure when it is declared; Category II – 
NA agree to implement the measures upon declaration of State of Military Vigilance or 
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when the appropriate Alert Stage has been declared, with their approval. Category III – NA 
reserve the right to implement, or determine the extent of implementation, of this 
measure; Category IV – This does not apply to the nation.14 
State of Military Vigilance 
Military Vigilance15 covered periods of delicate relations or rising tensions, and required low 
scale preparation to facilitate a faster transition to higher readiness later. This comprised 
inconspicuous preparations that could be maintained for a considerable time without undue 
strain or unfavourable public reaction. Because the majority of the measures to be 
undertaken during Military Vigilance were preparations for and precautions against war, 
rather than overt acts of mobilisation, they could be implemented unobtrusively and in a 
very short time. The GWB measures indicated that the MoD and Government departments 
would have no problems implementing them as long as there was no sudden acceleration to 
the crisis. 
Counter-Surprise Military System 
These were defensive military actions that needed to be taken quickly in response to, or the 
threat of, attack with little or no warning, and were not dealt with by the Formal Alert 
System. These were broken down into ORANGE, which was an indication of possible attack, 
and SCARLET that required immediate action. The Counter-Surprise system was meant to 
deal with rapid or surprise attacks, and involved defensive military actions to enable NATO 
forces to survive such an attack.   
Formal Alert System 
These were a series of actions required to complete an orderly transition from peace to war. 
“It will be employed in circumstances where deteriorating international relations lead to 
increased tension and a growing threat …”16 This has three stages – SIMPLE was the first 
step which initiated full deployment of all forces assigned to NATO17 and should be 
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completed as discreetly as possible.18 Some of the Measures this required19 would be 
impossible to implement discreetly; for example, calling-out the reserves and the Ulster 
Defence Regiment, and ceasing public duties for military units in London and Scotland. 
REINFORCED20 was the second stage, and should have resulted in the highest level of 
readiness for NATO forces. Finally, GENERAL marked the transition from peace to war, and 
would be declared on or immediately after hostilities commence.21  By the early 1980s, the 
Government War Book Group Decisions had been organised to correspond as closely as 
possible with the NATO alert system. As such, Group Decisions 2, 8, 9 and 14 relate directly 
to Military Vigilance, Simple Alert, Reinforced Alert and General Alert respectively.22  
British Planning - Transition to War  
The Transition to War Committee 
This committee was responsible for coordinating departmental actions, and was made up of 
Permanent Secretaries and a military advisor under the chairmanship of a senior minister.23 
Recommendations were made to the Cabinet to be authorised, or authorised by the 
Committee directly, depending on the circumstances obtaining at the time.24  
The Process  
Prior to 1967, the Transition to War plans moved directly from a ‘Warning Period’ in a ‘Pre-
Strike Phase’ to the ‘Strike Phase’ of strategic nuclear exchange.25 After Flexible Response 
was adopted, the planning for Transition to War included a Conventional Period within the 
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Pre-Strike Phase.26 Once a crisis was identified, and aggression against NATO might be the 
result, the first codeword would be issued by the Prime Minister.27 This would have initiated 
a review of all departmental War plans: at this stage political control was exercised by the 
Cabinet, advised in turn by the Transition to War Committee. This would have equated to 
the State of Military Vigilance in the NATO Alert System. Unobtrusive preparations would 
have begun at this stage. 
If the crisis were to deepen, and indications of Warsaw Pact forces moving to a war footing 
were identified, the second codeword would be issued.28 The Cabinet Office and Transition 
to War Committee have sought approval from the Cabinet to instruct all departments and 
services to implement all preparatory stages for putting the country onto a war footing. 
NATO would have been at the Formal Alert Stage. More obvious measures, visible to the 
public, would have made an appearance. The full timescales would vary depending on the 
crisis and the political will, but as an approximate guide, to implement all National 
Transition to War measures would have taken some three to four weeks.29 Vital to the 
functioning of many of the GWB Measures were the Emergency Powers. Many feared the 
enacting of the Emergency Powers Bill would be the beginning of the implementation of a 
dictatorial state, but there was practical thinking behind the need for it.30 The MoD 
presented it thus: “Until [Emergency Powers have been enacted] the Serviceman will, with 
minor exceptions, have no more powers than the ordinary citizen.”31 But if the Emergency 
Powers are not enacted until a late stage due to political delay, the vital preparations for 
troops and equipment movements would not have been completed in time.  
How did the Government identify when a crisis was occurring? The decision to put out the 
first codeword would depend very much on individual circumstances obtaining at the time. 
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To provide some suggestion of the reaction to an approaching crisis, a memorandum is to 
be found in the MoD War Book collection of the National Archives. The memo was from 
Rear Admiral Reffell, and begins, “In view of the international tension resulting from the 
crises in Iran and Afghanistan, I believe that the MoD(N) [Navy] Transition to War 
arrangements should be reviewed and, if appropriate, alerted.”32 In this circumstance, war 
plans were to be checked, and preparations made, discreetly, for Transition to War 
measures. No authorities outside the MoD(N) were to be involved, and if the situation did 
not become a crisis, it would be good preparation for Exercise HILEX80. This sort of 
preparation, if seen by the ‘enemy’, could have caused increased tension in an already 
difficult international situation. The decision, taken by a senior military commander without 
reference to the political structure, was a good example of how crises could escalate before 
the politicians had an opportunity to assess the situation and react accordingly. 
The speed of mobilisation was crucial for reinforcing the in-place units in Germany. NATO 
sought to coordinate the national emergency systems with its own alert system, ensuring 
that mobilisation would be consistent across the Alliance. The British Government found the 
idea unacceptable and even the timing of deployment would be difficult to achieve. The 
Long Term Defence Programme had two measures that aimed to solve these problems, but 
the Government responded in the following ways: 
“Co-ordinate and synchronise, as far as possible, national policies with the 
NATO Alert System to ensure that NATO allocated reservists and reserve units 
will be available in their war positions when required. We already intend this 
(although we have made clear that we cannot guarantee to meet the 48 hour 
timescale stipulated for deployment.) 
Seek to provide links between national mobilisation plans and the NATO Alert 
System. On the understanding that automatic triggering of national 
mobilisation plans – which would not be acceptable – is not implied, this 
presents no difficulty for the UK.”33 
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The United Kingdom’s plans for preparation and prosecution of a war needed to be co-
ordinated with those of NATO, as the Government position was that the country would not 
be engaged in a general war except in support of NATO.34 NATO provided an Alert System 
which was designed to bring the Alliance armed forces to readiness in time of tension or 
war. According to the British Government, the NATO Alert System, “… is primarily concerned 
with arrangement for those military forces which will come under the Major NATO 
Commanders’ (MNC) operational command…”35 but does include some civil actions 
required to support those military arrangements. The national system, and in particular the 
United Kingdom’s Government War Book, covers a multitude of military and civil actions. 
The civil actions had time dependencies on, “… constitutional, political, economic and 
administrative considerations rather than on international military requirements or 
assessments.”36 However, a close analysis of the GWB shows that some of the military 
actions, especially those involving transport, were dependent on these matters as well. 
Crises, Timescales and Scenarios 
The Transition to War process as described in some of the exercises began with a 
breakdown in international relations. The exercises used a change in Soviet leadership 
followed by a WTO invasion of Yugoslavia as the beginning of the crisis.37 Almost all of the 
NATO exercises used the ‘Slow Moving Crisis’ as a basis for their scenarios as this allowed 
the full deployment of forces in the build-up period.  
Crises 
There were three outline scenarios for a transition to war and it is worth evaluating them:38 
A Slow Moving Crisis 
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“This scenario is of such a timescale as to allow the Cabinet/TWC [Transition to War 
Committee] … to discuss and authorise individual GWB measures and … requests 
from Major NATO commanders …” 
Intermediate Timescales 
“A crisis evolving in the intermediate timescale is intended to be dealt with by a 
combination of MPDs [Major Policy Decisions], individuall [sic] decisions and, where 
necessary, GDs.” 
Rapidly Moving Crisis 
This was described as a, “ … rapid transition from peace to war …” It was in a rapidly 
moving crisis that timescales for decision making were all important, and as such the 
14 Group Decisions would be implemented as rapidly as possible. 
There was some confusion in both NATO and the MoD about the likelihood of warning of an 
attack. The NATO assumption was not that the WTO would launch a surprise attack, but that 
there would be a steady deterioration of international relations over a period of more than 
20 days, resulting in an outbreak of hostilities.39 Contrast this with the private comments of 
the US Secretary of State for Defense in 1979: “We estimate that the Pact could concentrate 
ground forces of five ‘fronts’ – 85 to 90 Divisions – for an attack on NATO’s Centre Region 
within about 15 days … the Pact could also assemble over 4,000 tactical aircraft … within 
three to five days.”40 A Joint Intelligence Committee assessment in 1977 anticipated that 
only two weeks warning would be available to NATO, perhaps even as little as two days, 
allowing a surprise attack to be launched.41 The WTO might have a week of preparation 
before the signs were noticed by Western Intelligence;  
“… the Alliance may now receive as little as one week’s firm warning of the 
Warsaw Pact achieving full war posture. As short a time as 48 hours warning 
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might be obtained in the less likely even of the Soviet Union choosing to 
optimize strategic surprise by opening hostilities before achieving a full war 
posture.”42  
Relative Timing 
Given concern about the speed of mobilisation, the warning time was crucial for raising the 
nuclear threshold. An indication of just how difficult it was to predict an approaching crisis, 
or to identify any mobilisation of troops, was shown following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979. Little or no warning came from the US Intelligence Agencies such as the 
CIA, who reported before the invasion that, “We have not seen indications that the Soviets 
are at the moment preparing ground forces for large-scale military intervention in 
Afghanistan.”43 The Soviets prepared an Airborne Division, an independent Airborne 
Regiment, and five Military Transport Divisions, increased the readiness of two Divisions in 
the Turkestan Military District, and brought the Bridging regiments in the Kiev Military 
District to full strength for deployment.44 The Soviets had employed distraction methods to 
keep the Western countries guessing as to their intentions right up to the point of invasion. 
In the same way preparations during the war scare in 1983 were missed, with US 
Intelligence reporting, “The Soviet air force standdown had been in effect for nearly a week 
before fully armed MIG-23 aircraft were noted on air defense alert in East Germany.”45 
Western intelligence seemed to have had a problem identifying WTO mobilisations and 
preparations for war. 
Many of the scenarios for simulation were referred to by the respective mobilisation times 
for the WTO and NATO forces. The initial mobilisation day was referred to as M-day, and the 
first day of combat as D-day. There were several scenarios and settings which are used 
throughout the Government and NATO documentation, referred to in the style 5/3 or 
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31/24. The first number refers to the number of days the WTO would have to mobilise and 
prepare, and the second number refers to how much time NATO would have. There was a 
delay between the WTO mobilising and NATO confirming mobilisation had occurred. The 
Government War Book states, “For planning purposes, it is assumed the most likely period 
of warning of hostilities would be 1-2 weeks …”46 but plans used by both the Government 
generally, and MoD in particular, used a longer period of warning thus enabling full 
mobilisation.47  
A surprise attack is the basis for the 5/3 setting, and would probably equate to the ‘rapidly 
moving crisis’, with the WTO mobilisation seen by NATO intelligence five days before 
hostilities commence.  NATO would have begun to mobilise two days after the notification 
of WTO mobilisation, with NATO therefore having three days’ warning before D-day. 
Because the WTO forces know they will be attacking, unobtrusive preparations for 
mobilisation can occur up to fourteen days before mobilisation, increasing availability across 
the spectrum of forces.48 This would effectively mean the ‘rapidly moving crisis’ should have 
been called a 19/3 scenario.  
The one or two week scenarios, or ‘intermediate timescale’, involved NATO receiving 
between seven and fourteen days’ warning before the outbreak of hostilities. An extended 
variant of this was the 25/10 scenario.49 The 31/24 setting assumes that the WTO was 
involved in a full-scale deliberate build-up of forces during a period of rising tension, and 
allowed for a full deployment of forces. This could be aligned with a ‘slow-moving crisis’. 
NATO was assumed to mobilise simultaneously with the WTO, but with mobilisation only 
becoming fully effective seven days after WTO mobilisation. Hostilities begin thirty-one days 
after the WTO began mobilisation, and therefore 24 days after NATO’s full mobilisation 
started.50 The 31/24 setting, or minor variations upon it, was used in many NATO scenarios 
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and wargames, as it allowed the largest force to be mobilised by the NATO countries, and 
the greatest number of reinforcements to be delivered to the UK and Europe from the USA 
and Canada.51 The same type of scenario was used in fictional books on the subject.52 
Following from the Israeli example of being subjected to stop-go crises which made 
mobilisation difficult, even in the face of evidence of the enemy mobilisation, the need for 
firm political decision making in these scenarios was vital. 
The importance of political decision making 
The crucial variable in all of the plans for the Transition to War was the decision to initiate 
those plans. Brodie wrote,  
“When it comes to exercising national military initiative in the thermonuclear 
age, it cannot be assumed for security purposes that one’s own government 
will act other than deliberately and cautiously. It may do otherwise, but 
security should not rest on the premise that the government will move 
speedily and aggressively.”53  
There was, necessarily, a balance to be found, but the longer mobilisation was delayed, the 
more likely it would be that the troops in Germany would have to fight un-reinforced, at 
least in the short-term. Unless there was a complete shift from the previous behaviour of 
Western Governments to reduce the likelihood of ‘provocation’ to a potential enemy, the 
prospect for prompt decision making initially looked poor. The Defence Staff’s view of this 
was summed up in an article for the NATO magazine: 
“A major problem with reinforcement is the question of timing. If it is too 
early, a delicate political and military situation could become unbalanced; 
while if it is too late, the battle (and indeed the war) might well be lost. In 
common with all NATO nations, the UK faces the difficult task of deciding 
politically when we should move militarily. There is no easy answer to this 
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problem; it depends on good intelligence and firm political will. Once the 
political decision is made, our forces must be able to move as quickly and as 
efficiently as possible.”54 
There would inevitably be a delay inherent in all decision making, as according to the MoD 
War Book, “All deployment plans would be subject to the prior agreement of the NATO MC 
and the concurrence of the British Government as advised by the Chiefs of Staff.”55  
The timing of mobilisation was crucial to the implementation of NATO plans for defence and 
reinforcement, and this timing was critically dependent on political will. The need for 
prompt political decision-making was recognised by the Cabinet Office: “We are … 
uncomfortably dependent on getting early warning of impending aggression and acting on it 
boldly.”56 Provocation of the WTO in a crisis was high on the list of concerns for the political 
and military leaders of NATO and its member nations. Reinforcement of the forces in West 
Germany was a highly visible procedure, obvious to the WTO within hours of it starting. For 
the Armed Forces to achieve their reinforcement and mobilisation timescales, quick 
decisions were needed from politicians. But in the Western Governments during the Cold 
War there was a profound fear of acting ‘provocatively’. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
Macmillan had authorised the Vulcan and Victor nuclear strike force to Alert Condition 
Three (fifteen minutes’ readiness, armed and fuelled) but was reluctant to disperse them to 
their war locations for fear of provoking Khrushchev.57  The civil defence organisations were 
not mobilised for the same reason.  The WTO seemed less worried about provoking the 
West. Later prime ministers could not be expected to make quick decisions, either for fear 
of provocation or internal unrest. Although Margaret Thatcher had taken rapid action 
against the Argentinians in 1982, the same speed could not be expected against a nuclear-
armed enemy. 
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Mobilisation 
Sufficient warning was crucial to enable timely mobilisation of the Armed Forces. According 
to the Chiefs of Staff in 1978, mobilisation of the reserves would take, “… between 15-20 
days (mobilisation to mainland Europe takes 10 days) …”58 but this relied on warning time 
prior to mobilisation. In contrast to this upbeat appraisal, the units required to react most 
speedily give a different timescale. “With no warning time or prior implementation of 
Transition to War Measures it is clear that it would take up to a fortnight to bring 
Commando Forces to a full war footing.”59 The Norway trained Commandos were supposed 
to be available to respond rapidly to a sudden crisis.  
Herein lay the main problems: firstly, knowledge of how quickly troops can or cannot be 
deployed was essential to be able to develop plans: secondly, without stores and 
ammunition they could not fight; without logistic support they would not have ammunition. 
When so much of the planning involved the use of non-regular troops, timing and warning 
were crucial. According to the GWB, the plans to provide logistic support to British forces in 
continental Europe would take nearly four weeks, “… dependent on mobilisation and 
requisitioning powers …”60  
The timescales for mobilisation and deployment had not changed from those of the late 
1970s, but the exercises to test them became more media focussed than before. For 
Exercise Lionheart in 1984 the 8,500 men of 1st Infantry Brigade, a regular formation, 
embarked at Marchwood military port, near Southampton, and arrived 36 hours later at 
Esbjerg, Jutland.61 An exercise such as this was good publicity, showing the troops streaming 
onto and off RORO ferries at ports in England and Denmark.62 No mention was made of 
either the lack of enemy interdiction, or the reliance on civilian equipment, especially dock 
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facilities. This coverage also conveniently avoided mentioning the missing logistical troops, 
all reservists. 
Transport for the mobilisation of some units might have proved troublesome, depending on 
the timing. According to Colonel Hellberg, in 1982, when the Commando Brigade was 
mobilised for the Falklands, “… British Rail were unable to reposition their rolling stock in 
time to meet any of the deadlines …” because a weekend was approaching.63 The Brigade 
had to rely instead on hastily arranged road transport to move its supplies. In a full 
mobilisation, the movement of ammunition by road and rail would be made easier by a 
relaxation of the laws preventing explosives being transported, but there would have been a 
hugely increased demand for that rolling stock.64 Protection of that rolling stock, and the 
transport infrastructure generally, would pose many problems if war were to break out. 
Home Defence  
During the build up to, and prosecution of, a war, internal security against sabotage and 
politically organised demonstrations, as well as looting and general lawlessness, were the 
major demands to be placed on the Military and Police.65 The Police would be brought to a 
war footing even before the Emergency Powers Bill was passed.66 Not only for the 
protection of military installations required for national defence and the nuclear deterrent, 
this protection was also needed for the stocks of food and fuel expected to be required after 
the war. Radiac equipment would be issued to all the forces, liaison officers established at 
Regional and Sub-Regional HQs at the same time as the Local Authorities were preparing 
themselves. The harmonisation of military preparations and civil defence showed thorough 
in many of the exercises, for example with SQUARE LEG: “…the United Kingdom 
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Government issued directives to all County … authorities to commence overt 
implementation of the War Emergency Plans …”67 involving all the Emergency Services. 
To prepare for a war, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) would have 
obtained extra food stocks from commercial companies, as well as dispersing food stocks 
around the country, all of which needed protecting. These food reserves were primarily for 
post-strike military use.68 From experience in exercises, requests were expected for military 
protection for food stocks held at approximately 200 locations spread throughout the 
country.69 This reflected, reasonably objectively, the demands that would be placed on the 
military for protecting post-strike food reserves alone. There would be other Key Points 
(KP)70 which required protection including gas and oil rigs and pipelines, coal mines and 
nuclear as well as conventional power stations. The energy suppliers, or what the GWB 
categorised as the, “… four fuel and power industries …”71 (coal, gas, electricity and oil) 
would be brought to war readiness immediately the first codeword had been issued. It was 
anticipated that this would take up to four weeks to staff all the wartime headquarters and 
prepare and co-ordinate these operations.72 Once the Emergency Powers were in force, all 
motor fuel and oil, along with the petrol stations themselves, would be requisitioned and 
the distribution of fuel undertaken by Government representatives.73  
Recognition of the scale of the task of protecting KPs was given in WINTEX 83: “… All Army 
KP guards are committed to KP guarding on a priority basis”74 as there were insufficient 
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troops to guard them all: “Until TA manpower becomes available, there is a shortage of 
manpower to guard KPs.”75 Manpower for Military Aid to Civil Ministries (MACM) was also 
limited, which meant that supporting operations could not be carried out at the same time 
as increasing preparedness for war.76 
Before reinforcements and reserves could be mobilised and transported, the transport 
system needed to come under the control of the Government, which required civilian 
movement to be severely limited. The establishment of Essential Service Routes (ESR)77 
would be completed at this time. Prior to the Enactment of the Emergency Powers Bill, 
transport requirements for the deployment of labour, Services’ mobilisation and food stock 
dispersal would have to be identified.78 Two weeks were needed to put the first stage of 
these plans into place. Another three weeks were needed once the Emergency Powers bill 
has been enacted.79 Roads and waterways could be closed, traffic regulated, restrictions 
lifted (such as speed limits), and vehicles requisitioned or directed for any use by the 
Military or Civil authorities. Protecting the transport system was a vital function for the 
Police Force. The Government had no plans in place to control evacuation or stop 
uncontrolled civil movement within the UK but would instruct those nationals in other 
NATO countries to stay where they were.80 One exercise saw, “… [fuel] rationing imposed as 
the very first of Britain’s transition-to-war measures … During the next month, requisitioning 
of ships, aircraft, vehicles, and premises was introduced.”81 Fuel rationing would help clear 
the ESRs by limiting the movement of civilian vehicles. The TV drama ‘Threads’ caused 
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widespread public consternation with a vivid portrayal of rationing and road closures under 
Emergency Powers.82 
Several committees would be set up to oversee the operation of ports and shipping. 
Maritime defence required the requisitioning shipping and facilities early in any developing 
crisis. In addition to expected defensive mining, the major port facilities would be defined as 
Key Points and guarded by armed troops. Any food, fuel or other useful cargo in ships would 
be offloaded and added to the reserve and ports would be evacuated of any ships not 
immediately required.83  
In the transition to war, air transport, vital to the reinforcement of Europe the armed forces, 
would quickly be controlled. The Secretary of State for Transport had the powers, in a crisis, 
to requisition any part of a business or property relating to civil aviation.84 There would be 
increasing demands on air transport both to reinforce the forces in Europe and to remove 
civilians from Germany, as any crisis developed. The expectation was that the reinforcement 
process would cause severe congestion at the civil airports concerned,85 and that casualty 
evacuation would fill many returning aircraft once hostilities had opened. 
In preparation for expected casualties, the National Health Service (NHS) and private 
hospitals would be emptied of all but the most serious cases. Admittance to hospital would 
be for emergency cases only. The local authorities and voluntary organisations would 
establish casualty collecting posts and First Aid posts.86 Certain professional qualification 
requirements would be loosened, enabling medical practitioners, for example dentists, to 
be used in a general hospital setting. Some procedures under the Mental Health Act would 
also be relaxed, allowing detention of those diagnosed as unstable.87 
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Realisation that, as part of the outcome of Flexible Response, there could be a purely 
conventional war, directly affected Civil Defence. The Home Office reported, 
“… civil endurance needs to exceed military endurance. Plans need to be 
made not only for a nuclear aftermath, but also for the possibility of hostilities 
ceasing short of general nuclear war. Plans need to ensure national survival 
in the period after cessation of conventional or limited nuclear war … and no 
such plans exist at present.” 88   
An optimistic assessment by the Chiefs of Staff was for 60 days of tension followed by 30 
days of war. The impression drawn was that it would take several months for the country to 
return to anything approaching normality, even if there had been no nuclear exchange. The 
Home Office view was that, “A successful military defence would achieve little if it was 
followed by a collapse of the economy.”89  
Surprise Attack 
Generally, NATO viewed a surprise attack as unlikely, but it did acknowledge that the WTO 
had the capability to launch an attack at short notice,90 which would be classed as a ‘Rapidly 
Moving Crisis’. A surprise attack would fall into the 5/3 setting, and would be covered by the 
NATO Counter-Surprise Military System.91 The GWB does not have its own Group Decision 
to be implemented in the event of the declaration of Counter Surprise, but, “… action in 
such circumstances would be limited to implementing as many Transition to War measures 
as possible in the time available.”92 The GWB measures would be implemented as quickly as 
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possible, using Group Decisions to move large numbers of measures through the Cabinet as 
quickly as possible.93 
A Counter Surprise Military System Alert would require the peacetime establishment of the 
Armed Forces to respond, as there would be insufficient time to call up the reservists. Upon 
the declaration of the Alert, the UK Mobile Force, comprising an infantry battalion, small 
numbers of reconnaissance troops, engineers, artillery and logistics, as well as a squadron of 
Harriers and a flight of RAF helicopters, would be deployed as quickly as possible.94 The UK 
Mobile Force (UKMF) could not reach Germany for at least sixteen days following the 
declaration of the alert. In the 5/3 scenario, they would therefore arrive thirteen days after 
the commencement of hostilities. 
The suspicion therefore is that, if the WTO were able to launch a sufficiently large assault, 
the forces in place would not receive reinforcements in time or in the numbers needed. The 
regular forces of all services would be available, less those on leave and training. Forces on 
short warning would take 24 hours to issue the instructions, and another 3 days to 
prepare.95 This would mean the main forces would be deploying at the time of a WTO 
attack. All these preparations are contingent on the mal-location of forces being 
corrected.96 Some BAOR troops were garrisoned a considerable distance from their 
deployment locations, and this relocation was an integral part of BAOR’s transition to a war 
footing.97 A surprise attack could have caught BAOR relocating many major units, and 
therefore probably in confusion. 
This scenario would also leave short those regular units which rely on individual reservists to 
make up their numbers, as a minimum of 48 hours is required, after mobilisation, for the 
Individual Reinforcement Plan to ensure the reinforcements are in place.98 There were plans 
in place to deal with a surprise attack against BAOR, entitled ‘Operations on Restricted or 
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Light Scales’.99 These focus on the deployment of airportable units which were light in 
armour and might involve the covering force deployed in an emergency.  Logistical support 
would not be in place to supply the fuel and ammunition required, and a large part of the 
War Maintenance Reserve (WMR) would be unavailable, as the majority would still be in the 
UK.  
The WMR held in the UK was meant to be shipped to BAOR and RAF(G) from Harwich, 
Felixstowe or Chatham.100 Considering the locations from which the WMR has to be 
moved,101 the potential for traffic-jams and confusion was great. The Royal Navy and Royal 
Air Force would be in a marginally better position. The RAF dispersal of aircraft could be 
initiated immediately the Alert was issued,102 however the support and maintenance forces 
would take some time to catch up. Royal Navy Ships could put to sea after loading their war 
stores, with a reasonably quick turnaround as seen during the preparation to send the Task 
Force to the Falklands.103 Indeed, the speed with which the Task Force sailed is a good 
indicator of the naval response to a surprise situation, given strong political direction. 
Tension – Build up to a Crisis – Military Vigilance 
During a period of tension or delicate international relations, the NATO Alert System called 
for low-level preparations and precautions that would not be obvious to the WTO, referred 
to as Military Vigilance. The purpose of this was partly for security, but also to avoid 
provoking a response. NATO could have maintained these actions for a considerable time 
without too great an economic or political impact, and would not cause too great a concern 
for the public. They comprised mostly of reviewing plans, preparatory arrangements, such 
as re-activating standby communications centres, and obtaining authorisations. When a 
Military Vigilance alert had been announced, the GWB planned that, “British Telecom and 
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the MoD would prepare communication circuits, and activate those required, including 
Maritime Air Telegraphic Organisation and submarine broadcasts.”104 The Telephone 
preference scheme would be implemented, enabling only those phones, “… required in a 
civil or military emergency …”105 to be used and the vast majority of phone users would be 
disconnected from the network.   
The measures rely entirely on the peacetime establishment of the Armed Forces.106 Most of 
the measures to be taken are precautionary, or ‘Paragraph 1’ in the Government War Book. 
Some, however, are ‘Paragraph 3’, such as sending the logistics liaison staff to NATO 
headquarters,107 or the implementation of recognition and identification procedures,108 but 
none of these ‘Paragraph 3’ measures could be considered provocative, or so it was hoped. 
These measures are simple and quick to implement, taking no more than 24 hours.  
The state of Military Vigilance allowed communications and contingency forces to be 
brought to a higher state of readiness in preparation for employment and deployment. 
ACLANT and ACCHAN forces would carry out plans for covert surveillance and 
reconnaissance within the NATO boundaries.109 ACE forces would be involved in a more 
obvious measure, found in the deployment of selected ground reconnaissance forces to, “… 
positions near appropriate Alliance borders …”110 Reconnaissance was required not only to 
speed the deployment of the main covering forces should hostilities break out 
unexpectedly, but also as a sign of increased military surveillance to the potential enemy. 
From this one can conclude that NATO commanders did not believe reconnaissance to be a 
cause of provocation. 
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Operational command of these contingency forces would be transferred from the MoD to 
the appropriate Major NATO Commanders. Because this measure refers to regular BAOR 
forces directly, the amount of time required to implement it is short, only some 24 hours. 
The State of Military Vigilance meant forces were alerted and ready for mobilisation should 
any crisis escalate and approach hostilities. 
One Week or More 
For situations that did not fall into the category of a surprise attack and developed over a 
period, NATO had the Formal Alert System that listed the measures and actions necessary to 
move the member countries from peace to war. The Formal Alert System would continue 
from the State of Military Vigilance in a situation where a period of international tension 
began to deteriorate. The measures to be implemented in the Government and MoD War 
Books under Formal Alert made heavy demands on transport and communications 
networks.  
Normal radio and television broadcasting would continue for as long as possible to keep the 
public informed. If the BBC broadcasting system had sustained damage or the Government 
felt it necessary, the BBC Wartime Broadcasting System (WTBS) would be introduced. The 
WTBS was a single channel radio service which would provide news and information to the 
population. It would also enable Regional Headquarters to broadcast information.111 The 
Government and Armed Forces had radio networks such as Control by Radio (CONRAD), as 
well as fixed line communications throughout the country, such as the Emergency 
Communications Network. CONRAD was operated primarily by Territorial units.112  Some of 
the communication systems established by the Government were for the purpose of air-raid 
warning and nuclear attack warning, such as the 7,000 sirens and 16,000 warning receivers 
situated throughout the country.113  
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Common to all the Armed Forces was the need to mobilise the reserve personnel, move 
those units and equipment to the required locations, prepare and move reserve equipment 
and ammunition into position, and to clear civilians from the warzone or areas of probable 
combat. Britain needed to reinforce BAOR, RAF Germany, NATO headquarters and other 
parts of the NATO defence with over 100,000 personnel from the regular and reserve 
forces, 120 aircraft, 19,000 vehicles and 40,000 tons of stores.114 Britain also needed to 
mobilise the Home Defence forces, and prepare the civil authorities for war. The amount of 
time that mobilisation and movement took became critical, even if a State of Military 
Vigilance had existed.  Given NATO had assessed a reduction of likely warning times and an 
increase in WTO conventional force capabilities, rapid reinforcement of Europe was of great 
importance. The lift of US and Canadian troops into the UK would have required a large 
number of civilian ships and aircraft, in addition to the enormous amount of transport 
required to crew ships, disperse aircraft and their support crews, and move ammunition and 
equipment.115 Special care would also have been taken to protect nuclear weapons, either 
in storage or being transported, and would have proved to be an additional drain on military 
resources and the civil authorities.  
For reasons of financial economy, many units were based in the UK, but were an organic 
part of the BAOR Order of Battle (OOB) and the defence of Western Europe. These units and 
their equipment had to be deployed as quickly as possible.116 Some deployments could be 
put into effect during the Military Vigilance period, but moving the reinforcements was not 
unobtrusive. The airports at Glasgow, Manchester (Ringway), Birmingham, Heathrow and 
Gatwick would have been full of troops moving to reinforce to BAOR.117 Plans allowed civil 
aircraft to be commandeered to move the reinforcements, in addition to any available 
military flights. Troops and heavy equipment which would not go by air were planned to go 
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from ports such as Belfast (Ardrossen), Felixstowe, Harwich, Dover and Folkestone. Given 
that many troops were to be moved by air, and their vehicles by sea, the opportunity for 
dislocation was high, especially if hostilities had already broken out.  
The forces were planned to move to the airports and ports by road and rail. As examples, 
the 7th Field Force HQ and Signal Squadron alone had over 200 troops and more than 70 
vehicles of various descriptions, ranging from a saloon car to 4 tonne cargo lorries.118 6th 
Field Force, allocated to UKMF, was designated to go to Denmark. They were to leave by the 
airports at Lyneham and Brize Norton, with no sealift.119 To deploy this single formation 
involved the movement of 11,000 troops, 3,600 vehicles, trailers and artillery pieces, 14,500 
tons of freight and 38 aircraft.  
During a period of tension, and to prepare for the influx of mobilised troops as the 
possibility of war approaches, logistic units would be deployed to the Continent.120 These 
comprised 4,500 personnel, 200 armoured vehicles, and 1,200 other vehicles, all to be 
moved by sea using approximately ten RORO ferries or LSLs from the ports at Harwich, 
Felixstowe and Chatham. It would take 24 hours to activate the Logistic Installations,121 and 
to provide full logistic support would take 26 days to implement from initial notification.122 
An examination of the 6th Field Force OOB shows that, although the main force is comprised 
of 85% regulars and 15% TAVR, the Logistic Support Group is up to 80% TAVR.123 (See 
Appendix H, Logistic Support Group Order Of Battle) Logistic support was vital to the full 
deployment of BAOR. Without the call-up of the reserves, these units would be desperately 
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under strength. The NATO Defence Planning Committee mentioned this call-up timing in a 
report;  
“A greater problem than overall manning levels is the manning of specialist 
units, logistic support forces and headquarters. A particular problem is that 
calculated undermanning of logistic units in order to maintain the strength of 
combat units is near the point where the combat troops may not be effective 
because of lack of initial logistic support. In many specialist areas units are 
severely undermanned in junior officer and key noncommissioned officer 
ranks. Among the fortunes which depend on substantial reserve 
augmentation, headquarters manning tends to fall below the level required 
for effective transition to war.”124 
By using normal cross-channel commercial means, two squadrons of the Royal Corps of 
Transport would move some 250 vehicles and equipment to Germany. Troops from the 
Royal Signal, Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC), Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 
(REME) and Pioneer Corps would be flown in by RAF transports and married up with the 
equipment in Germany.125 The GWB warns: 
“The timing of the move is vital as these men are required to assist 1(BR) 
Corps to deploy to their defensive positions. Without these men to move 
operational stocks 1(BR) Corps could not deploy within the time limit set by 
COMNORTHAG’s General Deployment plan.”126  
Four days were expected to be sufficient to deploy these troops, assuming personnel were 
at 72 hours’ notice. The units allocated to the UK Mobile Force were instructed to keep their 
regular units at seven days’ notice at all times, reduced in times of tension. Any delay from 
an earlier decision not to put the troops on 72 hours’ notice would now delay their 
deployment. The Advance and Key Parties were to be permanently on 24 hours’ notice.127 
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For the UKMF alone, ready use ammunition weighed nearly 2,000 tonnes and would take 
specialist equipment and personnel to move it safely and quickly.128 
To provide as many personnel as possible for deployment, all service colleges, schools and 
training establishments would cease their training, and those personnel under training 
would be returned to their units or war appointments. Again, timing was critical as this, “… 
should be implemented at a sufficiently early stage to enable those involved to take up war 
appointments …”129 The same applied to exercises, displays, visits and other overseas 
operations as well as troops on leave or on other non-service courses. Service Personnel 
would be recalled and retained, to the extent of stopping the discharge, retirement or 
transfers of personnel. Those abroad at training establishments would be returned to their 
respective units.130 A directive to the Commander of 7th Field Force ensured, “Any units 
training overseas are to be capable of moving to areas of operations direct from the training 
area without having first to return to the United Kingdom. Stores and vehicles remaining … 
are to be so disposed that they can be packed and despatched by the rear party.”131 Troops 
in Northern Ireland would be returned either to the UK or to Germany, depending on their 
unit,132 and the Ulster Defence Regiment called out. From November 1984, it was planned 
to remove 3,800 personnel from the Falklands, and 600 from Ascension Island. 50 would 
remain in the Falklands. 5,800 short tons of freight and 2,400 of ammunition would also be 
transported to Europe. This particular movement might be considered optimistic, as the 
whole move could have taken 52 days to complete.133  
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Before any UK troops could be sent to reinforce BAOR, the West German Government 
needed to provide consent.134 If NATO were mobilising, this consent would be expected to 
be forthcoming. Vital to the movement of troops, vehicles and equipment to Germany was 
the arrangement of adequate reception facilities by the FRG Government. This required the 
activation of Joint Theatre Plans (JTP) for reinforcement of forces in Germany, and staging 
facilities in Germany and Belgium.135 Nationalised and Service shipping, and RAF transport 
aircraft would be required.  
The plan ‘To Reinforce BAOR with Regular Earmarked Units and Individuals’ was estimated 
to take up to five days,136 and comprised all the necessary movement of troops and supplies 
to West Germany. The mobilisation of the reserves, most notably the TAVR, was of concern 
for the MoD. The Individual Reinforcement Plan intended that those ‘A1’ categorised units 
would receive their reinforcements within 48 hours of mobilisation. As part of this process, 
newly released reservists, presumably more experienced with current training, would be 
prioritised for allocation to Germany.137 Calling out the reservists would take an estimated 4 
days from the signing of the Queen’s Order.138 There would need to have been sufficient 
warning time to activate the reserves as, “The Army currently requires three clear days 
before call-out of Reserves in order to re-deploy stores to war locations … and establish 
Temporary Mobilization Centres (TMC) … under Measure 3.39.”139 Some 9,500 members of 
the Territorial Army and Royal Auxiliary Air Force would move to West Germany as an 
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advance party to man lines of communications. Other reservists would join the UK/NL 
amphibious force at this stage.140  
Emergency Powers and Powers of Direction over nationalised shipping would be required as 
civil shipping would be needed for transport duties. Deploying the forces to war stations 
would take anywhere between one and three days, and depended on the correction of 
force mal-location. Covering Forces ‘mal-located’ in BAOR needed repositioning eastwards, 
and “… the critical deficiencies in the War Maintenance Reserve for British Forces in 
Germany …”141 would need urgent correction. At the same time as moving and protecting 
large number of troops and supplies to the Continent, the Navy would be required to carry 
out its defensive actions around Britain’s coast. 
Defensive minelaying would have required nearly three weeks to complete, and was an 
elaborate process. The plan was to use Emergency Powers to requisition two ferries, and 
have Cammell Laird convert them under a dormant contract. These ferries would then 
collect their mines from Milford Haven. The mines themselves were stored at the RN 
Armament Depot Trecwn, and would be transported to Milford Haven by road where they 
would be assembled. These mines were primarily for use against enemy submarines having 
a minimum depth of 48 feet and so allowing surface ships to pass over them.142 Minelaying 
involved requisitioning the ferries required, converting them for minelaying, and then 
loading the mines. Royal Navy elements to train the crews (and receive training 
themselves), and prepare and deploy to the ferries, would have needed collecting, 
transporting and billeting. The ships would only then be finally able to lay the mines. This 
assumed that the ferries were requisitioned as soon as the necessary measures had been 
implemented.143 Offensive mining would take place at the same time, but although the UK 
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had a stock of mines for this purpose, they are all declared to SACLANT.144 The number of 
mines for defensive minefields around the UK coastline was a concern for the Royal Navy, 
and it insufficient stocks were available to fulfil all the requirements.145 
In all of these measures described, there is an enormous requirement for transport, 
especially shipping, to move personnel, large vehicles and ammunition stocks. However, the 
amount of shipping available may not have been adequate, considering the concurrent 
requirement for REFORGER and other functions. Merchant shipping was needed for the 
transatlantic reinforcement of Europe, reinforcement of Continental Europe from the 
United Kingdom, and direct support of the Royal Navy and economic shipping.146 It was the 
opinion of the House of Commons Defence Committee that, “… different Departments of 
State [have failed] to achieve a policy objective … that there should be … sufficient ships 
genuinely available … to meet the defence needs of the United Kingdom…”147 Britain had 
also promised to supply shipping to the US for troop transport. The decline of the Merchant 
Navy, and the reduction in surface support ships for the Royal Navy, meant that, with all the 
plans working together, there would be insufficient shipping, inadequately guarded, to fulfil 
all the demands placed upon it. Flexible defence had a sting in the tail, “… that the demand 
for merchant shipping in any major conflict is likely to be increased by the greater emphasis 
on sustainability, the expectation of higher levels of consumption of fuel, ammunition and 
logistic supplies … and the increasing trend towards naval reliance on merchant vessel 
support.”148 None of the field exercises accounted for this problem, but it was recognised in 
some command post exercises. 
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Exercise example 
WINTEX-CIMEX ‘83 was a Command Post Exercise (CPX) intended to simulate NATO’s 
response to a worsening international crisis. The title comprises ‘Winter Exercise – 
Civil/Military Exercise’ and were performed biennially. It did not involve the deployment of 
troops. The exercise tested cooperation between military and civil defence during a 
transition to war and escalation to nuclear use. Although the scenarios for the exercises are 
usually prefaced with a warning that they do not represent the views of the British 
Government or NATO, the similarities between them and the scenarios used in MoD 
wargames would indicate that they are a good example of the course of events in an 
anticipated crisis.  
The ‘events list’ used in the WINTEX-CIMEX series changed only slightly during the last 
decade of the Cold War. Common to all the exercise timescales is a period of some months 
of tension leading to a deteriorating international situation. Initially, NATO policy makers did 
not believe that the WTO would purposely plan to attack Western Europe. The concern was 
that a misunderstanding would lead to war, or war would be caused by unintentional 
pressures from one side on the other.149 It is difficult to conclude whether a miscalculation 
was expected to provoke a ‘bolt-from-the-blue’ attack, or provide the WTO with the excuse 
to initiate a planned attack. Some ‘opportunism’ by the WTO might have occurred if events 
in NATO suggested it would be successful.150 
The concern was that the Soviet Union would take advantage of any apparent diminution of 
Alliance solidarity, reduction in the credibility of NATO’s deterrent, or an international 
crisis.151 There was continuing distrust between East and West over Berlin and Afghanistan, 
and actions taken in these locations could have led to a misunderstanding serious enough to 
end in combat. Evidence for this type of misunderstanding can be found in the Soviet 
reaction to the NATO ‘AUTUMN FORGE’ exercises of 1983, which culminated in exercise 
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ABLE ARCHER.152 ABLE ARCHER was a command post exercise which tested the transition 
from conventional to nuclear war. Yuri Andropov, convinced that NATO, and especially the 
USA, was about to launch a decapitating first strike against the Soviet Union, had instituted 
operation RYAN to obtain information about the attack, and to prepare the Soviet Union’s 
response.153 At around the same time there was division in NATO about the deployment of 
new nuclear weapons, and an international incident involving the shooting down of civilian 
airliner by the Soviet Union. 1983 may have been the closest that the two superpower blocs 
had come to war since 1962.  
Accidental escalation during a crisis was seen as a possible cause of war. In the WINTEX 83 
‘media reporting’, a British Airways flight returning civilians from the Middle East is ‘buzzed’ 
by a MiG23 during the invasion of Yugoslavia, but no shots are fired. The similarity between 
this and the actual loss of a civilian airliner (JAL 007 from New York to Seoul, September 1st 
1983) is an indication of how this sort of ‘accidental’ escalation could occur.154 The rising 
tension provides opportunities for errors of judgement on both sides. Bernard Brodie had 
already identified this problem: 
“It is … impossible for us to predict with absolute assurance our own behaviour in 
extremely tense and provocative circumstances. If we make the wrong prediction 
about ourselves, we encourage the enemy also to make the wrong prediction about 
us. The outbreak of the war in Korea in 1950 followed exactly that pattern.”155  
One could attribute the outbreak of the Falklands War to the same cause.  
NATO had a continuous round of exercises to test the responses of particular parts of the 
Alliance defence planning. An example of the plans to reinforce Europe can be found in 
Exercise CRUSADER 80 which comprised SQUARE LEG and JOG TROT. The exercise was to 
move reinforcements from arrival ports and airfields to final destinations in British Logistic 
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Support Command (BRLSC) and 1(BR) Corps in continental Europe.  As part of this exercise, 
“… 15,500 men and 5,000 vehicles will pass through ports and roads in Belgium and will 
transit Holland.”156 During exercise Square Leg,  
“The reinforcement of BFG was successfully completed … but is [sic] must be 
remembered that only about one third of those who would move in actually 
took part in the exercise, and that none of the concurrent plans were being 
executed. But greater flexibility in the period of tension … should mean that 
in a real emergency the increased number could be moved without 
difficulty.”157  
In addition, troops began to leave the UK on the 1st of September, but troops stationed in 
Germany did not leave their garrisons until 15th September, allowing a full fourteen days to 
transport the reserves to their war fighting positions without interruption. 
As moving large numbers of troops, vehicles and equipment is expensive, the larger 
exercises were played out infrequently. Exercise LIONHEART ‘84, for example, moved 57,700 
UK troops to Europe.158 In exercise SQUARE LEG and no attempt was made to emulate the 
destruction of transportation; “The move of reinforcements was conducted non-tactically. 
Thus in War, the move might take longer because sabotage acts could mean diversions on 
the route.”159  Enemy interdiction rarely intruded into these sorts of field exercises. General 
Thompson commented that, “The plan[s] depended for success on the Soviets not attacking 
before we had landed …”160  
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Timings – details from exercise WINTEX-CIMEX 83 
As an outline to the exercise, a State of Military Vigilance was declared by NATO on D-31.161 
NATO Simple Alert was declared on D-5, and Reinforced Alert on D-2.162 The outbreak of war 
was 4th March 1983 (D-day). Nuclear weapons are first used, by NATO, on D+5. By 
comparison with other exercises, there is only minor variation of the speed with which war 
begins, and how quickly nuclear weapons are used.  
The UK Government decided on reinforcement on D-13. The Emergency Powers Bill was 
introduced in the Commons on D-7, and the mobilisation of reservists was ordered. This 
meant, according to the Government War Book (GWB), the reservists did not have time to 
mobilise or deploy before fighting began. The Transition to War Committee (TWC) agreed to 
transfer command of British Forces to NATO.163 D-6 saw the Government announce the 
evacuation of all military dependents from Europe. UK implementation of NATO Military 
Vigilance and Simple Alert was completed by the morning of D-5 (27th February) and the 
UKMF began its deployment to BALTAP. On D-4, following the invasion of Yugoslavia by 
WTO forces, the UK Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO) was activated and the 
main body of 1(BR) Corps deployed. GWB Measures to prepare the UK for nuclear attack 
were implemented on D-3. Reinforced Alert was 95% complete, according to the UK 
Government, by D-2.164 
Despite the build-up of tension and preparation for war in WINTEX 83 being as sympathetic 
as possible to NATO needs, stocks of ammunition and supplies were reported as being low 
soon after the beginning of hostilities. D+2 (6th March) showed stocks of some naval surface-
to-air and surface-to-surface missiles as zero.165 The continental reception ports have come 
under attack, and this was disrupting the outloading of those ships into Europe. Of the 
Home ports, ten of the twelve were closed until further notice through bombing and mining, 
and the Clyde was closed for at least 24 hours. Warship losses ran at 35%, which would 
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cause serious problems for the defence of convoys and anti-submarine efforts. Stocks of air-
to-air and air-to-surface missiles were reported as being low.166 Shortage of anti-tank guided 
weapons (ATGW) and Chieftain tank 120mm ammunition were reported as low, and 2nd 
Allied Tactical Air Force (2ATAF) sortie rate was reduced by up to 40%. Chemical weapons 
have been used by the WTO in Europe and the UK. The situation deteriorated, and nuclear 
weapons were used on D+5 (8th March) by NATO. 
During the WINTEX 83 exercise, and expressed in other plans and discussions, the spare 
capacity of the road-freight businesses were all-but monopolised by the needs of 
reinforcement and supply.167 This may have been a reflection of the demand for private 
freight transport during the preparation for the recovery of the Falklands in 1982. WINTEX 
83 was portrayed as a ‘slow moving crisis’ and as such the demands placed on transport are 
less than in an ‘intermediate’ or ‘sudden’ crisis. 
Conclusion 
Despite some conflict between the National Government plans and those of NATO, there 
was comprehensive planning for most eventualities. But simply because a plan covers a 
contingency does not mean it can be carried out, or that it will deal comprehensively with 
that contingency. Contradictions exist in some assignments, especially regarding the tasks of 
naval vessels.168 Transportation facilities and vehicles would have been under enormous 
pressure with demands from several agencies at once. 3 Commando’s Falklands 
mobilisation shows the demand for transportation, and how in many circumstances, the 
provision would be inadequate. The Brigade’s War Maintenance Reserve comprised 1,260 
tons of POL, 8,260 tons of ammunition and 3,880 tons of ordnance stores. “The bulk was 
lifted using virtually all the United Kingdom-based Regular Army Transport Units, as well as 
several Territorial Army Transport Units … commercial operators also provided a substantial 
lift.”169 With all forces being mobilised together in a European crisis, there would not have 
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been sufficient road, rail or air transportation to fulfil demand. And in all the planning there 
is no account taken of interference by the enemy, be that sabotage or conventional or 
chemical attack. These threats are acknowledged, but then for all practical purposes 
ignored. 
New operational doctrines and tactics had been instigated to deal with a changing threat, 
but as good as the Armed Forces were, they could not fight without fuel, ammunition and 
food. Nor could they move quickly with the limited dedicated military transport available. 
The exercises held publicly in Germany ran for around 10 days, seemingly to provide public 
reassurance of the conventional capabilities of NATO’s defence. 
The planning had been adjusted to fit one specific threat scenario. As General Julian 
Thompson wrote, “The unexpected always happens, it is no good … ‘shaping’ the threats to 
fit your capability, and ignoring those to which, inconveniently, you have no response.”170 
Let down by the politicians, they would have been left, effectively unarmed, on a nuclear 
battlefield against a numerically superior foe. No operational planning, doctrinal review or 
tactical innovation would have circumvented that outcome. As is shown in the Case Studies, 
the reasons for British military successes are less to do with the policies obtaining at the 
time, or previously. They are much more to do with the individuals recruited and trained by 
the military, and motivated to succeed. Generally, their success is despite policy rather than 
because of it. The only recourse available to stop collapse would be to use nuclear weapons. 
Therefore, the policy of deterrence would have failed. Indeed, there was little or no 
flexibility of response for the Armed Services, despite their own planning and training. 
In the words of General Julian Thompson:  
“… the armies of the NATO Alliance, unlike their potential enemy, have 
prepared for the likely campaign as best they could on an ad hoc basis, making 
great, but unco-ordinated efforts to gather together the largest possible 
number of tactical vehicles, trucks of all descriptions, and other equipment, 
while giving little, if any thought to the ideal combination which, in theory, 
would have carried them the furthest, or, one might add, enabled them to 
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last the longest.”171 
The GWB seemed to have been written in an environment remote from the real exigencies 
of mobilisation and war. Although it was a necessary attempt at formalising the process of 
transition-to-war and crisis management, the limitations and dependencies discernible in 
the Books were not improved by the Government’s policy shifts. Whilst the Books contained 
some caveats regarding the needs of particular Measures, the overall impression is that the 
Book was an ‘ideal’ and in the confusion and hesitancy of a real crisis the demands on the 
Government, and on the Armed Forces and civilians, would make much of the Books’ 
contents redundant. A case of ‘hoping the best and planning for the best.’ What it perhaps 
did provide was a ‘Post-Strike’ justification for certain operations which might have 
appeared severe in the build-up to a crisis and the preparation for hostilities.  
The timing of the plans means that only in certain circumstances would the whole of BAOR, 
RAF Germany and the Royal Navy be mobilised for combat. In excess of thirty days’ was 
required after a crisis was declared for the forces to be in place and ready at their full 
strength. The British Armed Forces, well-motivated, well-trained volunteers, could mobilise, 
given sufficient warning time, but were there adequate forces to fulfil the demands placed 
on them?
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The Extent of the Contribution 
The 1979 SDE described Britain’s contribution to NATO as being concentrated, “… on those 
areas where its resources will most effectively aid collective Alliance defence: the defence of 
the United Kingdom base and its immediate approaches; the Eastern Atlantic and Channel; 
the Central Region of Europe …”1 
Britain’s contribution could be divided up into the following areas:  
 forces deployed or to be deployed on the European continent;  
 forces deployed in or from the UK; 
NATO Command and Assigned Forces Deployed in Europe or NATO Earmarked 
Forces for European Deployment 
(For definitions of the various assignment categories, see Appendix P, Glossary of Terms) 
Permanently deployed in Germany was BAOR, an army of approximately 55,000 regular 
troops, and RAF(Germany) comprising the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) of 12 
squadrons. UK forces would train in NATO countries, as well as have a presence at the main 
NATO HQs. The Royal Marine Commandos were a self-contained mobile force, with combat, 
logistic and helicopter support, and were NATO assigned as part of the UK/Netherlands 
Amphibious force.  
To bring the army up to full strength, more than 60,000 regular and reservist troops from 
the UK and other parts of the world were to be mobilised and transported to Germany, 
Denmark and Norway. For cost purposes, some of the NATO command, assigned and 
earmarked forces were stationed in the UK rather than on the continent.2  
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NATO Forces Earmarked, and Other Forces, for Deployment in or from the UK 
A proportion of the Armed Forces, some 30% of the Army3 for example, were not assigned 
directly to NATO. Forces deployed to the Eastern Atlantic, Channel Command and the UK Air 
Defence Region were all NATO command or assigned, but based in the UK. The UK Air 
Defence Region was designated a NATO region in 1975, and the Commander-in-Chief UKAIR 
became a Major Subordinate Commander (MSC) under SACEUR.4 Commander-in-Chief 
Channel (CINCHAN), a Major NATO Commander, was the British Admiral in command of the 
Home Fleet and the subordinate command of the Eastern Atlantic. (See Appendix A, Figure 2 
- NATO's Politico-Military Structure)  
As the land defence of the UK home islands were not part of a NATO command, some of 
those land forces defending it were not subject to direct NATO military command, but could 
be considered ‘Other Forces for NATO’. According to the Foreign Office, the UK and Portugal 
“… are the only two European members whose provision for the defence of the homeland 
does not at the same time contribute to the defence of the alliance in Europe.”5 This 
description was misleading in that the defence of the UK contributed directly to the defence 
of the Alliance in Europe, and in many ways any defence of Europe would have been much 
more difficult without it.  
Those troops identified for home defence of the UK were as vital to NATO as those in 
continental Europe were. Because of Britain’s geographic position and the use of Britain as a 
staging post, many thousands of Armed Forces and civilians would have been directly 
employed in war work, along with civilian facilities. In addition there would be troops giving 
support to the emergency services, both in terms of protecting key points, and in keeping 
the Essential Service Routes (ESR) clear for military traffic. The military defence of the Home 
Base was tied in intimately with Civil Defence. Military assistance to the Civil Power (MACP) 
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would be a wide-ranging task, including supporting the Police in maintaining order, 
protecting food supplies and other important locations.6 
The Single Service NATO contribution 
Royal Navy 
A crucial role for the Royal Navy was the denial of access to, and use of,7 the Northern and 
Eastern Atlantic to the mainly Soviet submarines and surface ships intent on intercepting 
the reinforcement of Western Europe, and the free use of the seas by the NATO navies. To 
achieve this objective the Navy required sufficient vessels armed with adequate numbers of 
up-to-date weapons. All the major vessels of the Royal Navy were under NATO command or 
NATO assigned, with the remaining vessels available to support NATO operations.8 In 
addition was the Royal Marine Commando (RM) Brigade. The RM were NATO Assigned at 
high readiness as part of the UK/Netherlands Amphibious force, but could also be deployed 
under National Command.9 
The Royal Navy was structured for anti-submarine and anti-air warfare, to protect the sea-
lanes around the UK and Continent. Assigned to NATO at mobilisation would be two Heli-
carriers, two Escort carriers, nine Air Defence/Anti-Submarine Warfare (AD/ASW) Escorts, 
17 Anti-Surface/Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASS/ASW) Escorts, four ASW Escorts and 20 
submarines.10 Four Squadrons of Long Range Maritime Patrol aircraft were dedicated to 
NATO.11 The Royal Navy had modern weapon systems, a small pool of highly trained regular 
personnel, but limited war-stocks of ammunition for its main vessels.12   
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The RN had the Fleet Classes of nuclear powered hunter-killer submarines and the older 
diesel electric boats of the OBERON and PORPOISE classes capable of hunter-killer 
operations or minelaying. The hunter-killer submarines were intended to sink WTO 
submarines and hunt the WTO nuclear missile carrying vessels. Taking into account those 
submarines undergoing refits, in 1979/1980 there was a 20% shortfall in war-loads of 
torpedoes for these submarines.13  
The ‘Anti-Submarine Carriers’ such as HMS Invincible began sea-trials in 1979. These ships 
were to provide command and control for ASW operations in the Eastern Atlantic.14 
However, a reduction in the number of ASW helicopters to be carried on them meant that 
this capability was at its limit.15 HMS Hermes became the last of the Centaur Class Aircraft 
Carriers (HMS Bulwark was decommissioned in 1981) and was scheduled for 
decommissioning in 1982. Hermes was saved by the outbreak of the Falklands War, and 
finally sold to India in 1986. With the cancellation of CVA-01 aircraft carriers in the 1966 
Defence Review, and the scheduled disposal of Hermes, the ‘Through Deck Cruisers’ would 
become the Royal Navy’s only fixed wing capable carriers, using the Sea Harrier, as well as 
Sea King helicopters in the anti-submarine and recovery roles.16 The Sea Harrier was to 
enter front line service in 1980, fitted with the Blue Fox radar and Sidewinder AIM9L. HMS 
Invincible was launched in 1980, HMS Illustrious launched in 1982 and HMS Ark Royal 
operational in 1986.17 The SEA KING Anti-Submarine helicopter was due for replacement,18 
and a project was under way to identify a successor. It was anticipated that this would be 
part of a European helicopter package, which turned into the MERLIN, or EH101, from what 
became AgustaWestland.19 The replacement was urgently required, as there was great 
reliance placed on the use of helicopters in the Royal Navy anti-submarine role. 
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15 DP 14/81, Appendix 1 to Annex A, ‘NATO Long Term Defence Planning’, para. 1.f, FCO 46/2586, TNA. 
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Notwithstanding the urgent need for replacement of Sea King, the EH101 did not enter 
service until 1999. 
A core part of the force dedicated to NATO was the Frigates and Destroyers for anti-
submarine, carrier and other general escort duty.  NATO force goals required the Royal Navy 
to provide 55 escorts for SACLANT by 1986, with 35 of them being at the highest state of 
readiness. Because of cuts, only 40 would be available, and at a lower overall level of 
readiness.20 Equally, 13 escorts were requested for ACCHAN by 1986, but only 10 were 
offered.21 Examples of the ships operated by the Royal Navy for NATO’s escort role were the 
Leander, Type 22 and Type 42 vessels. 
Among the smallest vessels were the Leander Class Frigates. These were of an all-purpose 
type, with a modernisation programme under way. The Ikara Anti-Submarine weapon 
system or the Exocet anti-ship missile were to be installed, which meant removing the 
forward 4.5” gun due to space restrictions.22 Some Exocet23 equipped Leanders were 
assigned to Channel Command,24 and SACLANT had requested the Leander to be equipped 
with the Sea Wolf point defence missile for better survivability, but this was not accepted.25 
By 1985 there were 18 Leander class vessels available.  
The Type 22 Frigates were intended to replace the smaller Leanders,26 and complement the 
Type 42 air-defence vessels. These Frigates were to have the Sea Wolf missile, and some 
                                                     
20 DP/14/81 (Final), Appendix 1 to Annex A, NATO Force Goals and Long Term Defence Programme, Report by the Defence 
Policy Staff, 6th October 1981, ‘NATO Long Term Defence Planning’, para. 1.d, FCO 46/2586, TNA. 
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22 Mike Critchley, British Warships & Auxiliaries (Cornwall: Maritime Books, 1979), 27–28. 
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were to have Exocet.27 SACLANT had request six Type 22s by 198428 with five in service in 
198429 rising to seven in 1985.30 Type 22s were criticised for have low cost effectiveness, 
and making only a slight, last-ditch, contribution to future anti-submarine warfare as 
envisaged by the Admiralty.31  
The Type 42 Guided Missile Destroyer was proposed as a cheaper replacement for the Type 
82 air-defence vessels which had been cancelled at the same time as the fleet carriers 
following the 1966 Defence Review:32 only one Type 82 was built before the cancellation.33 
There were four Type 42s in service in 1979, with two more under construction. The Type 
42s were to have been upgraded with a close-in weapons system to improve survivability 
against missile attack, but this programme was cancelled in 1980 for financial reasons.34 
Twelve Type 42s were in service by 1985,35 missing SACLANT’s Maritime Force Proposal by 
two vessels.36 
The Type 42 and the planned Type 23 typified the cost-saving measures demanded by the 
Government. Keith Speed, who had been sacked as Navy Minister a few days before for 
criticising the reduction of the fleet,37 said in the House of Commons on the 19th May 1981, 
 “… we cannot continue to have frigates costing £130 million a time, excellent 
though they are. … They are first-class ships, but, frankly, we cannot afford 
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them in the numbers that we need …”38 
The Type 42 had been subject to design changes to reduce its cost,39 and the Type 23 
design, approved in 1983,40 was intended to be a cheap ‘complement’ for the Type 22. It 
would end up costing almost as much, with modifications and additional weaponry added 
because of the lessons from the Falklands.41 Despite these lessons, the Type 23 still was not 
fitted with an anti-missile close-in weapon system because of cost savings.42 
The naval modernisation programme, which was to be implemented from the beginning of 
1980, was hit hardest by the Government moratorium on new defence projects,43 and the 
run-up to and presentation of the 1981 Defence Review.44 Modernisation should have 
included the addition of several new types of missile to various ship classes, most notably 
the Sea Dart surface-to-air missile, which had been accepted into service 1978, and was to 
be fitted to all Type 42 Destroyers. These modernisation plans were abandoned for financial 
reasons as part of the 1981 review, and a study started to investigate the best method for 
the upkeep of the vessels.45 
The emphasis in the 1981 Review was to be on the Army and RAF in continental Europe, 
with the surface ships of the Navy and the extra-NATO role being the target of cuts. The 
nuclear deterrent and home defence were seen as inviolable, and there remained little to 
cut in the Continental commitment.46 This meant the Navy took the brunt of the defence 
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cuts in the 1981 review. The review identified, “… the best balanced operational 
contribution for our situation – will be one which continues to enhance our maritime-air and 
submarine effort, but accepts a reduction below current plans in the size of our surface fleet 
...”47 This replicated the reduction in destroyers, frigates and mine countermeasures vessels, 
a reduction in amphibious vessels and conventional submarines, and an increase in nuclear 
powered submarines, outlined by the Labour Government in 1975.48 59 destroyers and 
frigates had been previously declared to NATO, but that figure was to be cut to 48,49 along 
with a substantial reduction in the RFA and other specialist ships.50 The Royal Navy provision 
for the Eastern Atlantic and Channel was lacking by a considerable proportion, and the 
British Government expected NATO to express concern.51  
Following the 1981 Defence Review several shipbuilding plans were either cut or deferred, 
along with upgrades to some existing ships.52 Among those cancellations were six Mine 
Counter Measures vessels and one Type 22. There were some closures of Naval 
establishments to save money, but there was the development of Marchwood Military Port, 
planning for which had begun in June 1978. This was to provide regular shipments to 
Antwerp for BAOR and featured heavily in the reinforcement plans for BAOR.  
Functional, and therefore well protected, ports were essential to all the maritime forces 
whether combat or transport vessels. Protection of these vital installations required both 
defensive mining and mine clearance capabilities.53 Clearing mines in home waters would be 
a problem, as, according to the Secretary of State for Defence, 
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“… after securing the approaches to the nuclear submarine base at 
Faslane, we [have] insufficient resources to clear the cross-Channel 
routes and provide safe access to our major ports.”54 
The Mine Counter Measure vessels were meant to locate and destroy enemy mines, and the 
MoD would, “… need to take up ships from trade (on a voluntary basis) in support of these 
operations.”55 Great reliance was placed on the taking up of trawlers in periods of tension, 
but the timing for equipping the vessels would mean that there would need to be a decision 
early in any crisis.56 Many of the minesweepers were crewed by the Royal Navy Reserve, 
and hence would be delayed in becoming operational. In 1979, there were thirty three 
Coniston (or TON) Class Mine Countermeasures Vessels (MCMV) listed, although three were 
on standby or undergoing maintenance and sixteen were deployed as either sea training 
tenders for the RNR, or coastal fisheries protection.57  
The TON Class was designed for use in shallow seas and coastal waters or rivers and ports. 
Being obsolete, with ineffective sensor equipment, they were to be replaced by a new, 
plastic hulled HUNT class vessel. Plans were to have 30 new HUNT class vessels by the early 
1990s. The first HUNT class MCMV, HMS Brecon, was due to enter service in 1979. HMS 
Ledbury was to be launched in 1979, with three more ships on order. However, the cuts of 
1981 hit the MCMVs hard, with six previously planned orders being dropped.58 By 1985 
there were meant to be twelve HUNT Class in service and fifteen TONs,59 but the actual 
numbers were ten HUNT and thirteen TON.60  
                                                     
54 Note of a conversation between the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence at 10 Downing Street on 20th 
February 1978, ‘Defence against the Soviet Threat to the United Kingdom’, PREM 16/1563, TNA. 
55 Measure 4.11, ‘Government War Book, Volume 1’, CAB 175/53, TNA. 
56 Measure 12.17, To requisition ships, fishing vessels and craft for naval, military and other special purposes, ibid. 
57 Critchley, British Warships & Auxiliaries, 43. 
58 MO 8/2/12, Annex III, Defence Estimates 1981/82, Memorandum from John Nott to the Prime Minister, 16th January 
1981, ‘Defence Estimates, Working Papers 1981 to 1982’, para. 4.a, FCO 46/2557, TNA. 
59 MO 15/3, Annex B, ‘Defence against the Soviet Threat to the United Kingdom’, 1, PREM 16/1563, TNA. 
60 Annex C Ministry of Defence, ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1985’, 60, Cmnd 9430. 
 Page 190 
 
Limited stocks of mines meant that defensive mining, upon which the Navy relied for part of 
the defence of the home islands, would fall seriously short of requirements,61 due to some 
mine development having been cancelled for financial reasons.62 In planning the defensive 
mining of the UK, Commander Parry, writing on behalf of the Director of Naval Warfare, 
listed the number of mines available for protective mining (1460 in total) and asked that 
future plans should be based on the number required, rather than those available.63 (See 
Appendix M, Ports requiring protective mining) Much of the perceived shortfall was due to 
cost-cutting exercises in the 1970s, and the Director of Naval Plans wrote in reply:  
“In noting the numbers of mines available … the suggestion  … that plans 
should be based on numbers required rather than what is actually in stock, 
DN [Director Naval Warfare] plans … will be guided by the cost restriction … 
the plan should be limited to involve little or no capital expenditure.”64 
Supporting all the vessels in the Royal Navy, from Carriers to Minesweepers, were the ships 
of the Royal Feet Auxiliaries (RFA). They provided everything from fuel supply to sealift 
capability, and included the stores ships Stromness, Tarbatness and Lyness.  Tarbatness was 
to be converted to amphibious tasks in support of the RM Commando Brigade during 
1979.65 This was under review due to costs in 1980,66 and this vessel shows in the 
1981/1982 Defence Estimate working papers as being for sale. All three were sold to the 
USA to be used as Military Sealift Command vessels but there was no indication of 
replacement stores ships from the subsequent Navy lists or the Defence Estimates. Much of 
the planning for reinforcement of Europe in time of war relied on the speedy control of 
merchant shipping, both for transport of reinforcements and for the maintenance of trade 
for vital supplies. Ships would need requisitioning early in any crisis as the RFA had 
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insufficient capacity for all the demands that would be placed upon it. Along with a 
multitude of other tasks, RO-RO ferries were to be used to transport troops and equipment 
to Europe.67 The need to co-ordinate merchant shipping would be left, according to NATO, 
until the outbreak of hostilities.68 The British Government, perhaps conscious of its reliance 
on maritime supply, had a complex but comprehensive set of controls that could be put in 
place for the Naval control of all shipping of any sort, access to ports and anchorages, 
restriction of access and departure from British waters, and the requisitioning of foreign 
ships for national use.69 
Technological advances in communications and data processing led to several projects 
throughout the late 1970s and 1980s intended to improve command and control as well as 
weapon targetting.70 Improvements for ships and submarines, announced in the 1979 SDE, 
had contracts awarded in 1984 to Ferranti to develop the 2050 bow mounted sonar, which 
was subsequently fitted to the Type 42, 23 and 22.71 A Maritime Navigation System to 
provide warships with computer-assisted navigation was planned, with new satellite and 
radio communications to be introduced by mid-1980s. The Operational Control Command 
Control and Information System (OPCON), a new Automatic Data Processing (ADP) system 
which integrates with the NATO Commands was introduced and updated throughout the 
decade.72 The data link between vessels showed its worth during the Falklands War, with 
various ships sharing data related to threats via dedicated digital links.73 Other new and 
emerging technologies were providing the basis for development of radar jamming 
equipment, new Electronic Warfare passive surveillance capabilities and radar interception 
equipment for surface ships. Automated Data Processing systems were extended to cover 
Royal Navy shore based establishments, improving data links between sea and land. 
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Royal Marines 
The role of the Royal Marines (RM) was to support and strengthen the vulnerable flanks of 
the NATO Central Region, as well as the protection of more vulnerable, but vital, islands of 
EASTLANT. In discussing their main role, Ewen Southby-Tailyour, a Royal Marine officer, 
wrote: 
“This Amphibious Task Group was expected to sail early in a crisis and 
certainly early enough to be received by the ‘host nation’ before hostilities 
began. By reacting so soon, a display of NATO solidarity would be shown that 
might … deter an enemy in its actions.”74  
Despite its vital role, RM winter training was to be cut from 1981 as a cost saving measure, 
with a noticeable impact on the specialist reinforcement function to NATO.75  
The Commando units were all lorry mounted and were, consequently, significantly less 
mobile and secure than either the SAXON76 or FV43277 equipped units. Because of the need 
to strengthen the anti-armour capability of any units that might have to directly face the 
WTO troops, the RM Commando were to receive Milan, as well as having TOW missiles 
fitted to their LYNX in early 1980s. The allocation of Milan was not to be at the same level as 
in ‘heavy’ infantry formations (18 Milan in the RM, 24 in the Infantry ‘A’ battalions.78)  
41 Commando had been reformed in 1977,79 but was to be merged with the other 
Commandos because of the 1981 Defence Review, thus keeping the same number of troops, 
but reducing the cost of overheads. In a briefing note regarding this, the question was put 
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regarding the effect this will have on Britain’s NATO commitments, to which the answer 
was, “…that we will have one fewer Commando than planned.”80 
Royal Air Force 
Since the 1950s, the size and capability of the RAF had diminished, especially since the 
nuclear deterrent role had passed to the Royal Navy. The RAF had a particularly wide 
ranging remit under NATO, employed in the Channel, Eastern Atlantic, Central Air Defence 
Region and the UK Air Defence Region (UKADR). For the Royal Air Force to be credible, it had 
to counter the threat of large-scale ground and air attack on the Central Front, interdict 
enemy movement behind the front, and protect the air above the home islands and the sea 
surrounding it.81 It also had to provide part of the early warning and reconnaissance 
capability for NATO. All RAF aircraft and ground based missile systems, with the exception of 
helicopter squadrons in Cyprus and Hong Kong, were subject to levels of NATO 
categorisation. 
The number of aeroplanes in the RAF fell by almost 10% in the first few years of the 1980s.82 
In the same way that the other services were subject to severe cuts, the RAF suffered 
shortages in almost all areas of its operations. Recruitment of the necessary technical and 
flight personnel was a problem. 2,000 fewer personnel would be recruited in 1981 than had 
previously been planned. Fast jet pilots and engineering officers were areas of the worst 
shortage.83  
The RAF was divided into RAF Germany (RAF(G)) and Strike Command. The Commander-in-
Chief (CINC) of Strike Command was NATO CINC UK Air Forces responsible for the air 
defence of the UK and naval units and shipping in the surrounding waters. Strike Command 
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provided offensive aircraft in support of SACEUR and the maritime operations of CINCHAN 
and SACLANT.84  
RAF Germany was to provide close air support for the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) 
and air defence for the West German Air Defence Identification Zone. RAF Germany had 11 
squadrons in the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (2ATAF) to provide close air support for 
NORTHAG. Some of the air-defence and strike aircraft were assigned to the protection of 
seaborne forces, which included two squadrons of Phantoms and two of Buccaneers. The 
RAF provided Bloodhound and Rapier missile air defence systems for airfields in Germany 
and the UK. 
Strike Command was formed into four groups: No1 Group provided strike/attack aircraft for 
SACEUR and SACLANT. No11 Group provided all-weather fighters for the air defence of the 
UK base, and one squadron for maritime defence. No18 Group provided Nimrod maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft, Sea King, Whirlwind and Wessex helicopters. No38 Group provided 
Jaguar and Harrier squadrons for SACEUR’s strategic reserve, and worked with UKMF.   
Air defence of the UK had suffered considerably during the early Cold War. The expectation 
had been that any war would turn nuclear very quickly, the provision of expensive air 
defence systems was considered unnecessary.85 In 1978 the Secretary of State for Defence 
warned the Prime Minister that the air defence of the UK was,  
“… inadequate; there are only enough BLOODHOUNDs, which cover 15 key 
RAF and US airfields, for a single reload. Air defence relies upon a largely 
unhardened radar ground environment, supplemented by information from 
… a single squadron of obsolete airborne early warning aircraft. Much of the 
command and control system is unhardened, insecure and vulnerable to 
sabotage and jamming.”86 
By 1981 the Conservative Government saw the air defence of the UK as being,  
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“… at a dangerously low level … The UK is a forward base for SACLANT and a 
rear base for SACEUR. About 40% of all US aircraft earmarked for use in war 
in Europe will be based in this country and the UK will be a vital reinforcement 
platform for Europe.”87  
The LTDP specified UK Air Defence numbers in 1978 to be 144 fighters, but there were only 
98.88 The Air Defence version of the Tornado, which was supposed to replace the Lightning 
and Phantom on a one-to-one basis, would not come into service until 1985.89 The LTDP 
suggested that Britain obtain 30 additional Multi Role Combat Aircraft/Air Defence Variant 
(MRCA/ADV) for the United Kingdom Air Defence Region (UKADR)90, 16 for the Central 
Region91 and provide a squadron of US made F14s for the high level defence of the UK,92  
but these suggestions were rejected. Overall front line aircraft numbers were set to fall from 
590 in 1981 to 550 in 1982/3.93 This deficit became known as the ‘Fighter Gap’, a phrase 
coined to describe both home defence and the capabilities of the RAF on the Central 
Front.94  
80 front line Interdiction and Strike (IDS) fighters were allocated to the Central Front.95 The 
planned replacement of out-dated aircraft on the Central Front by the mid-1980s did not 
progress smoothly, with a reduction in the number of Tornado F2s ordered.96 According to 
                                                     
87 The Foreign Policy aspects of major changes in UK Defence priorities, Report from D Gillmore, Defence Department, 13th 
March 1981, ‘NATO: UK Defence Policy’, 3, FCO 46/2585, TNA. 
88 A07783, Defence of the United Kingdom (DOP[78]12), Memorandum to the Prime Minister from John Hunt, 1st August 
1978, ‘Defence against the Soviet Threat to the United Kingdom’, para. 2.b, PREM 16/1563, TNA. 
89 Note of a conversation between the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence at 10 Downing Street on 20th 
February 1978, ‘Defence against the Soviet Threat to the United Kingdom’, PREM 16/1563, TNA. 
90 DPSB 58/1 & D/DS 12/18/44, Annex B, Appendix 5(2), Long Term Development Programme, ‘NATO Defence Planning 
Long Term Defence Programme’, sec. TF5-1, DEFE 13/1411, TNA. 
91 DPSB 58/1 & D/DS 12/18/44, Annex B, Appendix 5(2), Long Term Development Programme, ibid., sec. TF5-9. 
92 DPSB 58/1 & D/DS 12/18/44, Annex B, Appendix 5(2), Long Term Development Programme, ibid., sec. TF5-5. 
93 DP 12/81 An assessment of UK Defence Programme Changes Note/Paper by the Directors of Defence Policy, ‘NATO 
Logistics Policy General UK Logistics Assumptions’, para. 26, DEFE 25/432, TNA. 
94 Dorman, Kandiah, and Staerck, The Nott Review, 31, ICBH Witness Seminar Programme. 
95 A07783, Defence of the United Kingdom (DOP[78]12), Memorandum to the Prime Minister from John Hunt, 1st August 
1978, ‘Defence against the Soviet Threat to the United Kingdom’, para. 2.b, PREM 16/1563, TNA. 
96 DP 14/81, Report by the Defence Policy Staff, NATO Force Goals 1981 - 1986 and Long Term Defence Programme, 
Appendix 4 to Annex A, Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘NATO Long Term Defence Planning’, 8, FCO 46/2586, TNA. 
 Page 196 
 
the Defence Policy Staff, this meant that, “… the planned declaration of 115 Tornado F2s 
coupled with the running on of four Phantom squadrons will produce a total declared force 
of 171 interceptors, this more than meeting numerically the aim of the Air Defence report’s 
recommendation.”97 The Tornado was a superior aircraft to the Phantom, but the running 
on of four squadrons of Phantoms did not make up qualitatively for the failure to provide 
the Tornados. In addition, the location of all the Tornado F2s in the UK, rather than 
Germany, caused some problems with NATO regarding readiness for a quick response to a 
surprise attack in Germany.98 Despite the need for more capable aircraft in both the UK and 
Germany, the rate of orders for Tornado was reduced in 1984,99 meaning the intended 
targets of aeroplane numbers would never be reached.  
Two squadrons of Lightnings and seven squadrons of Phantoms were deployed in the UK for 
air defence and interception. The Lightning was a UK built interceptor, and the Phantom a 
US built air defence fighter purchased in place of the cancelled TSR-2.100 Maintenance and 
support of the Lightning was difficult. Group Captain David Stewart described it as, “… 
superb to fly, a bitch to maintain and always short of fuel.”101 As part of the overall package 
of improvements for the air defence of the UK the formation of a new Lightning fighter 
squadron was announced in the 1979 SDE.102 Subsequently, to save some £5m, the creation 
of the new squadron was abandoned.103  Instead, an ‘emergency squadron’ was to be 
formed. This was to be done by using the Lightning Training Flight, based at Binbrook, which 
had four Mk3/Mk6 Lightnings, seven operationally qualified pilots and sixty-two ground 
crew. By utilising the ‘In Use Reserve’ of Mk 6 Lightnings, and recalling pilots and ground 
crew with Lightning experience, but who are no longer in the front line, a force equivalent 
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to a full squadron could be created. This ‘shadow squadron’ would then be declared to 
NATO at a C3 rating, denoting its lower readiness state.104  Because of out-dated capabilities 
and maintenance difficulties the Phantoms and Lightnings were to be replaced in the mid-
80s by Tornado aircraft, with the first two squadrons beginning conversion in late 1984.105  
Hawk trainer aircraft, modified to carry Sidewinder (AIM9L) missiles, would be available for 
UK air defence.106 The Sidewinder was bought as a replacement for the Sky Flash MK2, a 
medium range air-to-air missile, which was announced in 1980 to replace the MK1. It was 
cancelled the next year for budgetary reasons, prompting the comment from the Assistant 
Under-Secretary of the Defence Staff that it would result in the, “… abandonment of air 
defence improvement already announced. Gap until advance weapon available late 80’s or 
early 90’s. [sic]”107 The powerful, but shorter range AIM9L was to be procured from the USA, 
and the Sky Flash MK1 kept on.   
In the Central Region the Harrier, together with the ground attack version of the Tornado, 
was to be used for close air support (CAS). The Harrier received a considerable boost of 
confidence following its performance in the Falklands War, and improved variants entered 
service for both the RAF and the RN during the 1980s. The Harriers were to be upgraded in 
1987 to the GR5 version from the GR3. Other modernisation plans included fitting chaff and 
flare dispensers to all front line aircraft, and this programme was accelerated after the 
Falklands War108, where chaff had been jammed into the airbrakes of Harriers due to the 
lack of chaff dispensers.  
Varieties of other aircraft of differing roles were subject to cuts. Photographic 
reconnaissance, a vital part of the RAF’s role, was undertaken by Canberras, which entered 
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service in 1951, and were originally due to be phased out in the mid-1970s for safety 
reasons.109 The aircraft were kept on, but then again marked for disposal in 1984 to be 
replaced by Tornado PR in 1987.110 The disposal of the Canberras was accelerated to 
1981/82 to save money,111 and the reconnaissance gap was to be filled by a mixture of 
Jaguar and Harrier aircraft adapted for the purpose.112 These replacements had only a 
tactical reconnaissance capability and were not capable of the longer range, comprehensive 
reconnaissance cover provided by the Canberras. However, as late as 1989 there was a 
squadron of Canberra PR9s listed amongst the Photographic Reconnaissance Units,113 with 
the last operational Canberra squadron being disbanded in 2006.  
The Canberra had started service in the 1950s, at the same time as the Avro Vulcan, and 
both were due for replacement. The Vulcan was declared to NATO in both the conventional 
and nuclear role.114 A reduction in their number was of considerable concern for SACEUR as 
they had no immediate replacement with the same capability. Tornado GR1s were 
scheduled to replace them from mid-1982, but only entered service in 1983-84.115 RAF 
Buccaneers and Jaguars were also declared to NATO in the same roles, but the Buccaneer 
numbers had to be reduced because of fatigue cracks in the airframes.116  The Buccaneer 
had served on the Royal Navy aircraft carriers, but with the last fleet carriers, Ark Royal, 
retiring in 1978, all remaining Buccaneers were transferred to the RAF. To help fill the gap 
left by the loss of the Buccaneers in the maritime attack role, the Nimrod Maritime 
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Reconnaissance aircraft was upgraded to be able to drop homing torpedoes and carry 
Sidewinder missiles117. 
A vital role undertaken by the RAF in times of crisis would be the preparation and operation 
of the reinforcement airports and airfields, for civil airliners and transports, RAF transports 
and for incoming US and Canadian troops and supplies.118 Once the reinforcement of NATO 
had been completed, the RAF Air Transport Force would be transferred to SACEUR’s 
command, however some aircraft would be retained for various national tasks.119 In terms 
of reinforcement, the RAF could initially move the majority of its aircraft dedicated to NATO 
in only a few days. What would take the time, and effort, to move to Germany would be the 
supporting infrastructure, personnel and equipment required to keep the aircraft running, 
and repair them after operational sorties, and to defend the airfields against air and ground 
attack.  
Bloodhound and Rapier surface-to-air missiles operated by the RAF Regiment provided air 
defence for RAF airfields in Germany and the UK. Bloodhound, which was originally 
designed and built in the 1950s and upgraded in the 1960s, was outdated and severely short 
of missiles. Its replacement, which was planned as a cooperative project between several 
NATO members, was not expected to be operational until the 1990s.120 Because of 
Bloodhounds limitations, air defence of the UK was strengthened by the deployment of 
three Rapier squadrons by the USAF at West Raynham, Brize Norton and Honington. The 
1979 SDE stated that the ground defence of several RAF airfields was to be bolstered by the 
addition of Royal Auxiliary Air Force Regiment Field squadrons.121  
In contrast to the active defence of airfields, the provision of airfield damage repair was 
slow to develop, partly due to disagreements within NATO on the criteria for particular 
studies into damage repair and explosive ordnance disposal. The difference between the 
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MoD approach and that of the US can best be summed up by the Joint Logistic Plans for 
USAF operations at RAF Bentwaters and Woodbridge: 
“Airfield Damage Repair (including rapid runway repair) is under study by the 
MoD and planning for this is no [sic] to be proceeded with …”  
But for the US forces, 
“Equipment and materials are to be provided for the support of two x 91-man 
US Rapid Runway Repair Teams for Airfield Damage Repair Assistance.”122 
Teams for airfield damage repair were required in the UK as well as for RAF(G) as only the 
Harrier was capable of operating from anything other than a hardened airstrip. Royal 
Engineer squadrons were allocated to the airfields in Germany for runway repair.123 They 
were mentioned in the 1989 SDE: “The ability of our front-line airfields in RAF Germany has 
been much improved by the redeployment this year of a Royal Engineers squadron for 
airfield damage repair …”124 but during the greater part of the 1980s airfield damage repair 
had been planned on an ad-hoc basis. 
Following the inclusion of the UK airspace as a NATO region, there were several 
improvements to communications and command and control systems of the UKADGE which 
enhanced the detection of air threats. These included the deployment of mobile air defence 
radars, Nimrod AEW aircraft, and later JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System). 
From the late 1970s onwards, there was a realisation that an integrated air defence and 
early warning system was needed, complete with ground defences for the land bases.125 
This was also partly in response to the WTO development of long-range bombers with 
stand-off missiles. The UKADGE was developed to integrate into the NATO Air Defence 
Ground Environment (NADGE), with the majority of finance provided from the NATO 
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Infrastructure fund.126 It replaced the Linesman system, which although planned as part of 
the ‘trip-wire’ strategy, had only come into service in 1974.127  
Many of the air defence radar and warning installations were sited near to the coast, and 
many were unhardened, some even in Portacabins on the surface protected by nothing 
more than a chain-link fence. This vulnerability was caused by delays in implementing the 
Improved UKADGE system.128 Some of the UKADGE installations were upgraded from the 
original ROTOR installations of the 1950s, and had nuclear, chemical and biological 
protection added, as well as being buried deep underground.129 Air Chief Marshall Sir Peter 
Harding, CINCUKAF, said, “ … of course, I’ll be a lot happier when it is all underground … ”130 
Although there were mobile, smaller radars available (90-series), they would not be as 
capable as the larger, fixed installations, and use by the WTO of attacks with persistent 
chemical weapons on these vulnerable locations would have quickly rendered them 
inoperable. Considering the urgent need for the improvements, funding for UKADGE and 
improved radar proved difficult to progress through the NATO bureaucracy, especially after 
the specification for the system was modified following contractor bids.131 
One squadron of the venerable Shackleton aircraft, developed from the Lancaster of World 
War Two by AVRO, provided airborne Early Warning (AEW). Eleven Shackletons provided 
radar coverage from Lossiemouth, but were expected to be replaced by Nimrod AEW from 
1983 onwards (originally the late 1960s132). The reduction of the number of Shackletons 
before the introduction of Nimrod was intended to save approximately £5m, but would, “… 
permit only one AEW barrier to be mounted in the Faroes-UK gap (against an operational 
minimum of two) …”133 The Nimrod Mk 3 AEW was reported in 1983 to be ready for 
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operational deployment in 1984,134 but problems with the development of the Mission 
System Avionics delayed this. The Mk3 project was cancelled in 1986, and E3-A AWACS were 
ordered to replace the by now obsolete Shackletons in 1987, but by 1989 the Shackletons 
were still the only aircraft listed as Airborne Early Warning flying with the RAF.135 One part 
of the warning system, the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), had been the 
only area of major, consistent, investment in the 1960s. It was intended to give as much 
warning as possible to get a nuclear retaliation launched. Like all the other early warning 
locations, BMEWS was classified a Key Point, and even though it was an RAF installation, it 
would require protection provided by the Army and emergency services. 
Army  
To defend the Home Base and parts of Western Europe, in 1979 the Army had 138,000 
regular and 176,000 reservist personnel. The Army consisted of various types of forces, from 
rapid-response units on permanent high-readiness, to large formations of reservists which 
took weeks to mobilise. Permanently stationed in West Germany was the British Army of 
the Rhine (BAOR), consisting of 1(BR) Corps, under NATO command. The primary role of 
1(BR) Corps was the defence of the British sector of the NATO ‘layer-cake’ in West Germany.  
(See Figure 5 - NATO ‘Layer Cake’). 1(BR) Corps was combined with FRG, Netherlands and 
Belgian forces to form NORTHAG for the defence of the North German plain, a vital sector of 
the Central Region. In 1974 the Chiefs of Staff assessed that 50,000 was the minimum 
strength for 1(BR) Corps to retain its basic combat capability.136 Key to the successful 
defence of 1(BR) Corps area was the mobilisation of the reserves, and the quick 
reinforcement of troops from the UK. Speed of reinforcement of BAOR had been high on the 
list of priorities for the LTDP in 1977, but in 1980, the SDE still noted that, “We need to … 
speed up the arrangements for the reinforcement of BAOR in an emergency.”137 Given 
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sufficient time to reinforce, the British Army’s 1(BR) Corps would exceed 100,000 
personnel.138 
If a crisis arose, the UK Mobile Force (UKMF) was airportable, and intended to deploy 
rapidly to support the regular forces on continental Europe. This could be a national 
deployment, or on the orders of SACEUR.139 UKMF comprised an armoured reconnaissance 
regiment, three battalions of regular infantry and two of TAVR, and supporting arms 
including the Logistic Support Group.140 Because approximately 40% of the UKMF were 
reservists, it might deploy without its reservists if a crisis developed very quickly. Because of 
the reliance on the reserves to fill-out the numbers, the MoD warned, “There is a possibility 
that were SACEUR to request the deployment of the UKMF(L) before the TA was mobilised 
there might be some delay before the whole force could be deployed.”141 
There was a need for urgency in deploying forces given that  the WTO were thought capable 
of a quick attack with only 48 hours’ warning. BAOR ‘Covering Force’ units were to be 
deployed forward of the main defensive positions to delay an enemy advance, and to 
identify main thrust lines.142 The covering force was required to be able to reach their 
combat positions within 24 hours of a warning. All main combat units were expected to be 
at their General Defence Plan locations within 48 hours of notification, complete with their 
basic load of ammunition.143 The main combat units, armour-heavy battle-groups in the 
Main Defence Area (see Appendix F, Figure 14 - British Corps defence area) were expected to 
engage and destroy the advancing enemy.144 There were 16 reinforcing combat battalions (6 
Regular and 10 Reserve) which would not be able to achieve this timescale in an emergency 
                                                     
138 Introduction to Chapters 3 and 4 of the Government War Book, January 1976, ‘Government War Book, Volume 1’, CAB 
175/53, TNA. 
139 Measure 4.50, To Deploy the United Kingdom Mobile Force, January 1980, ibid. 
140 Annex, Composition of the New UKMF(L), no date, ‘Army Organisation and Structure - United Kingdom Mobile Force 
(UKMF) Organisation’, DEFE 70/431, TNA. 
141 D/DS12/48/16/1, Danish Defence: Reinforcement (Draft), 22nd September 1981, ‘NATO Rapid Reinforcement Planning’, 
para. 4, FCO 46/2583, TNA. 
142 Section 17 - Covering Force Operations, ‘1(BR) Corps Battle Notes’, 3-17–1. 
143 ACDS(OPS) S/52/1, Annex G, Readiness of Standing Forces, 1978, ‘NATO Defence Planning Committee Meetings’, G-1, 
FCO 46/1700, TNA. 
144 Section 18 - The Main Defensive Battle, ‘1(BR) Corps Battle Notes’, 3-18–1. 
 Page 204 
 
because they were based in the UK for cost saving purposes.145  In addition, many units 
permanently stationed in BAOR were kept under strength, and the cadre companies and 
units were to be brought up to strength during a crisis by the mobilisation of regular 
reservists using the Individual Reinforcement Plan. These personnel were for the 
reinforcement of units categorised as ‘A1’, the highest state of preparedness. As such, the 
reinforcements were expected to be with their units no later than 48 hours after being 
called up. The Individual Reinforcement Plan was introduced in 1981 allowing the reservists 
to be in their General Defence Plan locations within 48 hours.146  
From the analysis of the wargames, and the timescales involved in mobilising and 
transporting the reinforcements to the continent, it was possible that the Armed Forces 
would face a similar problem to that of the BEF in 1940 during the retreat to Dunkirk.147 Had 
a breakthrough of the front line been created, the rear area troops would have been ill 
equipped to stop it.148 Rear-area troops, such as the 2nd Infantry Division, were poorly 
equipped to fight a mechanised, fast moving enemy, having reduced numbers of anti-
armour and other heavy weapons, as well as limited mobility. In BAOR, some non-front-line 
units were equipped with Saxon armoured personnel carriers (the armour of which was 
supposed to be proof against only small calibre weapons), and yet others only had lorries.  
Main Battle Tanks (MBT) 
The Army placed a great deal of reliance on the Main Battle Tank as its primary anti-armour 
weapon.149 The Main Battle Tank of the British Army had been the Chieftain since the 1960s. 
The Chieftain was a powerful MBT, deployed in four armoured brigades in BAOR. Despite 
initial problems with the power plant and gearbox, it had been improved and updated, but 
by the early 1980s it was feared the newer WTO tanks would outclass it. A project was 
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undertaken in 1978, called MBT-80, to develop a successor.150 Due to cost increases and 
other delays this plan was finally abandoned in 1980, and Challenger tanks purchased. 
Challenger had been developed for the Iranian army, but the order had collapsed following 
the Iranian Revolution. This allowed the Army to purchase the available tanks and those on 
order. The disadvantage with Challenger was the Army would receive a weapon system that 
had not been designed specifically for its requirements. In a memorandum to the Cabinet 
Office, Michael Quinlan stated that the MoD recognised Challenger was, “… not … an 
adequate long-term substitute for MBT 80 and could not therefore be used to replace the 
full Chieftain fleet.”151 There would be a deliberate compromise: Challenger would replace 
half of the fleet, but the other half would remain Chieftain until a new tank was 
developed.152 
NATO wanted BAOR to field 638 of the new Challengers by 1989, to replace completely 
Chieftain.153 Financial and developmental constraints meant that the Chieftains would not 
be replaced on a 1:1 basis. The Force Proposals also requested an additional two tank 
regiments to be raised.154 These new regiments were formed by the simple expedient of 
reducing the number of tanks in existing regiments from 74 to 57, and re-using the spares in 
the new units.155 Britain was expected to produce 264 Challengers by 1986, bringing the 
Army total of all tanks to 684 plus the WMR.156  Five Challenger regiments were to be in 
place in BAOR by the end of the 1980s157 but by 1986 only enough tanks for two had been 
ordered.158 These new weapons were themselves underfunded for maintenance and 
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modifications, and in 1989-90 in Germany, Challenger 1 availability was just 23%.159 A 
replacement for the remaining Chieftains was expected to be in service by the mid-1990s.160 
Anti-armour weapons 
Following the success of unguided anti-tank weapons during the Second World War, 
development of guided weapons saw the introduction of the first true anti-tank guided 
weapons (ATGW) in the 1950s. The NATO armies recognised the need for heavy attrition on 
any attacking armour in the first few days of battle, and the maintenance of that capability 
throughout any war. Only profligate use of anti-armour weapons of whatever sort would act 
as an equaliser to balance the numerical preponderance in WTO armour.161  
By the 1970s, the British Army’s anti-tank guided weapons included Milan,162 Swingfire,163 
TOW164 and HOT.165 Small, shoulder launched, short range unguided weapons such as the 
M72 LAW, LAW 80 and the recoilless rifle Carl Gustav were also employed. (The Light Anti-
tank Weapon (LAW) was an unguided, one-person, disposable weapon.) A proliferation of 
these weapons during the 1980s, enabled by technological improvements, meant individual 
soldiers and small combat teams were equipped with greater anti-armour capability than 
ever before. Other improvements in warhead design meant that ATGWs had a high 
probability of a kill if they hit their target.  
One of the key Long Term Defence Programme proposals was to increase the holdings and 
reserve stocks of these anti-armour systems, especially guided weapons. The NATO Force 
Proposals also leaned heavily towards the modernisation and expansion of the number of 
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weapon systems. Task Force 1 of the LTDP was responsible for looking into the demands of 
the Armed Forces for ATGW. Their findings conflicted with existing UK programmes in 
several respects, not least the cost of their recommendations. The MoD accepted, “… in 
principle the need to commit resource … However we are not convinced, on the evidence 
presented, that the recommended proposals are necessarily the best way of enhancing our 
anti-armour capability.”166 This was supported by the findings from the Yom Kippur War 
that of the Israeli tanks lost, less than 25% were destroyed by weapons other than tank-
guns.167 
The British Government publicly recognised the need to improve BAOR’s anti-armour 
capabilities in the 1980 SDE.168 The NATO Force Proposals for 1979 -1984 required that by 
the end of 1982, 630 Milan systems would be in place. Each infantry battalion would deploy 
24 Milan launchers.169 The Milan was a portable anti-tank guided missile used by the British 
Army and Marines, deployed in teams in FV432 armoured tracked vehicles, or housed in 
dedicated turrets on the FV120 Spartan170 armoured tracked vehicle. The LTDP proposed 
that 20,500 additional Milan anti-armour missiles be added to the UK’s inventory between 
1979 and 1984.171 Declared planning indicated that there would be 11,000 Milan missiles in 
the war reserve by the end of 1982. A Review of Ammunition Rates and Scales (RARS) study 
of about the same time recommended an additional 28,000 missiles.172 The study indicated 
that almost 40,000 anti-armour missiles would be required for a variety of combat situations 
over the expected war-fighting period of 6 days. 647 Milan systems were planned to be 
deployed by mid-1983, and an additional twelve systems, with wheeled vehicles, were 
required for UK AMF(L). No increase was included in national planning, so this addition was 
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not accepted.173 An additional 180 Milan systems were to be deployed to BAOR in 1984.174 
Because of the alterations in the number of launchers deployed, the war reserves of Milan 
were expected to drop from 58% in 1981 to only 36% in 1986: the reserve was not expected 
to reach 100% until 1989.175  
The LTDP proposed purchasing an additional 48 Swingfire systems.176 These plans were 
unacceptable due to the cost, as well as the fact that the production of the FV430 base 
vehicle had ceased.177 As a result, the 1981 Force Goals requested that 48 additional 
Strikers178 were purchased as part of the same programme as the increase in Milan. Britain 
had declared 108 FV438179 vehicles, and 64 Striker vehicles to NATO.180 The Army responded 
that,  
“Whilst we accept in principle the LTDP measure … to commit resources of 
the order indicated to anti-armour, the UK intends to meet this by increasing 
its MBT fleet and the number of Milan and the redeployment of more Striker 
to BAOR. The latter will bring the Reinforced Corps holdings to 48 Striker.”181  
But as noted above, the number of MBTs would actually decrease with the introduction of 
Challenger. 
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The MoD accepted in 1977 that from 1983 a LAW would be introduced to replace Carl 
Gustav and the M72 on a one-to-one basis.182 One study suggested each infantry battalion 
would receive 570 LAW80s, although this was marked as unconfirmed.183 However, by 1981, 
this had been altered to an unspecified number of LAW80, which, “… will not replace [the 
M72 and Carl Gustav] on an exact one for one basis, but the recommended scales will be an 
improvement.”184 How the reduction of the number of LAWs would be an improvement was 
unspecified. The LAW80 finally entered service in 1988.185  
It is worth noting here that the type of anti-armour weapon used by the soldiers dictated 
their tactics. For example, none of the man-portable anti-armour weapons with which BAOR 
was equipped were capable of being fired from within a confined space due to the severity 
of the back-blast. This severely limited the flexibility of small-unit tactics when applied to 
large West German urban sprawl or village ‘sponge-tactics’.186 (The original LTDP 
requirement had specified that the capability to fire LAW80 from within buildings was 
desirable.187 The West German Heer developed the Armbrust in the 1980s specifically to 
overcome this limitation and allow their troops to fight from within buildings.188)  
To provide highly mobile ATGW, SS11189 air-to-surface missiles were provided for the 
Westland Lynx. To keep them up-to-date, NATO required that by mid-1983 the LYNX be 
fitted a replacement. TOW had been chosen by the British Government as part of its 
national plans to update the anti-armour helicopters earmarked for NATO.190 An additional 
108 anti-armour helicopters were requested by NATO in 1981, but the same answer was 
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given to support the partial implementation of this proposal as was given for the Striker 
system; more MBTs and Milans would take up the slack. The number of LYNX/TOW systems 
was to be increased to 78 (three more than previously.)191 Between 1979 and 1989, 25 
LYNX/TOW systems had been ordered.192  
In recognition of the increased tempo of war that the WTO was capable of, including night-
fighting,193 the LTDP required night sights to be fitted to all ATGW by 1982. The response of 
the UK Government was that standardisation could not be implemented immediately 
because, “… each missile system requires its own tailored night sight.”194 A Swingfire sight 
was under test in 1981, fitted to the Striker vehicle, and was due to be issued to units 
beginning in October 1981.195 775 Milan night sights were in operation by 1986, with a 
further 375 ordered.196 
Air Defence 
During the 1960s and 1970s small calibre anti-aircraft weapons such as the 40mm BOFORS 
had been replaced by missile systems.197 The Army used Blowpipe198 and Rapier199 anti-
aircraft missiles. Provision of a towed quadruple Blowpipe launcher for Territorial Air 
Defence units was reported in the 1979 SDE, but cancelled in 1980/81 for financial 
reasons.200  
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Despite initial concerns about reliability, and problems establishing firing posts, Rapier 
performed well in the Falklands.201 Blowpipe performed poorly, achieving approximately a 
15% hit rate202 (although Freedman relates that only two hits were achieved from more 
than 100 launches203). Even though improvements were clearly identified from the 
Falklands, such as the ability to engage crossing targets, some of these were delayed or 
cancelled, and additional production of Blowpipe deferred.204 Javelin, a more advanced 
variant of Blowpipe, began to replace it from 1985 in BAOR.  
Other equipment examples 
Other equipment necessary for the defence of the 1(BR) sector of NATO were deferred or 
cancelled. The introduction of BATES, the Army’s new computerised artillery target 
engagement system, was intended to allow a greater concentration of firepower through 
improved communication. It would integrate several different communication systems, with 
improved data processing, and feed target data to differing artillery systems, including the 
new MLRS.205 Part of the 1981 – 1986 Force proposals, its introduction was delayed to 
1987.206 According to the SDE in 1984, BATES was, “… in full development …”207 and one 
system had been ordered by 1986.208 Intended for introduction in the mid-1980s, it was 
delayed by financial cuts until it was described as being introduced, “… in the early 
1990s.”209  
                                                     
201 Ministry of Defence, ‘The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons’, para. 231, Cmnd 8758. 
202 Isby and Kamps Jr, Armies of NATO’s Central Front, 292. 
203 Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, vol. 2 (Abingdon, 2005), 733. 
204 AUS(DS)/BF12/1 (21/81), Annex A, Estimates 1981/82 - Announcement of Measures, Memorandum from AUS(Defence 
Staff) to DUS(P), 13th January 1981, ‘Defence Estimates, Working Papers 1981 to 1982’, l. 12, FCO 46/2557, TNA. 
205 Ministry of Defence, ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1979’, para. 326, Cmnd 7474. 
206 DP 14/81 (Final), Appendix 2 to Annex A, Serial EL17, NATO Force Goals 1981-1986 and Long Term Defence Programme, 
6th October 1981, ‘NATO Long Term Defence Planning’, 8, FCO 46/2586, TNA. 
207 Ministry of Defence, ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1984’, para. 424, Cmnd 9227. 
208 Ministry of Defence, ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986’, para. 401, Cmnd 9763-1. 
209 Ibid., para. 424. 
 Page 212 
 
More crucially, the Barmine, necessary for blocking routes of enemy attack and funnelling 
the enemy into killing zones, was delayed for cost reasons.210 This weapon was vital not only 
to defence, but also for flank protection of the ‘Counterstroke’ attacks, and was explicitly 
mentioned as part of the ‘Battle Group Tactics’. It was lighter, provided greater coverage 
and could be laid more quickly than conventional mines.211  
The ‘Counterstroke’ doctrine relied on good communications for the attacking forces to 
coordinate the advance with their respective blocking forces. Communications had been a 
problem for the Armed Forces, famously failing the Airborne troops at Arnhem in 1944.212 
Thus the importance of good, secure, communications had not slipped the MoD’s notice. 
Clansman213 was the Army’s new tactical battlefield radio system, which replaced 
Larkspur.214 The Ptarmigan system, a communications and data network backbone, replaced 
the obsolete Bruin system. The Wavell system introduced networked computers into the 
communications chain, and the overall system improved communications up and down the 
chain of command.215 These systems connected higher levels of command with the units, 
and provided data processing capabilities. However, Clansman suffered from a reduction in 
purchase scale,216 and the supply was delayed by ‘cheese-paring’, especially to those units 
allocated to rear-area or home defence.217  
Home Defence 
The defence of the Home Base was divided into two distinct but mutually dependent parts: 
military defence and civil defence. Military defence was divided into two main types: 
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defence against any direct attack on the United Kingdom from external forces and defence 
to secure the United Kingdom against internal threat.  
The defence of the UK home base was undertaken by troops of the United Kingdom Land 
Forces (UKLF) which provided troops for Home Defence roles as well as for SACEUR’s 
strategic reserve.218 8th Field Force (later known as 5 Brigade), made up of regulars and TAVR 
personnel, was assigned specifically for home defence.219 According to the UK Commander-
in-Chief, the primary purpose of the defence of the UK as a whole was to retain, “… the 
United Kingdom’s ability to launch a nuclear counter offensive …”220 as well as maintaining 
the capability of the Armed Forces to carry out their mobilisation and deployment plans.  
The Chiefs of Staff Committee stated that, “The Home Defence plan … must be consistent 
with NATO doctrine and with the criteria … for the reinforcement of NATO.”221  
The Home Defence forces would provide troops for the defence of Key Points, air defence 
aircraft and SAMs, and other troops deployed for protection of troop and equipment 
movements.222 The need to protect the UK home base was explained in MC48/3, which 
stated,  
“Security of Rear Areas. The NATO nations have the responsibility to establish 
adequate civil defence and internal security organisations within their own 
resources and to enable NATO forces to have maximum freedom of action 
and secure lines of communications.”223 
The United Kingdom Home Base was defined by the MoD as, “… the main-land areas of the 
UK, its offshore islands, coastal waters out to the 100 fathom line and the airspace within 
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the UK Air Defence Region.”224 The 100-fathom line (approximately 200 metres) coincides 
generally with the continental shelf. Defining this region of sea as the home base has 
operational implications as a naval officer questioned about the definition above remarked,  
“It is better to keep enemy submarines out of shallow coastal waters where 
merchant shipping and naval vessels concentrate at harbour entrances or 
other anchorages, and under certain circumstances it is easier to conduct 
anti-submarine warfare in deeper water.”225 
In 1969 NATO described the importance of the UK home base and the surrounding maritime 
area in the following way: 
“Strategic Importance of the British Isles 
19. The British Isles, by virtue of their location, industrial capability, ports and 
airfields, provide a valuable base for early warning and the operation of ASW 
forces, strategic counter-offensive forces and support of NATO forces in 
Europe.  
Strategic Importance of the English Channel and the North Sea 
20. The English Channel and North Sea cover the approaches to the coasts of 
the United Kingdom, Northern France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, 
Denmark and Southern Norway, with the major ports therein, several of 
which rank among the largest in the world. The intensive shipping activity in 
these areas constitutes the life blood of the economy and prosperity of the 
countries concerned.”226 
The British Isles were not a part of NATO Allied Command Europe (ACE), but the air over it 
and sea around it were. Thus, troops that were earmarked for home defence were not part 
                                                     
224 ‘The Soviet Air Threat to the United Kingdom Base, 1980 - 2005’, 1, D/DIS(CS)17/20, DEFE 62/3, TNA. 
225 Interview with Captain Dr David Reindorp, RN, 3rd July 2014  
226 Appendix A, ‘Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area’, para. 19 and 20, MC 
48/3, NATO. 
 Page 215 
 
of the NATO contribution,227 although the defence of some ground installations and 
infrastructure, vital for any continued operations in Europe in the event of a war, was a grey 
area within NATO policy. Britain had plans for 35 battalions of troops, plus logistics and 
communications, to be mobilised to defend the home islands in time of war.228 
There was no formal link between HQ UKLF and the NATO chain of command.229 There had 
been suggestions, which were never implemented, of making the Commander-in-Chief UK 
Land Forces a NATO Major Subordinate Commander similar to Commander-in-Chief United 
Kingdom Air Forces.230 The UK Home Defence plans did not include an equivalent to the 
NATO ‘Counter-Surprise’ plan,231 and as such left the UK Home Base vulnerable in a sudden 
crisis.  Between 1971 and 1985 parts of the Government and MoD War Books were being 
updated to include new procedural arrangements between HQUKLF and NATO, including 
the co-ordination of the movement of troops to designated ports for reinforcement into 
Europe.232 As far as co-ordination and communications went between NATO, the 
Government departments and Armed Services operationally responsible for Home Defence, 
there was room for improvement.  
In order to fulfil part of its obligation, NATO asked the UK to re-categorise some of its forces 
in order to, “… present a true picture of current status of categorised forces against war 
authorised strength.”233 The LTDP had ‘invited’ the British Government to recategorise some 
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33 battalions from ‘National Command’ to ‘Other Forces for NATO’, which was accepted. 
Not accepted was the requirement to recategorise 11 battalions from ‘Other Forces for 
NATO’ to ‘NATO Earmarked’.234 There was debate within the MoD about assigning UK Home 
Defence ground troops to NATO, which the MoD felt might provide, “… a NATO shield over 
the UK based forces … which otherwise might be vulnerable to defence cuts.”235 But this 
could be a double-edged sword. The Government was concerned, “… whether there is any 
political advantage to be gained in drawing NATO’s attention to forces which exist … and of 
which otherwise NATO would take no official cognizance.”236 It might be expected that, in 
the event of war, SACEUR would be calling for any reserves to be shipped to Europe to help 
defeat an attack. In this case, the British Government would be in a situation similar to that 
of 1940 when the French called for more RAF fighters to be sent to France, but which 
Dowding knew would be needed for home defence, and so refused.237  
Military Defence 
The defence of the Home Base was the responsibility of United Kingdom Commanders-in-
Chief Committee (Home) (UKCICC(H)) comprising Commander-in-Chief United Kingdom 
Land Forces (CINCUKLF), Commander-in-Chief Naval Home Command (CINCNAVHOME) and 
Air Commander Home Defence Forces (ACHDF).238 Their particular military responsibilities 
were: 
 The mobilisation of manpower and material resources 
 The reinforcement of NATO 
 The defence of the United Kingdom Base 
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 The reception of casualties and non-combatants from Europe 
 The provision of Military Assistance to the Civil Authorities (MACA)239 
In a period of tension or approaching war, the Armed Forces needed to be free, during the 
Preparatory Phase (See Appendix I, Figure 19 - Relationship of Home Defence Terms), to 
mobilise and deploy. Their priorities were to protect the nuclear counter-offensive 
capability, Key Points and transportation routes, and to assist the Civil Authorities and 
Ministries. This would effectively include all those sites containing nuclear weapons and/or 
their delivery systems, and the transport network required for war fighting, the carriage of 
military supplies and dispersal of weapons.  In concert with the Civil Authorities, the 
Transition to War plans would be activated, and MACA implemented.  
The Commanders-in-Chief Committee asserted that during mobilisation and Transition to 
War, “… the security of the United Kingdom base is essential and it is a major task of the 
Home Defence forces to ensure it is maintained.”240 There were moves afoot in the late 
1970s to have the UK Home Base incorporated as a Land Region of ACE, but these never 
came to fruition.241 Therefore, it was entirely in the hands of the UK Government to define 
the policy and strategy for the defence of the UK home islands. Nonetheless, this policy and 
strategy had to interconnect with the NATO strategy, so there would be the minimum 
friction in time of war.242 The two were inextricably linked.  
United Kingdom Land Forces (UKLF), Naval Home and Air Commander Home Defence Forces 
HQs would be established at separate locations, with alternate HQs established on land and 
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at sea:243 there was no airborne command centre for the Services or Government. Liaison 
offices from all military services, as well as from the Police, would be established at both 
central and regional civilian HQs. The country was divided into several Home Defence 
Regions. (See Appendix I, Figure 16 - UK Home Defence Regions) Regional Seats of 
Government (RSGs) headed by a Cabinet Minister with Military Liaison were established 
with modern communications equipment, some in completely new bunkers.244   
As part of the Home Defence establishment, UKLF had specific responsibility for protection 
of vital NATO and national installations, especially those involved in mobilisation and 
transport. The MoD mobilisation and reinforcement plans, as well as plans for the staging of 
US and Canadian reinforcements, required billeting, transport, supply and shipping. Many of 
the US and Canadian forces would arrive in Europe via the UK, through its ports and 
airports.245 The pressure on the Armed Forces for protection duties would be added to by 
the need to guard such facilities as telecommunications centres and networks, food stores 
and utilities. The use of Naval and Air Force personnel under Army control was an option 
available to the ground commander in time of crisis.246 A microwave communications 
network covered the country by the 1980s, and was complemented by the older, wired 
communications provided by the GPO, later British Telecom.247 All of this needed protection 
from sabotage and direct attack. 
The military commanders were uncertain about their ability to fulfil the demands of Home 
Defence as, “… there are already more tasks than the Army (the other two Services are 
already fully committed) is able to undertake.”248 To relieve the pressure on the Regular 
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troops, and because of poor recruitment numbers for the Territorial units, the Home Service 
Force was to be raised in 1982.249  
A.1.1.1 Defending the Nuclear Deterrent 
According to the Defence Operational Planning Staff, “The primary aim of the Armed forces 
in the United Kingdom … is to safeguard the nuclear counter-offensive capability.”250 Only 
once this job had been completed would the subsidiary aims, such as completing 
deployment of forces to war stations and to support active naval and air operations, be 
addressed. The defence of locations containing nuclear weapons had a high priority for 
Home Defence units. It was anticipated that it would also require a large Police presence to 
counter civilian demonstrations in any approaching crisis.251 The stationing of Ground 
Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) meant that active deployment required local protection to 
enable them to leave the base, and national protection of the road network for operational 
deployment at their launch locations.252 Each squadron deployed six transporters for the 
missiles and control centres, and another sixteen vehicles for the technicians and security 
personnel.253 Because these forces were of vital importance, their launch sites would be Key 
Points254, which would enable the area around them to be designated a Ground Defence 
Area capable of being defended with deadly force. 
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A.1.1.2 Key Points 
Key Points255 included ammunition stores, communication centres, Early Warning systems, 
and as mentioned above, the launch sites for nuclear-armed aircraft. These were locations 
that could be defended with deadly force, even before the outbreak of a war. Key Points 
and lines of communication were of great importance not only for the defence of the 
islands, but for the successful implementation of the reinforcement plans for US, Canadian 
and British forces in Europe. They were of 4 types:256 
 Nuclear (Type I). Installations which have at any time a vital role in enabling 
the country to receive timely warning of an imminent nuclear attack or to 
carry out a nuclear counter-strike. 
 Continuity of Government (Type II). Installations the major disruption of 
which would seriously affect the maintenance and continuity of Government 
of the country, centrally at any time and, in war, regionally. 
 Critical (Type III). Installations which, during specific periods, have a vital role 
in enabling the country to fulfil its commitments to NATO. 
 Survival (Type IV). Installations which would require protection in the survival 
period. 
All Key Points would require protection from the beginning of a crisis, including ‘survival’ 
Type IV installations whose function would only begin after a nuclear attack. 
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A.1.1.3 Defence of the Home Base/Islands 
Defence of the Home Base required the Armed Forces to provide support for sea and air 
operations, as well as the protection of locations vital for the reinforcement of Europe.257 
(See Appendix J, Forces available for home defence) The Chiefs of Staff expected, “Those 
personnel of all three Services, including Reserves, who are not assigned or earmarked for 
assignment to NATO and who are not involved in the mobilisation or support of such forces 
will be available for Home Defence tasks.”258 This would have been approximately 100,000 
personnel, although given the size of the task, the military commanders were dubious about 
their ability to fulfil the demands that would have been placed upon them as, “… there are 
already more tasks than the Army (the other two Services are already fully committed) is 
able to undertake.”259 
Locations crucial to the maintenance of order, provision of energy supplies and food stores 
would have required protection. The transportation network included Essential Service 
Routes and the Military Road Route System which were primarily to keep main roads, 
railways and waterways clear for military traffic, but according to some were also meant as 
a way to reinforce the ‘stay-put’ policy.260 They would have limited civilian access to certain 
routes, enabling essential traffic a clear path to its destination. Food stores would have 
required particular attention to ensure the Post Strike Reserve (PSR) rations had been 
obtained and stored. Food storage facilities had been constructed during and after World 
War Two for this purpose, located on both the road and rail network to facilitate 
distribution.261 The PSR was, “… 30 days food at an austere scale for the mobilised strength 
of the RN ashore, Army and RAF units remaining in the UK …”262 Control of food and fuel for 
civilians post-strike was under the control of Regional Commissioners. 
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Civil Defence 
The UK Government used two separate definitions for Civil Defence: 
“UK Definition. Any measure not amounting to actual combat for affording defence 
against any form of hostile attack by a foreign power or for depriving any form of 
attack by a foreign power of the whole or a part of its effect, whether the measures 
are taken before, at or after the time of the attack. 
NATO Definition. The mobilisation, organisation and direction of the civil population 
designed to minimise by passive measures the effects of enemy action against all 
aspects of civil life.”263 
Civil defence against conventional or chemical attack was almost non-existent in the UK, 
being dominated by plans in place for nuclear ‘post-strike’ continuation of Government, 
protection of food and fuel supplies, and an attempt to rebuild the nation. There were no 
professional organisations for Civil Defence other than the emergency services, which would 
undoubtedly be tied up coping with conventional attacks and protecting vital infrastructure.  
The UK had no national civil defence corps264 and any response to an emergency was to be 
organised at a regional and sub-regional level. This was also the level at which any co-
operation between military and the civil authorities would operate, including the United 
Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO).265 (See Appendix I, Figure 17 - 
ROC/UKWMO Group Boundaries) The UKWMO was to identify and report nuclear blasts and 
plot radiation levels, allowing the emergency services and military forces to avoid entering 
areas of high risk following the explosions. The UKWMO posts were not defined as key 
points, and had been targets for vandalism by anti-nuclear protesters. The posts were 
dotted around the countryside, and although they had no air filtration or other radiation 
protection, the UKWMO personnel were expected to operate their posts during and after a 
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nuclear attack. (See Appendix I, Figure 18 - Example ROC/UKWMO post distribution) They 
would report sightings of explosions and radiation levels to the Regional HQs. 
In each Region an Armed Forces HQ would be established, with two Sub-Regional HQs.266 
(See Appendix I, Figure 16 - UK Home Defence Regions) The task of supporting the Civil 
Authorities would not be easy:  
“It will be appreciated that should hostilities seem imminent or actually break 
out, the armed forces are likely to be fully occupied with their primary military 
roles of deploying troops in support of NATO and securing the UK base. 
Although some units of the Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) have 
been earmarked for tasks in this country including protection of certain key 
installations, it is unlikely that there would be the manpower, surplus 
equipment or supplies to devote to purely civil purposes.”267 
Continuation of Government was of primary concern for the authorities. Central 
Government would be housed at the Central Government War Headquarters at Corsham, 
codenamed ‘BURLINGTON’, later changed to ‘TURNSTILE’.268 The national organisation was 
arranged around the Local and County authorities. For emergency planning, local authority 
organisation was broken down into County Main, County Standby and District Controls. For 
example, Buckinghamshire had one main, one stand-by and five district HQs in place by 
1978 with plans in place for food control, communications and monitoring.269 Nationwide, 
there were forty-seven County Mains and three hundred and thirty-three District 
Controls.270 The Civil Defence (General Local Authority Functions) Regulations, 1983 (added 
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to in 1986)271 strengthened the existing legislation, making it compulsory for local 
authorities to prepare and maintain plans for emergencies, including conventional attack.272 
Civil defence against conventional weapons occupies two sentences in a ten-page 
Government document detailing the processes for emergency planning. Civilians were not 
provided with protection against chemical attack, nor had advice been given to the public 
about chemical weapons.273  
Journalists had made the public aware of the possibility of the Emergency Powers Bill being 
enacted in a crisis.274 With the enacting of the Emergency Powers Bill civilians could be 
conscripted for work to assist the military or civilian authorities, and also gave sweeping 
powers to the Police.275 During a transition to war, public opinion would be of great 
importance to the smooth operation of the Government’s plans. If there were strong 
opposition to the possibility of war, the Defence Operational Planning staff expected it, “… 
would be exploited by dissident elements. In such circumstances the effect of industrial 
action upon public life might involve the Armed Forces in safeguarding essential services.”276  
Pamphlets and radio and television information programmes would provide advice about 
what to do in the event of a nuclear attack.277 Most Government advice recommended 
staying in your home, and building a shelter. Critics maintained that the policy of making the 
population stay-put would result in millions more deaths than if evacuation plans had been 
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put in place.278 Given the size of the UK and the relative power of the nuclear warheads, it is 
debatable how successful any evacuation plans would have been, especially at a time when 
the military needed all the available transport and routes for mobilisation and 
reinforcement. The priority in a crisis or war were the needs of the military. 
Conclusion 
Much was made of maintaining the fighting power of the Armed Forces and their 
contribution to NATO. However, although the numbers of fighting troops in the Central 
Region varied little (see Appendix C, Figure 9 - Army comparison of regular, reservist and 
auxiliary forces, including BAOR, 1975 - 1991), the contribution of the Royal Navy declined 
numerically, despite the short-term effects of the Falklands War (see Appendix C, Figure 11 - 
Royal Navy comparison of regular, reservist and auxiliary forces 1975 - 1991). Indeed, some 
of the 1981 cuts were reinstated after war. The Royal Navy benefitted from the backlash 
which followed the Falklands War, but with the warming of relations between East and 
West from 1985, the pressure to reduce defence spending returned, and cuts and 
cancellations resumed. Vital improvements, such as the provision of anti-submarine 
helicopters and increases in escorts for Channel Command were not achieved. The RAF 
faced the problem that aircraft are inherently expensive to develop, and closing the ‘Fighter 
Gap’ would prove to be financially impossible. 
The home islands were not a defined land region of NATO, yet they were a fundamental 
part of NATO’s strategy of defence in depth, allowing air strikes and naval forces to be 
launched separately from those forces in Continental Europe. Large numbers of RAF and 
USAF aeroplanes were based in the UK and would have provided direct support to any 
fighting in Europe. The home islands were also to be used as a focal point for reinforcement 
and resupply of the NATO forces in Europe. As such, Britain was an obvious target for WTO 
air and naval attacks, as well as sabotage on land.  
It is difficult to see how Britain’s NATO commitment could not have been severely 
compromised following the severe cuts imposed by the 1981 review. The cuts were 
announced as efficiency drives, but were financially driven. As John Nott said, “… that was at 
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the heart of the defence review: money, money.”279 But the cuts were not confined to the 
European commitment. Greater reliance on reservists and deep cutbacks to the air defence 
of the British Isles during the 1970s had left them vulnerable to conventional attack, despite 
them being of great strategic value to NATO. Training, supplies and new equipment all 
suffered as part of the ‘cheese-paring’ cuts which had preceded, and were continued in, the 
1981 review. Insufficient resources would be available in times of crisis to protect and 
defend all of the essential services and locations in the UK. Civil Defence, redundant in the 
event of nuclear war, had been equally ignored in the case of conventional defence. 
Although there was no direct organisation for Civil Defence within the UK, with the enacting 
of the Emergency Powers Bill civilians could be conscripted for work to assist the military or 
civilian authorities. The Emergency Powers Bill also gave sweeping powers to the Police. The 
threat was not only from the outside, and much thought was given to controlling internal 
dissent. During a transition to war, public opinion would be of great importance to the 
smooth operation of the Government’s plans. If there were strong opposition to the 
possibility of war, it, “… would be exploited by dissident elements. In such circumstances the 
effect of industrial action upon public life might involve the Armed Forces in safeguarding 
essential services.”280  
The time from discussion to approval to deployment to complete war-reserve stocks for any 
complex weapon system was many years. Beginning in 1977, NATO, through the LTDP, 
pushed hard to increase ATGWs in the Central Region. As late as 1988-89, the SDE reported, 
“… The anti-armour capabilities of NATO ground forces are being increased by the 
introduction of significant numbers … of the Milan and Tow types and enlarged ammunition 
stocks.”281 It was also indicative of the delayed purchasing of systems and ammunition to 
offset costs, which was used as a device to keep the Defence budget down, but allow the 
politicians to appear to keep their promises. Although the plans adopted by the British 
Government acknowledged the change of NATO strategy, the resources available did not. 
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Chapter 7 - Reserves and Reservists 
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Defining the reserve 
Two main elements repeat throughout the Long Term Defence Programme (LTDP) and Force 
Proposals, and both can be covered by the ‘catch-all’ term ‘reserves’. This term covers 
reserves of manpower, embodied in the Regular Reserves and the Territorial and Auxiliary 
forces, generally referred to as Reserve Forces or Reservists.1 The Regular Reserves were 
personnel who had served in the regular forces, and through this had an obligation to serve 
as a reservist for a fixed period following their discharge from regular service. They would 
train for several days each year. These were earmarked as Individual Replacements for 
specialist tasks, or to fill out particular units. The Territorial Army, or Territorial Army 
Volunteer Reserve (TAVR), was made up of volunteers who served on a part-time basis, did 
not necessarily have any previous military experience, trained during evenings and at 
weekends and attended a two-week annual training exercise.  
The term ‘reserves’ also covers ammunition, spares and supplies, generally referred to as 
the War Maintenance Reserve (WMR), Warstocks or War Reserves. The MoD defined War 
Reserves in three categories: 2 
 Combat supplies. This comprises ammunition, fuel and rations 
 Equipment, vehicles and stores required to bring units up to their 
war establishment, and to replace losses during operations 
 Defence stores and other specialist equipment required for a 
particular operational or administrative contingency. 
This chapter will begin with an examination of the War Maintenance Reserve, and then 
study the reservist forces. 
                                                     
1 Ministry of Defence, ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1980’, para. 616, Cmnd 7826. 
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The War Maintenance Reserve - Stocks and Sustainability 
The importance of the War Maintenance Reserve (WMR) is outlined in a Minute to the 
Secretary of State for Defence in 1977 which asserted,  
“… our war reserves are absolutely vital … There are therefore several equally 
critical aspects to this problem – the quantity of war reserves; their 
deployment and storage; and our ability to resupply forward units at a rate to 
keep pace with the battle.”3   
War Reserves were crucial to the development of flexibility of response if conventional war 
was to act as more than a trip-wire for nuclear release. There would be no opportunity to 
manufacture additional stocks of missiles and equipment in the event of war.4  Deploying 
those weapons and equipment that the Armed Forces did have would require pre-
positioned stocks of all necessary supplies, vehicles and weapons. In addition, it would be 
crucial that those supplies which were in place could be moved efficiently to the fighting 
front, and those reserves held further back could be moved quickly to replenish depleted 
stocks. MC48/3 makes the need clear: “War reserves must be acquired and pre-positioned 
for sustained operations at levels sufficient to carry out the strategy, and thus to make it 
credible.”5  
Establishing the levels 
In 1955 NATO Strategy described the ready war reserve in the following fashion: 
“… the ultimate NATO target is the building up of reserves of ammunition, 
equipment, POL [Petrol, Oil and Lubricants] and other supplies to cover the 
first 90 days of a war. Steps should be taken by all nations to achieve this 
                                                     
3 D/MIN/JG/7/11, War Stocks, Memorandum from the Private Secretary to the Minister of State for Defence, 
21st December 1977, ibid. 
4 PAO 5/81, 2nd February 1981, ‘NATO Logistics Policy General UK Logistics Assumptions’, para. 22, DEFE 
25/432, TNA. 
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target as rapidly as possible.”6 
There were Standing Groups in NATO (SGN) which defined the rates to be set for various 
types of ammunition and stores which were to be held, and these groups progressively 
revised the requirement for war reserves down to 30 days by the 1970s.7 The UK planning 
assumptions were supposed to have been linked to Alliance policy, providing, “… warlike 
stocks [for] 30 days of conventional hostilities.”8 The levels required were interpreted 
differently in the UK to NATO, and each arm of the services had differing approaches and 
timescales.9  
The need for sufficient war reserves was recognised by the British Government, and its 
importance discussed at Cabinet level.10 In 1974, the Chiefs of Staff’s assumption was that 
the reserve stocks would need to cover, “… a period of up to eight days at maximum 
intensity …”11 In a 1977 report to the Minister of State for Defence concerns over the crucial 
nature of the reserves for the defence of Europe were expressed explicitly by the Defence 
Council:  
“… our war reserves are absolutely vital to the efficient conduct of our 
defence. There will be no time to produce more weaponry in significant 
quantities and little time to deploy all that we have.”12  
                                                     
6 Enclosure C, War Reserves, Standing Group to the North Atlantic Military Committee, ‘Report by the Standing Group to 
the North Atlantic Military Committee on Military Planning Factors’, 30 November 1955, MC 55, NATO. 
7 This went back to the 1950s, when a War Reserve of 90 days was suggested but not implemented. See International 
Planning Team to the Standing Group, ‘Army Ammunition Attrition Rates and War Reserve Levels’, 1954, SG189/5, NATO. 
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Budget: Public Expenditure Cuts and Cash Limits; NATO Commitment; Part 1’, PREM 19/161, TNA; ‘Statement 
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The UK employed a different approach to NATO in assessing the levels of reserves needed 
for any anticipated war in Europe, as according to the MoD the,  
“… Army and RAF plan for 8 days at intensive rates of effort, the Navy 7 days, 
though they make allowance for a long period of tension and intermittent 
engagements. NATO plan on the basis of 30 days at lesser rates of effort, 
which is clearly not in line with the way we and our allies see the battle 
going.”13  
Army and RAF war reserves were scaled based on an 8-day war at maximum intensity, the 
last two days of which were expected to include tactical nuclear exchanges. The Royal Navy 
assumed a 3-month period of tension, 3 weeks of intermittent action followed by 7 days of 
operations at intensive rates. The Royal Navy descriptions are illuminating, defining a, 
“ … period of tension as an increase in the level of operations resulting in an 
increased consumption of fuel, general stores and detection devices such as 
sonobuoys, but without the expenditure of weapons.  
Intermittent action is defined as increased consumption of fuel and general 
stores, along with limited expenditure of major weapons. There would be a 
sustained rate of patrolling by air defence aircraft and Long Range Maritime 
Reconnaissance involving minor weapons and detection device expenditure.  
Intensive operations are defined as involving all categories of weapons and 
stores.” 14 
These assumptions were judged to equate to the war reserves defined by NATO which 
stipulated 30 days operations at lower rates of intensity.15 Fuel stocks for the Royal Navy 
were 60 days at War Usage Rates, although there were recommendations to increase this to 
90 days to incorporate 60 days of tension and 30 days of combat.  
                                                     
13 D/MIN/JG/7/11, 21st December 1977, in Ministry of Defence, ‘War Reserve Stocks’, DEFE 13/1059, TNA. 
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The need to establish just how long a war might last, when ammunition reserves were 
limited, was significant. Some NATO planning for War Reserves employed what was called 
the ‘Exponential War Model.’ This model predicts that the longer the war lasted, the higher 
the probability that the reserves would run out before it ended.16 Ammunition production 
during a conflict with the WTO was regarded as zero,17 and knowledge that the war would 
be of limited duration would give the forces confidence that weapons could be used 
freely.18 Herein was a source of concern to the Armed Forces regarding the lack of missiles 
of all types, as only the profligate use of such weapons would be sufficient to hold back a 
WTO attack in NORTHAG. Nevertheless, based on experience from the Falklands War, the 
General War Rates seriously under-estimated ammunition usage. General Thompson noted 
that in the Falklands usage of larger calibre ammunition, such as artillery shells, was in 
excess of, “… the rate for the most intense operations envisaged in a war against the 
Warsaw Pact.”19 In a war in Europe, this knowledge would result in reluctance to use 
ammunition for fear of running out at the crucial moment.20 This was a similar problem to 
that faced by the USA during the early period of the Vietnam War. Stocks of ammunition 
were available to supply the troops, but the actual usage rates were much higher than 
anticipated. This led to a serious reduction in stock levels before production of ammunition 
could be increased sufficiently to balance the increased usage.21  
To allow military officers to establish what were considered the ‘correct’ levels of reserves, 
planning scenarios and wargames were used. Once a planning scenario had reached the 
stage where hostilities break out, the MoD used manual and computer games, or wargames, 
                                                     
16 ‘Implications of Limited War Reserves and Limited Resupply on the Progress of a War’, para. 17, ADM 
219/729, TNA. 
17 D/D of S POL(RAF)/65, Annex A, NATO Logistics Policy General UK Logistics Assumptions, 6th August 1981, ‘NATO 
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as well as computer simulations, to assess the likely outcome of the battles. This is modified 
to some extent by an input called ‘Military Judgement’. ‘Military Judgement’ is that 
judgement expressed by experienced Military personnel regarding the demands of 
particular situations, meant to add a level of human modification to what might become an 
accounting exercise.22 Computer wargame modelling and team wargames contributed to 
the doctrine of the British Armed Forces in direct, practical ways. Weapon densities were 
tried out in wargames, with different scenarios representing different approaches to 
defeating an enemy attack.  The stocks of ammunition were assessed through these 
computer models and wargames, and the requirements for logistical backup and war 
reserves were derived from these.23 
The Defence Operational Analysis Establishment (DOAE) used several different models for 
assessing land, air and sea warfare results, and some of the models were severely limited in 
their range of scenario modelling. For example, the DOAE study on direct fire, “… disregards 
the expenditure of a proportion of CHIEFTAIN HESH rounds in suppressive and other indirect 
tasks …”24 and did not take into account attrition of vehicles by air-to-surface attack. In 
another analysis the use of disposable, one-man LAWs was not attempted, nor the use of 
chemical weapons by the WTO,25 despite chemical weapons being specifically mentioned as 
a threat.26 In a more comprehensive report analysing the ‘Future Battlefield’, there was only 
a limited representation of air defence and logistics. The morale effects of surprise were 
implemented by a simple reduction in the effectiveness factors of enemy troops, based on 
the judgement of the players.27 Fuel and repair facilities to service the warfighting units 
were almost unrepresented in the modelling. 
                                                     
22 Attoe et al., ‘Direct Fire Anti-Armour Ammunition Requirements for the 1(BR) Corps Battle’, para. 7.iii, DEFE 48/994, TNA. 
23 For example, see B James, ‘Weapon Weighting Vectors in the Battlegroup Model’, DOAE Working Paper 
(DOAE, October 1975), DEFE 48/803, TNA; ‘The Counterstroke Future Battlefield Study’, DOAE Note 663/202, 
DEFE 48/1077, TNA. 
24 ‘Ammunition Rates and Scales’, para. 52, DEFE 48/1030, TNA. 
25 Attoe et al., ‘Direct Fire Anti-Armour Ammunition Requirements for the 1(BR) Corps Battle’, para. 5, DEFE 
48/994, TNA. 
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Factors which were not taken into account in the calculation of the expenditure of tank 
ammunition were:  
“a. Overkill,  eg, simultaneous engagement of the 
same target by two or more weapons, 
or re-engagement of an AFV already 
put out of action but not outwardly 
seen as no longer posing a threat. 
b. False Targets eg, firing at incorrectly identified 
targets, such as natural features, as a 
result of battle fatigue or poor 
visibility. 
c. Suppressive Fire eg, in support of infantry actions. 
d. Prophylactic or Speculative fire eg, at possible enemy locations such 
as copses or farm buildings.”28 
These omissions meant that a large proportion of actual combat ammunition expenditure 
was not calculated. In another report, prophylactic and overkill was assessed purely by 
‘Military Judgement.’29 Armoured battles showed that tanks often required more than one 
hit to put them out of action. 30 Unless there was clear evidence that the tank had been 
disabled, troops tended to continue to fire at the target until they scored a catastrophic 
kill.31  
                                                     
28 ‘Ammunition Rates and Scales’, 10, DEFE 48/1030, TNA. 
29 Attoe et al., ‘Direct Fire Anti-Armour Ammunition Requirements for the 1(BR) Corps Battle’, para. 23, DEFE 
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The NATO usage rates for Chieftain main armament was seven rounds per gun per day.32 In 
contrast, the British Army estimated intensive rates to be equal to a, “… nominal hourly 
expenditure … per tank …” of approximately 14 rounds during a heavy defensive battle of 
the sort expected in NORTHAG.33 The Review of Ammunition Rates and Scales (RARS) 
allowed for the consumption of 52 rounds per day,34 and the WMR assessed by the DOAE 
provided 360 APDS/HESH per tank in BAOR for the eight-day battle scenario (approximately 
45 rounds per tank per day).35 The MoD usage and stock levels were estimated using a 
combination of military experience and some newly introduced computer simulation 
systems which progressively replaced manual wargames. Reserves and consumption rates 
were based on, “… historical evidence from the Korean and Second World Wars modified by 
various more recent … studies [of the Yom Kippur War] and threat reassessments.”36  
Some of the NATO war reserve stock levels had not been reviewed since the 1960s,37 and 
few attempts had been made to establish a single definition for the duration of hostilities or 
the rate of ammunition expenditure and attrition of armed forces.38 Following analyses of 
the expenditure of ammunition in the Yom Kippur War standard usage rates were 
considered out of date39 In a memo regarding the ‘State of Logistics’ the Vice-
Quartermaster-General (VQMG) discussed the, “… true state of affairs and our consequent 
lack of staying power …”40 regarding war reserve stocks and their management and 
                                                     
32 VCGS 50-3, Annex A, War Reserves Comparison Table Selected Items, June 1977, Ministry of Defence, ‘War Reserve 
Stocks’, DEFE 13/1059, TNA. 
33 ‘Ammunition Rates and Scales’, 3, DEFE 48/1030, TNA. 
34 VCGS 50-3, Annex A, War Reserves Comparison Table Selected Items, June 1977, Ministry of Defence, ‘War Reserve 
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36 D/MIN/JG/7/11, War Reserves, Army, 22nd July 1977, Ministry of Defence, ‘War Reserve Stocks’, para. 2, 
DEFE 13/1059, TNA. 
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38 D/MIN/JG/7/11, Annex A, 21st December 1977, Ministry of Defence, ‘War Reserve Stocks’, DEFE 13/1059, 
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39 D/MIN/JG/7/11, War Reserves, Air Force, 22nd July 1977, ibid., para. 3. 
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maintenance. One report published by the DOAE, intended to establish ammunition levels 
for 1(BR) Corps, concluded, “It seems inevitable that expenditure in actual battle will be at a 
higher level than in simulated trials.”41 This opinion was reflected in the findings from the 
Falklands War when the UK rates were once more re-assessed.42 The Commandos had used 
five times the Daily Ammunition Expenditure Rate (DAER) for 105mm shells and 81mm 
mortar ammunition, with the 105s running out of ammunition at one point.43 This did not 
bode well for a sustainable supply of stores in an intensive war in Europe. Given that the 
Falklands Campaign was not as intensive as a European war against the WTO was expected 
to be, that the MoD was surprised by the consumption rates would suggest that the 
estimates of ammunition usage were inconsistent with the realities of combat. 
War Reserve Levels 
Fearing the threat of war with the Soviet Union, as a priority in the 1950s, NATO required a, 
“… complete build-up of ammunition and equipment reserves …”44 along with Petrol, Oil 
and Lubricants (POL), to recommended levels. Cost cutting repeatedly hit the stockpiles, and 
occasional use of war reserves of fuel in times of national shortage meant the levels were 
never achieved.45 In 1977, when the Long Term Defence Programme (LTDP) was introduced, 
Britain’s Government was well aware that, “… Our war reserves are not closely aligned to 
NATO’s stated requirements, nor can we demonstrate fully that our holdings meet these 
requirements.”46 However, some in Government disagreed. In a memorandum to the 
Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Quinlan47 noted that Task Force 9 of the LTDP, “… 
                                                     
41 Attoe et al., ‘Direct Fire Anti-Armour Ammunition Requirements for the 1(BR) Corps Battle’, para. 48, DEFE 
48/994, TNA. 
42 Ministry of Defence, ‘The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons’, para. 311.i, Cmnd 8758. 
43 Hellberg, ‘An Experience with the Commando Logistic Regiment’, 119, in The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years 
on: Lessons for the Future, Sandhurst Conference Series. 
44 ‘Annual Review 1953: Report on the United Kingdom’, 21, C-M(53)150, Part III, United Kingdom, NATO. 
45 D/MIN/JG/7/11, War Reserves, Army, 22nd July 1977, Ministry of Defence, ‘War Reserve Stocks’, para. 1, 
DEFE 13/1059, TNA. 
46 D/MIN/JG/7/11, War Reserves, 21st December 1977, ibid., para. 4. 
47 Michael Quinlan was Deputy Under-Secretary (Policy) at the Ministry of Defence from 1977 to 1981, and Permanent 
Under-Secretary from 1988 to 1992. 
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concluded that NATO has not the logistic support required for the strategy of flexible 
response – a sweeping view which we could not accept without qualification.”48  
As part of the LTDP NATO announced intended improvements in reserves of some 
ammunition stocks thus: “Ministers … noted that, for example, the Alliance will increase by 
end-1978 holdings of anti-armour missiles by about one-third and plan similar 
improvements in stocks of other critical war reserve munitions.”49 Although an increase of 
30% of anti-armour missiles sounds considerable, MoD research suggested that the BAOR 
holdings should be increased by a factor of 8.50 There was another two-phased programme 
of short- and medium-term measures adopted at the same time as the LTDP,51 and 
accelerated in 1980 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.52  
According to national policy, stock levels would be improved even before the findings of the 
LTDP Task Forces were complete: in 1977 an example regarding Army shortfalls anticipates 
the deficiencies would gradually be made good between 1981 and 1987.53 The situation at 
that time was summed up in a memorandum to the Minister of State for Defence: 
“Among the most serious shortfalls are Army air defence and anti-tank 
missiles (Blowpipe, Rapier, Swingfire, Milan, Tow) and [RAF] air-to-air missiles 
(Sidewinder, Sparrow, MRAAM). [Based on the latest plans] stocks of 
Blowpipe by 1980 will be sufficient for less than 5 days at intensive rates and 
stocks of Rapier, only 2 days. [Similarly] 5 days’ stocks of Milan will not be 
accumulated until 1987/88 and of Swingfire until 1984/85. Heavy ammunition 
is also in short supply, for example Chieftain APDS (3 days’ stocks by 1980) 
[Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot], 155mm shells for FM70 [Artillery piece] 
                                                     
48 DUS(P) 236/78, memorandum to Secretary of State for Defence from Michael Quinlan, 17th March 1978, 
‘NATO Defence Planning Long Term Defence Programme’, para. 3–i, DEFE 13/1411, TNA. 
49 ‘Final Communiqué, Defence Planning Committee’, para. 5, NATO. 
50 ‘Ammunition Rates and Scales’, para. 32, DEFE 48/1030, TNA. 
51 Spring 1977 DPC Ministerial Meeting, Statement for the record by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, ‘NATO 
Defence Planning Long Term Defence Programme’, DEFE 13/1411, TNA. 
52 Britain and NATO, 7. 
53 D/MIN/JG/7/11, War Reserves, Army, 22nd July 1977, Ministry of Defence, ‘War Reserve Stocks’, para. 6, 
DEFE 13/1059, TNA. 
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(2½ days’ in 1980) and 51mm Mortar ammunition (3½ days by 1980).”54  
The Conservative Government had publicly and repeatedly emphasised its intention to 
remedy the low levels of ammunition and other stocks, reporting in 1979, “… the United 
Kingdom is taking positive steps towards implementation and will play a full role in those 
measures …”55 After the attempts of AD70 to improve the situation, and the ongoing LTDP, 
by 1982 there was recognition by General Rodgers (SACEUR) of, “… NATO’s shortcomings … 
in its ability to sustain its forces in combat with personnel replacements, ready reserve 
units, stockpiled ammunition and pre-positioned reserve combat equipment.”56  
Subsequently, in a 1984 pamphlet, the Eurogroup reported the United Kingdom as having, 
“… earmarked several hundred million dollars over the next few years to increase its 
stocks.”57 By the end of the 1980s the words have changed regarding war reserves, asserting 
that the, “… Army continues to invest heavily in warstocks to improve the sustainability of 
its operations; its stockholdings generally meet NATO and national requirements.”58 This 
phrase of ‘generally meeting NATO and national requirements’ was also applied to the RAF 
and Royal Navy, but directly contradicts the memoranda quoted above. Many of the 
requirements, certainly in modernised anti-tank guided weaponry, should have been 
completed by the mid-1980s at the latest.  
The Royal Navy also had shortfalls in stocks, reporting, “There are also doubts about the 
adequacy of new provisioning of some RN missiles and torpedoes, for example Sea Dart 
[surface-to-air missile], Sea Wolf [point-defence missile] and Mark 24 [Tigerfish] 
torpedoes.”59 The Royal Navy assessed the ammunition and fuel quantities required to fulfil 
its role in the following way:  
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“Each situation is developed to an ‘end point’ at which the action might 
logically be supposed to break off i.e. by enemy destruction or withdrawal or 
by our own disablement or sinking … The resultant figure therefore 
represents the number of weapons needed for a ship or aircraft to engage in 
the type of high level action postulated without running out of ammunition 
(the criterion adopted is that there should be a 90% probability that the action 
will end without the weapon stock being exhausted.)”60 
Storage and outloading had less impact on the Royal Navy, as each ship was expected to be 
able to carry a sufficient amount of stores and supplies for its intended task at sea. “In some 
cases the total Reserve is carried onboard and is part of the ship’s arsenal. In other 
replenishment stocks are held in support ships; and in other again there are further stocks 
ashore.”61 In a situation of deteriorating international relations, the Royal Navy would be at 
sea and using fuel for some time before the situation turned to conflict. This posed the 
additional problem that refuelling and rearming could be a lengthy process, and would be a 
time of vulnerability.  
Items other than weapons were crucial to the naval war expected in the Eastern Atlantic, 
and were limited in number. Submarine detection devices – sonobuoys – were required in 
large numbers.62  The purchase of 10,000 additional sonobuoys before the end of 1979 had 
been approved as part of the NATO Short Term Measures,63 although according to the Royal 
Navy, until it had more experience in, “… operating passive sonar systems it will not be clear 
whether or not we are adequately provisioned in this area.”64 
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The financial limitations were manifested as under implementation of second and third line 
war reserves.65  The exceptions to this were supposed to be POL and rations,66 but the need 
to economise actually led to a £5m cut in fuel holdings in 1980-81, despite resistance from 
the MoD.67 Vehicles themselves were the target of cost-cutting and double counting, as the 
Vice Chief of the General Staff noted in 1977: “… reserves of some vehicles are only 
maintained at the 80% level by double-earmarking armoured vehicles in the UK Training 
Organisation and B68  vehicles from stocks deployed in Northern Ireland.”69 
Because of this lack of reserve stocks, in the event of a drawn out war in which nuclear 
weapons were not used, NATO could suffer defeat through attrition alone. The war reserves 
of ammunition, fuel, equipment, vehicles and personnel would be used up within the first 
few days of a war. The concept of a longer war was discussed in NATO, but not given 
significant weight.70 This lack of sustainability reached through all the Armed Services, and 
was threatened by additional cuts to the stocks. The Vice Chairman of the Defence Staff 
wrote in 1981; 
“… BAOR does not have the capability to sustain conventional warfare for 
more than 4 days without resort to nuclear weapons. I am … dismayed to see 
that … rather than enhancing our logistic posture the Army are proposing a 
reduction in B vehicles and spares, in order to reach baseline targets. An even 
more serious prospect is that in order to reach second-line targets both the 
RN and Army would have to make swingeing cuts in stock levels of key items 
including Sidewinder missiles, the new tank gun round and rockets for the 
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new multiple launch rocket system. I cannot believe this is right.”71 
Any idea of a sustainable deterrent force in Europe was undermined by these significant 
deficiencies in ammunition stocks, logistical handling, resupply and reinforcement. The 
Chiefs of the Defence Staff wrote to the Secretary of State for Defence in the following 
terms: 
“Present (and past) policies have thus dangerously lowered the nuclear 
threshold and represent (of necessity) a return to the ‘trip-wire philosophy’ 
of the early 1960s at a time when we no longer have strategic nuclear 
supremacy and possibly not even parity.”72   
The Sterling value of the shortfall of war reserves was not insignificant. The Armed Forces 
showed nearly a £1000m deficit (in 1979 prices) in stockpile requirements in 198073 and 
following the defence review of 1981, if the finances were to be provided as planned, the 
three services would take up to a decade to rectify the shortfall.74 The projected cost alone 
of providing additional Swingfire and missile war reserves was £201M (1978 value).  
Given the financial constraints upon the UK at the time, it would be unrealistic to have tried 
to make good the entire range of deficiencies in the war reserve. The UK Government was 
recommended to concentrate on particular aspects of the war reserve, such as anti-armour 
missiles.75 The need to increase the ammunition reserves and the urgency for it was not 
always reflected in the planning process, despite the best efforts of the RARS team.76 The 
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conservative estimates for ammunition stocks to sustain usage for six days’ fighting on the 
Central Front would just have been reached by 1991. But simply increasing the stock of 
ammunition was not sufficient, given the neglect of the past decades: “… the succession of 
changes in the Defence Programme in recent years has meant that many of the weapons 
and systems are not of the preferred type. The RAF, in particular, depend to a great extent 
on older weapons.”77 According to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (Personnel and 
Logistics) (VCDS(P&L)) the RAF could only work towards reaching stockpile target levels by, 
“… making do with out-of-date weapons, many of which are an older generation.”78 The 
same Officer reported that, “… In short, our warstocks are seriously low by our own UK 
standards and they do not measure up to NATO’s current minima …”79 
War reserves were an area where economies could be achieved without an appreciable 
effect on the publicly reported capabilities of the Armed Forces. A 1977 report from the 
VCGS acknowledged that, at national consumption rates, reserves for key equipment and 
ammunition would be used up between days one and four of the projected eight-day battle.  
“As a result of an Army Board decision to effect savings … the majority of the 
Army’s war reserves are temporarily underimplemented to 80% of planned 
scales, exceptions being rations and POL, which have been maintained at 
100% level, and certain anti-tank and air defence missiles (e.g. SWINGFIRE, 
RAPIER and BLOWPIPE), the provision of which was already subject to 
financial constraints.”80  
This meant that those weapons which were needed in quantity, such as anti-tank and air 
defence, were at a level lower than 80% for purely financial reasons, rather than any 
military considerations. Rapier stocks were being built up as this was a new item, but, the 
“… policy of underimplementation has since been, and continues to be, applied to all new 
service purchases …”81 Thus, in 1978 there were only two reloads for each Rapier system on 
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the Central Front.82 LYNX TOW and Rapier stocks would be exhausted quickly, and Milan and 
SWINGFIRE ammunition – the core of anti-armour missile defences for BAOR - were far 
below the required levels.83  
Modernisation programmes, such as the LTDP and (CDI)I, introduced a significant problem 
for war reserves: as a weapon system was introduced or increased in number, so the 
reserve stock of ammunition and spare parts needed to be built up.84 This situation was 
aggravated by the policy of saving money by retiring older systems before the new systems 
were available or fully operational, 85  such as Airborne Early Warning capability on the ASW 
carriers,86 or keeping old and out-dated systems on long beyond their service life, as with 
the Mark 8 Torpedo.  
Because of production limitations and budgetary restraints, the front-line equipment and 
ammunition might be bought and introduced, but the build-up of stocks would be spread 
over several years, leaving the weapons with no true reserve in the event of war, certainly 
until many years after their initial introduction. Once the production lines closed the 
possibility of replacement equipment, or additional ammunition, was almost nil. During 
production, changes to the design or quantities were difficult to implement. The Navy’s view 
was that, “A lead time of about 3 years is required to change production plans.”87 
NATO exercises and adherence to SGN rates had the effect of hiding the real lack of 
sustainability. The Vice Chief of the Naval Staff wrote in 1977, “… There is no doubt that for 
major weapons overall our provision is barely adequate [but] against current NATO 
requirements, which are far from satisfactory, we can legitimately claim that we are 
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adequately provisioned.”88 General Julian Thompson wrote, “The logistic wonderland 
behind the façade was evident only to the professionals, and not to all of them.”89 In 
evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) on 30th April 1981, the 
Secretary of State for Defence commented that, “… in every case we have done our utmost 
to ensure that in no way do we cut back on necessary war ammunition, war fuel stocks and 
war spares.”90 The VQMG was dismissive of attempts to ‘interpret’ evidence which 
contradicted this position,91 suggesting that, “… we are failing in our duty if we do not 
ensure our political heads appreciate the full extent of our deficiencies and that … such 
information … be given to the HCDC. Needless to say, I am also sure they would not wish to 
be left on false ground.”92 
Readiness and Storage of Stocks 
At the same time that budget limits were identified as the major obstacle to successful 
implementation of policy, the Armed Forces reported that, “Ammunition readiness … 
remains one of the major obstacles to increased readiness and rapid deployment to the GDP 
positions.”93 Nevertheless, the LTDP report findings regarding ammunition readiness for the 
covering and main defence forces in Germany were effectively dismissed in wording similar 
to Michael Quinlan’s above: “The Report … tends to suggest that the situation is worse than 
it actually is. Our readiness plans are based on a compromise between the requirements of 
war, and the constraints of peacetime regulations tempered by financial constraints.”94 The 
tension between NATO demands, in the shape of Force Proposals and the LTDP, and 
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Government policy, constrained as it was by severe financial difficulties, was shown up more 
clearly in the logistical setting than almost anywhere else. 
In addition to the need for transport for the stocks, there was also the need for adequate 
storage. The cost of storage for the reserve stock increases the overall price of any proposed 
weapon system, changing the budget from a simple one-off purchase to a long-term 
expenditure. The Private Secretary for the Minister of Defence was moved to justify the 
parlous state the reserves had got into by saying; 
“While the policy underlying attrition rates is obviously crucial, it makes little 
sense to come up with a theoretical war reserves holding which we cannot 
afford, for which we have no storage facilities and which we could not deploy 
sufficiently quickly after hostilities break out.”95  
Rather than rectifying these drawbacks, the justification was to reduce war stocks as a cost 
saving measure because they would never be used.  
There were significant deficiencies not just in ammunition stocks but also logistical handling 
equipment and the transport chain. In the late 1970s and early 1980s it was evident that the 
personnel numbers, equipment and transport available to load and move the ammunition 
reserve was inadequate for the task.96 New ammunition for new weapons cause storage 
problems in their own right, with the rounds for FH70 and SP70 guns being three times 
heavier, and twice the volume, of the weapons being replaced.97  “The problems of 
peacetime storage, outloading of depots during a time of reduced warning, and daily 
resupply are manifold. (Existing war reserve stocks of ammunition weigh over 100,000 tons; 
a 155mm shell weighs 96lbs [43.5Kg]).”98 The unspectacular side of defence planning 
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emerged in the need for, “… 1000 additional 8 tonne trucks and 1200 trailers …”99 Without 
these and their drivers, the ammunition and supplies would not be delivered to the forward 
units. The lorries then available did not have the necessary capabilities for the required 
readiness levels of the 1980s. During the preparation to send 3 Commando to the Falklands, 
the need for additional lorries and reserve and civilian drivers shows how vital these were. 
The LTDP required the Armed Forces to buy additional Lorries and outloading equipment for 
ammunition and POL handling. The additional Forklift Trucks100, lorries and trailers, as well 
as 3,000 extra troops, were required to meet the transport needs for an 8 day resupply.101  
An additional 1,500 support vehicles with a self-lift capability were to be added by 1988. 
Most of these would be 2nd and 3rd line vehicles, with only a small proportion allocated to 
the 1st line, or unit, level.102 Logistic handling systems such as DROPS (Demountable Rack 
Offload System) and MMLC (Medium Mobility Load Carrier) were developed for the 
expected combat levels in Germany.103 By 1989, 827 14-Tonne load carriers and 3,006 8-
Tonne load carries of this type had been brought into service.104 The rail flatbed cars initially 
bought by the British Government to work with DROPS were not ISO compatible and were 
eventually replaced. The MMLC and DROPS system was implemented after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, but in time for the 1991 Gulf War.  
The NATO Defence Planning Programme called for the need to increase holdings of 
mechanical handling equipment and accelerate the Forward Storage Site Programme.105  
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Deciding on the location of main ammunition storage was an operational level problem. The 
location of main ammunition storage – East or West of the Rhine – was important for two 
reasons. Firstly, the stores needed to be where they could be quickly outloaded to the 
necessary units. Secondly, they needed to be far enough back so that they would not be 
easily overrun by the advancing WTO troops. These demands placed on storage locations 
seemed to be mutually exclusive, and indeed the final locations were not ideal in terms of 
proximity to the land forces. Locations towards the IGB, East of major river lines such as the 
Weser, caused problems for planners because in some scenarios the advancing WTO troops 
would be at the Weser within 30 hours, negating the utility of having forward located supply 
dumps.106 
Despite efforts to improve the WMR and ammunition handling and transport problem, the 
situation would not improve quickly. The planning process had begun in 1971, and as part of 
the NATO Infrastructure projects, storage and handling depots were planned for BAOR 
throughout the 1980s.107 It was estimated that there would be sufficient ammunition 
storage space by 1986 for only 4½ days intensive fighting, even though the new Forward 
Storage Sites were expected to be completed by 1987.108  
Unit ammunition was stored within 20km of a unit’s barracks,109 but this would be ready-
use ammunition only. The single most difficult problem in providing sufficient storage for 
reserve stocks of ammunition and POL far enough forward was the FRG Government.  It was 
a, “… difficult and protracted business …”110 to obtain the land, hence assuming command 
of existing storage sites was preferred. For example, facilities at Wohle were to be taken 
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over from the FRG as a forward storage site for the BAOR reconnaissance force, but was 
only some 25-30km from the IGB, and thus directly threatened by even a small advance by 
WTO forces.  Uploading of ready-use ammunition provided another problem – vehicles 
could not be left ‘bombed-up’ and available for use because of the UN Agreement on 
Ammunition Storage, the FRG Environmental Laws and UK storage regulations. Most British 
forces were stationed in populated areas, and vehicles carrying ammunition would be 
vulnerable.111 As the MoD insisted that all the units could be uploaded in eleven hours, 
keeping vehicles ‘bombed-up’ was deemed unnecessary. However, this eleven-hour figure is 
based on full mobilisation of all units, provided only after the reservists are mobilised and 
moved to West Germany. 
Reservists 
Britain had made use of part-time soldiers for much of its history, from the Trained Bands of 
the Civil War,112 through to the Fencibles of the French Revolutionary era. It was in the 
Napoleonic Wars that the part-time soldiers became an active recruiting ground for the 
regulars, and provided manpower to free the regulars to serve abroad whilst keeping the 
home base defended. Yeomanry, Fencibles and Militias fed partially trained volunteers into 
the regular army, or at least that was the concept. In many ways, these organisations 
recruited men who would otherwise have been available to the Army for service 
overseas.113  
To prepare the British Army for larger scale modern war, the Haldane Reforms before the 
First World War had completed modifications to the Army that had started after the 
Crimean War, and had accelerated following the Second Boer War.114 The expansion and 
restructuring of the Reservists essentially bridged the gap between the regular troops being 
deployed at the beginning of a war and the mobilisation of conscript forces, as well as 
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providing for the defence of the home islands to free up the regular troops for service 
abroad. In 1914 the reservists filled the gap between the deployment of the Expeditionary 
Force to France and the deployment of Kitchener’s army in 1916.115 They did this by serving 
in the front line, as well as deploying to garrisons to free up the regular troops there. 
Between the two wars the Armed Forces shrank, to be expanded greatly from 1939 with the 
re-introduction of conscription. Conscription, and a large ‘citizen’ army, was brought to an 
end by Duncan Sandys, then Minister of Defence, in 1957. The Sandys reforms had 
emphasised a move to all-regular armed forces,116 but deficiencies in the numbers of front-
line forces caused by cost-cutting were progressively made up by a reliance on reservist 
forces.  
The political imperatives for using reserves were clear: it saved money as the reserves were 
not permanently employed in the same way that regulars were; the numbers looked good 
when presented for public consumption; politicians could say they were saving money but 
keeping the armed forces efficient and effective; and with a shortage regular personnel, the 
reservists were even more valuable.117 Fighting capability is a function of proficiency and 
availability amongst other factors,118 and reservists will not be as proficient in their roles as 
regular service personnel, as they train for only a small portion of their time, and do not live 
the military life. The capabilities of the regular forces were maintained by constant training 
and unbroken exposure to the military system. However capable and committed the 
volunteer reserves were, or indeed the regular reserves, they would not be as well trained 
and as capable as the regular units, and to expect anything else would be to put improper 
expectations upon them. The Government had long seen reservists as a cost-effective 
option in peacetime, but understood that training would be required to bring them up to 
the necessary levels of proficiency.119 The reservists were promoted by the Government as 
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being on a par with their regular counterparts: “Since many of [their] tasks would put 
Reservists in the front line alongside Regular Servicemen, they have to be just as efficient 
and professional.”120 Their availability was limited, as they would need to be mobilised by 
Queen’s Order or Cabinet authorisation. They would then take several days more to become 
deployable. The point made above is significant to this thesis, that the reserves are cost-
effective in peacetime, but far less so in a crisis which develops quickly, or provides little 
warning time for mobilisation.  
The military perspective of using reservists was different, unsurprisingly, to that of the 
politicians. Their view was, “…the reserves are to be available for call up at time of grave 
national peril, NOT to be used as a top-up for a hollowed-out force in operations other than 
war.”121 Given time for training, the reservists could be expected to provide mass, and to 
perform well, but only when time allowed. There are examples of reserve and territorial 
units performing as well as regular ones, but only after several years of training.122 The 
military saw the necessity of having a trained reserve of personnel, but viewed its 
development and deployment differently to the politicians. The Army regarded the TAVR as 
vital to make up the numbers deployed into Europe: “[The TAVR] cannot be regarded as a 
reserve … which might turn up or might not, for the number of regular battalions allotted to 
the BAOR divisions is not sufficient to free TAVR battalions … from a specific role in the 
Divisional deployment.”123 It was not just Britain that relied more and more on reservists: 
for example, by 1985, to provide greater resources for the front line units the West German 
Army had cut its supporting forces in favour of reservists.124 
The reservist could be a convenient way to bolster numbers without spending a large 
amount of money. In the 1983 SDE another reorganisation of BAOR provided three 
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armoured divisions and a new infantry division which was to be based entirely in the UK.125 
The Second Infantry Division HQ was based in York and comprised three Brigades, two of 
which were largely reservist in composition (15th and 49th). It is instructive to inspect the 
make-up of particular brigade and divisional level units which were established, and which 
display the formation’s dependence on reserve troops. 15th Brigade comprised six infantry 
battalions three of which were reservist, and three batteries of artillery, all of which were 
reservists. 49th Brigade comprised six battalions, four of which were reservists, and three 
batteries of artillery, all of which were reservists.126 
The use of large numbers of reservists had an impact on the availability of these formations 
in a crisis. NATO ACE Force Standards for readiness and the UK measurement were 
different, sometimes deliberately so. The MoD defended their position, noting that NATO 
standards were aimed more at conscript armies, not volunteer forces.127 For an Armoured 
Division for example, ACE required 90% manning levels for the regular units. Because the UK 
forces were mixed regular/TAVR, the overall Divisional manning level would be 74%, and so 
would not reach the required standard. Some units earmarked for the reinforcement of 
BAOR were at a lower category of readiness than required by NATO because they were 
either made up almost entirely of reservists, or were only cadre strength and would be filled 
by reservists after mobilisation.128 The LTDP had tried to address this problem by requesting 
that Britain comply with the minimum manning levels. The suggestion was accepted ‘in 
principle’, but was effectively ignored. As it addressed, “… unit, as opposed to formation, 
manning levels …”129 the British Government considered that the inconsistencies would 
continue.  
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In addition, reservist units were armed with old or obsolete weapons, and transported in 
soft-skinned vehicles. The LTDP specifically moved to reverse this trend, and Task Force 3 – 
Reserve Mobilisation, prioritised the replacement of obsolete equipment for reserve units 
by modern equipment. The MoD partially implemented this, with TA infantry battalions 
receiving Milan and LAW 80 from 1982 onwards, 130  and the SA80131 after its introduction to 
the regular forces. Old 5.5” artillery pieces were to be replaced with the 105mm Light Gun, 
and Clansman radios were to be issued. The Blowpipe Quadruple Towed Launcher was to be 
issued to the TA Air Defence units, but this was cancelled for financial reasons.132 The 
provision to TA battalions of Milan (6 launchers) and LAW80 was not in the numbers issued 
to regular infantry battalions (which was 24 Milan launchers by 1983).133 Despite this, the 
Government proclaimed that, “The equipping of TA units to the standard of Regular units is 
progressing well.”134  
Logistics 
Regular RAF and Army were permanently deployed as front line units in Germany, with 
reservists filling out some of those front-line units as well as taking up the rear-area 
defence. As well as filling combat roles, reservists provided up to 80% of the logistic 
personnel in the British Army during the late 1970s and 1980s.135  The limitations on 
recruitment of regular personnel for logistical and rear-area units, along with the policy of 
cutting the ‘tail’ to provide for the ‘teeth’, meant that although the regular combat forces - 
the ‘teeth’ - could be deployed quickly, they would very soon find themselves without 
adequate re-supply or reinforcement. Realistically, in anything other than a slow moving 
crisis, the front line units would only have their ready reserve ammunition and stores 
available, as the logistical chain would not be staffed with enough personnel to enable 
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stores to be moved forward or distributed. This in turn would have presented a problem 
regarding the timing of the mobilisation of reserves – if the Government was reluctant to 
mobilise for fear of provocation, as with the Cuban Missile Crisis,136 but which turned 
quickly to combat, the reservists who undertook crucial roles in the rear areas would not be 
mobilised in time to arrive at their designated location.  
Timings for mobilisation and deployment of NATO forces had been queried following a 1978 
JIC assessment on warning time which indicated, “… that we may have as little as 48 hours 
warning of a [WTO]  attack.”137 The expectation was that regular units would fulfil the ACE 
Forces Standard time for reaching their defensive positions, which was 24 hours for covering 
forces and 48 hours for main forces.138 Thus, they would be in position as a WTO attack 
began. Concern was raised regarding the deployment of mobile forces, that the first 
deployment of Advance and Key parties could only be expected at Mobilisation plus two 
(M+2) days, with the main force arriving at M+6139 meaning they would be transported and 
deployed during the first few days of hostilities. Further unease was that, “… political 
pressures could delay the despatch … by SACEUR, or events could move so fast that [they] 
would not be deployed as such at all.”140  
Once the troops were ordered to move the act of transporting them, even in peacetime, 
was the source of logistic problems which would be exacerbated if hostilities had already 
begun. This was demonstrated by concerns raised by the MoD over sufficient transport for 
exercises in 1978: 
“Increased NATO exercises for … and their heavy requirements for movement 
resources are affecting other exercise programmes. An example is ADVANCE 
EXPRESS which, when taken with BOLD GUARD, may prevent movement of 5 
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and 7 Field Forces to BAOR this year because there will be no spare airlift.”141  
The pressure upon transport in a crisis prompted MoD representatives to write that the 
reinforcement of BAOR under SACEUR’s Rapid Reinforcement Plan, “… will impose 
considerable demands on movements [sic] resources possibly in competition with other 
forces …”142 The number of regular specialist personnel available had fallen due to defence 
cuts, which meant there were not enough transport drivers for the vehicles in any of the 
services. A warning note was sounded regarding logistic support, the Rapid Reinforcement 
Plan (RRP) and mobilisation:  
“At present the high percentage of TA in the LSG [Logistic Support Group] and 
the fact that the force cannot be maintained for more than 72 hours without 
the LSG, preclude deployment before the signing of QO2.”143  
Overall the MoD had warned in 1977 that, “There are serious logistic implications in terms 
of storage, transport and manpower both in peace and war.”144 The fighting units, whatever 
services they belonged to, depended on a logistical tail for supplies of fuel and ammunition 
and other essentials. The drawback of having so many reservists as support troops was 
summed up in a memo by the Assistant Chief of the Defence staff in 1978: 
“A particular problem is that calculated undermanning of logistic units in 
order to maintain the strength of combat units is near the point where the 
combat troops may not be effective because of lack of initial logistic support. 
In many specialist areas, units are severely undermanned in junior officer and 
key noncommissioned officer ranks. Among the formations which depend on 
substantial reserve augmentation, headquarters manning tends to fall below 
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the level required for effective transition to war.”145  
Personnel – Recruitment and Retention 
Retention of experienced personnel within the Armed Forces was a perennial problem, as 
Forces pay was poor in comparison to the private sector. Numbers were stabilised by 
improving pay rates146 and conditions of service, which led Francis Pym, the Secretary of 
State for Defence in 1979 to write, “… the signs are now pointing to an improvement in 
recruitment and retention, although the loss of highly trained and experienced men cannot 
readily be made good.”147 Increased pay, and a squeeze on defence spending meant, 
perversely, some personnel would have to be made redundant. The cuts were to be made, if 
possible, in the ‘tail’, as demonstrated when, in July 1981, Sir Frank Cooper, Permanent 
Under Secretary at the MoD, wrote, “… Service redundancy is to be kept to a minimum. This 
does not mean you should hold back on measures in the support area …”148 
The skilled and experienced personnel required were under-represented in regular units. 
During the 1980s the recruitment reservoir, men and women aged between 16 and 19, 
shrank. Because of this, some infantry battalions were as much as 10% under strength, and 
the peacetime establishment of the armoured battalions understrength enough to have to 
put some tanks in ‘light preservation’.149 As measured in 1981, the pool of trained personnel 
was short by 4,000 in the Navy, 4,000 in the RAF and 10,000 in the Army.150 In BAOR 
particularly, some regular infantry battalions had one entire company reduced to cadre 
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strength, to be filled upon mobilisation by reservists.151 In response to a letter from SACEUR 
regarding forces in the Central Region which did not meet ACE force manning standards, the 
MoD replied, “1(BR) Corps units are below strength. On the basis of current forecasts this 
will be the case until 1983/84.”152 
In an attempt to overcome the shortfall of regular troops, the TA was planned to expand to 
86,000 by the end of the decade, but by 1984 only numbered 64,900153 having declined 
from 72,000 in 1983.154 The Auxiliary forces of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force were also 
to be expanded155 but suffered the same shortfall in numbers. Several Royal Navy ships 
were transferred to the standby squadron because of shortages of certain skilled ratings and 
junior officers which left them inadequately crewed. (see Appendix C, Figure 11 - Royal Navy 
comparison of regular, reservist and auxiliary forces 1975 - 1991) 
To relieve the pressure on the Regular troops, and in the hope of filling the shortfall in the 
TA, the Home Service Force (HSF) was raised in 1982, and was mainly based with TA units.156 
The HSF was intended to assist regular and TA units in guarding important military and 
civilian installations during a war.157  By 1989 the Government expected that, “… 29,000 TA 
soldiers (including the Home Service Force) and some 45,000 ex-regulars would have home 
defence roles, guarding installations, undertaking reconnaissance and providing 
communications.”158 However, by mid-decade the HSF had only raised 3,000 troops159 of the 
anticipated 4,500.160  
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The need for a large pool of trained personnel was indicated by the MoD’s estimate of 
losses:  
“For the Army, attrition rates of main equipments and manpower are 
calculated assuming that 50% of the reinforced No 1 (BR) Corps (110,000 
men) must be in existence on the eighth day. The RAF assumes that 70% of 
its front line aircraft will be available throughout the 6-day period … The Royal 
Navy does not assess its war reserves in the same manner …”161  
Army attrition rates were expected to be 6.25% per day.162 But numbers of regular 
personnel dwindled continually over the decade of the 1980s. (See Appendix C, Figure 9 - 
Army comparison of regular, reservist and auxiliary forces, including BAOR, 1975 - 1991) The 
MoD expressed the fear that, “The reduction from 38 Regular and TA battalions available … 
to 35, probably by 1 Apr 83, further accentuates the difficulties of meeting likely 
commitments, as there are already more tasks than the Army … is able to undertake.”163  
Mobilisation 
Readiness of reinforcements presented a consistent shortfall against NATO expectations. 
Since so many of the reinforcements for BAOR were reservists, the problem was acutely felt 
by the Army. The LTDP had required that reserves were to be recategorised as C1 (2 day 
readiness) or C2 (3-4 days) as opposed to the existing C3 (5-15 days) which would enable 
faster reinforcement.164 The MoD’s response was that 30% of reservists would report on day 
one, 50% on day two and 15% on day three, which removed the need for 
recategorisation.165 Not to be deterred, the 1979-84 NATO Force Proposals included a serial 
which requested that reserve units earmarked for reinforcement of BAOR were replaced 
with regular units. This was an unpopular request, and the comment for this proposal reads, 
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“Accepted in principle. There are currently no firm plans to implement this measure in the 
Force Proposal period …”166 SACEUR introduced the Rapid Reinforcement Plan (RRP) in 1981 
to speed up deployment of forces into the NATO Central Region. Part of the problem with 
the UK contribution was the scale of reservist mobilisation demanded by the RRP.167 The 
Individual Reinforcement Plan (IRP) was also introduced in 1981 by the UK Government with 
the intention of halving the time needed to mobilise the reservists.168 However, the use of 
individual reservists may have had a deleterious effect on unit cohesion due to lack of unit 
training.  The Army conducted research into preparation for Operation Granby in 1991 and 
found, “… that few commanders deploying to the Gulf [in 1991] considered their units to be 
battle ready, including those at the peak of their training cycle, not least because 
reinforcements had to be absorbed and trained …”169 In a shooting war in Europe, there 
would not have been time to undergo the intensive training that was available to the troops 
in the Gulf. 
The 7th Field Force, which was the direct reinforcement for BAOR, consisted of regular and 
TA units. Had it needed to take the field quickly, before mobilisation had completed, 7th 
Field Force would have been approximately 30% below its expected field strength.170 6th 
Field Force was the land element of UK Mobile Force, consisting of 13,500 troops, and was 
the strategic reserve for SACEUR and would have been deployed into Denmark (Baltic 
Approaches, or BALTAP) as its primary destination.171 Emergency reinforcement was the 
responsibility of UKMF, but even after the post-Falklands reforms were implemented, the 
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role and resources of this force were being questioned: “Some of its tasks are beyond its 
capabilities … more realistic employment options should be renegotiated …”172 
Sudden deployment in a crisis would have entailed substantial difficulty, as most of the units 
within the Logistic Support Group (LSG), 6th Field Force’s logistic support, were at cadre 
strength, and would be filled out by TA reinforcements and individual regular ‘Shadow 
Postings’ (See Appendix H, Logistic Support Group Order Of Battle). Only then would they be 
operational. In a note to the Director of Military Operations the warning was made clear: 
“The effect of this situation is that the Regular element of the LSG cannot support the 
Regular combat element of the 6th Field Force prior to call out of the Reserves.”173 This 
meant that a regular force, equivalent to an infantry brigade, would be incapable of 
supporting itself in a sudden crisis if it were called upon to fight. The same note continues, 
“To deploy the Regular element of the 6th Field Force before Callout or at least before a 
guarantee that Callout will take place, would therefore, involve considerable risk.”174 This 
critical situation did not improve throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. As the ‘teeth’ to 
‘tail’ ratio was increased for greater ‘efficiency’, the threat to the operational capability of 
the Armed Forces intensified.  
Nor was the problem of readiness and availability limited to the Army. The Royal Navy kept 
a squadron permanently available for action in the Eastern Atlantic but suffered from 
double tasking of some ships. An example is the UK group deployed in the North Sea from 
mobilisation would lose five of its six ships to provide escort to the 2nd UK carrier group out 
of the Clyde on M + 10.175 Ships would also be needed to escort the UKMF and UK/NL 
Amphibious forces deployment in Europe.176 The Director of Naval Operations felt, “… 
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unable to say that the service would be fully ready to meet its commitments after the likely 
warning time …”177 due to shortages in many major weapon systems, key personnel and lack 
of training. 
Training 
Military training aims to rehearse the practical use of military doctrine to ensure success in 
its real application.178 Training works at the individual, team, collective, operational 
grouping and command levels. If these are not practised during peacetime it will be too late 
when war occurs. General Wavell wrote in 1933, “… so far as training is concerned I hold 
that it is a positive advantage to have to train simply ‘for war’ and that to train ‘for a war’ is 
a danger because that particular war never happens ...”179 It is axiomatic that a reservist 
who serves a limited number of days per year will be less well trained in any given period of 
time than a regular, a fact accepted in 1981 by the Directors of Defence Policy:  
“The TA’s lack of expertise, stemming from their limited training and the fact that 
few have regular Army experience, must cast doubts on their ability to cope 
effectively with the Regular Army tasks that will eventually be transferred to them. 
As a result the overall war fighting capability of 1(BR) Corps will be reduced and this 
will lessen its deterrent value.”180 
Training was a soft target for financial savings. For example, in 1980 to find an initial £100 
Million savings cuts were made in,  
“… collective Army training in the UK and Germany between 35 and 45%; TA 
training by 25% and certain other forms of Army training by up to 30%.”181  
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RAF training and flying time had been reduced for financial reasons leading to a serious 
shortage of pilots for fast jet flying.182 RAF recruitment in 1977/8 was only 68% of that 
required, with the number of trained pilots 13% below target. Because of these economic 
restrictions, the RAF did not expect to have the required number of pilots until the end of 
the 1980s.183  
Standards of training in the Army were cause for concern, with the gunnery standards of 
tank units and artillery regiments lower than was acceptable. Engineers were also suffering 
from a lack of coherent training.184 This was caused partly by the demands of non-NATO 
postings such as Northern Ireland, by administrative functions and course attendance by 
only parts of units under training.185 The specialists such as artillery gunners and tank crews 
were posted to Northern Ireland as infantry, which led to a deficiency in standards of 
training for the NATO roles. According to the 1979 SDE, the plan to increase the, “… size of 
the Army by 6,000 … will improve standards of training and readiness, particularly in BAOR 
…”186 This recruitment target brought its own problems: 6,000 additional troops would take 
a significant amount of time to recruit and train, leading to a drop in readiness in the short 
to medium term. Long term cost-cutting and inflation had left the British Armed Forces in a 
state of neglect which would prove extremely difficult to correct. 
Conclusion 
There was a NATO-wide failure to obtain universally agreed stock levels and force 
requirements. This lead to the British Government having to deal with fundamental 
discrepancies between the MoD and NATO over the War Maintenance Reserve levels. There 
were disagreements regarding readiness levels and mobilisation of reservists, and their 
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speed of deployment. Whilst publicly declaring conformity with NATO requirements for 
stocks and reservists, the British Government was secretly very clear about the deficiencies. 
The armed forces relied to an increasing extent on reservists to fill out the fighting units as 
well as the rear area and logistic units. The levels of the War Maintenance Reserve (WMR) 
and logistic support were consistently below that required for any sustained combat. These 
two ‘reserve’ elements featured in almost all Task Forces of the Long Term Defence Plan, as 
well as the Conventional Defence Improvement Initiative (CDI(I)) (See NATO Strategy and 
Policy above).187  
Michael Quinlan’s reluctance to accept the LTDP findings regarding the failure of NATO’s 
logistics to support the strategy of flexible response demonstrated a position frequently 
adopted by the British Government. It did not reflect the deep concern shown by some 
politicians such as Dr David Owen, and those serving officers who repeatedly warned the 
Government of the shortcomings of the mobilisation, stocks and supply capabilities of the 
British Armed Forces. 
The Chiefs of the Defence Staff were aware of the deficiencies, and in 1981 warned, 
“Decisions taken now to restore stock levels could, for financial, industrial and technological 
reasons, still take some ten years or more before they have been fully implemented. In the 
meantime the nuclear threshold will not be far removed from MC14/2.”188 This meant that, 
despite NATO adjusting its strategy in 1967 with the full support of the member states, 
Britain would not be in a position to fulfil the commitment made in the late 1960s until the 
early 1990s, if all went as planned. John Nott189 wrote, “You must never let the ordinary 
naval rating or soldier down by skimping on his ammunition, his kit, his training and his food 
…”190 However, these were the areas which were most prone to financial cuts. 
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The Aims 
Given the definition of Britain’s contribution and an analysis of the planning and the 
assessment of the outturn of British defence, is it possible to determine that the 
contribution was credible in terms of the demands placed on it by NATO and the British 
Government itself? If the strategy was to be credible, it needed an adequate conventional 
capability with the capacity to supply it in war. MC14/3, “… requires sufficient ground, sea 
and air forces in a high state of readiness, committed to NATO for prompt, integrated action 
…”1 Were Britain’s forces credible, not only to the WTO, but to NATO, and indeed to the 
country itself? The concern was very real, from both the political and military 
establishments, that NATO was not offering a credible show of force, and that the political 
will to improve credibility was lacking.2 Deterrence requires the threat of force to be 
credible and that the will must exist to employ and sustain it.3  
The implementation of British defence policy must therefore be viewed through the lens of 
Flexible Response. It is crucial to understand the link between policy and its implementation 
to fully understand how, and if, the Government was committed to the principle of 
collective defence and raising the nuclear threshold. Whilst at other times in history defence 
policy has been educated guesswork, during the later Cold War NATO members had one 
strategy and were faced with one opponent in the WTO. Although this apparent stability did 
not enable policy makers to see the future, it did provide a relatively secure framework from 
which to start.4 A commitment to raise the nuclear threshold meant Britain must be ready 
to mobilise its Armed Forces and fight a war which could remain conventional. Politically 
this provided the Government with a positive public face to put on defence spending. The 
Government was in a position to know, in reasonable detail, what the military needs were. 
Militarily, it meant providing the Armed Services with the means to fight a conventional war 
in Northern Europe and the Eastern Atlantic for an unspecified period.  
                                                     
1 ‘A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the 
Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area’, para. 19, MC 14/3, NATO. 
2 Facer, ‘Conventional Forces and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response’, v, R-3209-FF. 
3 Ministry of Defence, Design for Military Operations, 9, D/CGS/50/8. 
4 Historical Context, (2) Patterns for Anticipation, Gray, Strategy and Defence Planning, chap. 4, First edition. 
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A JIC assessment in the late 1970s warned the British Government that unless the Alliance 
increased its conventional capability, deterrence would not remain credible either to the 
WTO or to NATO itself.5 The British Government insisted that it was committed to 
conventional deterrence, and that “The danger in allowing the conventional imbalance to 
grow unchecked is that it would lower the nuclear threshold and therefore make the 
deterrent strategy less credible.”6 
There was concern expressed by NATO members over the weakening of forces committed 
by Britain to NATO and whether they remained credible.7  The 1975 Defence Review spoke 
in the most general terms about keeping, “… in close contact with [our Allies] about 
outstanding issues and the detailed implementation of our plans …”8 but did not actually 
address, directly, the concerns of the other NATO members. In 1976 the Secretary General 
of NATO, Dr Joseph Luns,9 summoned the UK representative and gave him what can only be 
described as a reprimand. The UK Government was reminded of its obligation to notify 
NATO before making any cuts to defence spending, as, “… [Her Majesty’s Government] had 
up until now asserted that cuts made were not having a quantitative or qualitative effect on 
our NATO contribution, but it was no longer possible for the Alliance to take the British 
Government’s word for this.”10 Cuts continued to be made as part of the defence 
programme, but they were concealed from immediate Alliance scrutiny. In 1980 Michael 
Quinlan wrote to the Cabinet Office that the changes to Britain’s NATO commitment were,  
“… very substantial … I have kept to a minimum those which will show up as 
cutbacks to previously-declared plans to NATO, and in my judgement their 
scale falls short, (though only just) of the level requiring special report to … 
                                                     
5 MO 15/3, Annex, Memorandum to the Prime Minister from the Secretary of State for Defence, 23rd March 1977, ‘JIC 
Assessment of Soviet Threat’, para. 25, PREM 16/2259, TNA. 
6 Britain and NATO, 7. 
7 Ministry of Defence, ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975’, para. 14, Cmnd 5976. 
8 Ibid., para. 15. 
9 Dr Joseph Luns was Secretary General of NATO from 1971 to 1984. 
10 Telegram from Sir John Killick (UKDELNATO) to FCO, 14th December 1976, ‘Review of Defence Policies and Defence 
Expenditure’, n.d., PREM 16/1186, TNA. 
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the Alliance …”11 
This approach was further demonstrated in a message from the Defence Department to the 
UK delegation in NATO: 
“… many of the economies will be achieved by delaying or abandoning 
programmes not yet underway, it will be possible to avoid an impact on our 
allies … [but] some of the changes will, of course, become apparent to our 
allies in the normal course of NATO’s defence planning process.”12 
General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) questioned NATO’s 
overall credibility at the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) meeting in 1980,13 despite 
which the UK Defence Review of 1981 made further quantitative cuts to the British 
contribution to NATO in addition to the earlier qualitative cuts.14 UK attendees at the 
December 1981 DPC ministerial meeting in Brussels had the objectives of reaffirming 
Britain’s commitment to NATO, ensuring recognition of the contribution Britain made even 
under financial limits, and  discouraging complaints.15  In 1982, General Rogers indicated 
that, “… nations have fallen quite short of their fulfilment and cannot realize them at 
current levels of effort.”16 He wrote further, that, 
“… Alliance capabilities today are clearly inadequate to meet the growing 
Warsaw Pact conventional threat. Instead of possessing the variety of 
capabilities which would truly translate into flexibility in response, NATO is 
left in a posture that in reality can only support a strategy more accurately 
labeled [sic] a ‘delayed tripwire.’ The amount of delay following a 
conventional Warsaw Pact attack before the tripwire would be activated and 
NATO would face resorting to the nuclear option would depend on such 
                                                     
11 DUS(P) 336/80, The Defence Programme, Memorandum From Michael Quinlan to R M Hastie-Smith, Cabinet Office, 27th 
June 1980, ‘UK Future Defence Planning’, para. 21, FCO 46/2171, TNA. 
12 DPN060/1(69), Memorandum to UKDEL NATO from D Gillmore, 18th July 1980, ibid., para. 7. 
13 DPC Ministerial Meeting, 8th and 9th December 1981, Essential Facts, ‘NATO: Defence Planning Committee (DPC)’, 1981, 
para. 1, FCO 46/2630, TNA. 
14 The Way Ahead, Draft, ‘Defence Expenditure 1979-81’, para. 5, PREM 19/416, TNA. 
15 D/DS12/20/1/36, Steering Brief from N Beaumont, Head of DS12, 1st December 1981, ‘NATO: Defence Planning 
Committee (DPC)’, para. 3, FCO 46/2630, TNA. 
16 Rogers, ‘The Atlantic Alliance: Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade’, 1151, Foreign Affairs. 
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variables as length of warning time and the timeliness and appropriateness of 
decisions taken by political authorities.”17  
As well as having credible fighting forces, the ability of those forces to be deployed quickly 
and operate well add to their effectiveness as a deterrent. Their composition, sustainability 
and doctrine all contributed to that effect. If those attributes were missing or flawed, their 
deterrent value would be diminished. Given the comments from both sides of the Atlantic, 
can the forces committed and provided by the British Government be described as 
adequate, and were they capable of completing their tasks?  
There is also a comparison of qualitative and quantitative dimensions. In some cases, 
quantitative measurement is essential, such as the calculation of the War Maintenance 
Reserve. In others, qualitative measurement is primary, as the technological development of 
‘smart’ weapons increases their lethality. However, the ways and means for achieving the 
aims of strategy are not always strictly military, and they are not always tanks, guns and 
ammunition. Training is vitally necessary for the effective operation of sophisticated 
weapon systems. There would be a lack credibility because of poor levels of training caused 
by cost-cutting: reservists and territorials will never be as well trained, or as up-to-date with 
the latest equipment. The reservists made for good publicity, for who could criticise a 
government that pledged to reduce wastage and inefficiency, and increase the capabilities 
of the fighting troops?  
Additionally, the civilian infrastructure, transport and facilities which would have been 
employed in a crisis or war must be sufficient to fulfil the strategic and operational 
requirement placed upon them. For example, if there were insufficient military lorries to 
move supplies, could the deficiency be overcome by commandeering civilian transport? 
These factors would have an enormous influence on the ability to implement a chosen 
doctrine and particular operational plans.  
                                                     
17 Ibid., 1152. 
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Credible Ways and Means? 
If the physical component – the means to fight – is lacking in any way, the other parts of a 
doctrine assume an academic quality.18  Soldiers, sailors and aircrew, along with those 
support personnel working in the rear, will fail through no fault or deficiency in their 
courage or abilities. Brigadier Richard Simpkin wrote, “… BAOR will be faced with a 
compromise between fighting the battle it believes it can win and one which will retain the 
essential minimum of coherence with its Allies.”19  
The British Government had the full conventional implications of the adoption of MC 14/3 
clearly laid out in a report written for the MoD by the Chiefs of Staff Committee: “The 
concept [of Flexible Response] creates a requirement for conventional forces, by land, sea 
and air, of considerable size.”20 The Chiefs of Staff report recognised that for Britain’s 
political and military standing within Europe, a significant contribution was required. The 
contribution to NATO’s conventional deterrence did not grow to a ‘considerable size’, 
despite cuts to the Out of Area (OOA) commitment, and efficiency drives in the structure of 
the Armed Forces. 
In an attempt to reduce costs whilst trying to keep the fighting capability of the forces up to 
the desired standard the Government undertook repeated reorganisations of the Armed 
Forces. The reorganisations of the British Armed Forces in the 1970s and 1980s affected 
their establishment and organisation, but did little to alter the basic defence policy, and in 
the words of Denis Healey, “… the services were sick and tired of continual 
reorganisations.”21 The repeated reorganisations of 1(BR) Corps had a deleterious effect on 
the stationing and movement of some reserve stocks, including armoured personnel carriers 
and radios.22 In the late 1970s the brigade structure of some BAOR units was changed, with 
                                                     
18 Ministry of Defence, Design for Military Operations, 35–36, D/CGS/50/8. 
19 Richard Simpkin, ‘Hammer, Anvil and Net - a Re-Examination of Conventional Defence of the Nato Centre’, BAR, no. 72 
(December 1982): 15. 
20 COS 43/68 Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Revision of NATO Strategy’, para. 114, DEFE 13/635, TNA. 
21 Healey, The Time of My Life, 261. 
22 VCGS 50-3, 10th June 1977, Ministry of Defence, ‘War Reserve Stocks’, para. 11, DEFE 13/1059, TNA. 
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‘Field Forces’ replacing them.23 The HQ staff were now redundant, thereby saving personnel 
and money which was to be spent on the ‘teeth’. Some units were relocated to the UK, 
offering further savings on foreign exchange and living accommodation costs. This provision 
of ‘Field Forces’ below divisional level proved unacceptable, and was reversed in the early 
1980s.24 Those units that had been moved to the UK were kept there for reasons of cost, 
making the reinforcement of BAOR more time consuming and dependent on quick political 
decision making in a crisis.  
The reorganisations were less to improve readiness and capability, and more about saving 
money on foreign exchange costs, and reducing what were seen as unnecessary headcount 
at HQs. In 1983, BAOR was reorganised again, but with a new Infantry Division based mainly 
in the UK.25 The reality of weapons upgrades, relocation and fundamental structural 
reworking of units, as well as a predominance of TA units in the new division, influenced the 
way they could be employed, and their speed of deployment.  
To remain credible, whatever services they belonged to, the combat units depended on a 
working logistical tail for essential supplies of POL and ammunition. This skeleton staffing of 
these units continued throughout the period, surfacing again in the Gulf War of 1991, with 
deeper cuts made in transport and logistics to maintain the front line forces.26   
Doctrine 
For the Armed Forces to remain a credible deterrent, the forces must be capable of 
employing sufficient forces and weaponry to achieve their goal, using current doctrine. 
Doctrine is defined in the North Atlantic Treaty as the, “… fundamental principles by which 
the military forces guide their actions in support of their objectives.”27 There are different 
levels of doctrine addressing different aspects of military activity. Military Doctrine defines 
                                                     
23 Ministry of Defence, ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976’, Cmnd 6432 (London: HMSO, March 1976), chap. 2, 
page 13-16. 
24 Isby and Kamps Jr, Armies of NATO’s Central Front, 241. 
25 Ministry of Defence, ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1983’, 14, Cmnd 8951. 
26 See for example D/DMO/77/18/1/MO3, Rapid Reinforcement Plan, Memorandum from Colonel Thorne, Annex A, 16th 
March 1981, ‘NATO Rapid Reinforcement Planning’, para. 3.c., FCO 46/2583, TNA; M. S. White, ed., Gulf Logistics: 
Blackadder’s War, 1st English ed (London ; Washington: Brassey’s, 1995), 4. 
27 Ministry of Defence, Design for Military Operations, 3, D/CGS/50/8. 
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the overall understanding and direction of the Armed Services, which acts as an interpretive 
layer between the political structure and the military organisation. Operational Doctrine 
works at the theatre level, and imparts understanding and instruction. Tactical Doctrine is 
the common foundation for planning purposes. These doctrines are developed and used by 
all arms of the Services.28 NATO defined an overall defensive strategic doctrine.29  
The MoD considers that doctrine underpins strategy and policy, and in military terms needs 
to be informative, based on past and present experience. Without a sound link between 
policy, strategy and doctrine, the Armed Forces would be unable to implement successfully 
the demands of their political masters.30 A British Army doctrinal publication of 1996 
asserted that, 
“Doctrine evolves in response to changes in the political or strategic 
background, in light of experience, or as a result of new technology. In turn, 
it influences the way in which policy and plans are developed, forces are 
organized and trained, and equipment is procured.”31  
According to this description, there is a feedback between doctrine and policy.32 This 
feedback should provide the policymakers with an understanding of the capabilities and 
limitations of the military forces available, whilst also indicating to the Armed Services what 
the policymakers are expecting of them.  
The evidence indicates that doctrine was allowed to give very little back to policy, and that 
the economic policy, promoted by the Treasury, dictated the ways and means available to 
the Armed Forces. This situation was not entirely of the military’s making, rather one placed 
upon them by the politicians of the time. Repeatedly in their evidence to the MoD and other 
                                                     
28 Ibid., 3–4. 
29 ‘Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area’, para. 13, MC 48/3, NATO; Ministry of 
Defence, Design for Military Operations, 3, D/CGS/50/8; For the tactical doctrines of the British Army of the period, see 
‘Land Operations, Volume II - Non Nuclear Operations, Part 2 - Battle Group Tactics’. 
30 Ministry of Defence, Design for Military Operations, chap. 2, D/CGS/50/8. 
31 British Defence Doctrine, Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0–01 (London: Ministry of Defence, 1996), 1.2. 
32 This is reinforced in UK Defence Doctrine, 5th ed., JDP 0-01 (Ministry of Defence, 2014), 19; See also Gray, The Future of 
Strategy, chap. 3, Theory and Practice. Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next 
Century (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 37–38. 
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Government departments, military reports described shortfalls in equipment, personnel and 
weaponry which meant the goals of the Armed Forces in both deterrence and warfighting 
would not be met. These reports were ignored or obfuscated by politicians for political 
ends. The LTDP was also clouded by the British Government, except in areas where money 
was already being spent.33 The British Government tended to adopt new measures 
proposed in the LTDP if there were already plans to do something similar.  
Doctrine is dependent on the tools available to remain relevant and credible. Because 
weapon systems take years, even decades, to design and develop, doctrine must develop in 
tandem with these systems. Guided weapons are an example of how a weapon’s 
development alters tactical doctrine. This can be seen in the development and use of all 
types of missiles since World War Two. The Royal Navy relied extensively on the use of 
guided missile weaponry, and developed tactics to make the best use of these weapons, but 
their initially unreliable nature and delays in development left hugely expensive platforms 
relying on out-dated weapons and tactics. HMS Conqueror’s use of the old, but reliable, 
Mark 8 torpedo to sink the ARA Belgrano demonstrated this.34   
In response to operational developments in the WTO armies, such as Ogarkov’s refinement 
of the Operational Manoeuvre Group concept, NATO commanders sought doctrinal 
reforms, and General Sir Nigel Bagnall’s ideas implemented in NORTHAG were a good 
example of this. By the early 1980s the WTO Operational Manoeuvre Group concept had 
matured, and WTO ground force structure and strength conformed to these warfighting 
theories. In 1985 the WTO had grown to approximately 200 divisions. Army formations and 
individual units had grown in size. The WTO armies were tank-heavy, but its order-of-battle 
was increasingly adapted to the combined-arms structure vital for victory in conventional 
operations in the new environment.35 The ratio of tanks to infantry increased in tank armies, 
and the mobility of divisions was enhanced with improved transport and logistical support 
troops.  
                                                     
33 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Long Term Defence Programme, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence, 
undated ‘NATO Defence Planning Long Term Defence Programme’, para. 6, DEFE 13/1411, TNA. 
34 Mike Rossiter, Sink the Belgrano (London: Corgi, 2007), 302; Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, 136. 
35 William Baxter, Soviet Airland Battle Tactics (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), chap. 4. 
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General Bagnall’s developments in the British Army doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s 
promoted the use of mobile defence and manoeuvre rather than the previous static, 
attritional defence.36 According to the DOAE, there would be, “… a greater emphasis on 
offensive action …”37 This ‘Counterstroke’ doctrine was further refined by General Farndale 
who succeeded Bagnall as GOC Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). The Counterstroke, “ … is 
a counter attack with the specific aim of destroying enemy forces which are on the move 
…”38, an approach which relied upon mobile forces identifying and attacking weaknesses in 
the enemy advance, at short notice and using reserves specifically kept for this purpose. It 
relied upon mobility in a fluid battle, highly trained troops, good communications between 
the units involved, and flexible command.  
The doctrine was extended to NORTHAG as the ‘NORTHAG Concept’, which saw positional 
battles as the precursor to counter-attacks.39 The Defence Operational Analysis 
Establishment (DOAE) analysis 288 gave a very precise description of the deployment of 
1(BR) CORPS and the intended method of defence against an invasion. The British Army was 
planning to use ‘Counterstroke’ forces in a very different way from the doctrine that had 
gone before: “… the main defensive phase of the new concept is radically different from the 
current concept, since it involves the intermingling of RED and BLUE forces …”40 This 
reduced the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons, with the troops of both sides in 
close proximity. According to Dr Wyn Rees, then senior lecturer in Politics at the University 
of Leicester and author of several works on British defence policy, the British might, “… 
absorb the first echelons of a Warsaw Pact armoured assault before delivering a counter-
stroke, with the help of substantial reinforcements.”41 The credibility of this doctrine relied 
entirely on the reinforcements arriving in a timely fashion, and being supplied with 
                                                     
36 McInnes, Hot War, Cold War, 60–68; See also Rees, ‘Preserving the Security of Europe’, 60, in Britain and Defence, 1945 - 
2000. A Policy Re-Evaluation. 
37 ‘The Counterstroke Future Battlefield Study’, para. 2, DOAE Note 663/202, DEFE 48/1077, TNA. 
38 Annex C to Section 2, ‘BATUS Training Report, 1981’ (MoD, 1981), 2C–1, MoD. 
39 Colin McInnes, ‘NATO Strategy and Conventional Defence’, in New Thinking About Strategy and International Security 
(London: HarperCollins Academic, 1991), 183. 
40 ‘Data Assumptions, Method of Analysis and Study Programme for DOAE Study 288 (1 (BR) Corps Concept of Operations 
1985 - 2005)’, para. 3, D/DOAE/44/616, DEFE 48/1095, TNA. 
41 Rees, ‘Preserving the Security of Europe’, 60, in Britain and Defence, 1945 - 2000. A Policy Re-Evaluation. 
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resources sufficient for their role. The House of Commons Defence Committee found, in the 
aftermath of the first Gulf War, that, “It is no use making front line forces highly mobile if 
they outstrip their logistic support …”42 
General Bagnall’s ideas converged with a heightening of East-West tensions, improvements 
in weapons technology and communications technology. The doctrinal changes improved 
the morale of the units in Germany, and showed the way ahead for the British Army.43 Yet, 
despite the improvements in provision of transport for the rear echelons, there were not 
enough troops to crew them unless there was fully fledged mobilisation of the reserve: nor 
was there sufficient ammunition or weapon systems. The Counterstroke demanded large 
quantities of helicopter borne ATGWs,44 but the British Government had opted for more 
tanks and Striker vehicles.45 The strictures of strategy – aims, ways and means – were not 
fulfilled for the counterstroke to work in the European Theatre even during a slow moving 
crisis. 
ATGW-armed helicopters had not been provided in the quantities required either by NATO 
or by the MoD’s own ‘Counterstroke’ proposal.  A DOAE study indicated the attrition rate 
for helicopter anti-tank sorties was expected to be 50% per sortie. This would mean that, 
flying 5 sorties a day per helicopter, as assumed in the study, the 75 LYNX/TOW required by 
NATO would be down to less than 5 helicopters by the end of the first day of fighting.46 The 
small number of LYNX/TOW available would have imposed serious limitations on any 
‘Counterstoke’ counter-attack which relied on ATGW armed helicopters for armed 
reconnaissance and flank defence. Thirty were required for a brigade level counter-attack – 
40% of the entire LYNX/TOW available to BAOR.47 It is clear that an MBT or vehicle mounted 
                                                     
42 House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby’, 17 July 1991, para. 44, HC 287, 
House of Commons. 
43 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Whitchurch, MBE RE, n.d., 8th December 2014. 
44 Thirty Lynx/TOW dedicated to a two brigade attack, ‘The Counterstroke Future Battlefield Study’, 10, DOAE Note 
663/202, DEFE 48/1077, TNA. 
45 DP 14/81(Final), Appendix 2, Annex A, Serial EL05, ‘NATO Long Term Defence Planning’, FCO 46/2586, TNA. 
46 ‘The Counterstroke Future Battlefield Study’, para. 34, DOAE Note 663/202, DEFE 48/1077, TNA. 
47 Ibid., 11. 
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Milan system does not have the flexibility of a helicopter mounted system,48 in terms of 
either tactical manoeuvrability or speed of deployment, but the helicopters were vulnerable 
even to small calibre anti-aircraft fire, and the WTO was well equipped with prodigious 
numbers of hand held and mobile anti-aircraft missiles and guns, such as the ZSU 23-4 
‘Shilka’, deployed at a rate of 16 systems per Motor Rifle Division,49 or various anti-aircraft 
missile launchers, deployed at a rate of 156 per MR division.50 Evidence from the Soviet 
equipped Syrian attack on the Golan Heights in 1973 suggested that the Israelis lost three 
out of every five aircraft sent in to attack the Syrian tanks to anti-aircraft fire.51  
The plans for the Counterstroke were inconsistent with the actual availability of 
ammunition, fuel and spares to prepare for, and execute, the attack. Existing WMR 
ammunition levels for the Chieftain main gun were 360 Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot 
(APDS)/High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) rounds per tank.52 The limitation unstated in the 
Counterstroke papers is that each tank could only carry up to 64 rounds,53 and providing 
replenishment in a highly mobile combat environment had not been accounted for. The 
FV431 had been designed as an armoured load carrier for just this type of operation, but 
only one prototype was built.54 Vehicles which provided ammunition supply to the 
armoured units were soft-skinned, such as the amphibious FV620 Stalwart, and vulnerable 
to small-arms fire.55  
The Counterstroke was expected to begin on day three of a war, but ammunition was 
expected to begin to run out through lack of reserves by day two, which would have left any 
                                                     
48 Annex C to Section 2, ‘BATUS Training Report, 1981’, para. 7, MoD. 
49 US Department of the Army, ‘The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment’, Field Manual (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, June 1991), 4–10, FM 100-2-3. 
50 Ibid., 4–39. 
51 Sunday Times Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 161. 
52 Attoe et al., ‘Direct Fire Anti-Armour Ammunition Requirements for the 1(BR) Corps Battle’, 21, DEFE 48/994, TNA. 
53 Foss, Jane’s Main Battle Tanks, 115. 
54 Foss, Jane’s Armoured Personnel Carriers, 147. 
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Memorandum from the MoD, Comment 6.A, 15th September 1978, ‘British Army of the Rhine’, FCO 46/1735, TNA. These 
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planned attack short of ammunition, fuel and other supplies. Later research into the reforms 
implemented by the then General Bagnall stated that,  
“ … one of the outcomes … of a series of cuts in strength … was a positive 
impact on the Army’s ability to take up a more demanding role later as, with 
ever shrinking resources, it tried to adapt to the increasing demands of the 
defence of Europe. In fact, these cuts paved the way for a more professional 
and efficient army to be established as it had to seek a way to do more with 
less.”56  
This statement seems to repeat the Government line of the time. However, the evidence 
suggests it was difficult for any of the Armed Forces to continue to fulfil their operational 
roles whilst being cut to the extent they were. The fighting troops and weapons may have 
looked formidable, but there was no depth to the Forces, and no sustainability. The 
misconception was being promoted that the Armed Forces could become more ‘efficient’, 
apparently aiming for some transcendent state of pure efficiency at some undetermined 
point in the future. 
It is axiomatic that defence alone cannot win wars,57 and the defensive nature of NATO 
strategy did not exclude counter attacks, as described above, and strikes at the enemy 
forces in their rear areas or homelands. Part of the doctrine for the RAF in NATO was to 
prosecute enemy forces deep within the Eastern bloc with the intention of stopping their 
progress into the West. The concept, known as ‘Follow On Forces Attack’ or FOFA, was 
adopted in the 1980s as part of, “… its doctrine for the defence of Western Europe.”58 It 
became an intrinsic part of NATO’s Flexible Response strategy.59 Utilising highly accurate 
guided air-to-surface weaponry it sought to create a void between the first and second 
echelons of the enemy attack, and only in extreme cases provide close air support to the 
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ground forces.60 The Warsaw Pact second and rear-echelon units would be decimated 
before they had the opportunity to bring superior numbers to bear, relying on the 
technological advantage of NATO in precision delivery of munitions.61 It depended on 
sufficient ground attack aircraft, cover from fighters and surface-to-air munitions to 
implement the policy successfully. For the RAF, Buccaneers and Jaguars, and later Tornados, 
would implement interdiction attacks to disrupt follow-on formations and the infrastructure 
they require, such as fuel depots and bridges.62 However, the decline in aircraft numbers, 
and reliance on older types of aircraft such as the Phantom, meant the capabilities of the 
RAF were below those demanded by NATO for its intended role. This increasing disparity 
with the WTO had been identified by Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter le Cheminant when he left 
his appointment as Deputy Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe in 1979. He 
wrote, “The capability gap between the Central Region forces and the Warsaw Pact forces 
with which we are confronted has continued to widen … I have watched our deterrence 
weaken and am now far less confident … than I was …”63 
The weakening of the defence effort affected not just the Central Region, but the maritime 
contribution too. As a continuing and credible deterrent to the growing Soviet Navy, the 
Royal Navy’s capabilities were reducing. Anti-submarine warfare was the raison d'être of the 
Royal Navy’s contribution to the Eastern Atlantic and Channel commands within NATO.64 
The role of the ASW carriers and commando carriers was central to the Navy’s role, but the 
fleet only reached near full complement with Ark Royal commissioned in 1985,65 however 
HMS Hermes had been put into standby in 1984 and was sold in 1986. The cuts to the Royal 
Navy surface fleet announced in the 1980 and 1981 SDEs meant its capabilities were not up 
to the level required by NATO. In a paper by the Directors of Defence Policy the situation is 
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described thus: “… an increasing inability … to contain Soviet maritime forces in an area of 
NATO’s choosing or to safeguard transatlantic reinforcement and replenishment, upon both 
of which NATO strategy depends.”66 The reprieve from this situation offered by the 
Falklands War was only temporary, with some ships continuing to be ‘short-lifed’, and 
others put into reserve in the years following the war.67  
Teeth Not Tail 
After World War Two, British defence policy varied between short periods of invigoration, 
such as during the Korean War, and periods of cutbacks. From Montgomery’s visions of a 
large citizen army, through to reductions to support the trip-wire response in Europe, 
reservists became central to making up the numbers and filling the gaps. By the late 1970s, 
the TA provided specialist units such as engineers, communications, transport and fuel 
detachments, as well as reinforcements to fill-out regular formations, rather than taking the 
field as fully formed brigades as had been the case previously. Greater reliance on reservists 
for non-combat duty drew a warning from the  Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff 
(Operations) (ACDS(Ops)): “A particular problem is that calculated undermanning of logistic 
units in order to maintain the strength of combat units is near the point where the combat 
troops may not be effective because of lack of initial logistic support.”68 
The relative numeric stability, as seen by some, of the NATO conventional forces in the 
Central Region was misleading. Dr John Duffield has stated that, “… despite substantial 
reorganization, the number of troops in the BAOR remained virtually constant … Most of the 
variation in the number of British military personnel on the continent since the late 1960s 
was due to changes in the size of the Royal Air Force contingent.”69 Although the British 
contribution has been demonstrated to have remained relatively stable between 1955 and 
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1990 (see Appendix C, Figure 8 - All Services comparison of regular, reservist and auxiliary 
forces 1975 - 1991), this is a limited, quantitative, view of the size and capability of the 
conventional forces. What Duffield’s assessment fails to appreciate is the reduction in 
regular forces, and the concurrent increase in the employment of reservists. This had a 
direct effect on capability and credibility of those forces. ‘Tail’, or rear-echelon troops were 
more likely to be territorials or reservists, or in the case of BAOR they were likely to be 
reservists and in the UK, which means they would not be available until after full 
mobilisation and reinforcement was under way. It was not only the Army that suffered. 
Between 1981 and 1986, some 6,000 Royal Navy personnel were cut from the support 
areas.70 A greater reliance on reservists, on units based in the UK, and allocating more 
resources to the ‘teeth’ elements at the cost of the ‘tail’ reduced the capabilities 
dramatically across the board.  
Colin McInnes, writing about NATO policy in the 1980s stated that, “NATO chooses to spend 
less on combat units (‘teeth’) in a deliberate decision to provide better support services 
(‘tail’).”71 This is in direct contradiction to the actual state of affairs, particularly for the 
British Armed Forces. The Government sought to explain it in the following terms: 
“… we continue to study ways in which we can streamline the structure of 1 
BR Corps while maintaining or even improving its effectiveness. Our aim is to 
concentrate as much of our available resources as possible on the teeth arms, 
whilst cutting back the ‘tail’.”72  
‘Streamlining’ was a euphemistic term for cutting costs. An officer in the British Army 
referred to it as the ‘teeth-to-gums’ ratio: cut the gums too much and the teeth fall out.73 
During the post-war reorganisation of the Army, Field Marshal Montgomery,  
“… understood how badly the army had been handicapped in the early years 
of the Second World War because it had lacked sufficient logistical … units, 
and so he readily embraced the need for both Active and Auxiliary Armies to 
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… field properly balanced formations with their full complement of rearward 
services.”74  
But the effects of the cuts in the ‘tail’ had been clear to some observers. Dr David Owen, 
Labour Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, criticised the policy in 
1978 by saying, “Our past emphasis on maintaining, at all costs, the ‘teeth’ element of our 
forces and cutting where necessary the ‘tail’ seems to have impaired our actual war-fighting 
capability to a very dangerous extent.”75 The dependence on reservists was outlined in an 
MoD paper in 1976 on the Order of Battle (OOB) of the United Kingdom Mobile Force: 
“… most of the Regular Units in the Logistic Support Group (LSG) are ‘cadre 
only’. This skeleton will need to be reinforced by TAVR units and individual 
Regular Shadow Postings before they become operational.”76  
Ministers and Secretaries of State continued to repeat what amounted to a mantra, that by 
cutting the ‘tail’ of the Armed Forces, more money would be available for the ‘teeth’. The 
converse opinion was presented by Professor Martin Van Crefeld: “If, for any given 
campaign, [the greatest fighting power] can only be achieved by having a hundred men 
pump fuel, drive trucks and construct railways … then 100:1 is the optimum ratio.”77  
The Labour Government’s approach of cuts aimed at the support/logistic services, whilst 
appearing to improve the ‘teeth-to-tail’ ratio, or ‘man-to-weapon’ ratio78, meant that, “… 
proportionally greater savings will be achieved in the supporting services.”79 The rhetoric 
was slightly different from the subsequent Conservative Government, with the 1984 SDE 
claiming, “We have … made progress in switching money from the support ‘tail’ into the 
‘teeth’ of the Armed Forces’ actual fighting capability.”80 Nevertheless, neither political 
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party explained, publicly, what effects these cuts in the ‘tail’ would have on the capabilities 
of the fighting units.81 In 1981 the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff wrote,  
“… There is no glamour in stocks of ammunition but without them our 
deterrent forces lack any credibility at all. Moreover, we are failing to provide 
the graduated response to which in NATO we subscribe; and, it seems to me, 
we make it impossible for our Government to negotiate from strength.”82 
Similarly, as a money saving exercise, the disposal of military equipment increased, instead 
relying on civilian transport and machinery to replace it in time of crisis.83 Military 
equipment is designed to perform a particular role in extremis, whereas civilian equipment 
is designed to perform a role in benign circumstances. Therefore, military equipment will be 
more expensive, and for a reason. A lesson not officially drawn from the Falklands was that 
civilian ferries and cargo ships were designed with modern European port facilities in mind 
for loading and unloading.84 When those facilities were not available, unloading became 
much more time consuming and inefficient, as the logistic troops in the Falklands 
discovered. Kenneth Privratsky wrote, “Try as they might to improvise solutions, they 
quickly learned that requisitioned ships were no substitute for amphibious vessels designed 
for getting supplies ashore quickly …”85 In all of the MoD scenarios of a possible WTO attack 
into Western Europe which have been reviewed, attacks on port facilities featured 
prominently.86 With cranes and docking facilities damaged or destroyed, the time required 
for loading reinforcements and supplies into ships in Britain and then unloading them into 
continental ports would be multiplied many times. This was demonstrated during the re-
stowing of ships at Ascension on the way to the Falklands in 1982. Georgetown had no 
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facilities to accept the RO-RO ferries, so re-stowing was conducted at anchor.87 This problem 
was not reflected in the field exercises practicing the transport of reinforcements and 
supplies by ship to Europe.88 
The reliance for the balance of the Armed Forces on reservists had serious implications for 
their operational capability in anything other than a slow moving crisis. The logistical troops 
of 5 Brigade were all reservists, and were not called up during the Falklands War because of 
the urgency of the situation.89 3 Commando Brigade went to the Falklands without its fuel 
handling detachment, which consisted entirely of reservists. Maintaining quality control of 
the fuel was also crucial, as contaminated or poor quality fuel damages engines and renders 
equipment inoperable. This was keenly felt during the build-up of forces at San Carlos when 
knowledge of the hazards of handling petroleum and aviation fuel in large quantities was 
essential. The demands placed on fuel handling in the Falklands by Rapier systems alone 
took up significantly more time and resources than was expected.90  
Industrial Planning 
As much as the ‘teeth’ relied on a ‘tail’, so the whole Armed Forces relied on a working 
industrial infrastructure to support it. In peacetime, industry was under little pressure to 
provide large numbers of any product – many orders were delayed to reduce costs. Small-
arms ammunition and smaller calibre ammunition could be produced in greater quantities 
given a small increase in funding to prepare the industrial capacity for expansion in times of 
tension. More sophisticated equipment, such as sonobuoys and anti-armour missiles, would 
be much more difficult to produce if war came. In a war in Europe the MoD expected there 
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would not be enough time to bring ammunition production up to the required levels to 
replace used stock.91   
For the UK, should it come to hostilities, the concept of a war in Europe longer than a few 
days was made effectively redundant by the inability of British industry to be turned over to 
war production in the time required.92 Even with 60 days’ tension before the outbreak of 
hostilities, the possibility of increasing production for a longer war would not be feasible.93 
There was no anticipation of being able to manufacture weapon systems, or what were 
termed ‘complex war consumables’,94 during a crisis. The production lines for large 
equipment items, such as aircraft or tanks, could be kept running if they were still in 
operation. For example, the addition of FV438s in the LTDP could not be accomplished 
because the production line of FV430s (upon which the 438 is based) was closed.95 Industrial 
output would remain extremely limited, effectively leaving the Armed Forces to fight with 
only the war reserves immediately available.  
The Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) stated that, “In the absence of effective resupply 
arrangements, provision should, in principle, be made for adequate sustaining stocks.”96 The 
MoD warned, “The UK’s basic and sustaining stocks are inadequate and are likely to remain 
so, and earlier studies have indicated that no hope should be placed on resupply through 
industrial production in wartime.”97 A review was requested in the early 1980s to assess the 
possibility of industrial expansion in time of war, but it was deferred and eventually 
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abandoned.98 There was little or no political will, or apparent economic flexibility, to 
prepare a credible manufacturing base for an anticipated war.  
Credibility Analysis – Mearsheimer’s viewpoint 
The credibility of NATO’s defences was analysed and discussed both by defence 
professionals and academics from the formation of NATO until today. Many of the 
contemporary analyses looked at strategy or numbers, taking a wholesale approach, but 
failed to address the overall capability based on existing force structures.99  An example is 
the analysis given by Dr J Mearsheimer, which provides an example contemporary to the 
period. It provides a useful perspective on the difficulties inherent in assessing the 
credibility of defence policy from a purely academic standpoint.100 
Professor John Mearsheimer is a political scientist well-known for his work on conventional 
and nuclear deterrence, and proposer of the theory of Offensive Realism.101 In 1982 
Mearsheimer wrote a paper entitled, ‘Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Europe’102 which 
was based on a chapter in his book, ‘Conventional Deterrence’.103 In this article, 
Mearsheimer examined the credibility of NATO’s strategy and capabilities, and the 
prospects for what he described as a Soviet ‘blitzkrieg’ against NATO. He concluded that, “… 
the task of quickly overrunning NATO’s defences would be a very formidable one.”104  
Mearsheimer focussed on the idea that war would start only if the attacker – in this case the 
Soviet Union and WTO – was assured of success, and would be able to avoid the conflict 
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degenerating into a war of attrition.105 However, the research presented in this thesis has 
shown that, even from a standing start, and even if the war were to become attritional, the 
WTO would win the conventional battle quickly simply by remaining in the fight. In addition, 
Mearsheimer does not anticipate opportunistic ‘grabs’ that NATO would be poorly prepared 
to repel. The MoD’s view was summed up by Sir Francis Pym in 1980 which was that, “Short-
warning aggression, and the prospect of short-duration war, is far more attractive to the 
Soviet Union …”106 
Hew Strachan, agreeing with John Mearsheimer, wrote in 1984 that, “NATO’s existing 
conventional defences certainly have their defects, but they are not so weak as to invite 
Soviet attack.”107 This position is opposed by a RAND report which identified lack of 
sustainability and overall weaknesses in the NATO defence. The report stated that a failure 
to improve NATO’s conventional forces would risk providing the Soviet Union with an 
opportunity for a, “… quick strike with a limited objective.”108 NATO had been aware of this 
particular threat109 but the plans in place did not allow for a conventional response to a 
quick strike (assumed to be akin to a ‘bolt-from-the-blue’, or Surprise Attack). The fear was 
that the WTO could prepare for a full scale attack in 15 days or less,110  with NATO’s 
mobilisation delayed by political caution and Soviet distraction techniques. 
Mearsheimer stated that NATO had, “… the wherewithal to deny the Soviets a quick victory 
and then to turn the conflict into a lengthy war of attrition …”111 In fact, the sustainability of 
NATO’s conventional defences, certainly in Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), were 
inconsistent with his viewpoint. Intelligence and analysis from NATO suggested the WTO 
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forces were configured for a war of at least several weeks.112 The WTO had forward based 
war stocks providing two weeks’ offensive support as well as ammunition and fuel stocks to 
fight a high intensity war for about two months. 113 
Mearsheimer dismissed the idea that the WTO forces were capable of a standing start 
attack. The relative speeds of mobilisation by either side were cause for concern by Western 
planners, and this concern was recognised in their planning.114 Rather than selecting the 
option of a delayed mobilisation of NATO, Mearsheimer chooses a similar type of scenario 
that most NATO exercises are predicated on: the WTO mobilisation is followed by NATO 
with little or no delay. This conveniently allows full mobilisation of all available forces. This is 
recognisably similar to the WINTEX timescales and the 31/24 scenario.115 The drawback with 
this scenario is its failure to recognise the capability of the Soviets successfully to employ 
distraction methods to keep the Western countries guessing as to their intentions right up 
to the point of invasion.116 Mearsheimer states, “…there is little doubt that NATO would 
detect a full-scale Pact mobilization almost immediately.”117 Little or no warning came from 
the Western Intelligence Agencies before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, who concluded 
before the invasion that, “We have not seen indications that the Soviets are at the moment 
preparing ground forces for large-scale military intervention …”118 Additionally, a US 
Presidential Inquiry in to the war scare in 1983 showed that clear WTO military preparations 
had been missed: “The Soviet air force standdown had been in effect for nearly a week 
before fully armed MIG-23 aircraft were noted on air defense alert in East Germany.”119 
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Western intelligence seemed to have a problem identifying Soviet and WTO mobilisations 
and preparations for war. 
Basic assumptions made by Mearsheimer regarding force capabilities, doctrine and tactics 
are also flawed. His diagram representing the ‘Initial Distribution of NATO Divisions’ shows 
the sectors as having all their divisions ‘up’ in the forward defence line, and all equally 
capable.120 Using the British sector as an example it is shown with four divisions in the 
battle-line. (See Appendix E, Mearsheimer’s distribution of divisions on the Central Front, 
Figure 13 - Initial Distribution of NATO Divisions) At least one of 1(BR) Corps’ divisions is 
predominantly filled by reservists (2nd Infantry Division), and allocated to rear-area defence, 
up to 75km behind the front line.121 This division was not equipped with the same level of 
anti-tank capability available to the Armoured Divisions. One division is held in reserve to 
counter-attack any penetration of the main line, in accordance with the doctrine of the 
‘Counterstroke’. Which leaves two divisions ‘up’, defending the 65km front in the British 
sector. The Soviet frontage for a division in attack formation, “… is normally 15 to 25 
kilometres wide. This width could vary considerably with the situation.”122 Individual 
regiments could deploy over as little as three kilometres. In the US Field Manual FM100-2-1, 
an instance is cited of a World War Two Soviet Corps attacking across a front only seven 
kilometres wide achieving a 17-to-1 superiority in tanks.123 In contrast, in the main battle 
area of BAOR the British divisions are expected to defend a frontage of 30-35 kilometres 
each.  
The idea that the WTO would use ‘steamroller’ tactics is criticised by Mearsheimer,124 
despite this being the approach anticipated by BAOR.125 This is predicated on Mearsheimer’s 
incorrect understanding of Blitzkrieg, and Soviet and WTO implementation of their method 
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of attack. Dr Ned Wilmott described Blitzkrieg thus: “Blitzkrieg envisaged a broad frontal 
attack in order that the enemy front should be gripped, thereby ensuring that contact could 
not be broken … With the enemy’s attention held, the main blow(s) would fall on a relatively 
narrow frontage by concentrated armour and motorized forces.”126 The WTO planned to 
achieve local superiority to break through the NATO line in several places. This led 
Mearsheimer to another misunderstanding: that a multipronged advance would be 
beneficial to NATO. Mearsheimer writes, “… it will, at best, end up pushing NATO back 
across a broad front …”127 Successful attacks – those made by the WTO which break into 
and through the NATO line – would be reinforced from the subsequent echelons, and there 
would not be a ‘broad front’ retreat by NATO. In the same way that Blitzkrieg worked in the 
Second World War, a WTO attack would aim to punch holes through the NATO front, 
allowing Operational Manoeuvre Groups (OMG) to attack the rear areas and encircle NATO 
forces.128  According to Professor Michael McGwire,  
“the strategy of defeating NATO by conventional means … entailed the 
creation of ‘operational maneuver [sic] groups’ that would paralyze NATO’s 
command and communication system by seizing its neuralgic points before 
its political leaders could make up their minds about resorting to nuclear 
weapons.”129  
The US Army Field Manual on Soviet Operations and Tactics proposed the purpose of a 
Soviet attack was, “… to carry the battle swiftly and violently into the enemy rear.”130 This 
effect would be amplified if NATO units fought following the policy of ‘Forward Defence’.131  
The use of simple ‘bean-counts’ to compare forces gives little meaning to the analysis. By 
invoking the concept of Blitzkrieg, Mearsheimer undermines his own conclusion. A brief 
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comparison with ‘Fall Gelb’132 is instructive. In 1940, the Allies considered their position 
strong, with greater forces and more capable weapons.133 A simple evaluation of forces sizes 
was inadequate to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two sides. Britain 
and France could field 3,383 tanks, while Germany only 2,445, with a balance of infantry 
divisions.134 Following Mearsheimer’s approach to force comparisons, in 1940 the Allies 
should have easily held off the German attack. History shows that this did not happen, and 
the cause was not numbers, but a difference in the thinking and tactics employed.135 The 
tactics proved the difference between successful attack and defence.  
Mearsheimer indicates that the WTO has a 2.5:1 superiority in tanks and 2:1 in infantry.136 
He takes a very optimistic view of the ability of NATO to prepare for and repel an attack, but 
he takes a conversely pessimistic view of the WTO’s ability to prepare and launch that 
attack.137 Mearsheimer does not present any nuances of the competing strategies, doctrine 
and tactics which might reveal a different outcome to his conclusion. He omits entirely the 
airborne capability and Operational Manoeuvre Group concept, both of which were 
important to Soviet and WTO doctrine. These omissions undermine the validity argument he 
puts forward.   
Conclusion 
Defence policy has emphasised the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons, rather than the 
strategic dependence on them to support the inadequate conventional forces. The 
conventional forces were publicised as the tool to raise the nuclear threshold, but were 
inadequately supplied to fulfil that promise. The outcome of the cuts to the ‘tail’ was that 
rather than enhancing the fighting capabilities of the forces, as was the publicly stated 
intention, the reduction in logistics meant that there would be no cuts to the front line, 
                                                     
132 ‘Case Yellow’, the code name for the German invasion of the Low Countries and France in 1940. 
133 A. J. P. Taylor, The Second World War (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1975), 51–62. 
134 Corrigan, Blood, Sweat and Arrogance, 211. 
135 For a more detailed analysis of the reasons for the defeat of the Allies in 1940, see Corrigan, Blood, Sweat and 
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137 For a contrasting view, see ‘Offensiveness, Defensiveness, and War Aims’ in Heuser, ‘Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in 
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rather than an increase in spending on the front line. This is a subtly different outcome from 
the impression the political parties wished to communicate.  
The minimum credible warfighting deterrent forces might have been achieved at the ‘teeth’ 
end of the calculation, but behind those ‘teeth’ was an insufficient ‘tail’. The inadequacies of 
the ‘tail’ effectively neutralised any positive aspects of the ‘teeth’. The contradictions 
between providing for warfighting deterrence and the actual force levels seem to point to 
one conclusion: the British Government, and ultimately NATO, provided itself with a logical 
argument for a quick use of nuclear weapons if war came to Europe. The argument might go 
that conventional forces were overwhelmed surprising quickly, and to defend the Alliance 
nuclear weapons were used. Whether anyone would be present to witness this, or if they 
were present to be interested, is a moot point. 
Because of the defensive nature of NATO, the operational demands for attack had been 
neglected in the British Army. The Falklands War was to provide an opportunity to relearn 
the need for close support weapons such as grenade launchers to help in the attack. In 
addition to General Bagnall’s rethink of doctrine this was to prove extremely important. The 
operational doctrine of the British Army developed during the 1980s to include more 
aggressive and larger counter-attack and counter-strike training. The troops would need to 
be re-equipped to take into account the different tactical demands this would place on 
them. 
The concepts of FOFA and the Counterstroke were both closely associated with the 
objective of raising the nuclear threshold.138 Doctrinally, the British Army moved from a 
relatively static, attritional defence to a more mobile, flexible style under the direction of 
General Sir Nigel Bagnall and General Sir Martin Farndale. Nevertheless, despite the 
doctrinal improvements, the supporting structure remained the same. There was a heavy 
reliance on reservists, especially in the logistic units, and reduced stocks of POL and 
ammunition. The changes in the doctrine in NORTHAG did not affect the underlying problem 
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that within the first few days of a war a lack of sustainability would lead to demands by local 
commanders for the release of tactical nuclear weapons. 
The doctrines of ‘Forward Defence’, counter-force and mobile defence in depth developed 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but the methods of providing the fighting forces with 
replacement weapons, ammunition and other supplies did not. Continuous reorganisation 
of the formations and structure, primarily of the Army, caused confusion over roles and 
capabilities. Up to the end of the 1980s NATO, and in particular Britain, did not have the 
forces in being, equipped with enough of the right weapons, to have conducted a defence in 
NORTHAG , even with the improvements brought about by General Bagnall. Through 
‘cheese-paring’ and poor long term planning, the British Armed forces were equipped with 
some high quality weapon systems, but without either the density for effective use or the 
logistical tail to sustain them. The Royal Navy’s position changed over the period, from being 
a main player to a subsidiary role. This was initially forced by Nott in 1981, and despite his 
protestations that it was not a choice between a ‘maritime’ or ‘continental’ strategy, it is 
clear that the maritime proponents lost, and the ‘continental’ won. Britain seemed to be 
organising for peacetime efficiency and cost-saving rather than wartime effectiveness.139 
The contribution to Europe, characterised in Bagnall’s work, although not the only 
contribution made by Britain, was significant both militarily and politically to NATO. Often 
seen as the main part of Britain’s involvement with NATO, it would be undermined by the 
changes to defence policy and spending. Money saving schemes necessitated the return of 
substantial numbers of troops to Britain. At worst this would render some sections of British 
defence policy impossible to implement, or at best slower to carry out than was previously 
planned. 
Credibility relied upon sufficient weapons, with adequate supplies of ammunition, but also 
enough well trained personnel to use them. Despite Bagnall’s improvements in tactics and 
operations, as well as developments of more accurate and sophisticated ‘smart’ weaponry, 
if those weapons ran out of ammunition before the enemy’s did, or the trained soldiers, 
sailors and aircrew were not available to use them, then they were effectively useless. 
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General Thompson wrote, “The consequences of dependence upon defective stockpiles do 
not bear thinking about, for it could spell nothing short of disaster.”140 The proliferation of 
ATGWs towards the end of the 1980s went some way to making up the numerical inferiority 
of NATO against the WP. There was still the problem that a large number of anti-tank 
weapons would have been deployed in the reinforcement phase, which would have meant a 
degradation of the army’s ability to stop and hold a ‘bolt-from-the-blue’ attack. The ‘holding 
force’ had both insufficient numbers and low reserve stocks to fight any form of attack. 
MC48/3 makes clear the need for sufficient war reserves to maintain credibility,141 but 
continual ‘cheese-paring’ was a constant problem within the MoD.142 Once spending had 
been set, new cost cutting measures would leave the Service Chiefs with little or no room 
for manoeuvre, the contracts for major systems and spending already having been signed. 
The only place for cuts would therefore be in training, fuel and spares. The inadequacy of 
the stocks and supplies for warfighting, as well as the over-dependence on reservists, were 
displayed in both combat deployments examined in this thesis – the Falklands and the First 
Gulf War.  
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel is credited with stating that, “The battle is fought and decided 
by the quartermasters before the shooting starts.”143 In the case of NATO, and Britain’s 
implementation of its defence policy, the quartermaster would not have been mobilised by 
the time the battle was fought. 
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Overview 
The case studies give examples from the period which demonstrate some of the 
shortcomings of British policy and war planning. The examples are drawn from two 
examples of preparation and deployment for war. But one must be cautious about 
extrapolating real-world events too far. Some lessons can be drawn from the campaigns 
which were relevant to NATO, but it must be remembered that they were fought in entirely 
different conditions to those prepared for in Europe, and under circumstances that make 
the drawing of some parallels difficult. In the words of General John Jumper, generic lessons 
should not be drawn from an idiosyncratic campaign.1 
Applying the MoD’s definitions of crisis types2 to the Falklands War, it would fall under the 
title of a ‘Rapidly Moving Crisis’; The Gulf War 1991 was a mixture of ‘Slow Moving Crisis’ 
and ‘Rapidly Moving Crisis’ (see Appendix P, Glossary of Terms). Both Wars showed 
ingenuity in planning and flexibility in execution by the Armed Forces. The Falklands War 
was a clear success: Britain had recovered the Falklands against overwhelming logistical and 
operational problems, and against a numerically superior enemy close to its own homeland. 
The First Gulf War was another success. With minimal losses the Armed Forces had again 
demonstrated their capability, and the Government had confirmed the success of their 
policy. (For detailed coverage of actions in the campaigns, see publications in the footnote 
below.3)  
                                                     
1 Peter W Gray, ‘Air Power: Strategic Lessons from an Idiosyncratic Campaign’, in The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: 
Lessons for the Future, The Sandhurst Conference Series (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005), 253. 
2 ‘War Book Working Party: Post War Developments in the United Kingdom Transition to War Plans’, 14, CAB 175/32, CAB 
175/32, TNA. 
3 For more detail on the campaigns, see Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign. Vol. 1: The 
Origins of the Falklands War, Whitehall Histories (London: Routledge, 2005); Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of 
the Falklands Campaign. Vol. 2: War and Diplomacy, Reprinted, Whitehall Histories (London: Routledge, 2006); Major 
General Julian Thompson, 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands: No Picnic (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2007); Clapp 
and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands; Eric Grove, Britain’s Gulf War: Operation Granby (London: 
Harrington Kilbride, 1991); Patrick Cordingley, In the Eye of the Storm: Commanding the Desert Rats in the Gulf War 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1996); Peter De la Billière, Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War (London: 
HarperCollins, 1992); White, Gulf Logistics, 1st English ed; Bruce W Watson, Military Lessons of the Gulf War (London: 
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The Falklands War 
The mobilisation for the Falklands War provides an in-period example of the British Armed 
Forces preparing for, deploying to and carrying out combat operations. In 1982 Britain sent 
two enhanced brigades of infantry (5 Brigade and 3 Commando) and more than 100 ships to 
the South Atlantic.4  Analysis of the effort to send ships, men and aeroplanes to the South 
Atlantic provides a measure of the readiness and capability of the armed forces and civilians 
involved.  
The Falklands War can be analysed for the activation of naval units, land units and logistical 
resources, as well as the resupply in theatre of the combat forces. It offers some fine 
examples for the preparation and transition to war by the Royal Navy and Army. Although 
the Falklands War was fought 8,000 miles away, it is the process by which the forces were 
mobilised, fitted out, supplied and supported that is relevant to this research. The distance 
between the UK and the Falklands will need to be taken into account in any analysis.  
In EASTLANT and ACCHAN the Royal Navy intended to be used under an umbrella of land 
based Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) 
aircraft. The Royal Navy was prepared for escort duties and anti-submarine work against the 
WTO Navies, rather than remote outpost protection. The First Sea Lord commented the 
year before the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands that war, ”… seldom takes the 
expected form and a strong maritime capability provides flexibility for the unforeseen.”5 The 
conflict was as far from the Eastern Atlantic/European theatre as could be imagined, both 
geographically and militarily, but the mobilisation, materials usage and logistical effort 
retains relevance. Could lessons be learned for Europe, despite it being in Lawrence 
Freedman’s words, “… precisely the war for which Britain was planning least ….”?6  
                                                     
4 Ministry of Defence, ‘The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons’, para. 108, Cmnd 8758. 
5 Personal note to Margaret Thatcher from the First Sea Lord, 18th May 1981, ‘Defence Expenditure 1979-81’, PREM 
19/416, TNA. 
6 Freedman, ‘British Defence Policy after the Falklands’, 333, The World Today. 
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The Royal Navy’s operations in the Falklands have been described by Dr Geoff Sloane as a 
‘War without a doctrine.’7 Some of the more advanced naval weapons, and thus the training 
for their use and tactics developed around them, were not as successful as anticipated. 
Missile and torpedo reliability was questionable, which meant that faith in the weapons’ 
abilities was fragile. Because of Cold-War planning and cost-cutting, the Royal Navy did not 
equip its ships with anything other than missiles for air-defence, and had no close-in point 
defence systems other than Sea Cat, which entered service in 1962, and three vessels with 
Sea Wolf.8 The air threat demonstrated the inadequacies of Sea Cat, but also showed the 
potential of its successor, Sea Wolf. These missiles were intended as anti-aircraft defence 
aboard warships, but Sea Cat only recorded one hit from ten launches;9 Sea Wolf was 
claimed to have five hits,10 but was only fitted to three ships of the Task Force.11 During the 
Falklands War, some ships had general purpose machine guns (GPMGs) fixed to the rails 
around the decks to provide close-in anti-aircraft fire, but this was a temporary expedient.12 
Considering the WTO air force and navy were heavily equipped with air-to-surface and 
surface-to-surface missiles, their effect and the Navy’s vulnerability was noted.13 
Vulnerability to missile attack was the principal lesson taken by the Navy from the Falklands, 
despite being identified in the LTDP as a vulnerable area which required improvement.14 
This weakness was subsequently addressed by the purchase of Phalanx and Goalkeeper 
close-in weapon systems.   
                                                     
7 MA Strategic Studies Lecture, University of Reading, Dr G Sloane, 2013. See also ‘Operation Corporate 1982: A Maritime 
Doctrinal Perspective’, Semaphore, no. 6 (2012). 
8 Finlan, ‘War Culture: The Royal Navy and the Falklands Conflict’, 205, in The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons 
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9 Ibid. 
10 Ministry of Defence, ‘The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons’, para. 227, Cmnd 8758. 
11 Finlan, ‘War Culture: The Royal Navy and the Falklands Conflict’, 208, in The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons 
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12 Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War, 81. 
13 Ministry of Defence, ‘The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons’, para. 229, Cmnd 8758. 
14 Annex B, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Long Term Defence Programme, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
Defence, Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, ‘NATO Defence Planning Long Term Defence Programme’, 
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In Tigerfish, the Royal Navy had an unreliable torpedo that had failed its acceptance tests, 
but was still put into operation15 - a feasibility study was underway in 1979/80 to provide a 
replacement, but instead the weapon was improved and upgraded over the following 
decade. The lack of reliability meant that when HMS Conqueror attacked the ARA Belgrano 
during the Falklands War, the decision was taken to use the old, but reliable, unguided Mark 
8 torpedo.16  
The Royal Navy may have struggled with some unreliable weapon systems, but the presence 
of some major vessels was only possible because of the timing of the Argentinian invasion. 
Had it been delayed by a year or two, several major ships would have been missing from the 
Navy lists. Two ships essential to the retaking of the Falkland Islands, HMS Intrepid and HMS 
Fearless,17 were to be disposed of prematurely in 1982 and 1984 respectively, as according 
to the 1981 SDE, “… the likely needs did not warrant replacement …”18 Indeed, HMS Intrepid 
was in the process of being decommissioned for sale but was quickly brought back into 
service to go to the Falklands.19 No provision was to be made to run these ships after 
1984.20 They were to be replaced operationally by using commercially available RO-RO 
ferries. If the British Commando Brigade was only to be deployed into Europe, this disposal 
of ships made financial sense in the short term. However, this would mean that only in a 
slow-building crisis would the Commando Brigade be capable of being deployed using 
ferries, as in a sudden crisis the great demand for ferries would limit their availability. Also, 
the use of ferries would provide its own problems if the dock facilities were damaged. 
Unloading in San Carlos from requisitioned ships was fraught with problems. Kenneth 
Privratsky wrote that RO-RO vessels, 
“… had been designed to pull next to piers and either open side doors and let 
cargo roll off or use pier-side cranes … now … there were no piers … vessels 
                                                     
15 ‘Mk 24 Torpedo’, n.d., E90, DEFE 24/389, TNA. 
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like Norland could not lower stern doors sufficiently to reach mexefloat 
lighters … The offload rate for civilian vessels averaged only twenty tons per 
hour, compared to ninety tons per hour for LSLs.”21  
Ships such as HMS Fearless and Intrepid, and the Landing Ships Logistic (LSL) such as RFA Sir 
Galahad were designed specifically for unloading military equipment. This can be bulky and 
cumbersome, and without the use of purpose built ports were more than four times faster 
than the RO-RO ferries to unload. Speed was essential in the San Carlos landings, limiting 
the risk to those troops doing the unloading, and those awaiting the stores and equipment 
being unloaded.  
The vulnerability of the fleet extended to the threat from mines which the Royal Navy 
suspected the Argentinians had laid in Falkland Sound, against which they initially had no 
answer.22 The lack of mine counter-measures (MCMV) and minesweeper vessels with the 
fleet deployment meant that on at least one occasion a major ship, HMS Alacrity, was used 
to check for mines in Falkland Sound by the simple expedient of sailing through the Sound 
from end to end.23 This was a serious risk, and highlighted the deficiency in mine sweeping 
capacity for the Task Force. There were a number of MCMVs and minesweepers available, 
but they were designed for use in shallow water and could not make the sea voyage. Fishing 
vessels could be requisitioned, along with other types of vessels, for Naval, Military and 
other special purposes, most notably minesweeping and counter-measures.24 Deep sea 
minesweepers or MCMVs could be obtained by requisitioning deep sea trawlers and 
converting them. There were, at the time of the Falklands, two deep-sea trawlers chartered 
by the Royal Navy for deep sweeping, and based on their performance and design several 
new ships were to be added to the Royal Navy’s fleet.25 With the HUNT Class Mine Counter 
Measure Vessels not yet operational, and existing TON Class vessels not capable of the long 
                                                     
21 Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands War, 120. 
22 Woodward and Robinson, One Hundred Days, 278–79. 
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sea voyage to the Falklands, five deep sea trawlers were requisitioned and sent South. 26 
They were not available in the area until after the initial landings at San Carlos.27  
Vessels taken up from commercial trade, such as the trawlers, had serious limitations. The 
extension of communications capability, as well as data sharing and satellite links, to Ships 
Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) proved problematic.28 Without specially trained crew and 
installed equipment, those ships not designed for use in war took time and effort to bring 
up to the required standard. Although some vessels could be converted to wartime use, 
encrypted communications and data handling required specialist equipment and operators. 
Because of the limited numbers of specialist navy technicians, the flow of signal traffic 
during the Falklands War exceeded the capacity to handle all the data. Important signals 
were filtered out and acted upon, but less important signals were left, some unread to the 
end of the campaign.29 A similar problem affected the possibility of arming the STUFT 
vessels with defensive weapons. Without the communications equipment and radar 
necessary to operate the sophisticated weaponry, they could fire at friendly ships or passing 
aircraft. 
The Royal Navy also included the Royal Marine Commandos, and like many of the ships in 
the task force, they were on high readiness and could be mobilised quickly. 3 Commando 
Brigade formed part of the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force contribution to the forces of 
NATO.30 It comprised three Commando Battalions (40, 42 and 45 Commando) plus 
supporting artillery and air troops, besides much else. The Brigade had organic logistical 
support in the form of the Commando Logistics Regiment. As a high readiness force, the 
Brigade was permanently on 7 days’ notice. Following the 1981 Defence review, the Royal 
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Marines were to be retained in their infantry role, but were to lose their specialist shipping 
which was vital to their amphibious role, and to the retaking of the Falkland Islands.31 
Before sailing, 3 Commando’s establishment was reinforced by 2 and 3 Parachute 
Regiments and Special Forces (see Appendix K, Operation Corporate Order of Battle, 1982).32 
The majority of the Brigade logistics troops were regulars, and immediately available for 
service. Colonel Hellberg, 3 Commando’s Logistic Regiment Commander, recorded the 
personnel of the Logistic Regiment who went to the Falklands consisted of, “… 346 officers 
and men with only 54 prime movers and nine motor cycles.”33 One significant omission was 
the Petroleum Troop. “The Regiment’s Petrol Troop (383 Troop) was TAVR and therefore 
had not been mobilised.”34  
There was insufficient transport to move the enlarged 3 Commando Brigade and all its 
equipment and stores upon mobilisation: Colonel Hellberg wrote, for transporting the WMR 
of 3 Commando Brigade,  
“… at very short notice, HQ United Kingdom Land Forces (UKLF) had to provide 
a massive fleet of Royal Corps of Transport (RCT) 16-ton vehicles. Additionally 
we had to requisition many civilian freight vehicles. Although not planned, 
these additional vehicles (many driven by Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer 
Reserve (TAVR) drivers to augment our own Transport Squadron) provided an 
excellent service …”35  
The War Maintenance Reserve (WMR) for the 3 Commando alone weighed 9,000 tons. 
Colonel Hellberg wrote, “… the WMR of 3 Commando Brigade consisted of a total of 30 
days’ stocks of Combat Supplies at Limited War rates with 60 day’s stock of technical and 
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general stores.”36  It was moved using the ad-hoc formations of RCT and commercial 
vehicles and voluntary drivers described above, which meant, “… the roads to Portsmouth, 
the Royal Corps of Transport marine base at Marchwood, on Southampton Water, and 
Devonport were the scenes of activity not seen since the end of the Second World War.”37  
Supporting 3 Commando was 5 Brigade, which had been formed from parts of 6th and 8th 
Field Force when they were disbanded.38 Upon mobilisation for the Falklands War, the 
Parachute battalions normally on its establishment were used to reinforce 3 Commando 
Brigade. They were replaced in 5 Brigade by the 1st Welsh and 2nd Scots Guards, which had 
just finished public duties. 5 Brigade went to the Falklands with, “…only two ordnance 
companies, since its intended logistics unit were reservists …”39 despite a conference 
covering the subject in Aldershot on the 4th May.40 General Thompson wrote, “5 Infantry 
Brigade had come south with inadequate logistic support so an ad-hoc logistic support 
group was cobbled together by the Commando Logistic Regiment …”41 This failure indicates 
what would have happened in a rapidly moving crisis had any of the reinforcement units for 
BAOR been moved before mobilisation of the reserves had taken place. After the Falklands 
the brigade was converted into 5 Airborne Brigade, and as a direct consequence of the 
logistic problems faced in the Falklands a dedicated Logistic Battalion was established for 5 
Airborne.42 
The war highlighted deficiencies not just with mobilisation plans but also with individual 
items of equipment. Simple items were missing from the Army’s inventory; the infantry 
Bergan was not available for the Guards battalions sent to the Falklands, and civilian 
replacements had to be bought.43 The lack of modern night vision equipment, used 
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extensively by the Argentinian forces, would cause serious difficulties in the Falklands,44 and 
was rectified in subsequent SDEs.45 The improvements in simple items like boots and 
protective equipment could also be attributed to the War. A lesson learned from the 
Falklands War, and relearned from previous wars, was that anti-aircraft guns, either 
machine guns or small calibre quick firing artillery, can be invaluable against low-level 
aircraft attack both at sea and on land.46 The MoD had moved towards an all-missile 
defence for ground forces, but this was re-though after the Falklands, with anti-aircraft 
artillery and machine guns being re-introduced (some of which were captured from the 
Argentinians). The Argentinian forces were well equipped with anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) as 
well as surface-to-air missiles, and brought down five Harriers with ground fire.47 
To provide sufficient Sea Harriers for the fleet the initial squadrons (800 and 801), which 
had only eight aircraft each, had to absorb other aircraft, pilots and maintenance crew to 
bring them up to strength.48 By using training aircraft and one trials aircraft twenty Sea 
Harriers were accumulated. The Sea Harrier was in such short supply that RAF GR3 Harriers 
were also pressed into service. Pilots, however, were in short supply. At least two were still 
being trained on the voyage down to the Falklands.49 
The RAF used the Falklands war to justify the need for the JP233 Runway Denial Bomb.50 
The freefall bombs used to attack Stanley Airfield by the Vulcan bomber and Harriers may 
have caused great damage, but only one hit was registered on the runway. Concern over the 
AAA meant the Harrier pilots preferred to ‘toss’ the bombs at the airfield, rather than fly in 
close.51 The JP233 was introduced in the 1985 after lengthy lobbying from the RAF as a 
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means of making attacks on enemy airfields more effective.52 Because of the need for low 
level attack to use the weapon, it is difficult to assess how effective it would have been in 
the Falklands, where Argentinian radar-controlled anti-aircraft defence had good coverage 
around Stanley Airport.53  
For the Commandos, the Falklands Campaign was a testament to the training of the 
personnel involved, and their determination to succeed. General Thompson wrote, “… that 
in just over forty-eight hours, without warning and with no contingency plan, they had 
prepared the staff tables for a greatly expanded Brigade to load into shipping, much of 
which had only been allocated a matter of hours before ….”54 For the Royal Navy, it was 
justification for the existence of their service, especially the surface fleet, but left some 
questions about vessel vulnerability.  
Case Study within a Case Study - Cost cutting and the problems with ‘Shiny Sheff’ 
and the Type 42 
During the Falklands Campaign, Admiral Woodward had set a combination of Type 22 and 
Type 42 vessels as radar pickets to warn of incoming Argentinian air attack. The need for the 
Type 22/42 combo was specific to the Falklands, as there was no Airborne Early Warning 
(AEW) available in the early stages of the war. Exposed and isolated, these ships were a 
priority target for the Argentinian air force. Without AEW it was inevitable that some of the 
pickets set by Admiral Woodward would suffer in the same costly manner as those of the US 
Navy during the invasion of Okinawa in 1945.55  
Intended as a fleet air-defence vessel, with the capability to fly anti-submarine helicopters, 
the Type 42s were a cheaper replacement for the Type 82 cancelled in the 1966 Defence 
Review. As a cost saving measure, the Type 42’s hull was shortened which caused poor sea 
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handling. The Treasury view was that the decision must be based on value for money.56 The 
shortening of the hull was made against the normal Navy weight, space and stability 
margins, and caused ‘slamming’ in bad weather.57 ‘Slamming’ is the bottom of the vessel 
hitting the surface of the sea whilst sailing in high seas. This puts excessive loads onto the 
structure of the vessel and can cause serious damage. It was also know that this caused 
‘wetness’ (spray and waves breaking over the deck) forward of the bridge.58  The reduction 
in length was reversed with a modified design for the eleventh ship and all subsequent 
orders.59 As early as 1975 the Type 42 was identified by the Admiralty as having a reduced 
capability, but, “… nevertheless it is not unreasonable to retain the unit in the construction 
programme for the time being. As improved SEADART/radar capability will be needed later, 
the design can be reviewed when the way ahead on the weapon systems is clearer.”60  
The performance of the early Type 42 was described by Admiral Woodward as, “… 
unreasonably slow in a short swell, with their bows slamming into the waves rather than 
splitting them to each side cleanly.”61 The deck spray (‘wetness’ forward of the bridge) had a 
damaging effect on the Sea Dart launcher system, with the continuous soaking by salt-water 
causing malfunctions – the flash-doors would not open and sensing equipment failed to 
recognise that a missile had been loaded, and unnerving experience when under attack. 
Because of the shortening of the hull, the, “… consequences had not been obvious … now 
they were …”62 These vulnerabilities were exposed notwithstanding the threat from 
Argentinian air attack being less than expected from the WTO in a war. The consequences 
would have been far more serious if the WTO air threat is considered. The overall 
vulnerability to missile and air attack demonstrated in the Falklands War was a serious 
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concern for the Navy despite having been identified in a report by the Chiefs of the Defence 
Staff in 1981.63 The Type 42, intended to be the fleet air-defence vessel, was an example of 
cost-cutting in peace-time hampering the Armed Forces operations during war. 
Operation GRANBY - The Gulf War 1991 
The British deployment to Saudi Arabia under Operation Granby can be analysed in a similar 
way to that for the Falklands. Overall, this deployment can be analysed as a slow-moving 
crisis, but with some elements of a rapidly moving crisis, using some of the plans developed 
for Western Europe, but modified for special in-theatre requirements.64 (See Appendix L, 
Operation Granby Order Of Battle, 1991) Operation Granby is seen by many as a validation 
of the ‘improvements’ and ‘efficiencies’ of the previous years’ defence policies.65 It is also 
used as a confirmation that the reforms of doctrine undertaken by Generals Bagnall and 
Farndale in BAOR were effective. 66  
The First Gulf War of 1991 saw Britain deploy more than 45,000 personnel to Saudi Arabia.67 
The Gulf War demonstrated the plans for the Transition to War short of full mobilisation. 
The reinforcement plans for Britain’s contribution to NATO required large numbers of 
reservists, both regular and volunteer, to fill-out units deployed or deploying in NORTHAG. 
Because of the political situation, however, the initial mobilisation for the Gulf War was 
carried out without the reservists which would fill the gaps in the deployed units.68 The 
initial deployment followed the overall plans for a ‘Rapidly Moving Crisis’, which would 
allow forces to be deployed quickly without reservist mobilisation.  
Initially, to bring 7 Brigade up to warfighting establishment Brigadier Cordingley had to draw 
on the rest of the army: the Staffordshire Regiment required more than two hundred men; 
each tank regiment needed additional sixteen-man tank troops; and the artillery needed to 
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double in strength from five hundred personnel to one thousand.69 The Staffords were to 
absorb almost an entire company of the Grenadier Guards to bring them up to war 
establishment.70 This may have had a deleterious effect on unit cohesion due to lack of unit 
training.  The Army was acknowledged these shortcomings after the war: “Research has 
shown that few commanders deploying to the Gulf [in 1991] considered their units to be 
battle ready, including those at the peak of their training cycle, not least because 
reinforcements had to be absorbed and trained, equipment modified etc.”71 In a war in 
Europe, even in a slow moving crisis, there would not have been time to undergo the 
intensive training that was available to the troops in the Gulf. 
When the Army deployment was expanded from a brigade to a division, the problem of 
finding sufficient troops was exacerbated. Sir Peter De la Billière commented; 
“The trouble with Operation Granby was that nobody could tell how long it 
might last and because many of the British formations had been specially 
tailored to take part, replacing them was going to be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible. To create the first wave of formations had been relatively simple, 
as we simply poached men from other units to make numbers up, but it was 
obvious that by the time we came round to forming a second wave we would 
already have done our poaching and would find ourselves in serious 
difficulties.”72 
The House of Commons Defence Committee commented that the plans for mobilising 
troops at short notice for an emergency, were, in some cases, found wanting.73 
In the First Gulf War the entire logistical effort of the Armed Forces was focussed on keeping 
one enhanced division, comprising five tank regiments and five infantry battalions,74 in the 
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field. Estimates of the amount of ammunition shipped to the Gulf vary between 48,000 
tons75 and 102,000 tons.76 Taking the lowest figure, this amounts to almost half of the WMR 
held by Britain in Germany for whole of BAOR. Logistically it was estimated that each day, a 
division would use approximately 4,500 tons of supplies in mobile operations.77 The House 
of Commons Defence Committee reported that 95% of Royal Corps of Transport personnel 
were, “… deployed on operations in the Gulf or elsewhere … meaning that it was at the limit 
of Regular availability …”78 Indeed, according to Lt Col Reehal, responsible for transport and 
movement in the Gulf, the, “… whole RCT was decimated to provide the necessary 
personnel and vehicles …”79 He continues:  
“Trucks were taken away from units engaged on outloading UK and BAOR 
depots and the blinding realisation that to support one division, let alone four, 
required virtually every RCT soldier and vehicle in the British Army, was a 
salutary one.”80 
Spares for all sorts of equipment were not available, and had to be ‘robbed’ from the other 
formations to equip the forces in Saudi Arabia. The situation was such that, according to 
General Thompson, “There were no operational Warrior AIFVs and only about 10 running 
Challengers left in the whole Rhine Army, not to mention a host of other equipment left 
useless by cannibalisation.”81 In the same manner, all RAF(G) support helicopters were 
deployed for GRANBY leaving none for operations on the NATO Central Front.82 
Challenger itself caused some problems. Because of its complexity, a lack of spares and also 
lack of proper funding, maintenance of the vehicle and its systems had been inadequate. In 
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BAOR, “… at any one time over three quarters of the tanks were under repair or otherwise 
out of service.”83 The HCDC considered it, “… scandalous that the Challenger 1 tank fleet 
was in such a poor state in BAOR.”84 The vehicles were also to suffer with sand ingress to 
the engines, but this was not a problem confined to the desert. The air filtration system had 
previously been identified as problematic, with dust ingestion causing problems on 
exercises in Germany.85 Writing on the problems with Challenger, Lawrence Freedman 
commented that, “Engine troubles were embarrassing enough in exercises in Germany: they 
would be catastrophic in actual war.”86  
Challenger and Warrior were subject to extensive improvement, including up-armouring, on 
arrival in Jubail.87 The additional armour for the Challengers was to improve the protection 
of the storage bins, and to bring the early Mark versions up to the latest armour 
specifications. This upgrade process depended on an extended timescale to supply and fit 
the improvements. This would not have been available to the Armoured Divisions in Europe, 
even in the 30 day scenario.  
The desert provided a perfect environment for long-range anti-tank fire, especially as the 
Challenger out-ranged its opponents by a considerable degree.88 However, a comparison 
with what might occur in a European war must be considered carefully. Tanks and anti-tank 
missiles were capable of hitting targets at extreme range in the desert, whereas in Europe 
the line of sight is much more restricted, with tank-to-tank engagements expected to take 
place at an average of 500m.89 An advantage in weapon range would not count for so much 
in the European theatre as in the desert, which would level the disparity in weapon 
capabilities between NATO and the WTO. The HCDC noted, “During the Cold War, MoD 
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considered it was what the forces had in their ‘shop window’ which was important: the 
United Kingdom did not apparently expect to have to use it.”90 The LYNX/TOW attack 
helicopter was a disappointment in the Gulf War. This was a weapon system, like the 
Challenger, that was relied upon extensively in the doctrine of ‘Counterstroke’, but had 
been identified as needing urgent replacement. The HCDC complained the helicopter, “… 
lacked the capabilities, particularly survivability required …”91 for such operations. This 
system had two vital roles in the Counterstroke doctrine: flank protection and anti-tank 
attack role. The aim of the attack role was to cause heavy losses on enemy armour as the 
counter-attack commenced, and to provide deception as to the point of attack. Flank 
support was to protect the counter-attack against enemy forces.92 Survivability in this 
situation was paramount, considering the weight of anti-aircraft fire that WTO Motor-Rifle 
and Tank regiments possessed.93 The Counter-stroke anticipated facing an enemy of 
Divisional size.94  
The deployment of forces from Germany relied heavily on sea-lift capability, which caused 
some problems in obtaining sufficient ships of the right capabilities. This demonstrated the 
drawbacks inherent in the Government policy of replacing specialist military equipment, in 
this case shipping, with contracted civilian substitutes. There was also some confusion about 
the powers to requisition vessels.95 Concerns over precisely this problem had been 
expressed by the House of Commons Defence Committee in 1988 in their report ‘The 
Defence Requirement for Merchant Shipping and Civil Aircraft.’96 The Committee urged that 
numbers of merchant vessels available for military use be increased.  
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The problems with the military use of commercial ships which had already been identified in 
the Falklands War reappeared in the Gulf War. Initially there was only one berth available, 
in Jubail, which was capable of taking the British RO-RO vessels.97 Had the US ships not been 
equipped with their own side and rear ramps, the demands for this berth would have 
exceeded capacity by a considerable amount. Indeed, as some problems were experienced 
with the internal ramps on RO-RO vessels, ship’s cranes had to be used, slowing the 
unloading process considerably.98 
Without the establishment of dedicated port facilities at Jubayl in Saudi Arabia, and the 
unlimited fuel availability, the HCDC considered that, “… the United Kingdom would have 
been stretched to provide logistic support …”99 There was more than sufficient time to 
establish operating bases and rear-area support, and The HCDC noted: 
“The six month period of grace in Operation Granby meant … that some 
deficiencies in our ability to provide intervention forces from a standing start 
were not fully exposed. Units cannot be deemed to be ready for operations if 
they rely unduly on mobilisation of Reservists, in particular for support 
resources.”100  
General Thompson commented that, “Operation Desert Shield … was a classic Red Carpet 
operation, that is a build-up in a friendly country, which provided three key assets: airfields, 
ports and an enormous bonus, fuel; all without any enemy interference whatsoever …”101  
The HCDC also identified simple deficiencies which needed immediate rectification. Some 
40% of stretchers did not fit the stretcher carriers in the Hercules transport allocated for 
casualty evacuation.102 There was disappointment in some sections of the Armed Forces 
that many of the expensively acquired vehicles and weapons worked less than well in the 
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desert environment. Engines failed and weapons jammed due to simple dirt ingress. 
Although some of the weapon failures was attributed to poor or incorrect maintenance, the 
HCDC reported, “Some section and platoon commanders considered that casualties would 
have been suffered because of weapon stoppages had the enemy put up more resistance in 
close combat.”103 This problem was to recur in Iraq and Afghanistan in later years. 
The RAF was considered to have fared well in the Gulf overall, but some concern was raised 
over the medium level attack training.104 This lack of training had been caused by the 
‘cheese-paring’ of training flights and fuel use over the previous thirty years. Nor could the 
success of the air war be taken as an indicator of future wars. In the First Gulf War, and 
subsequent NATO and coalition operations, British and allied aircraft have operated in a 
permissive environment, almost absent of the threats a major war would entail. Squadron 
Leader Dick Druitt, a pilot in the Gulf War commented, “If the opposition had been anything 
like military people, the first planes they’d have taken out would have been the tankers and 
the AWACS, because without them the others could never have reached their targets.”105 
The RAF considered the JP233 was essential to the success of the air-superiority campaign. 
100 JP233s were used by the RAF, as against 6,000 1,000lb bombs. Its use was problematic: 
the attacking aircraft had to climb to a minimum of 500 feet to release the weapon whilst 
flying along the target runway, making it extremely vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire. According 
to the RAF, for the loss of four Tornados, “Eight Iraqi main operating bases had been closed 
while the operations of several others had been markedly reduced.”106 This had been in a 
battle-space without serious enemy contention in the air. The nature of the allies’ air 
superiority was marked by the fact that the RAF fired no air-to-air missiles during the war.107 
Given the demands placed on air interdiction against WTO air forces in MoD and NATO 
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planning, it is difficult to imagine what the losses would have been when faced with the 
dense WTO integrated air defence. 
Although a great success, GRANBY was fought in an almost entirely permissive environment 
without enemy interdiction of supply routes or serious competition for air superiority or 
control of the seas.108 The coalition rear area logistic areas were not subject to attack by 
enemy air or land forces. Log Base Alpha, as it was called, was the central logistic base for a 
large part of the allies’ supplies. General Cordingley commented how the logistic area stood 
out in the desert, and would have been an inviting target had the Iraqi forces been capable 
of an attack.109 NATO defence in NORTHAG, and British doctrine, relied on absorbing the 
first attacks from the WTO and then employing the ‘Counterstroke’. Whilst this posed little 
problem for the troops involved because of their professionalism, it showed the limitations 
of the equipment, supply and support which would have been provided for any battles in 
Europe. It is clear from General De la Billière’s comments that, once the first attacks had 
been met, had a similar situation obtained, there would have been ‘serious difficulties’ in 
providing for any counterattack. An attempted ‘Counterstroke’ would have been stillborn. 
Conclusion 
Common threads that run between Corporate and Granby are: the shortcomings of vessels 
provided for shipping; a need to oversupply ammunition and POL when compared to the 
scales for NATO; lack of suitably qualified personnel in essential roles, both combat and 
support; and insufficient numbers of essential weapons and platforms to perform the 
required tasks. 
Margaret Thatcher wrote that the Falklands War,  
“… had real importance in relations between East and West: years later I was 
told by a  Russian general that the Soviets had been firmly convinced that we 
would not fight for the Falklands, and that if we did fight we would lose. We 
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proved them wrong on both counts, and they did not forget the fact.”110 
The Falklands showed some deficiencies where readiness of forces was concerned. Although 
the Royal Navy was able to mobilise a fleet, some of it was not functioning correctly (HMS 
Invincible requiring a gear-box change soon after departure.111) The Army suffered from 
readiness problems, even with the forces that were supposed to be specifically for 
emergencies. The Falklands did not have much of an impact on Home Defence thinking, but 
did show up some deficiencies in the AEW and anti-missile defences. What British 
operations in the Falklands War lacked was a credible doctrine for a non-WTO enemy.  
The reliance for the balance of the Armed Forces on reservists had serious implications for 
their operational capability in anything other than a slow moving crisis. 3 Commando 
Brigade went to the Falklands with a reduced logistical tail, and entirely without its fuel 
handling detachment. This was keenly felt during the build-up of forces at San Carlos when 
knowledge of the hazards of handling petroleum and aviation fuel in large quantities was 
essential. The demands placed on fuel handling in the Falklands by Rapier systems alone 
took up more time and resources than was expected.112 Maintaining quality control of the 
fuel was also crucial, as contaminated or poor quality fuel damage engines and make 
equipment inoperable. 5 Brigade logistical troops were all reservists, and were not called up 
because of the urgency of the situation.113 
Both examples of real mobilisation were not on the scale which reinforcement of BAOR 
would constitute. That would have been a much larger movement of troops and equipment 
over a timescale similar to the Falklands War, but much shorter than the Gulf War. The 
British road, rail and air transport infrastructure would have been stretched to or past 
breaking point. 
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Because of the defensive nature of NATO, the operational and tactical needs for attack had 
been neglected in the British Army. The Falklands War was to provide an opportunity to 
relearn the need for close support weapons such as grenade launchers to help in the attack. 
In addition to Bagnall’s rethink of doctrine this was to prove extremely important. The 
troops would need to be re-equipped to take into account the different tactical demands 
this would place on them. Manoeuvre warfare as espoused by Bagnall and Farndale is all 
very well, but unless it is backed up with a fully functioning logistic tail it will very quickly run 
out of essential supplies. The tail must be capable of following any attack, thus requiring 
mobility and the capacity to withstand enemy interdiction that would inevitably result. 
Operation Granby showed what the British Armed Forces were capable of, given time and 
money. The deployment, however, highlights the lack of sustainability inherent in the 
policies and practices adopted over the previous twenty or more years. The Gulf War, 
because of the Government’s reluctance to mobilise the reserves, is a demonstration of 
what would have been available for a rapidly moving crisis in Europe. The time taken to 
develop the deployment, however, highlights several worrying deficiencies which would not 
have been rectified, even in a slow moving crisis in Europe. The upgrades to vehicles, 
training of troops and deployment of the logistical tail took longer than would have been 
available had war come to Europe. 
As a demonstration of the fighting capabilities of the 1(UK) Armoured Division, using the 
doctrines developed from Bagnall’s work in the 70s and 80s, the Gulf War showed their 
potential, but it also highlighted the weaknesses. Without supplies, without sufficient 
helicopter support, and with an aggressive enemy air force, any ‘counterstroke’ in a war on 
the Central Front may well have been abortive. 
Both wars were successful in achieving their aims and the Government publicly confirmed 
the success of their policies. Nevertheless, the reality did not support the Government’s 
position. The Gulf War showed how dependent a British deployment was on a slow logistic 
build-up and the provision of generous Host-Nation support. Both wars revealed problems 
in providing sufficient support for the fighting troops.  
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I hope someone has worked out if we can defend ourselves. 
Jim Callaghan, Labour Prime Minister, 1978  
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Overview 
In 1978 Sir Frank Roberts, diplomat and businessman, wrote to Sir Anthony Duff at the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office to report that he had heard, through a confidential 
business associate, that Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, regarded it as 
scandalous that the British troops in West Germany had supplies of arms for only two 
weeks.1 Sir Frank expressed surprise that this might be the case, and asked for corrective 
information. The information given to Sir Anthony Duff from C Henn of the MoD as part of 
the process of replying states that, “… we are in no position flatly to deny the suggestion …”2 
In the response to Roberts, Sir Anthony Duff said, “It was good of you to offer to pass on a 
corrective. It seems to us, however, that there would be disadvantages in trying to do this.”3 
There is a mixture of surprise and concern expresses in these letters, along with reluctance 
to discuss in any detail, even with trusted allies, the true situation. This exchange seems to 
encapsulate the circumstances within the British Government at the time: a few knew the 
fighting capability of the forces were insufficient, and passed that information on; some 
knew but were evasive or offered ambiguous information; some knew and kept it to 
themselves; others did not know, but were naturally concerned; and yet others never knew. 
Prime Ministers such as James Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher were both, at least initially, 
unaware of the deficiencies in Britain’s defence. 
The opinion expressed by Kissinger, and repeated by Sir Frank Roberts, runs parallel to the 
analysis of NATO’s fighting capability later presented by Mearsheimer and supported by 
Strachan (and many others). The true levels of reserves available to NATO armies were a 
relatively well-kept secret, even to those in positions of authority. Kissinger had, however, 
identified the crucial drawback with NATO’s strategy. He may well have known the truth, 
and used this as a pointed reminder to the British Government, but the reactions of British 
Junior Ministers and civil servants were revealing in their honesty.  
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The means provided to the Armed Forces were, on cursory inspection, sufficient to provide 
for deterrence, and the planned response to aggression. NATO instigated several projects to 
remedy shortcomings in numerous areas, mostly without success. The main recurring 
themes in the NATO projects were; force levels, reserves, readiness and planning. The 
means to sustain the forces were, nonetheless, deficient in all essential areas. Weapons 
dictate tactical doctrine, and the absence of sufficient sustaining stocks of particular weapon 
types and ammunition stocks meant the ‘sponge-tactics’ or ‘counterstroke’, amongst others, 
were effectively redundant. The RAF was incapable of many of its roles in the Follow-on 
Forces Attack, as it had to rely on older or obsolete, unguided, weaponry. 
Superficially, the policy and strategy of Flexible Response appeared convincing, but was 
ambiguous. The aim of NATO policy, defined in the strategic concept document MC 14/3, 
was to prevent aggressive action by the WTO through credible deterrence. But if deterrence 
failed NATO would seek to restore the status quo ante by employing force proportionate to 
that used by the aggressor, or threatening escalation.4 It was, essentially, a compromise 
between the need to maintain US attachment to Europe, and the European fear of war and 
occupation.  
As a compromise between European reluctance to accept the cost of building conventional 
forces to fight a long war, and US calls for a no-first use policy, MC 14/3 was something of a 
hollow concept, an attempt to please all the NATO members, but actually pleasing none. 
According to Isby and Kamps in their key work on the armies deployed on NATO’s Central 
Front, although all NATO members adopted Flexible Response, none undertook the full 
expansion of conventional forces required for its successful execution.5 Because of this 
failure, whilst seeming a positive attempt to lower the nuclear threshold, MC14/3 actually 
had no such effect. NATO as a whole did little from the late 1960s until the early 1980s to 
alter its response to a WTO invasion of Western Europe. Inherent in the lack of fighting 
capability was the near certainty of the choice between capitulation and the use of nuclear 
weapons if a full scale war broke out: the uncertainty regarding nuclear use was of how, 
                                                     
4 ‘A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area’, para. 17.a, MC 14/3, NATO. 
5 For information on force levels on the Central Front for all the NATO nations deployed there, see Isby and Kamps Jr, 
Armies of NATO’s Central Front. 
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when and how many. Clarity on this last problem was never achieved. A few improvements 
identified in AD70, the LTDP and CDI(I) had begun to show results, and were beginning to 
achieve their 1967 goals, when the reason for their existence disappeared. 
The way in which the WTO and the Soviet Union were dissolved means the cause cannot be 
identified solely in the strategy and policy adopted by NATO after 1967. Care must be taken 
lest a post hoc analysis is applied to their demise.  The fact that a war never happened in 
Europe during the Cold War is not proof that NATO strategy worked, and we should not be 
led into current or future vulnerabilities by believing so. As Dr McInnes wrote, “The case 
that flexible response has worked is not proven; the best that can be said is that it has not 
failed.”6 The reasons for the end of the Cold War were more complicated than the ability to 
out-produce the Eastern-bloc in tanks and missiles, and are still debated today.7 An 
authoritarian system dependent on central planning, riven by corruption and inefficiencies 
could not survive in a socially and technologically developing world. The threat that had 
existed for more than forty years, whether real or imagined, disappeared suddenly. 
The assessment of the threat from the WTO – whether it was right or wrong – was the basis 
for the strategy developed over the years following the end of World War Two. The 
assessments, made by such groups as the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Chiefs 
of Staff Committee (COS), were the starting points for the plans and processes put in place 
to deter, and if necessary counter, aggression from the WTO. Most of the assessments 
accepted that the WTO had the potential to mobilise with greater speed and secrecy than 
NATO’s various armed forces. NATO’s strategy was primarily aimed at deterring the 
prospect of war if a crisis had reached a tipping point. The early 1980s was a time of deep 
suspicion between East and West, and any display of weakness or indecision could have 
been easily misinterpreted. Deterrence at the time was a delicate balance between the two. 
Deterrence must work at all levels, as a nuclear war could have been the result of a 
conventional beginning, with an aggressor failing to obtain a sufficiently speedy victory – 
                                                     
6 McInnes, NATO’s Changing Strategic Agenda, 7. 
7 Crawshaw, Goodbye to the USSR; Robert Service, The End of the Cold War (London: Pan Books, 2016); Fortmann and 
Haglund, ‘Of Ghosts and Other Spectres: The Cold War’s Ending and the Question of the Next “hegemonic” Conflict’, Cold 
War History. 
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what Sir Francis Pym described as, “Short-warning aggression, and … short-duration war …”8 
- what were referred to as ‘salami-tactics’. Since the possibilities for accidentally launching a 
nuclear attack were remote, as Michael Quinlan had suggested,9 if the objective of raising 
the nuclear threshold was to be realised, and to counter to the WTO threat, conventional 
forces in sufficient numbers and sustainability should have been the rational policy.  
As both sides in the Cold War moved away from immediate use of nuclear weapons, the 
conventional defence of continental Europe, the Channel and the Atlantic was a necessary 
condition of NATO policy. NATO Strategy and British policy appear to have been publicly 
positioned to answer the WTO’s military capabilities, but secretly the posture responded to 
the assessment of the WTO’s intentions. The British Government repeatedly concluded that 
the WTO did not intend to start a war deliberately. In a crisis that might accidentally have 
turned into war, a short duration conflict allowing political negotiations and a cooling-down 
period was hoped for. 
One of the UK Government’s explicitly stated goals was to maintain Alliance cohesion, 
effectively bridging the gap between US policy and that of the majority of continental 
European members. The act of providing a greater proportion of the defence budget for the 
front line, or ‘teeth’, forces showed where the British Government thought would provide 
the greatest deterrent, and unifying, effect. It demonstrated to the other Alliance members 
Britain’s commitment to the defence of Europe. What it also appeared to do was to keep 
any potential ground war as far from Britain’s shores as possible, fulfilling the publicly 
declared primary role of defence policy which was to maintain the security of the home 
country. Michael Quinlan was pragmatic in his work on nuclear deterrence10 and the need 
to maintain the NATO Alliance. However, his and other civil servants’ comments regarding 
war stocks and the British level of contribution to NATO display either a lack of knowledge 
of the true situation or a diplomatic avoidance of the problem.  As a lack of knowledge 
seems unlikely the latter position appears more probable. This conclusion returns to the 
                                                     
8 Defence Policy and Programme, Appendix A, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence, 7th July 1980, ‘UK 
Future Defence Planning’, para. 2, FCO 46/2171, TNA. 
9 Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, 22. 
10 Such as Thinking About Nuclear Weapons; ‘The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Policy for Western Possessors’, International 
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-). 
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proposition that defence policy should be a response to the potential threats to the security 
of the nation which does not reflect the facts presented as the core of this research. 
Defence policy was not shaped by the threat, but rather by the amount of money 
realistically available, by answering the question of ‘How little can we get away with?’11 This 
was – and still is – a situation not conducive to long-term strategic thought and planning. 
NATO policy was an attempt to balance contradictions within the Alliance whilst also 
achieving a level of collective defence against the perceived Soviet threat. Attempts to 
balance the internal political and bureaucratic demands may have led to an imbalance in the 
military forces available to NATO. Some aspects of Alliance theory seem to hold true, such 
as smaller countries taking a disproportionately smaller share of the defence burden.12 That 
burden enlarged as the cost of technology increased the cost of weapon systems and 
reserves. Improving the defence ‘posture’ by using new technologies and new doctrines 
took precedence in the contemporary writings over ensuring the existing force structure 
worked.13 Non-offensive defence (NOD) was promoted as a way to decrease tensions in 
Europe. What was not undertaken in any detail was to question the fundamental weakness 
of the non-front-line component and reserves, and the overall sustainability of the forces in 
war. Sustainability had been a problem for NATO from the 1950s: 
“For the defense [sic] of Western Europe, and particularly Continental 
Europe, it will be necessary to make a maximum initial effort with all 
available resources even though it may not be possible to sustain this 
effort, provided, by so doing, sufficient delay may be achieved to allow 
for reinforcement, and for the strategic air offensive to take effect.”14  
In any crisis of conflict, the plans show a delay for reinforcement from either the UK or the 
US/Canada. The US was dependent on REFORGER, which would become effective up to 90 
days after the beginning of a crisis. In conjunction with the delays in mobilising sufficient 
                                                     
11 This is discussed in detail in Gray, ‘Strategy and Defence Planning’, 162, in Strategy in the Contemporary World., 5th ed. 
12 Olson and Zeckhauser, ‘An Economic Theory of Alliances’, 9, RM-4297-ISA. 
13 European Security Study, Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe, 10; Bellany and Huxley, New Conventional 
Weapons and Western Defence; Booth, New Thinking About Strategy and International Security. 
14 ‘NATO Medium Term Plan’, para. 54, DC 13, NATO. 
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forces from the UK, the regular forces deployed on Continental Europe and the seas around 
it would be stretched beyond breaking point whilst waiting for reinforcement. 
Britain had been identified as crucial to the defence in depth of NATO, and as a rear-area for 
the reception of reserves and reservists. Despite this important role, the British Government 
appeared to circumvent its full commitment to NATO through tergiversation and the use of 
political rhetoric which did not reflect the practice. The Government reduced defence 
spending as a percentage of the wealth of the country, even at a time of great threat. 
Increases in spending, such as after the Falklands War, were maintained only for a short 
time, and the trend as a percentage of GDP was consistently downward. (See Appendix B, 
Figure 6 - Defence Budget as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, with trend, 1955 to 
1990) Economics more than threat assessment influenced strategy, and ploys such as 
‘cutting the tail to provide for the teeth’ and dependence on reservists placed the Armed 
Forces in an extremely vulnerable position. 
Whilst in Government, Dr David Owen, Fred Mulley and Francis Pym were candid in their 
private comments regarding the paucity of defensive and logistical capabilities with which 
British defence policy had left the Armed Forces.  In the 1960s and 1970s the Labour party 
had leaned towards effecting détente and devoted greater energies to pursuing 
disarmament as a means of preventing war – and saving money. The Conservatives moved 
détente into a secondary role and pursued a policy more akin to warfighting deterrence. The 
events in Afghanistan and Poland confirmed Western fears of Soviet aggressive intentions, 
but not sufficiently for an increase in defence spending. 
Unseen by most of the public at the time, but sometimes leaking out from the Government, 
were the differences of opinion robustly shared between politicians, and by some of the 
military officers. Sir Francis Pym, leader of the Tory ‘wets’, was famously removed from his 
position of Defence Secretary because, according to Margaret Thatcher, he had sided with 
the Ministry of Defence and failed to adhere to the monetarist policy imposed by the 
Government.15 Keith Speed, Navy Minister, was sacked in 1981 for disagreeing with the 
reduction in the numbers of Royal Navy vessels. The 1981 Defence review effectively 
                                                     
15 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 141–43. 
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returned Britain’s policy to that of 1952 – national policy was to focus on an intensive war in 
Europe which was to be of short duration, and the use of nuclear weapons was explicit in 
the planning. In one naval officer’s view, the review, “… emasculated the conventional war 
capability of the Royal Navy and our national commitment to the NATO alliance in favour of 
a national strategic weapons system.”16 The Directors of Defence Policy agreed with this 
conclusion.17 
The main policy announcements made by the British Government appeared to be an 
attempt at public reassurance. The idea of a long warning period was central to almost all 
overt British planning, and was made public to reduce fears and demonstrate preparations 
for the eventuality of war. The field exercises, for example exercise Lionheart in 1984, 
continued for ten days of conventional combat, and had extensive media coverage. Far less 
public was the assumption that the use of nuclear weapons would, sooner or later, have 
been inevitable. The probability was, based on even the most minimal expenditure of 
conventional ammunition, that the use of nuclear weapons would have been necessary 
within a few days. Nevertheless, both NATO and British policy advocated the need to raise 
the nuclear threshold, improve conventional defence and increase overall readiness. With 
the resurgence of CND in the late 1970s and early 1980s support for raising the nuclear 
threshold was politically expedient. The political rhetoric supported the policy, but the 
practice did not match the words. 
The lack of sustainability in the conventional defence of Europe meant that there would be, 
perhaps, two or three days after hostilities commenced before the military situation was so 
bad that surrender would become inevitable, or nuclear weapons would be used. All the 
evidence, from military documents to Government exercises, points to the likelihood that 
SACEUR would have requested a release of tactical nuclear weapons within a few days. The 
weight of belief at the time was that once nuclear release had been approved, the move 
from tactical to strategic exchange would be relatively quick. The policies adopted in Britain 
                                                     
16 Admiral Sir John (Sandy) Woodward, GBE, KCB, in Dorman, Kandiah, and Staerck, The Nott Review, 71, ICBH Witness 
Seminar Programme. 
17 DP12/81, An Assessment of UK Defence Programme Changes, Strategic Implications, ‘NATO Logistics Policy General UK 
Logistics Assumptions’, para. 44, DEFE 25/432, TNA. 
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after 1967 made the possibility of nuclear war greater by misrepresenting the threat, the 
deterrent and the nuclear threshold. 
It may be that, in private, politicians and senior military officers believed a low nuclear 
threshold was inevitable. Fundamental conventional policy, followed quietly in the 
background, can be seen to go back to a document from 1968 produced by the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee (COS): 
“In major hostilities … we believe that tactical nuclear weapons would almost 
certainly become necessary; and since we do not envisage prolonged 
hostilities thereafter we do not believe that NATO resources should be 
devoted to those conventional capabilities appropriate only to sustained 
operations at the higher level, or to a campaign dependent on the attrition of 
the enemy’s forces or war making material.”18 
This is contrary to the public assertions regarding improvements in the Armed Forces 
efficiency, increasing the nuclear threshold, getting greater value for money, and cutting the 
tail to improve the teeth. The Chiefs of Staff Committee believed nuclear weapons would be 
used relatively quickly, and as such resources should not be committed to providing for a 
long or attritional conventional war. This appears to have been the unpublicised, but 
executed policy Britain pursued throughout the last twenty years of the Cold War, in 
contrast to the publicly declared policy. This dichotomy was expressed by Bernard Brodie 
who wrote, “… there is a monumental ambiguity in the public pronouncements of relevant 
officials of the highest rank.”19 It was not unusual for publicly declared policies to be ignored 
behind the scenes: the contradiction between Labour’s emphasis on not producing a new 
generation of nuclear weapons and the Chevaline upgrade to Polaris is a good example.20  
The true reason why cost cutting was feasible, and shortfalls in ammunition and reserves 
accepted, may be seen in the scenario papers for WINTEX 83 which read, “Initial release of 
                                                     
18 COS 43/68, Annex A, The British Contribution to NATO in the Long Term, Part IV - Capabilities Required by NATO, 
Conventional Capabilities, Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Revision of NATO Strategy’, para. 114, DEFE 13/635, TNA. 
19 Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 168. Brodie identifies The Chief of the Royal Air Force, Sir John Slessor, as an example 
of this ambiguity. 
20 Baylis, British Defence Policy: Striking the Right Balance, 42. 
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nuclear weapons by NATO in response to an overwhelming conventional attack could take 
place when NATO was faced with a militarily untenable position …”21 Knowing that NATO 
would never commit the resources needed to achieve the mass required for defence against 
a conventional WTO attack, it was inevitable that they would face a militarily untenable 
position, leading inexorably to the first use of nuclear weapons. This enabled those making 
the policy to have a face saving position when questioned about the intended use of nuclear 
weapons, and NATO’s dependence on them. Thus, money could safely be saved from the 
defence budget. Even as the Cold War dissipated after the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev, the 
plans and expectations for war still anticipated nuclear release after a few days. With this 
qualification to any defence policy, limited expenditure on the Armed Forces becomes more 
understandable. 
Defence policy has been likened to house insurance, but that analogy does not work fully. 
Better perhaps to view it as purchasing new windows and doors for a house. Economically, 
it is cheaper to buy wooden framed units with simple locks, but they will need repainting 
every two years, are not particularly secure, will degrade and require replacement. At the 
other extreme are the most secure, triple glazed, five point locking, steel framed units. 
These are very expensive, but will last thirty years without any more maintenance than an 
annual wipe down and lubrication. Even better, your insurance will be discounted because 
of the security they offer your possessions. In the same way, defence policy has been and 
continues to be discussed. Some urged increasing quantities of simple and cheap weapon 
systems, but the main drawback is that their lifetime is limited and so will need frequent 
updating and replacement: others urge small numbers of technologically advanced systems, 
expensive to develop, manufacture, deploy and support. Whatever the choice, politicians 
were always looking for ways to save on defence spending, looking for ‘efficiencies’ in the 
MoD. 
In attempting to reduce costs, ‘short-lifing’ meant valuable equipment was scrapped or 
decommissioned before the replacement had come into service, or indeed was being 
manufactured. This still occurs, for example scrapping the Harriers before their 
replacements were purchased. The Tornado aircraft currently being employed in Iraq 
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against IS forces are the only aircraft in the RAF inventory capable of precision ground 
attack. There are now only three squadrons of Tornados in the RAF, and one of those was 
due for disbandment, but has been kept on because of the possibility of escalation in the 
region.22 The Typhoon is only slowly entering service, with the ground-attack version lower 
in priority than the air superiority version although those priorities might change.23 
Analysts and Academics such as Mearsheimer, Chalmers and Unterseher may have had a 
point when they compared force sizes between the WTO and NATO and found little support 
for the gross inequality proposed by others (see various Statements on the Defence 
Estimates). But as with many analysts and academics writing about NATO doctrine and 
policy at the time, they failed to understand that a ‘bean-count’ of fighting forces was 
insufficient to establish a true view of the military balance.  
Some ‘knowledge’ of the period was simply assertions made without reference to the 
original material, such as the 55,000-man force level minimum for BAOR. These numbers 
were repeated so often that they became part of lore. Similarly, assertion that NATO’s 
conventional defences were not weak but simply required alternative strategies missed the 
fundamental problem: the strategy was sound, but the nations which had subscribed to it 
could not, or would not, spend the money necessary to increase the conventional forces 
and support materiel which were necessary. For the British Government, not alone in NATO 
in its thinking, the answer was to fill the gaps in the forces with reservists – the cheaper 
alternative. 
As Martin Van Creveld wrote,24 there has been little attempt in studies of defence planning 
to understand the causes of the lack of endurance of NATO or the national forces. This has 
shown itself in a disinterest in the logistical limitations of the Armed Forces, and their 
increased reliance on reservists. None of the published works reviewed for this thesis make 
the link between the plans, their timings, and the use of reservists and limited material 
resources. Most thought was put into discussing revisions and changes to policy and 
                                                     
22 See BBC report, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-29801025, ‘How much force will, or can, the UK bring to bear against 
IS?’, accessed 21/10/2014 
23 http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/typhoon.cfm, accessed July 2015 
24 Van Creveld, Supplying War, 2nd ed. 
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strategy, such as with Professor Strachan’s opinion in support of Professor Mearsheimer. 
This thesis has sought to provide the detail and connection between these important 
aspects of defence planning, and to identify common themes persisting in current policy.  
All logistics within NATO were a national responsibility, and NATO forces, including the 
British Services, lacked any kind of sustainability for armed combat against the WTO during 
the Cold War. The inability to distribute materiel in a crisis was a serious concern for the 
British Armed Forces. However, this concern was confined to a very few of the more 
obscure academic publications, and within the Armed Forces themselves. Some relevant 
articles have been published by the Armed Forces, and some academic papers, but they 
have been rare.  
In the event of a crisis, there would be two logistical supply problems face by the Armed 
Forces: the first would be the more mundane equipment in the rear-areas; the second the 
technologically advanced front-line weaponry. Armoured transport for front-line 
replenishment of supplies was non-existent. In the rear areas the limited numbers of regular 
specialist personnel and heavy haulage and lifting equipment, and the reliance on civilian 
transport, would have severely curtailed the ability to fulfil the logistic demands of the 
fighting units. Lorries with sufficient load capacity had been in short supply, as was 
commercial railway rolling stock and engines. Without dedicated shipping for transport, 
reliance was placed on RO-RO ferries, and if the dock facilities for these were damaged, the 
unloading times would have been multiplied several times. It has been shown that the WTO 
was expected to target ports and dock facilities in their planning, but field exercises did not 
account for this contingency. It is doubtful if the reinforcements for BAOR could have been 
transported in sufficiently quickly, even in the most benign of circumstances.  
The British Government was aware of the insufficient war-stocks and the inadequate 
supporting infrastructure. In addition, conventional war of any length would have required 
an established industrial base capable of switching to war production within the necessary 
warning times. No Western Government had such capabilities, nor were they prepared to 
invest in its creation. NATO and its member states chose to talk about raising the nuclear 
threshold, strengthening conventional forces, and improving deterrence, whilst certainly at 
a national level being aware that any war would have been short and have ended in a 
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nuclear exchange. Had the British Government been serious about providing for a non-
nuclear war, the plants used to manufacture essential war material and vehicles would have 
been mothballed after the initial production run. As it was, the production lines were 
dismantled, meaning no more ‘complex-consumables’ such as FV432s, Warriors or 
Chieftains could ever be produced. With high attrition levels expected, the supply of fighting 
vehicles would have been a limiting factor on the prosecution of any counter-attack. 
Attrition in war would account not just for the transportation but the ammunition and 
materiel as well. An insufficient War Maintenance Reserve was unquestionably a serious 
problem. The speed with which the reserves of ammunition would be used meant that 
within forty-eight hours some types would be exhausted. The personnel using those 
weapons would be left with no recourse: whether at sea, in the air, or on land, the Armed 
Forces would be rapidly left incapable of carrying out their mission. War is wasteful, and 
requires a plentiful supply of weapons and ammunition, and sufficient forces to employ 
them. In this respect, capability, and therefore ‘efficiency’, must be measured using a 
different metric to that used outside the military. 
 ‘Doing more with less’ has been symbolic since before the 1950s. This totem has 
manifested itself in efficiency drives, and demands for more effective Services. The 
‘efficiency’ of the Armed Forces has been ‘improved’ with each defence review, aiming 
presumably at a goal of transcendent efficiency at some undisclosed point in the future. 
There is some confusion between 'efficient' and 'effective' in the policies of successive 
Governments.  The idea promulgated since the 1980s by politicians that business practice 
can be applied to military organisations is seriously misplaced.  
The business notions of efficiency of production and operation are narrow concepts for 
single products/services which rarely put people's lives in jeopardy. The military does not, 
and cannot, work in the same way. Too much depends on the tools being provided to them 
working properly in situations not conceived of by anyone. In a combat operation, people's 
lives depend on the kit, weapons and tools working in extremis, and possibly not in their 
originally intended role. An office worker taking a delivery of the wrong sort of paper-clips 
does not seem to reach the same level of criticality. 
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Cost effectiveness has been used to justify stationing regular BAOR and RAF(G) units in the 
UK. For units stationed in West Germany, deployment would take up to 48 hours. For units 
stationed in the UK, deployment would take longer. Their movement would have been 
clearly visible to any potential watcher, and given the reluctance of Western Governments 
to appear ‘provocative’ it is possible their deployment could be delayed for political reasons. 
Locating the units in the UK might have saved money, but at the expense of operational 
flexibility and political decision-making freedom. Economic ‘efficiency’ outweighed strategic 
and operational means. 
In pursuit of ‘efficiency’ the Armed Forces had been cut to low levels, yet asked to do more. 
The concept of moving towards a ‘more efficient structure’25 is relatively meaningless 
concerning the Armed Forces. It implies that there is a ‘most efficient’ structure for the 
Forces. How can this be, when the roles they are required to fulfil are so disparate? During 
the Cold War, and especially the period of this research, there were those who thought that 
‘efficiency’ could be achieved by cutting the logistical tail and spending the money saved on 
the combat units. The necessitated extensive employment of reserves, and demonstrated 
that, in some cases, the rhetoric of efficiency when applied to the military was baseless, and 
what was created was militarily impractical. For example, considering the mine hunting and 
sweeping capabilities of the Royal Navy, the eleven River Class vessels and 30 other vessels 
which would be taken up from trade were crewed by RNR (requiring call-up which imposed 
a delay on their deployment), and the numbers of vessels and their capabilities are 
considerably below what the RN considered adequate for even the most minimal anti-mine 
operations during wartime. Given the considerable dependence on maritime resupply both 
for Britain and the forces in Europe, and the need for clear deployment routes for warships 
and nuclear submarines, this was more than just a serious deficiency. So many plans relied 
on maritime resupply that failure to keep the waterways into ports clear would have caused 
loss of shipping and extensive delays. 
The plans created by NATO and the MoD were based on threat analyses which were the 
best guesses of the analysts of the time. They were an attempt to respond to the actions 
expected of the Soviet Union and WTO in a crisis or time of war. But the plans also show the 
                                                     
25 Mark Phillips, ‘The Future of the UK’s Reserve Forces’, Occasional Paper (RUSI, April 2012), vii. 
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British Government attempting to deal with what was an intractable problem – providing 
the ways and means for achieving the strategic ends without the economic resources fully 
to do so. British defence planning was a case of trying to avoid the worst whilst planning for 
the best.26  
As Professor Gray says, defence planners do not have a crystal ball which allows them to see 
the future, but the Cold War was perhaps more predictable than most situations. Despite 
this apparent predictability, the politicians and military did not provide sufficient resources 
to meet the demands of the plans created by the British Government. There may have been 
a credible nuclear deterrent, but there was certainly little credibility at the conventional 
level. NATO’s overall posture was not a plausible working of Flexible Response, and NATO 
has been shown to have concerns over the credibility, both qualitatively and quantitatively, 
of Britain’s contribution. 
The situation regarding Britain’s home defence was little different. Home Defence was 
wholly inadequate, made apparent by the insufficient level of forces to protect the seas, 
airspace and key points of the country. A dependence on unsuitable civilian infrastructure 
and equipment, transport and supplies was dangerous. Had Britain been called upon to fulfil 
its role in a war in Europe, this research suggests that the forces provided were insufficient 
for their task with no certainty of sustainability beyond the first 48 hours. The plans did not 
necessarily reflect the military’s preferred way to deal with the threat as they assessed it.  
The situation was summed up by a JIC assessment in 1978, and reported to the Prime 
Minister:  
“Given even the maximum readiness of NATO forces, it is doubtful if the 
defences of the UK would be sufficient, even against only conventional attack, 
to prevent vital elements of NATO’s military capability being substantially 
damaged or destroyed.  The early loss of substantial NATO forces based in or 
transitting through the UK could force rapid escalation to the nuclear level 
                                                     
26 This phrase has been adopted from Hennessy, Distilling the Frenzy, 83. Hennessy used it in relation to the Beveridge 
Report of 1942. 
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and greatly reduce the time available for political resolution of the conflict.”27 
This statement directly contradicts the British Government policy of trying to raise the 
nuclear threshold. In the Prime Minister’s own hand on the cover of the report is the 
comment, “I hope someone has worked out if we can defend ourselves.”28 
The plans made, extensive though they were, appear more for convenience than to deal 
with either the WTO intentions or capabilities. The whole strategy for deployment and 
operations of the Armed Forces was predicated on a slow moving crisis turning to a general 
war along a predictable timeline. This did not take into account NATO’s concern that a swift 
attack launched by the WTO could reach a conclusion in a few days. This would present 
NATO leaders with an accomplished fact whilst they decided on nuclear release. The WTO 
intention would be to undermine Alliance cohesion, leading to a break-up of NATO. 
The credibility of British defence policy was precarious at best. There were not enough of 
any supplies, and what was available may never have been capable of being transported to 
the fighting forces. Greater reliance on non-military equipment for military duties meant 
delays in offloading, and sometimes unavailability of transportation. Obsolete or 
obsolescent equipment was retired before its successor was deployed, leaving gaps in the 
military capability. The most feared, and possibly the most likely scenario was the short 
warning, but with the WTO mobilised secretly. This would allow no time for REFORGER and 
only limited mobilisation in the UK. Named ‘smash and grab’ by some, WTO plans were 
released in the early 1990s showing the Rhine as a main objective29 which indicated what 
the WTO though would be a possible outcome of a war. 
In previous European wars, the British Armed Forces had had the opportunity of using time 
to recover from any early setbacks, reorganise and re-arm, before returning to the fray to 
                                                     
27 Annex to MO15/3, Response to the Soviet Threat to Targets in the UK, 16th January 1978, ‘Defence against the Soviet 
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28 JIC(77)10, The Soviet Capability to Attack targets in the United Kingdom Base, 26th October 1977, ‘Defence against the 
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defeat the enemy. This situation occurred in the Napoleonic wars, World War I and World 
War II. This time was also available to re-tool industry for the output of weapons and 
ammunition to continue the war. In the Cold War, if weapon systems were ineffective, there 
would have been no time to recover and redesign them. At the beginning of the Second 
World War British Bomber Command found some of its expensive investment in aircraft to 
be of little value. Their withdrawal meant that quantitatively Bomber Command was unable 
to deliver its promise until the new, heavy four-engine bombers arrived. Nighttime area 
bombing was adopted until the technology became available for accurate target location at 
night. All of these deficiencies were compensated for by the development, over time, of 
new and better equipment. Air Marshal Tedder summed this situation up when he wrote, 
“Surely it is the problems of the early stages of the war which we should study. Those are 
the difficult problems; those are the practical problems which we and every democratic 
nation have to solve ... It is at the outset of war that time is the supreme factor.”30 The 
temporally compensatory buffer was a crucial component that would be missing from the 
training and development aimed at fighting the next war. The ‘trip-wire’ posture of NATO up 
to 1967 effectively removed all of these temporal benefits, and replaced it with one 
‘wargasm’, a phrase used by Herman Kahn to describe the all-out nuclear war that the trip-
wire response would elicit. Flexible Response was supposed to remove the ‘wargasm’ 
reaction to WTO aggression. This was supposed to apply from the adoption of MC 14/3: in 
effect it simply gave a few days’ more grace before nuclear weapons would be used.  
Had a breakthrough been created by a successful WTO attack the Army might face a similar 
problem to that of the BEF in 1940 during the campaign in the Low Countries and the 
retreat to Dunkirk.31 Having limited mobility and reduced numbers or complete absence of 
anti-armour and other heavy weapons, many rear-area BEF troops were poorly equipped to 
fight a mechanised, fast moving enemy. 40 years later, a similar situation obtained in BAOR. 
The 2nd Infantry Division was equipped with light scales of weaponry, SAXON armoured 
personnel carriers (the armour of which was supposed to be proof against only small calibre 
weapons), and soft-skinned vehicles. These, mostly reservist, rear area troops would have 
                                                     
30 Arthur William Tedder, Air Power in War, University of Alabama Press (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010), 
25. 
31 Sebag-Montefiore, Dunkirk, 377–465. 
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been ill-equipped to stop any substantial breakthrough. The superiority in technology that 
NATO had would have been exhausted within a few days, and those remaining forces left to 
fight on very unequal terms. 
The so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, named from the development of highly 
accurate guided weaponry, should be regarded less as a revolution and more as an 
evolution. NATO has maintained from its inception that it would rely on the development of 
high technology weapons to provide the edge against the numerically superior WTO forces. 
This was enshrined in MC 14, published in 1950. The developments, seen as a ‘revolution’ 
were the outcome of decades of military demands and technological inventions that 
enabled those demands to be met. To replace nuclear weapons and their associated risk of 
escalation if used, extremely accurate weapons were required which could, with a high 
probability, destroy pin-point targets. The development of these weapons was a continuous 
process, from World War II onwards, as was the development of doctrines and tactics to 
exploit them. Armed forces have always been required to adjust to changing situations, but 
the relative stability of the political situation of the Cold War should have enabled policy and 
strategic decisions to have been made that were capable of being implemented in full. 
Problematically, weapon systems that had been factored in to future defence policy and 
doctrine had been cancelled when nearing completion. Additionally, reductions and 
alterations in force levels and composition were made, but the purpose and objectives of 
those forces were not changed.32 Overstretch, a term familiar to the British Army, could be 
applied to all of the Services. They each had a role to play in NATO, but each had its forces 
eroded by years of cuts and efficiency drives. The compromises undertaken by the MoD 
weakened the capability of the Armed Forces. 
Industry related to military production in Britain provided many thousands of skilled jobs, 
but with the reduced defence budget, and greater cost of technology, the loss of jobs was 
inevitable. Nevertheless, Britain developed a significant technological industrial base with 
defence roles, especially in aerospace and satellite manufacturing, even as the older heavy 
                                                     
32 Holmes, Nuclear Warriors, 6. 
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industries, such as shipbuilding, declined. Technology developed in Britain, such as TIALD33 
was rushed to the Gulf in 1991 and proved extremely capable. 
The victory in the First Gulf War was presented to the public as a clear indicator that the 
policies and modifications undertaken between 1979 and 1991 were successful. Closer 
analysis exposes the severe limitations the Armed Forces were working under, and how, in 
the First Gulf War, almost the entire resources of BAOR - resources meant to sustain a Corps 
- were only just sufficient to put a reinforced Division into the field. 
The British Armed Forces would have been unable to fulfil their commitment to NATO even 
in a slow build up to war. Defence spending had been cut to such an extent that, although 
the Armed Forces had capable weaponry, those weapons were limited in their use by a 
restricted supply of ammunition. Evidence from the Falklands and Iraq shows that the daily 
usage rates would have been exceeded, sometimes by large margins. This would have 
meant an even earlier collapse of any defence than was previously thought. The records 
from the National Archives have shown that, on many occasions, Armed Forces officers 
made this point to their Government representatives. On several occasions concerned 
Ministers did the same, but the results always seem to be unchanged: ammunition stock 
levels were kept low to save money.  
Conclusion and Final Remarks 
In the words of Albert Sorel, the French historian, this thesis has analysed the, “… eternal 
dispute between those who imagine the world to suit their policy, and those who arrange 
policy to suit the realities of the world.”34  The findings suggest that the former dominated 
the latter. Overall the link between threat assessment and force provision was almost 
independent of any perceived threat, and heavily dependent on available financial 
resources. Probably the most significant finding of this research had been the current 
political and policy continuities based on a misinterpretation of past events.  
                                                     
33 Thermal Imaging Airborne Laser Designator 
34 Albert Sorel, L’Europe et la Révolution Française, p. 474, quoted in Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 11. 
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The conclusion of this thesis is that Britain did not meet its commitment to NATO in either 
the ways or means to achieve the ends. So what? If these policies occurred during the Cold 
War, are they of any relevance now?  Why are they important?  The answer to this question 
lies in the context.  Before the advent of nuclear weapons, Britain had time to recover from 
any military setback. In the bipolarity of the Cold War, we know that no full-scale war took 
place. However, the policy decisions which were taken at the time have trickled down into 
current policy. Current threats include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. When, not 
if, Britain is involved in another large-scale war, the drawbacks caused by the apparent 
success of the ‘cheese-paring’ cuts to the Armed Forces will return to trouble the policy-
makers of the time. That is, if the war is not over within a few days. 
This research has questioned the links between policy, planning and execution for British 
defence. Overall, many of the links that should have existed – the feedback between policy, 
strategy, doctrine, tactics and technological development – have been found wanting. Each 
seems to have remained isolated. Since the end of the Cold War, the NATO strategy of 
MC14/3, and British defence policy, have been held as examples of success. They have 
justified continuation of cuts to defence spending. The justifications derive from two false 
premises: firstly, the policies employed in the past sixty years have all been successful; 
secondly that by cutting the Armed Forces, they will become more ‘efficient’ and, therefore, 
more ‘effective’. The evidence contradicts these beliefs, and the words of McInnes, that the 
policy success is unproven, rather it has not seen to have failed, are as pertinent here as for 
Flexible Response. Politicians demanded cuts in defence spending. Main weapons and 
projects were costed for up to ten years ahead. The only way to save money was to cut 
other, ‘soft’, aspects of the defence budget – fuel, ammunition, spares and training. A 
problem was created by the demands of the politicians, the limitations of the development 
and purchasing of major weapon systems, and the ‘can-do’ attitude of the Armed Forces. 
The German philosopher Hegel wrote, “What experience and history teaches us is that 
people and governments have never learned anything from history, or acted on principles 
deduced from it.”35 This holds true today, with short-term thinking affecting long term 
policy outcomes. The conclusion has so far dealt with the effects defence policy had on the 
                                                     
35 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, vol. 1, 1832, sec. II. 
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Armed Forces during the Cold War. We should return to Professor Winton’s comment that 
there could be an anticipation of future behaviour based on past events.36 The question that 
naturally follows is what implications does the research have for the current and future 
policy? 
Suggestions for future research 
I have continued my research, covering the period from the end of the Cold War up until the 
present. The intention is to see if the policy of ‘tail’ cutting and dependence on reservists 
has continued. The thawing of relations between East and West following Gorbachev’s rise 
to power allowed the NATO countries to use this as further excuse to reduce defence 
spending. More recently, with the MoD budget cut to about 2% of Gross Domestic Product 
the Armed Forces are finding it difficult to live up to the demands of their political masters. 
The problems with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan can be attributed to, at least in part, the 
‘penny pinching’ attitudes of the previous decades. The Armed Services’ positive attitude 
and limited resources coupled with a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ fear of budget cuts, has led to 
situations which have found the Services ill-equipped for action demanded of them, and 
their political masters unprepared to listen to the problems.37 
The cuts to the Armed Forces in the UK are viewed as a continuation of the ‘Peace Dividend’ 
following the end of the Cold War.38 Warnings are now being sounded that the cuts are too 
deep, and have gone too far for the Armed Forces to fulfil their purpose. As shown in this 
research, these cuts are not a recent phenomenon limited to the post-Cold-War world. 
Contrary to popular belief, spending on the Armed Forces was cut during the Cold War, and 
at a time of great threat. The apparent success of these cuts, and subsequent active 
deployments, indicated to politicians that the Armed Forces could be cut further without a 
threat either to national security, or to Britain’s ability to project force around the world. As 
the cuts continue, there will come a point beyond which the reduced Armed Forces are 
                                                     
36 Gray, The Future of Strategy, 61. 
37 Jack Fairweather, A War of Choice: Honour, Hubris and Sacrifice: The British in Iraq (London: Vintage, 2012), 347. 
38 Malcolm Chalmers, ‘The Financial Context for the 2015 SDSR. The End of UK Exceptionalism?’ (RUSI, September 2014); 
Malcolm Donald Knight, Norman Loayza, and Delano Villanueva, The Peace Dividend: Military Spending Cuts and 
Economic Growth (Washington, DC: World Bank, Policy Research Dept., Macroeconomics and Growth Division, and 
International Monetary Fund, 1996). 
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unable to perform even limited operations. Some would argue that point has already been 
reached.39 
Several papers were published during the first decade of the millennium relating to value-
for-money acquisition of defence equipment and technology, but the next big change came 
in 2010 with the Strategic Defence and Security Review, which sought to ‘…increase 
cooperation with our international partners to deliver defence more efficiently and 
effectively.’40 The SDSR still contained the words which have become familiar over the 
decades, in which the Services needed to ‘… generate and sustain forces more effectively 
and efficiently across the full range of future missions and tasks.’41 As recently as January 
2015, the Secretary of State for Defence said,  
‘… we’ve made some tough choices about the size of the armed forces. 
Although we did so in a way that has preserved our front line clout … And we 
recognised that if the department was to provide the military capability our 
country needs it had to become both more effective and more efficient.’42 
Preserving the ‘front-line clout’ is the new way of describing the same process as cutting the 
tail to provide for the teeth.  
The findings of this research, and the continuation through the post-Cold War period of 
spending cuts, have been echoed in the Chilcott Report, particularly those relating to 
logistics, readiness and capability of equipment.43  Well-known, but easily solvable 
problems, such as damage to vehicle engines caused by sand-ingress have continued, 
                                                     
39 See comments by General Odierno, US Army Chief of Staff, and others, House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘Re-
Thinking Defence to Meet New Threats’, HC 512 (London: The Stationery Office, 17 March 2015) See also ‘General Sir 
Richard Shirreff in Russia warning to West’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28948121, accessed 20th September 2016, 
and ‘UK military ill-prepared to defend an attack, says retired chief’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37391804, accessed 
20th September 2016. . 
40 Ministry of Defence, ‘Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review’, Cmnd 7794 (London: The 
Stationery Office, February 2010), Introduction. 
41 Ibid., 43. 
42 The Rt Hon Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, ‘Reforming Defence: Keeping Fighting Fit’ (Institute for 
Government, 28 January 2015). 
43 See, for example, Sir John Chilcott, ‘The Report of the Iraq Inquiry’ (London: The House of Commons, 6 July 2016), sec. 
6.3, Military Equipment. 
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according to the report.44 In addition, the ‘can-do’ attitude of the British Armed Forces has 
come under scrutiny, and is seen as a barrier to understanding the true situation within the 
Services.45 That true situation had been commented on in 2015 by Sir Michael Graydon,46 
former head of the RAF, and was recently voiced by General Richard Barrons, who had been 
head of Britain's Joint Forces Command: "Capability that is foundational to all major armed 
forces has been withered by design."47 
 
                                                     
44 Section 6.3 ibid., paras 36–38. 
45 Section 9.8 ibid., para. 197. 
46 The Daily Telegraph, 20th February 2015. 
47 The Daily Telegraph, 17th September 2016. 
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Appendix A NATO  
  
Figure 1 - NATO Force planning cycle 
Wendt, James, and Nanette Brown. ‘Improving the NATO Force Planning Process: Lessons from the 
Past’. RAND, June 1986. 
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Figure 2 - NATO's Politico-Military Structure  
Britain and NATO. Over Thirty Years of Collective Defence. London: HMSO, 1980, p 10 
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Figure 3 - NATO Maritime regions  
Britain and NATO. Over Thirty Years of Collective Defence, p 12 
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Figure 4 - NATO Land Regions 
Britain and NATO. Over Thirty Years of Collective Defence, p 11 
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Figure 5 - NATO ‘Layer Cake’ 
Illustration by K White 
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Appendix B Defence Budget Spending 
Data obtained from the Statements on the Defence Estimates, 1955 to 1991 
  
Figure 6 - Defence Budget as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, with trend, 1955 to 1990 
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Figure 7 - Spending on War and contingency stocks 1979 – 1989, with trends 
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Appendix C Comparison of regular and reservist forces 1975 – 
1991 
  
Figure 8 - All Services comparison of regular, reservist and auxiliary forces 1975 - 1991 
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Figure 9 - Army comparison of regular, reservist and auxiliary forces, including BAOR, 1975 - 1991 
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Figure 10 - RAF comparison of regular, reservist and auxiliary forces 1975 - 1991 
 Page 349 
 
 
Figure 11 - Royal Navy comparison of regular, reservist and auxiliary forces 1975 - 1991 
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Appendix D United Kingdom Air Defence Region (UKADR) and Air 
Defence Ground Environment 
 
 
Figure 12 - United Kingdom Air Defence Region (UKADR) and Air Defence Ground Environment   
Cocroft, Wayne, and Roger J. C. Thomas. Cold War: Building for Nuclear Confrontation, 1946-1989, p117 
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Appendix E Mearsheimer’s distribution of divisions on the Central 
Front 
 
Figure 13 - Initial Distribution of NATO Divisions 
Mearsheimer, John J. ‘Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe’. International Security 7, no. 1, 
(1982): 3–39, p 16. 
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Appendix F British Corps defence area within the ‘layer cake’ 
  
Figure 14 - British Corps defence area 
Isby, and Kamps, Armies of NATO’s Central Front. p269 
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Figure 15 - Diagrammatic Layout of Main Defence Area 
‘Data Assumptions, Method of Analysis and Study Programme for DOAE Study 288 (1 (BR) Corps Concept of 
Operations 1985 - 2005)’, page 7, D/DOAE/44/616, 23 January 1980. DEFE 48/1095. TNA. 
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Appendix G Forces committed by Britain to NATO, 1979 
Taken from Ministry of Defence. ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates 1979’, Cmnd 7474.  
Force Size Consisting of 
ACE Mobile Force (AMF) 
1,800 personnel 
One infantry Battalion group 
Logistical Support Battalion 
Additional combat and 
support troops 
1 Squadron Harriers 
 Pumas 
UKMF 
13,500 personnel 6th Field Force 
1 Squadron Jaguars 
1 Squadron Pumas 
Strategic Air Reserve 
3 Squadrons Jaguars 
1 Squadron Harriers 
Unit Reinforcements 
 SAS Units 
1 Squadron Buccaneers 
2 Squadrons Canberra Reconnaissance 
1 Squadron Vulcan Maritime Recce 
UK/NL Amphibious Force 
 1 Brigade HQ 
 
4 Royal Marine 
Commandos plus organic 
logistics, artillery, engineers 
and special units. 
EASTLANT and CHAN 
4 Polaris Submarines 
25+ 
Conventional and Nuclear 
Powered Submarines 
2 ASW/Commando Carriers 
1 Assault Ships 
65 Destroyers and Frigates 
 Page 355 
 
29 Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships 
36 
Mine Counter Measure 
Vessels/Minesweepers 
4 Squadrons Sea King ASW 
4 Squadrons Nimrod MR 
2 Squadrons Phantom Maritime version 
BAOR 
1(BR) Corps 4 Armoured Divisions 
 5th Field Force 
 7th Field Force (from UK) 
RAF(G) 2nd Tactical Air 
Force 
2 Squadrons Buccaneers 
4 Squadrons Jaguar (strike) 
1 Squadron Jaguar (rec) 
2 Squadrons Harrier 
2 Squadrons AD Phantom 
 Wessex 
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Appendix H Logistic Support Group Order Of Battle 
 
Logistic Support Group    Type  
OOB as at 1st April 1978      
       
Engineers       
 RHQ 74 Engineer Regiment  TAVR  
 112 Field Squadron   TAVR  
 114 Field Squadron   TAVR  
 272 Field Support Squadron  TAVR  
 74 Engineer Workshop   TAVR  
 74 Engineer Workshop Stores Section TAVR  
       
 RHQ 111 Engineer Regiment  TAVR  
 130 Field Squadron   TAVR  
 198 Resources Squadron  TAVR  
 111 Engineer Workshop  TAVR  
 111 Engineer Workshop Stores Section TAVR  
       
 Brigade Transport RE   Regular S 
 524 Specialist Team Royal Engineers (Construction) Regular  
 504 Specialist Team Royal Engineers (Bulk POL) TAVR  
 504 Specialist Team Royal Engineers (Power) TAVR  
 505 Specialist Team Royal Engineers (Engineer Procurement) TAVR  
 591 Specialist Team Royal Engineers (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) TAVR  
       
Transport       
 RHQ 27 Logistic Support Regiment  Regular  
 8 Transport Squadron   Regular  
 8 Transport Squadron Workshop  Regular  
 261 Transport Squadron  TAVR  
 261 Squadron Workshop  TAVR  
 262 Transport Squadron  TAVR  
 262 Squadron Workshop  TAVR  
 263 Ambulance squadron  TAVR  
 263 Ambulance Workshop  TAVR  
 280 MC Squadron   TAVR  
 51 Port Squadron (elements to Amphibious Force) Regular  
       
Medical       
 2 Field Hospital   Regular  
 55 FST    Regular  
 304 General Hospital   TAVR  
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 300 FST    TAVR  
 144 Field Ambulance   TAVR  
 312 Field Hygiene Platoon  TAVR  
 309 Medical Platoon   TAVR  
 394 Blood Support Section  TAVR  
 311 Field Medical   TAVR  
       
Ordnance       
 HQ 10 Ordnance Battalion  Regular  
 HQ 45 Ordnance Company  Regular S 
 A Section 221 Ammunition Platoon  Regular S 
 B Section 221 Ammunition Platoon  Regular S 
 C Section 221 Ammunition Platoon  Regular S 
 D Section 221 Ammunition Platoon  Regular S 
 131 Vehicle Platoon   Regular S 
 161 Equipment Section  Regular S 
 260 Equipment Section  Regular S 
 261 Equipment Section  Regular S 
 263 Equipment Section  TAVR   
 461 Equipment Section  Regular S 
 HQ 57 Ordnance Company  TAVR  
 Supply Platoon   TAVR  
 Bulk Stores Platoon   TAVR  
 Detail Stores Platoon   TAVR  
 HQ 883 Petrol Bulk Operations Platoon TAVR  
 A Section 783 Petrol Bulk Operations Platoon TAVR  
 B Section 180 Petrol Bulk Operations Platoon  TAVR  
 A Section 183 Petrol Filling Platoon  TAVR  
 B Section 280 Petrol Filling Platoon  Regular  
 B Section 883 Petrol Filling Platoon  TAVR  
 A Section 144 Laundry Platoon  TAVR  
 A Section 244 Laundry Platoon  TAVR  
 144 Bath Section   TAVR  
 244 Bath Section   TAVR  
 170 Local Resources Section  TAVR  
 270 Local Resources Section  TAVR  
 561 Equipment Section  Regular S 
 RAOC EFI Sections x 3   TAVR  
 
Those Regular units marked with an ‘S’ are ‘Shadow’ units, at cadre strength, and would 
need to be reinforced by regular reservists during mobilisation. 
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Appendix I UK Home Defence  
Figure 16 - UK Home Defence Regions 
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Figure 17 - ROC/UKWMO Group Boundaries 
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Figure 18 - Example ROC/UKWMO post distribution 
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Figure 19 - Relationship of Home Defence Terms 
DOP Note 713/74, Annex B, ‘Home Defence and Security of UK Base: Home Defence Organisation; Command 
and Control of Home Defence Forces, Pre-Strike Phase’, DEFE 11/879, TNA. 
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Appendix J Forces available for home defence 
Royal Navy48 
 
(1) Forces to guard those Points which have been accepted as a Royal Navy 
responsibility.  
(2) Forces for the seaward defence of ports and anchorages and for the local 
defence of certain Royal Navy shore establishments.  
(3) A surplus of manpower to meet unforeseen contingencies, held under the 
control of Area Flag Officers.  
 
Army 
 
(1) Forces under District Command to carry out pre-planned tasks, including 
the guarding of Key Points which are an Army responsibility.  
(2) A regional contingency reserve under District command. The scale will 
vary but the minimum provision is for a unit headquarters and 3 operational 
companies per Region.  
(3) A national contingency reserve, under HQ UKLF command, of 2 field 
formation headquarters and 8 infantry battalions with some supporting arms. 
(4) Forces under MOD (Army), HQ UKLF and District command for special 
duties and other pre-arranged Home Defence tasks, e.g.: 2 Signal Group, R 
Signals (TAVR) 
 
Royal Air Force  
 
(1) Force to guard Royal Air Force Key Points.  
(2) Forces for the local defence of airfields, stations and ancillary units 
(3) Forces to provide the air effort for Home Defence. 
 
Additional Forces  
 
(1) There are up to 59000 Royal Navy Reservists who, post mobilisation, 
could become available for Home Defence tasks. However, it is not intended 
to recall them for duty unless circumstances so dictate; this would take some 
7/10 days. 
(2) Certain additional Regular Army field force and TAVR units might become 
available for Home Defence tasks if the Chiefs of Staff authorised their 
employment whilst waiting for deployment to NATO, or alternatively, if the 
Government decided not to assign them to NATO.  
(3) At present there are no RAF Reserve Forces for Home Defence 
                                                     
48 UKCICC 1252/1, United Kingdom Commanders-in-Chief Committee (Home) Plan for the Home Defence of the United 
Kingdom in the Setting of General War, 1st January 1975, ibid.‘Home Defence and Security of UK Base Home Defence 
Organisation’, n.d., 4, DEFE 11/879, TNA. 
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Appendix K Operation Corporate Order of Battle, 1982 
Army Units49 
Two troops The Blues and Royals  
4th Field Regiment Royal Artillery (less one battery)  
12th Air Defence Regiment Royal Artillery (less one battery)  
29th Commando Regiment Royal Artillery  
Elements 43 Air Defence Battery, 32nd Guided Weapons Regiment Royal  
Elements 49th Field Regiment Royal Artillery  
Elements Royal School Of Artillery Support Regiment  
Elements 33 Engineer Regiment  
36 Engineer Regiment (less one squadron)  
Elements 38 Engineer Regiment  
59 Independent Commando Squadron Royal Engineers  
Elements Military Works Force  
Elements 2 Postal and Courier Regiment Royal Engineers  
Elements 14th Signal Regiment  
Elements 30th Signal Regiment  
5th Infantry Brigade Headquarters and Signals Squadron  
Elements 602 Signal Troop  
2nd Battalion Scots Guards  
1st Battalion Welsh Guards  
1st Battalion 7th Duke Of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles  
2nd Battalion The parachute Regiment  
3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment  
Elements 22nd Special Air Service Regiment  
656 Squadron Army Air Corps  
Elements 17 Port Regiment Royal Corps Of Transport 
Elements 29 Transport and Movements Regiment Royal Corps Of Transport  
Elements 47 Air Despatch Squadron Royal Corps of Transport  
407 Troop Royal Corps Of Transport  
Elements The Joint Helicopter Support Unit  
16 Field Ambulance Royal Army Medical Corps  
Elements 19 Field Ambulance Royal Army Medical Corps  
Elements 9 Ordnance Battalion Royal Army Ordnance Corps  
81 Ordnance Company Royal Army Ordnance Corps  
I O Field Workshop Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers  
Elements 70 Aircraft Workshop Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers  
Elements 160 Provost Company Royal Military Police  
6 Field Cash Office Royal Army Pay corps  
601 Tactical Air Control party (Forward Air Controller)  
602 Tactical Air Control Party (Forward Air Controller)  
603 Tactical Air Control Party (Forward Air Controller) 
Royal Marines 
                                                     
49 Ministry of Defence, ‘The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons’, 37–44, Cmnd 8758. 
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3 Commando Brigade Headquarters and Signal Squadron Royal Marines  
40 Commando Royal Marines  
42 Commando Royal Marines  
45 Commando Royal Marines  
3 Commando Brigade Air Squadron Royal Marines  
The Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines  
The Special Boat Squadron  
Royal Marines Detachments (including landing craft crews)  
Air Defence Troop Royal Marines  
1st Raiding Squadron Royal Marines  
Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre Royal Marines  
Y Troop Royal Marines  
The Bands Of Her Majesty's Royal Marines Commando Forces and Flag 
Officer 3rd Flotilla  
Field Records Office Royal Marines 
Ships of the Royal Navy 
Fleet submarines  Spartan, Splendid, Conqueror, Courageous, 
Valiant 
Oberon Class    Onyx 
ASW Carrier    Invincible 
ASW/Commando Carrier  Hermes 
Assault Ships    Fearless, Intrepid 
County Class    Antrim, Glamorgan 
Type 82    Bristol 
Type 42    Cardiff, Coventry, Exeter, Glasgow, Sheffield 
Leander Class    Andromeda, Argonaut, Minerva, Penelope 
Rothesay Class    Plymouth, Yarmouth 
Type 21   Active, Alacrity, Ambuscade, Antelope, Ardent, 
Arrow, Avenger 
Type 22    Brilliant, Broadsword 
Castle Class     Dumbarton Castle, Leeds Castle 
Armed Trawlers MCM   Cordella, Farnella, Junella, Northella, Pict 
Ice Patrol Ship    Endurance 
Survey Ships     Hecla, Herald, Hydra 
Squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm 
137 Wessex Mk 3  
800 Sea Harrier  
801 Sea Harrier 
809 Sea Harrier  
899 Sea Harrier  
815 Lynx Mk2  
820 Sea King Mk 5  
824 Sea King Mk2  
825 Sea King Mk2  
826 Sea King Mk 5  
829 Wasp  
845 Wessex Mk 5  
846 Sea King Mk 4  
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847 Wessex Mk 5  
848 Wessex Mk 5 
Ships of the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service 
 Mooring and Salvage Vessel Goosander 
 Tug     Typhoon 
Ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary 
Fleet Tankers, Large    Olmeda, Olna, Tidepool, Tidespring  
Fleet Tankers, Small   Blue Rover  
Support Tankers  Appleleaf, Bayleaf, Brambleleaf, Pearleaf, 
Plumleaf  
Fleet Replenishment Ships  Fort Austin, Fort Grange, Resource, Regent 
Stores Support Ship    Stromness  
Helicopter Support Ship   Engadine 
Landing Slips, Logistic   Sir Bedivere, Sir Galahad, Sir Geraint, Sir 
Lancelot, Sir Percivale, Sir Tristram 
Ships Taken Up from Trade (STUFT) 
SS Canberra  
RMS Queen Elizabeth II 
SS Uganda  
MV Alvega  
MV Anco Charger  
MV Balder London  
MV British Avon 
MV British Dart  
MV British Esk 
MV British Tamar  
MV British Tay  
MV British Test  
MV British Trent  
MV British wye  
MV Fort Toronto  
MV G A Walker  
MV Scottish Eagle  
MV Shell Eburna 
SS Atlantic Causeway  
SS Atlantic Conveyor  
MV Baltic Ferry  
MV Contender Bezant  
MV Elk  
MV Europic Ferry  
MV Nordic Ferry  
MV Tor Caledonia  
MV Astronomer  
MV Norland  
TEV Rangatira  
MV Saint Edmund  
RMS Saint Helena 
MV Avelona Star  
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MV Geestport  
MV Laertes  
MV Lycaon  
MV Saxonia  
MV Stratheve  
MV British Enterprise  
MV Stena Inspector  
MV Stena Seaspread  
MT Irishman  
MT Salvageman  
MT Yorkshireman  
C S Iris 
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Appendix L Operation Granby Order Of Battle, 1991 
British Army50 
First (British) Armoured Division 
7th Armoured Brigade 
Royal Scots Dragoon Guards (57 Challenger MBTs) 
Queen’s Royal Irish Hussars (57 Challenger MBTs) 
1st Battalion Staffordshire Regiment (45 Warrior IFVs)  
40th Field Regiment Royal Artillery 
21 Engineer Regiment 
4th Mechanized Brigade 
1st Battalion, Royal Scots 
3rd Battalion, Royal Regiment of Fusiliers 
14th/20th King’s Hussars 
2nd Field Regiment Royal Artillery 
23 Engineer Regiment 
Divisional Forces 
16th/5th The Queen’s Royal Lancers 
12th Air Defence Regiment 
26th Field Regiment Royal Artillery 
32nd Heavy Regiment Royal Artillery 
39th Heavy Regiment Royal Artillery 
32 Armoured Engineer Regiment 
4 Regiment Army Air Corps  
Second/Third Line Support 
39 Armoured Engineer Regiment 
1 Armoured Division Transport Regiment 
4 Armoured Division Transport Regiment 
                                                     
50 House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby’, G47–48, HC 287, House of 
Commons. 
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7 Tank Transporter Regiment 
10 Regiment Royal Corps of Transport  
27 Regiment Royal Corps of Transport 
1 Armoured Field Ambulance 
5 Armoured Field Ambulance 
22 Field Hospital 
24 Airmobile Field Ambulance 
32 Field Hospital 
3 Ordnance Battalion 
5 Ordnance Battalion 
6 Ordnance Battalion 
6 Armoured Workshop 
7 Armoured Workshop 
11 Armoured Workshop 
187 Company Royal Pioneer Corps 
518 Company Royal Pioneer Corps 
908 Pioneer Labour Support Unit 
Prisoner of War Guard Force 
1st Battalion Coldstream Guards 
1st Battalion The Royal Highland Fusiliers 
1st Battalion The King’s Own Scottish Borderers 
Theatre Troops 
30 Signals Regiment 
33 Field Hospital 
205 General Hospital 
 Elements of UK Special Forces Group 
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Royal Air Force 
Air Defence 
No. 5 Squadron RAF (Tornado F3) 
No. 11 Squadron RAF (Tornado F3) 
No. 23 Squadron RAF (Tornado F3) 
No. 25 Squadron RAF (Tornado F3) 
No. 29 Squadron RAF (Tornado F3) 
No. 43 Squadron RAF (Tornado F3) 
Attack/Reconnaissance 
No. IX Squadron RAF (Tornado GR1) 
No. 14 Squadron RAF (Tornado GR1) 
No. XV Squadron RAF (Tornado GR1) 
No. 16 Squadron RAF (Tornado GR1) 
No. 17 Squadron RAF (Tornado GR1) 
No. 20 Squadron RAF (Tornado GR1) 
No. 27 Squadron RAF (Tornado GR1) 
No. 31 Squadron RAF (Tornado GR1) 
No. 617 Squadron RAF (Tornado GR1) 
No. II Squadron RAF (Tornado GR1A) 
No. 13 Squadron RAF (Tornado GR1A) 
No. 6 Squadron RAF (Jaguar) 
No. 41 Squadron RAF (Jaguar) 
No. 54 Squadron RAF (Jaguar) 
No. 226 Squadron RAF (Jaguar) 
No. 12 Squadron RAF (Buccaneer) 
No. 208 Squadron RAF (Buccaneer) 
No. 237 Squadron RAF (Buccaneer) 
Maritime Patrol 
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No. 120 Squadron RAF (Nimrod) 
No. 201 Squadron RAF (Nimrod) 
No. 206 Squadron RAF (Nimrod) 
Air Transport/Air-to-Air Refuelling 
No. 24 Squadron RAF (Hercules) 
No. 30 Squadron RAF (Hercules) 
No. 47 Squadron RAF (Hercules) 
No. 70 Squadron RAF (Hercules) 
No. 242 Squadron RAF (Hercules) 
No. 55 Squadron RAF (Victor) 
No. 10 Squadron RAF (VC10) 
No. 101 Squadron RAF (VC10K) 
No. 216 Squadron RAF (Tristar) 
Support Helicopter Force 
No. 7 Squadron RAF (Chinook) 
No. 18 Squadron RAF (Chinook) 
No. 33 Squadron RAF (Puma) 
No. 230 Squadron RAF (Puma) 
RAF Regiment 
3 Wing  
4 Wing 
6 Wing 
33 Wing 
No. 1Squadron RAF Regiment 
No. 20 Squadron RAF Regiment 
No. 26 Squadron RAF Regiment 
No. 34 Squadron RAF Regiment 
No. 51 Squadron RAF Regiment 
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No. 58 Squadron RAF Regiment 
No. 66 Squadron RAF Regiment 
Royal Auxiliary Air Force 
4624 RAuxAF 
4626 RAuxAF 
 
Royal Navy 
Frigates/Destroyers 
HMS Brilliant 
HMS Brave 
HMS Jupiter 
HMS Battleaxe 
HMS Brazen 
HMS London 
HMS Cardiff 
HMS Exeter 
HMS Manchester 
HMS Gloucester 
HMS York 
Mine-countermeasures 
HMS Herald 
HMS Hecla 
HMS Ledbury 
HMS Brocklesby 
HMS Cattistock 
HMS Dulverton 
HMS Bicester 
HMS Brecon 
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HMS Atherstone 
HMS Hurworth 
Patrol Craft 
HMS Attacker 
HMS Hunter 
HMS Striker 
Oberon class submarines 
HMS Opossum 
HMS Otus 
Royal Fleet Auxiliary 
RFA Argus 
RFA Bayleaf 
RFA Diligence 
RFA Fort Grange 
RFA Olna 
RFA Orangeleaf 
RFA Resource 
RFA Sir Bedivere 
RFA Sir Galahad 
RFA Sir Percivale 
RFA Sir Tristram 
Fleet Air Arm 
845 Naval Air Squadron  
846 Naval Air Squadron  
848 Naval Air Squadron  
 Detachment of Royal Marines 
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Appendix M Ports requiring protective mining 
Taken from ‘Defence of Ports and Anchorages – Protective Mining’, DEFE 24/1721 - 
General War planning - defence of UK Ports and Anchorages 
Priority One 
Clyde Submarine Base 
Priority Two 
Reinforcement Ports 
Dover 
Folkestone 
Harwich 
Felixstowe 
Ipswich 
Immingham 
Marchwood 
Chatham 
Hull 
Belfast 
Larne 
Heysham 
Stranraer 
Cairn Ryan 
Ardrossen 
Liverpool 
 
Priority Three 
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Naval Bases 
Rosyth 
Plymouth 
Portsmouth 
Chatham 
Portland 
 
Priority Four 
 A large number of Naval Control of Shipping locations not already covered 
Priority Five 
 A list of major oil terminals and container ports 
Priority Six 
 A list of other major ports 
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Appendix N USUKLOC 
The US/UK Lines of Communication Agreement main elements (as of 1977) were1; 
Transportation, Mechanical Handling Equipment and Personnel 
To assist out-loading of 12 depots, ports and airfields in time scales varying between 
Simple Alert and D-Day + 180. The totals involved are; 
a. Cargo (including ammunition for Continental destinations – 90,000 short tons2 
b. Vehicles for Continental destinations – 2,600 
c. Cargo (including ammunition) for UK destinations – 570,000 short tons 
d. Passengers for UK destinations (mainly support personnel and casualties) – 
27,000 
e. Manpower in support of above movements – 700 
f. Vehicles and mechanical handling equipment – 152 
Support for the US Army Marine Reserve Fleet Hythe in the Solent 
The Marine Reserve Fleet constitutes a portable emergency container off-load 
facility. The following ranges of assistance are to be provided. 
g. Storage for 94 harbour and portcraft at Hythe 
h. Storage for some equipment at Marchwood 
i. Accommodation for activation personnel in Army barracks in the vicinity of 
Southampton 
j. Provision of skilled and unskilled labour, transport and medical cover 
k. Provision of craneage 
l. Provision of Petrol, Oil, Lubricants (POL) from Navy stocks at Gosport 
m. Provision of Tugs for cross-Channel movement of the Reserve Fleet 
Airfields 
The use of a total of 8 RAF, PE, CAA and civil airfields for aeromedical evacuation, 
resupply and reception of activation personnel. 
Emergency Hospital Sites 
A total of 9 sites providing 7,500 hospital beds have been earmarked for the 
treatment of casualties evacuated from the Continent. All this accommodation would 
                                                     
1 COS 1455/132, Annex B, ‘NATO Short Term Initiatives’, 3, DEFE 11/811, TNA. 
2 Equivalent to 2,000lbs. Commonly used in the United States. In the UK a ton (or long ton) is 2,240lbs, not to be confused 
with a tonne which is 1,000Kgs (sometimes known as a metric ton). 
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be vacated by the UK units moving to war stations or would be found on training units 
when training has been suspended. Development of the sites into emergency 
hospitals would be a US responsibility 
POL 
POL to meet anticipated US wartime requirements – mainly aircraft fuel – are 
included in the overall MOD requirements and have been notified to the Department 
of Energy for appropriate action. Extensive use of UK pipelines and other POL 
facilities is made in peacetime and would be expanded in war. 
“Department of Energy has current agreement with USAF to hold stocks of aviation fuel … 
During a Simple Alert, priority would be given to maintaining these stocks at a constant high 
level …”3 
DPC(81)5 sought methods for permitting US Military Forces deployed in Europe to draw on 
civilian petrol stocks in the first 45 days of a war.4  
 
                                                     
3 Measure 3.39, ‘Government War Book, Volume 1’, para. 4(d), CAB 175/53, TNA. 
4 Telegram from UKDEL NATO to FCO, 30th April 1981, ‘NATO Defence Planning Committee’, FCO 46/2629, TNA. 
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Appendix O United Kingdom Categorisation of NATO Alert 
Measures 
 
Figure 20 - Simple Alert comparison table for Government War Book Measures 
‘Government War Book, Volume 2 - NATO Alert System’. Cabinet Office, CAB 175/24. TNA. 
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Appendix P Glossary of Terms 
Stocks 
From ‘NATO Logistics Policy General UK Logistics Assumptions’, DEFE 25/432, TNA. 
Operational Stocks 
The expendable and non—expendable supplies, over and above national peace time 
operating levels, which are required by the Major NATO Commander to support forces 
declared to NATO. They are sub—divided as follows:  
a. Basic Stocks. Those stocks required by the MNCs to support the execution of 
approved operational plans for a minimum initial period of 30 days' combat.  
b. Sustaining Stocks. Those stocks required by the MNCs to support the execution of 
approved operational plans beyond the initial period until resupply becomes 
available.  
b. Replenishment. The provision, movement and distribution of available resources 
essential to support the operational capability or combat forces during both tension 
and war.  
Resupply 
The provision of the continued support of national forces, once operational stocks are 
exhausted, by arrangements established in peacetime, taking into account wartime 
contingencies.  
War Consumables  
These are defined as: 
Aircraft and ammunition  
 
Aviation fuel and Oil 
 
Bombs  
 
Torpedoes  
 
Ground defence ammunition and explosives 
 
Guided weapons 
 
Jettisonable fuel tanks 
 
Pyrotechnics  
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Rockets 
 
Sonobuoys 
 
Chaff 
 
Ejector Release Unit Cartridges 
 
Compressed and liquid gases 
Commitment 
To undertake or commit oneself to do a specified thing or act. Not the action itself, 
rather the promise of the action. 
Contribution 
The action of contributing or giving as one's part to a common fund or stock; the 
action of lending aid or agency to bring about a result. The act of providing that aid 
promised. 
Mobilisation 
Mobilisation is not synonymous with reinforcement. “Mobilisation is defined as the 
process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of 
readiness for war or other National emergency. This includes assembling and 
organising personnel, supplies and material for active military service.”5 Mobilisation 
can occur without the call-out of the reserves. 
Reinforcement 
The act of strengthening military units or forces.  
Crises 
Under the British Government’s War Book description, there are three scenarios for 
a transition to war6; 
                                                     
5 DOP Note 713/74 (Final), Annex A, ‘Home Defence and Security of UK Base: Home Defence Organisation; Command and 
Control of Home Defence Forces, Pre-Strike Phase’, para. 13, DEFE 11/879, TNA. 
6 ‘War Book Working Party: Post War Developments in the United Kingdom Transition to War Plans’, 14, CAB 175/32, CAB 
175/32, TNA. 
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A Slow Moving Crisis 
“This scenario is of such a timescale … to discuss and authorise individual 
GWB measures and … requests from Major NATO commanders …”7 
Intermediate Timescales 
“A crisis evolving in the intermediate timescale is intended to be dealt 
with by a combination of MPDs, individuall [sic] decisions and, where 
necessary, GDs.”8 
Rapidly Moving Crisis 
This is described as a, “… rapid transition from peace to war … ”9  
Preparatory Phase 
“The Preparatory Phase is the period following the first notification by HMG that 
Government War Book action is being considered. It will either end with a 
declaration of General Alert or with the cancellation of all Government War Book 
measures and a return to peacetime activity.”10 
Pre-Strike Phase 
The Pre-Strike Phase is the period which starts with the declaration of General Alert 
and ends either with the first launching of strategic nuclear weapons or with the 
cessation of hostilities. “It may be divided into: 
a. The Conventional Period 
b. The Tactical Nuclear Period”11 
                                                     
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 DOP Note 713/74, Annex A, ‘Home Defence and Security of UK Base: Home Defence Organisation; Command and 
Control of Home Defence Forces, Pre-Strike Phase’, para. 3, DEFE 11/879, TNA. 
11 DOP Note 713/74, Annex A, ibid., para. 4. 
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The Conventional Period 
“The Conventional Period is a period between the declaration of a General Alert and 
the launching of the first nuclear weapon of any kind.”12   
Key Point  
An installation considered to be of vital importance within the UK in transition to war 
(TTW) and war. 
Military Assistance 
When looking at the defence of Key Points, Emergency Service Routes, and the 
conscription of civilian workers for war work, Military Assistance assumes great 
importance. The deployment of troops must be connected with purposes that are 
lawful, and requires the exercise of the Royal Prerogative. 
The types of Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) are categorised as 
follows13; 
1. Assistance to the Police in maintaining order or preventing crime - Military 
Aid to the Civil Power (MACP). 
2. Assistance on urgent work of national importance – Military Aid to the Civil 
Ministries (MACM) 
3. Emergency relief work, or routine assistance at a local level with specific 
projects – Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC). 
This has no standing in law, but is a convenient categorisation of the types of aid. 
NATO Command Forces 
Forces in being which nations have placed under the operational command or 
operational control of a NATO commander. 14 
                                                     
12 DOP Note 713/74, Annex A, ibid., para. 5. 
13 Military Aid to Civil Authorities in England and Wales, Note by the Home Office, ‘Army Command Organisation in the UK’, 
HO 322/802, TNA. 
14 Definitions of ‘Assigned’ and ‘Earmarked’, 29th May 1975, ‘NATO Allied Command Europe and Mobile Land Force’, DEFE 
24/1462, TNA. 
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NATO Assigned Forces 
Forces in being which nations have been placed under the operational command or 
operational control of a NATO Commander. 
NATO Earmarked Forces 
Forces in being which nations agree to place under the operational command or 
operational control of a NATO Commander at a specified Stage, State or Measure in 
the NATO Alert System or as prescribed in special agreements. 
Other Forces for NATO 
Forces not assigned or earmarked for a NATO Command, but which might cooperate 
with NATO forces or be placed under the operational command or control of a NATO 
Commander in certain circumstances which should be specified. 
National Command 
A command that is organised by, and functions under the authority of, a specific 
nation. It may or may not be placed under a NATO commander. 
Previous definitions included: 
Assigned Forces  
Forces in being which have been placed under the operational command or 
operational control of a NATO Commander. 
Earmarked Forces 
Forces in being which nations have agreed to assign to the operational command or 
operational control of a NATO Commander at some future date. 
Other Forces 
Forces not assigned or earmarked for a NATO Command but which might cooperate 
with NATO or be placed under the operational command or control of a NATO 
Commander in certain circumstances which should be specified. 
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Appendix Q Glossary of Abbreviations 
 
AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery 
AAFCE Allied Air Force Central Europe 
ACCHAN Allied Command Channel 
ACDS(P&L) Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff, (Personnel and Logistics) 
ACE Allied Command Europe 
ACHDF Air Commander Home Defence Forces  
ACLANT Allied Command Atlantic 
AD Air Defence 
ADP Automatic Data Processing 
ADR Air Defence Region 
AFCENT Allied Forces Central Europe 
AFM Army Field Manual 
AFNORTH Allied Forces Northern Europe 
AFSOUTH Allied Forces Southern Europe 
APC Armoured Personnel Carrier 
ATAF Allied Tactical Air Force 
ATGM Anti Tank Guided Missile 
ATGW Anti-Tank Guided Weapon 
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System 
BAI Battlefield Air Interdiction 
BAOR British Army of the Rhine 
BATUS British Army Training Unit Suffield 
C2 Command and Control 
CAH Helicopter carrying heavy cruiser (Invincible class for example) 
CAS Close Air Support 
CDI Conventional Defence Initiative 
CDS Chief of the Defence Staff 
CENTAG Central Army Group 
CEPS Central European Pipeline System 
CGS Chief of the General Staff 
CINCEASTLANT Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic 
CINCENT Commander -in-Chief Central Europe 
CINCHAN Commander In Chief Channel 
CINCNAVHOME Commander-in-Chief Naval Home Command 
CINCUKAIR Commander-in-Chief United Kingdom Air Forces 
COM2ATAF Commander Second Allied Tactical Air Force 
COMBAOR Commander British Army of the Rhine 
COMNORTHAG Commander Northern Army Group 
COMUKADR Commander, UK NATO Air Defence Region 
CONRAD Control by Radio 
COS Chief of Staff/Chiefs of Staff 
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CPX Command Post Exercise 
DNOT Director of Naval Operations and Trade 
DOAE Defence Operational Analysis Establishment 
DOP Defence and Overseas Policy Committee 
DPC Defence Planning Committee 
DROPS Demountable Rack Off-loading and Pick-up System 
EASTLANT Allied Command Eastern Atlantic 
ECM Electronic Counter Measure 
EEC European Economic Community 
ERW Enhanced Radiation Weapon 
ESECS European Security Study 
ET Emerging Technology 
EW Electronic Warfare 
FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area 
FLOT Forward Line of Own Troops 
FOFA Follow-On Forces Attack 
FRG Federal Republic of Germany 
FTX Field Training Exercise 
GDP General Defence Plan 
GOC General Officer Commanding 
GSFG Group of Soviet Forces in Germany 
HNS Host Nation Support 
HQ Headquarters 
HUMINT Human Intelligence 
IGB Inner German Border 
INF Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 
ITO Individual Training Organisation 
JIC Joint Intelligence Committee 
J-STARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 
JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 
JTP Joint Theatre Plan 
LIC Low Intensity Conflict 
LOC Line of Communication 
LRRP Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol 
LTC Long Term Costing 
LTDP Long Term Defence Programme 
LTEP Long Term Equipment Programme 
MACA Military Aid to Civil Authorities 
MACC Military Aid to the Civil Community 
MACM Military Aid to Civil Ministries 
MACP Military Aid to the Civil Power 
MBT Main Battle Tank 
MC Military Committee 
MDA Main Defensive Area 
MICV Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicle 
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System 
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MNC Major NATO Commander 
MoD Ministry of Defence 
MOSWP Maritime Operational Situations Working Party 
MSC Major Subordinate Commander 
MTI Moving Target Indicator 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NOD Non-Offensive Defence 
NORTHAG Northern Army Group 
NSAG Naval Staff Advisory Group 
OAS Offensive Air Support 
OFC Options for Change 
OMG Operational Manoeuvre Group 
OOA Out of Area 
OTR Over Target Requirement 
PE Procurement Executive 
PGM Precision Guided Munitions 
POL Petrol Oil and Lubricant 
POMCUS Pre-positioning of Material Configured in Unit Sets 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RAF(G) Royal Air Force (Germany) 
REFORGER Return of Forces to Germany 
RN Royal Navy 
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic 
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile 
SHORAD Short Range Air Defence System 
SLAM Stand-off Land Attack Missile 
SP Self-Propelled 
STANAVFORLANT Standing Naval Force Atlantic 
TA Territorial Army 
TASMO Tactical Air Support to Maritime Operations 
TAVR Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve 
TDC Tactical Doctrine Committee 
TIALD Thermal Imaging Airborne Laser Designator 
TVD Soviet Theatre of Military Operations 
UKADGE United Kingdom Air Defence Ground Environment 
UKCICC(H)  United Kingdom Commanders-in-Chief Committee (Home) 
VCDS(P&L) Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (Personnel and Logistics) 
WP Warsaw Pact 
WTO Warsaw Treaty Organisation (also known as the Warsaw Pact) 
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